Occupation

[Darth Servo]

On a realated note (feel free to split this into its own thread if need be) if we could bring someone back from the dead would they be the same person? No, I'm not talking about zombies, I'm talking about fully restoring their body to a full healthy state. Is there a cutoff time after death where they would be a new person? A certain amount of new brain needs to be re-grown/memories restored?

I mean, an organ transplant obviously doesn't make one a new person. Plastic surgery doesn't make someone a new person.

What about the fictional story of the two women who were seriously injured in a car accident. One was completely brain dead but the rest of her body was fine while the other's brain was perfectly intact but her body was all but destroyed. The doctors "saved" them both by transplanting the good brain into the good body. Which woman would she be? Or would she be a totally new person?

Personal identity issues can get really wierd.

[Wyrm]

NecronLord, the fact that you are a moderator does not mean I should take particularly kindly to the fact that you are ignoring my point. Once more, THE LOGIC "A LIKE B, THEREFORE A IS B" IS FALLACIOUS

I think what Necronlord and I were arguing is "If A behaves physically identically to B, then both A is B and A is not B is physically irrelevant. So, what's the problem?"

[PayBack]

The problem, is some people are weird, and they fear the idea of ceasing to experience life. I happen to be one of the weird ones.. my life is far from perfect, but the idea of never experiencing anything ever again is something I'd avoid at almost any cost. The fact some copy that is indistinguishable from me, is enjoying life in my place gives me no comfort.

[PayBack]

On a realated note (feel free to split this into its own thread if need be) if we could bring someone back from the dead would they be the same person? No, I'm not talking about zombies, I'm talking about fully restoring their body to a full healthy state. Is there a cutoff time after death where they would be a new person? A certain amount of new brain needs to be re-grown/memories restored?

I mean, an organ transplant obviously doesn't make one a new person. Plastic surgery doesn't make someone a new person.

What about the fictional story of the two women who were seriously injured in a car accident. One was completely brain dead but the rest of her body was fine while the other's brain was perfectly intact but her body was all but destroyed. The doctors "saved" them both by transplanting the good brain into the good body. Which woman would she be? Or would she be a totally new person?

Personal identity issues can get really wierd.

For the first half of your question I'm not sure... that's a tricky one.. but for the second half of your post.. as far as I'm concerned only the lady with the living brain was saved... I can't see how they could say they saved someone brain dead by giving them a new brain.

[brianeyci]

I think what NecronLord is getting at is a philosophical difference. To any external observer, there is no way to tell the difference after transport.

In the Federation, this is probably what happened. Like any new technology, it was regarded with apprehension. Then slowly it was accepted, until even the people who knew how transporters worked never questioned the fact that they might be killing themselves.

Although, I think the whole thing is best viewed as a plot device to get people somewhere. There's been thousands of hours of footage, whole series, and so on, and nobody has discussed the transporter as a killing machine. It may be a killing machine, but what's the point of talking about it as such at length when it's never been discussed as such. TNG Realm of Fear is an obvious attempt to explain the transporter process as a fully conscious act. It fails scientifically, but matter transportation is pseudoscience anyway (especially the way they present it in Star Trek without a pad on the other end) and I have no problems handwaiving it away especially because the morality of the transporter is a non-issue in Star Trek.

Brian

[brianeyci]

Addendum : I also remember reading a Star Trek novel as a kid and they asked that very question and it was explained with technobabble that the transporter was not a killing machine. I'll be damned if I can remember the name though, the only Star Trek novel name I remember is Imdazi. It may be psuedoscience, but so is soul, matter transportation in the first place, FTL, ghosts, telepathy, and so on and so on. The answer had to have something to do with subspace. I personally prefer to think of the transporter as phasing matter into subspace (yes I know I know) and the matter actually not being broken down into atoms. See the TNG episode with the Romulan cloaking interfering with transport. Or the soul being inserted into a husk and the person's "essence" intact. But I can't back that up, it's just a personal preference.

Brian

[Stark]

The 'soul' in ST is clearly a physical property manipulated by the transporter, since you can be copied and gain additional soul, or be combined with something else and have your souls joined, and the transporter can be used to separate such 'souls'.

However, it's transporter 'accidents' that would prevent me using the transporter. In my above example, a copy of me was created on the planet to do something. Now, if the transporter disintegrates me during transport then builds both, which one is 'me', or which one has the right to decide the other is 'fake'? If the guy on the pad was never disintegrated, only scanned, doesn't that mean I essentially created a slave copy of myself to do something on the planet, simply planning to destroy it when the job was done?

Amusingly, since 'soul' is controllable and copyable, the starship could actually create a copy complete with soul, allow it to conduct its away team action, then on beam-up retrieve the soul copy and reinstall it in the original. The 'original' could remain on the ship, undergoing training, having a life etc, without ever needing to risk death on away missions. Dangerous hostage negotiation? Chief, I might need four Picards for this one! This of course would be morally dubious, but I feel transporters are anyway.

[brianeyci]

No, because if they lost the Picard energy they would have lost Picard. There is something that transporters can't replicate, and unless there's some exotic elements in a human body I'm unaware of, they should be able to make a new Picard no matter what but that's not the case.

Hell they should have been able to make a new body for Tuvix rather than killing him.

And maybe Thomas Riker's souless.

Hey Stark fuck you, you gave me a headache now lol.

Brian

[Stark]

Just because they couldn't reproduce the Picard energy without being able to scan it with the transporter process doesn't mean they can't 'make' it per se. In my examples, the orginial 'energy' is present on the pad in the original, and a transporter 'accident' is simply deliberately induced to create additional copies complete with Picard 'energy'. If they can beam the energy from outside the ship (IIRC the episode) to rejoin Picards body on the pad, they can dupe as much 'soul' as they want.

Then again, who wants to know why starbases aren't full of transporter buffers holding backups of important people a la Scotty? Combine the 'stay in buffers forever' with the 'oops a copy' accidents, and you've got a constant backup TerraHawks style.

[Stark]

GHETTO EDIT - It's worth remembering that Thomas Riker cannot lack 'soul' in a ST sense. In ST, a body without a 'soul' cannot fly shuttles, hit on Troi or do any of the things Thomas Riker did. Hence, he *must* have a ST soul, Picard 'energy' or whatever.

[Noble Ire]

Then again, who wants to know why starbases aren't full of transporter buffers holding backups of important people a la Scotty? Combine the 'stay in buffers forever' with the 'oops a copy' accidents, and you've got a constant backup TerraHawks style.

The Federation as an astounding tendancy to forget the improbable and incredible things their technology can actually do. Hell, in the TNG episodeRascals, they found a veritable fountain of youth in the transporters, and no one's heard of it since.

[PayBack]

I personally prefer to think of the transporter as phasing matter into subspace (yes I know I know) and the matter actually not being broken down into atoms. See the TNG episode with the Romulan cloaking interfering with transport. Or the soul being inserted into a husk and the person's "essence" intact. But I can't back that up, it's just a personal preference.

Brian

Were that the case, then yeah, I'd have no problem with using one. I don't have a problem with my "essence" being taken from my body and continuing to experience life in a copy.. original body or copy I don't care as long as I continue to experience life.

[Stark]

By saying that you've kind of missed the point. If there is a discontinuity of consciousness at all, it's arguable that you have died and been replaced by a functioning fascimile. Think of it like this: you're on the pad, you see the shimmer, the transporter room fades and you appear on the surface. It's entirely possible that what really happens involves 'you' dying during the procedure. Of course the 'you' at the other end remembers continuity through the whole thing: the copy was given your memories up to the moment of death and continued with their own afterward. But for YOU, for the 'you' that stepped onto the pad originally, you're dead and your memories were put somewhere else. The copy *thinks* nothing died, but the original certainly did. That's the whole point.

For instance that Egan novel involved simulating a copy of your mind: from the copy's perspective, everything seemed normal as they moved through their virtual world, accessed computers etc. However, in reality, the simulation is constantly stopping and starting as the 'owner' buys runtime on different servers as money permits. So it's possible for something to *appear* continuous when it is not, since as DW says it's by definition impossible to experience a gap in experience.

[NecronLord]

NecronLord, the fact that you are a moderator does not mean I should take particularly kindly to the fact that you are ignoring my point. Once more, THE LOGIC "A LIKE B, THEREFORE A IS B" IS FALLACIOUS

At the end of the process, a functioning copy of all that is me will remain. Therefore, why should I care about being temporarily disintegrated during the process? My self-identity is robust enough to take the idea that I can be temporarily nonexistant. It may not be the same me (just as, when I lose a skin cell, I am not identical to the 'me' that didn't lose it) but it will have all the thoughts, memories, etc that define me.

In answer to your example of 'create a copy and put a gun to your head.' Would the original me be aware of the gun? How long would you wait. If you shot the original a nanosecond after creating the copy, before it had a chance to experience anything that the copy didn't, no, I wouldn't care much at all. However, the longer between the copy and the shooting, the more distinct the original becomes. Or again, if the original was anesnetised during the process, and I had previously given my consent, I would have no problem with the original being blown away.

[NecronLord]

Ok great.. there's a rebirth straight after.. but you don't know about because you're dead! And the "go to sleep and wake up" bit is just bullshit because you DO NOT WAKE UP. You are dead.. ok? roll the credits.. the movie is over.. you no longer experience anything ever again

and brand new conciousness with your memories in created. You don't now blank out for a split second then wake up.. you blank out and it's over... for ever.

So? My self-idenity is robust enough to handle the idea that my mind is what is important. As long as my mind exists, I, the entity-that-is-me, exists. The physical body, and wetware that contained it, may have been destroyed, but it has then immediately been reinstated in another one. My mind, the entity-that-is-me, remains. Therefore, I, the entity-that-is-me, the thing that is presently thinking about how much you don't get it, has survived.

Wong and you are harping on that because you're not the exact same (it is, incidentally, unknown how accurately it puts people back together) entity, that entity is dead. The point is, so what? Like mind-transfer, what is important is the fact that the mind of the original is recreated in exact detail. Its thoughts, and memories, survive. That mind, by the sum of its experiences being recreated in exact detail, is re-created, and it doesn't matter how many times you say 'the original was dematerialised' the improtant bit - the mind, and the sum of its experiences, has been fully recreated.

'I' am the sum of my experiences, the 'I' would, therefore, be re-created by the transporter, and continue functioning.

Now, Wong is going on about this meaning 'A is like B, therefore A is B.' What he doesn't get, is that I am saying the mind itself is all that matters:

• A possesses a C
• A is destroyed
• B is created
• B possesses a C identical to the C(a) at the time of its destruction.

C, the sum of experiences and the ability to learn, think, etc etc, has been recreated in full, in C. Like a computer program, as long as it is identical, each iteration is, to all relevant purpouses the same. C(a) will not experience death, but it will be, in full, transferered to B, and will then continue running where it left off.

To me, the continuity of the initial C iteration is unimportant. The entity-that-is-me is recreated in such absolute detail, that caring about the fact that it may not truly count as me is sophistry.

• Death is bad because a conciousness is irretrievably destroyed.
• ∴ Any process where a conciousness is retrieved does not share the 'badness' of death.

Death and ressurection, as in any number of things, such as Stargate, is not as bad as true death, such as that caused by the Galactic Empire. Everything that is important in making a person a person, is retained in the transport process. They may briefly die, before being ressurected, with everything that is vaguely philosophically important, intact.

[Stark]

NL, you seem to be suggesting that you'd be fine with being scanned then shot in the face if a copy could be constructed. The issue is not net continuity of a 'you' fascimile, it's the fact that the first 'you' will definately be destroyed. I frankly don't understand how you can miss this: stepping on to a transporter pad will result in your death. Later, a functionally identical copy will be constructed, so to everyone else you appear the same, but YOU will be dead.

Since your recent transporter usage can be used to create a copy at any time, does this mean you're fine with being killed or tortured, since they can dupe up a new one who won't remember?

[NecronLord]

NL, you seem to be suggesting that you'd be fine with being scanned then shot in the face if a copy could be constructed.

Right you are. Will it hurt? What will I (or if you want to be sophistic, the new me) gain from allowing this to take place? Will I lose any memories (as in the Cultureverse, where you generally lose memories up to your last brainscan)

The issue is not net continuity of a 'you' fascimile,

It is to me.

it's the fact that the first 'you' will definately be destroyed. I frankly don't understand how you can miss this: stepping on to a transporter pad will result in your death.

Yes.

Later, a functionally identical copy will be constructed, so to everyone else you appear the same, but YOU will be dead.

I do not define myself by being alive. I define myself by the contents of my mind, (insert spiel about memories, hopes, whatever, here). If that is recreated in exact detail, I consider it sophistry to actually care, beyond an animal-distrust level, about the 'death' as everything important survives in a new form.

Since your recent transporter usage can be used to create a copy at any time, does this mean you're fine with being killed or tortured, since they can dupe up a new one who won't remember?

See what I said about pain (I don't especially want any incarnation of me to suffer without a damn fine reason)? And divergance? When there are two Cs existing at once, learning, C(a) will be becoming different to C(b) at which case, they may as well be defined as C and D

Further, Trekporters do not seem capable of this, for some reason they don't just replace Tasha Yar using the transporter.

[Wyrm]

Further, Trekporters do not seem capable of this, for some reason they don't just replace Tasha Yar using the transporter.

What about Thomas Riker? Yes, it required the intervention of a planet's funky atmosphere, but it did happen.

As to whether I'd be fine in being shot in the face if a copy could be constructed... yes, it is a philosophical bullet I need to bite. However, if we truly subscribe to the doctrine that physics is all there is, it is a conclusion we're forced into even if it makes us uncomfortable. If A is physically identical to B, then A is just as good as B for the physical part of any task you wish to choose, including being the physical part of the continuation of B. But if physics is all there is, then there is no nonphysical part to any task A or B can perform, so the physical part to the continuation of B is the whole continuation of B. This holds even if A is not B.

Obviously, I am not a physically identical copy of myself, but if physics is all, then the physically identical copy of myself is as valid a continuation of me as I am. This means that we are both continuations of me. And why should it not be? Why do I have at most one continuation? Since we're both identical continuations of me (provided I'm in stasis since my copying), then killing either one of me only destroys one of those continuations. Whichever continuation survives doesn't feel any different from me, and no physical test can distinguish the surviving continuation from me. It might as well be me.

Similarly, if I'm transported, then the me there will not feel any different from the me here, and no physical test you perform on the me there will turn up any different results from the me here. Therefore, the me there might as well be the me here.

In the face of physically identical, perfect copies of people (or even any living creature) and under the "Physics is All" doctrine, 'death' (in the classical sense) ceases to be a useful concept; it needs to be redefined to fit the new paradigm or discarded. And why shouldn't classical 'death' cease to be a useful concept in the face of perfect copies? Classical 'death' was formed in a world where perfect copies were not around even as a concept, and doesn't take into account the ramifications of physically identical copies (and, when applied to physically identical copies in the absence of "Physics is All", would assert that something was missing in the copies). There's nothing wrong with chucking out concepts that have outlived their usefulness, as they can only shackle you. It's part of the mental housecleaning that keeps intellectual progress moving.

On a gut level, all this does give me the heebie jeebies, but the Physics is All doctrine has served all of us well in the past, and I'm not going to give it up just because some of its conclusions make me uncomfortable.

[NecronLord]

What about Thomas Riker? Yes, it required the intervention of a planet's funky atmosphere, but it did happen.

I mean duplicating a person without beaming one up, or repairing the injuries (reviving, if you will) of someone as they're beamed up.

[Darth Wong]

At the end of the process, a functioning copy of all that is me will remain. Therefore, why should I care about being temporarily disintegrated during the process? My self-identity is robust enough to take the idea that I can be temporarily nonexistant.

No, you would be permanently nonexistent. Copying something is not the same thing as preserving it. I pointed this out with an analogy which you accepted, and then you searched for a red-herring distinction in order to pretend that it didn't weaken your argument.

[NecronLord]

No, you would be permanently nonexistent. Copying something is not the same thing as preserving it. I pointed this out with an analogy which you accepted, and then you searched for a red-herring distinction in order to pretend that it didn't weaken your argument.

Yes. You die in the process. That's what you keep on saying.

But why is death 'bad?' Because it is the destruction of the self. If the self is recreated in exact detail as a result of death, is is still bad? Why is the largely willing loss of 'continuity of existance' by people in the UFP somehow comparable to the Galactic Empire's wholsale one way, no coming back mass murder? That's what this tangent was initially established over, to try and make the UFP look as bad as the Evil Galactic Empire by comparing the deaths in the transport process to their mass murder.

[Darth Servo]

But why is death 'bad?' Because it is the destruction of the self. If the self is recreated in exact detail as a result of death, is is still bad?

Yes because it does not have YOUR CONSCIOUSNESS. Its like an identical twin. It is NOT YOU. YOU cease to exist and the xerox copy takes your place.

[NecronLord]

Yes because it does not have YOUR CONSCIOUSNESS. Its like an identical twin. It is NOT YOU. YOU cease to exist and the xerox copy takes your place.

So what? Why shouldn't I consent to making an exact copy of me?

If, for example, I could take a cyanide pill, go through a goa'uld sarcophagus, and wake up significantly richer, I'd do it. It may not be me, but it contains an exact copy of the entity-that-is-me, so why is a death something to be concerned about? C(b) will pick up C(a)'s life exactly where C(a) left off, and it will be, in every detail, identical to C(a). C(b) is C(a) born anew. It is not C(a), but it is indistinguishable from C(a), even to itself, so what's the problem? It's not like being transported induces personality change or loss of memory.

You keep going on about 'it is not you' but I'm not seeing why that actually matters in the slightest. Death is fearsome because it is the end but when your mind is preserved at the moment of death, and given another chance, death is no longer a scary concept to me. It may as well not be death, because an instance of me would continue anyway.

[PayBack]

By saying that you've kind of missed the point. If there is a discontinuity of consciousness at all, it's arguable that you have died and been replaced by a functioning fascimile. Think of it like this: you're on the pad, you see the shimmer, the transporter room fades and you appear on the surface. It's entirely possible that what really happens involves 'you' dying during the procedure. Of course the 'you' at the other end remembers continuity through the whole thing: the copy was given your memories up to the moment of death and continued with their own afterward. But for YOU, for the 'you' that stepped onto the pad originally, you're dead and your memories were put somewhere else. The copy *thinks* nothing died, but the original certainly did. That's the whole point.

For instance that Egan novel involved simulating a copy of your mind: from the copy's perspective, everything seemed normal as they moved through their virtual world, accessed computers etc. However, in reality, the simulation is constantly stopping and starting as the 'owner' buys runtime on different servers as money permits. So it's possible for something to *appear* continuous when it is not, since as DW says it's by definition impossible to experience a gap in experience.

I think if you read all my other posts on the subject you'll see I haven't missed the point. I'm well aware of the difference between continuing my existence, and a copy thinking it's a continuation of me... hell that's what I was struggling to hard to get across to the others. I was replying to the post about being phased into subspace and transported, not broken down into atoms (assuming your reply was to me, which based on my other posts is surprising).

[PayBack]

No, you would be permanently nonexistent. Copying something is not the same thing as preserving it. I pointed this out with an analogy which you accepted, and then you searched for a red-herring distinction in order to pretend that it didn't weaken your argument.

Yes. You die in the process. That's what you keep on saying.

But why is death 'bad?' Because it is the destruction of the self. If the self is recreated in exact detail as a result of death, is is still bad? Why is the largely willing loss of 'continuity of existence' by people in the UFP somehow comparable to the Galactic Empire's wholesale one way, no coming back mass murder? That's what this tangent was initially established over, to try and make the UFP look as bad as the Evil Galactic Empire by comparing the deaths in the transport process to their mass murder.

Why is death bad... because you don't get to see tomorrow.. you don't get to see what happens.. you don't get to experience anything new... you don't ever sit in the sun, or meet and talk to friends and loved ones.. you don't get to talk on forums or have sex, you don't get to listen to music or watch star wars... the destruction of self is only bad because you don't get to experience life. And that's exactly what happens when you're destroyed and copied by a transporter.. you don't get to experience live again ever... a copy gets to experience life in your place.. and how the hell you think that's ok is beyond me.