Do transporters kill?

[SapphireFox]

Being spatially separated has zip, zilch, nada, and nothing to do with what I was talking about. I can tell two protons are spatially separated, too. Their identicality (to call it a name) is a completely different property from whether or not they are spatially separated. It is not sufficient to demonstrate uniqueness.

Also, the quantum effects we observe with protons and electrons is also observed with atoms and even small molecules, albeit to a lesser exent. Simply aggratating particles does not let you escape the quantum wierdness — the proton is itself an aggragate. Instead, we find that the quantum wierdness fades into the classical regime as we increase the number of particles involved. This begs the quesiton of where the hell the dividing line between the quantum world and the classical world is.

It does not. If being spatially separated was enough to demonstrate uniqueness, then the same goes for protons, which can be localized to very small volumes that can be spatially separated. While two protons sitting in locations A and B is distinct from two protons both sitting in location A, proton 1 sitting in location A and proton 2 sitting in location B is NOT distinct from proton 1 sitting in location B and proton 2 sitting in location A. It is THIS distinction that is blurred in quantum mechanics and causes the wierd behavior that I aluded to in discussions in non-uniqueness — they relate only to whether the two individuals produced are interchangable, not whether we can tell that there are two of them.

Unfortunately my knowledge of physics is fairly weak once you enter the sub atomic and quantum worlds and despite my desire otherwise if I am honest with myself I can no longer consider myself qualified speak on or make determinations on that level. That is why I acquiesced to Simon_Jester's obvious superior knowledge of physics and bowed out of this section of the debate dealing with these matters. If you want to discuss matters on the sub atomic and quantum realms please direct it to Simon or another that can respond with something other than "I don't know" or "I guess". That being said I intend to answer the questions you have given me to the best of my ability.

Why? Because you say so? I don't have to be revived in the same location to reverse clinical death. Why should I expect it to be the same for any other form of death, including transporter death?

I did not mean movement to a new location, what I meant was that your matter needed to be put back in its original configuration. Nothing more nothing less.

And what difference does it make, physically, if I use the same matter or some similar matter for the reconstruction? If I put the raw matter I was disassembled from into a container, an identical amount of similar matter put into another container, mixed them up and then chose one canister from which my pattern would be reassembled from, what physical test can you perform on me to decide whether or not if the canister used was the original stuff or the similar but different stuff?

I seriously want an answer to this question. No, simply being done in a different place is not enough. The point of a transporter is to bink me from place to place, and if I agreed that being reconstructed in a different place was enough to kill me, we wouldn't be having this... discussion.

If you mixed the containers I believe it is likely that the interactions would alter both groups of matter possibly making any test a moot point. However I can't think of any test that would allow me to test the matter. (especially since I don't know what kind of matter it is. A bunch of protons, molecules, sub atomic particles,whole cells, or what?) However I believe that it would be likely "in universe" to be able to test for such things after all the transporter has to scan you and take you apart so it is likely that the transporter might need to know such things to be able to put you back together properly and not confuse your pattern with someone else's patterns. Otherwise you might end up with something like Tuvix every time you tried to transport more than one person at a time.

I do not pretend that the above questions have easy answers.

You are right that these questions don't have easy answers however I will try give you the best answers I can.

Did my original die on the transporter pad, or did my existence get transmitted to the remote site as the matter of that original body utterly lose that identity to be gained by another bit of matter?

As mention. in the "Whole of X" concept that Simon and I managed to agree on your original dies and his life is taken up by the copy it is as though there are two of you but one dies to give life to the other. The original dies but since the clone takes up the original's life it is as if his life has not been discontinued.

What if that matter was used to reintegrate a woman — am I that woman now?

An interesting question that has two answers from the matter perspective alone then yes, however since you did not mention what "OS" is driving that body a semi-layman answer may apply. Namely it depends on weather it's your mind or "OS" running the body in this second case your average person will see it as the woman if it is her "OS" running it or you if it is still your "OS" running the body

If I was copied, is it meaningful to talk about an original me and a clone me, or has my existence instead split into two beings that are (for the moment) identical, interchangable and as much claim on my identity as my pre-copy self? Or were there somehow two people in my body originally that now can lead separate existances?

Is it meaningful to talk about original and clone? I believe so as the original already was existing before and thus would have priority and seniority over and above any duplicate no matter how perfect. As for your existence being split into two beings it might be possible although it hearkens back to my "Soul Fragmentation" concept so I don't know if its applicable here. The only way I see you possessing two people in your body being separated is if you had a split or multiple personality syndrome.

These are indeed some interesting questions. I would be interested to see others take on them as they do seem to be very opinion related and possibly debate worthy questions

[Kamakazie Sith]

I underlined the relevant parts for you. Now unless you would like to claim that information is a form of matter then you would need new matter at the transit point to make a body from.

Congrats. You've shown us that they need a blueprint in order to put the matter back together. It says nothing of new matter being introduced. It says nothing of the original matter being discarded.

I find it funny that you bitch about me providing few examples when you have yet to give me even one example supporting your statement about disorientation or about the disorientation itself for that matter. Provide an example of someone who was transported without being prepared and displayed nothing that could be construed as disorientation, confusion, or loss of balance otherwise concede the point.

I don't accept your parameters for nothing that could be construed as confusion, disorientation, etc. It would be completely normal for there to be a brief period of reorientation if you were suddenly transported to a different location, especially if it were not a place you recognized.

I take issue with your prepared claim. No matter of being ready could prepare you for the disorientation your brain would experience upon dying and then reviving. You're talking about the complete ceasing of all brain functions for at least two seconds. That's why I gave you the example of a syncope episode where someone passes out. When those who faint come around they can suffer significant disorientation for a few seconds.

Here are a few examples off the top of my head.
I can't find the scene anywhere, but you can look up Dr. Gillian Taylor when she is beamed up. She is obviously scared, and may be a bit disorientated due to her surroundings being changed.

Also, you can look up the scene where Jason is beamed up in TNG Bloodlines. He is mid climb and does not suffer from any abnormal disorientation besides being surprised with the new place he is now standing in.

I must stress that NONE of this matters. It does not trump visual evidence of consciousness being maintained from transport start to finish.

Considering I haven't seen an example of any one who snaps out of having no brain functions like the transporter does I have no comparisons on how you came to your statement would you care to tell me how you came to your conclusion? For reference if nothing else.

That's why I pointed to persons who suffer from a syncope episode, or fainting. That's where I'm drawing my reference.

The whole episode is a delusion created by having difficulty in reintegration aka putting the subject together because of a storm. If If I recall correctly Reed even stated that at the end of the episode. I would hardly accept a delusion caused by a transporter fuck up
as being of proof anything considering all sensations caused by delusions are a lie. Hoshi experienced I think days worth of fake experiences.

Agreed on the delusion, since they pretty much state as much in the episode. Are you offering your concession then? You realize Hoshi experienced these delusions while stuck for 8.3 seconds inside the buffer (in other words not materialized). According to Trip she was "sorta trapped in the pattern buffer for a few seconds. Lt. Reed elaborates "8.3" seconds to be exact.

This means that she was experiencing brain activity while inside the pattern buffer. I'm sure I don't have to educate you on what is required for death?

Now there are two different scenarios arising from this First that something in Hoshi's brain didn't quite rematerialise exactly perfectly during a fucked up transport thus causing the fake memories of the delusion. Or that being stuck momentarily in the transporter caused some kind of time dilation effect allowing the pattern buffer which apparently now causes delusions as part of its function to experience days worth of fake memories to accumulate in just over 8 seconds.
I think its apparent that the first one makes more sense, especially considering the funky things transporters can do to the body.

Considering they explain it to you at the end it is number 2. During that 8.3 seconds while Hoshi was stuck in the pattern buffer she experienced several days worth of fake memories. Why? Who knows. However, it is pretty much the nail in the coffin for "transporters kill you" claim. They obviously do not kill you. Why? Who knows. Bad sci-fi.

However, I would further claim that even if they did kill you in theory as long as your life functions would restart after being rematerialized with the same matter then it would still be the original you...your consciousness and all.

[SapphireFox]

Congrats. You've shown us that they need a blueprint in order to put the matter back together. It says nothing of new matter being introduced. It says nothing of the original matter being discarded.

Actually if we take Barclay at his word then the matter has been transmuted or some other handwave from being matter into information. If not then the matter has to go some where and that means that it's either the matter reclamation unit for use elsewhere like the replicators or other transports, or its somehow its used in the transport and we both know Simon_Jester pointed out the energy problems with that.

I take issue with your prepared claim. No matter of being ready could prepare you for the disorientation your brain would experience upon dying and then reviving. You're talking about the complete ceasing of all brain functions for at least two seconds. That's why I gave you the example of a syncope episode where someone passes out. When those who faint come around they can suffer significant disorientation for a few seconds.

Here are a few examples off the top of my head.
I can't find the scene anywhere, but you can look up Dr. Gillian Taylor when she is beamed up. She is obviously scared, and may be a bit disorientated due to her surroundings being changed.

Also, you can look up the scene where Jason is beamed up in TNG Bloodlines. He is mid climb and does not suffer from any abnormal disorientation besides being surprised with the new place he is now standing in.

If your comparison is fainting you have to realize that its not a good comparison to coming out of zero brain activity any more than sleep is. I'm leery about the Dr. Taylor transport because of the confusion but I can easily accept the Jason incident as evidence toward your claim.

I must stress that NONE of this matters. It does not trump visual evidence of consciousness being maintained from transport start to finish.

If that's how you feel about it then why are even discussing this?

Agreed on the delusion, since they pretty much state as much in the episode. Are you offering your concession then? You realize Hoshi experienced these delusions while stuck for 8.3 seconds inside the buffer (in other words not materialized). According to Trip she was "sorta trapped in the pattern buffer for a few seconds. Lt. Reed elaborates "8.3" seconds to be exact.

This means that she was experiencing brain activity while inside the pattern buffer. I'm sure I don't have to educate you on what is required for death?

Considering they explain it to you at the end it is number 2. During that 8.3 seconds while Hoshi was stuck in the pattern buffer she experienced several days worth of fake memories. Why? Who knows. However, it is pretty much the nail in the coffin for "transporters kill you" claim. They obviously do not kill you. Why? Who knows. Bad sci-fi.

No, all that is stated was that she was in the buffer for 8.3 seconds not that it had caused the delusion. This is especially important considering that there have been MANY times a transport has had to stay in the buffer due to a difficult transport and NEVER have we seen a delusion caused by it I mean if being stuck in a buffer caused a hallucinogenic experience of any kind then Scotty whom we saw in "Relics" was trapped in the pattern buffer for decades would of had a dozy of a delusion the likes of which we would be speaking about even now. Considering we have never seen a delusion caused by extended time in a pattern buffer before or since the incident would lead me to believe that this incident was NOT caused by the pattern buffer.

As for the consciousness during transport. Basic logic would tell us that if you take someone apart "molecule by molecule" as Troi and Barclay stated in the beginning of the episode and/or converted into data as Barclay said later on then at some point your brain will not exist physically enough to support consciousness this I believe you understand.

Now in the same episode there is the visual evidence toward consciousness during transport

Now taking these two together means that Star Trek has officially contradicted itself in this matter in the SAME EPISODE and I believe you are right that this does qualify as bad sci-fi.

[Kamakazie Sith]

Actually if we take Barclay at his word then the matter has been transmuted or some other handwave from being matter into information. If not then the matter has to go some where and that means that it's either the matter reclamation unit for use elsewhere like the replicators or other transports, or its somehow its used in the transport and we both know Simon_Jester pointed out the energy problems with that.

There's also the whole other question of why anyone ever dies in Trek since the transporter could offer you unlimited Spocks or Data's.

If your comparison is fainting you have to realize that its not a good comparison to coming out of zero brain activity any more than sleep is. I'm leery about the Dr. Taylor transport because of the confusion but I can easily accept the Jason incident as evidence toward your claim.

If I thought it wasn't a good comparrison then I wouldn't have brought it up. You actually think the brains ability to cope will be better if it is reduced to zero activity? Interesting.

If that's how you feel about it then why are even discussing this?

I'm just pointing out that you're spending far too much time trying to deal with something that ultimately doesn't matter in the grand scheme. The effects of loss of consciousness points were just icing for the cake. You haven't addressed my primary evidence. All you've done so far is make excuses why it isn't what it appears.

No, all that is stated was that she was in the buffer for 8.3 seconds not that it had caused the delusion. This is especially important considering that there have been MANY times a transport has had to stay in the buffer due to a difficult transport and NEVER have we seen a delusion caused by it I mean if being stuck in a buffer caused a hallucinogenic experience of any kind then Scotty whom we saw in "Relics" was trapped in the pattern buffer for decades would of had a dozy of a delusion the likes of which we would be speaking about even now. Considering we have never seen a delusion caused by extended time in a pattern buffer before or since the incident would lead me to believe that this incident was NOT caused by the pattern buffer.

Seriously? It doesn't matter if her hallucinations were caused by the transporter or due to the copious amounts of mushrooms she ate prior to embarking on her mission. What matters is that during that 8.3 seconds while she was in the transporter buffer her brain was active.

As for the consciousness during transport. Basic logic would tell us that if you take someone apart "molecule by molecule" as Troi and Barclay stated in the beginning of the episode and/or converted into data as Barclay said later on then at some point your brain will not exist physically enough to support consciousness this I believe you understand.

Sure, I do. However, visuals trump basic logic.

Now in the same episode there is the visual evidence toward consciousness during transport

Now taking these two together means that Star Trek has officially contradicted itself in this matter in the SAME EPISODE and I believe you are right that this does qualify as bad sci-fi.

Trek routinely contradicts itself between visuals and dialogue. Since visuals are the closest evidence that can be used for calculations in the debates those were given more weight than dialogue, and for good reason.

Otherwise a Romulan/Cardassian fleet (DS9 The Die is Cast) would be able to destroy the 30% of the crust in four seconds with the destruction of the mantle expected in a hour IIRC.

Or my personal favorite where an ounce of antimatter is expected to blow the atmosphere off a planet. (TOS Obsession). --- Though if you watch the remastered version this actually does appear to have happened. Makes me wonder where the remastered series fall within canon.

[SapphireFox]

There's also the whole other question of why anyone ever dies in Trek since the transporter could offer you unlimited Spocks or Data's.

A good question, probably worth making another thread over. The writers would probably handwave it away with some technobabble about pattern degradation or some other BS tho.

If I thought it wasn't a good comparison then I wouldn't have brought it up. You actually think the brains ability to cope will be better if it is reduced to zero activity? Interesting.

No my point was we don't know what the symptoms of returning from zero activity are. They could be worse, less, the same, completely different we don't know.

I'm just pointing out that you're spending far too much time trying to deal with something that ultimately doesn't matter in the grand scheme. The effects of loss of consciousness points were just icing for the cake. You haven't addressed my primary evidence. All you've done so far is make excuses why it isn't what it appears.

Very well then. Consider this section tabled.

Seriously? It doesn't matter if her hallucinations were caused by the transporter or due to the copious amounts of mushrooms she ate prior to embarking on her mission. What matters is that during that 8.3 seconds while she was in the transporter buffer her brain was active.

Considering the massive amount of visual evidence of every single other extended transport not experiencing hallucinations while in the pattern buffer its incredibly unlikely that the delusions were experienced while in the buffer instead it is far more likely that the fake memories were created by an improper rematerization within the brain.

Sure, I do. However, visuals trump basic logic.

True. Very well I accept that Barclay is likely experiencing some form of consciousness during at least most of his transport. No matter how brain damaged that sounds.

Trek routinely contradicts itself between visuals and dialogue. Since visuals are the closest evidence that can be used for calculations in the debates those were given more weight than dialogue, and for good reason.

Otherwise a Romulan/Cardassian fleet (DS9 The Die is Cast) would be able to destroy the 30% of the crust in four seconds with the destruction of the mantle expected in a hour IIRC.

Or my personal favorite where an ounce of antimatter is expected to blow the atmosphere off a planet. (TOS Obsession). --- Though if you watch the remastered version this actually does appear to have happened. Makes me wonder where the remastered series fall within canon.

It makes me wonder just how much is in those photon torpedos anyway it can't be that much considering how crappy they seem to be. Have to watch that remastered edition episode on the Space channel sometime thanks.

[Simon_Jester]

THIS is the question I want answered, Simon: Is the original/copy distinction even physically meaningful in a world with perfect copy machines? If so, how? If not, why is it so "blindingly obvoius" that the two verions are "unique" — that is, distinguishable?

I would argue that the original/copy distinction is, as you imply, meaningless given perfect copying.

The reason it's obvious that the versions are unique is that they are only going to be perfect copies for however long it takes for the first carbon-14 atom to decay.

Whether Kirk-A and Kirk-B are unique objects has nothing to do with whether one of them is the original and one is the copy, or with whether I can tell which is original and which isn't. All that matters is that the Kirks be mechanically different in some sense, so that we can tell that one of them is not the other.

If that condition is satisfied, then whatever arbitrary label we choose to hang on the individual Kirks, they are still clearly different objects. They are NOT indistinguishable particles, because they cannot be interchanged freely without affecting the overall system anymore, because they no longer have exactly the same mass, electric charge, magnetic moment, and so on.

This is a major difference between Captain Kirk and, say, helium-4 nuclei. All possible versions of a helium-4 nucleus are exactly the same, or they wouldn't be helium-4 nuclei in the first place. Versions of Captain Kirk can differ from one another slightly and still all be "Captain Kirk."

Now, I can take two Kirks, call one Kirk-1 and the other Kirk-2, or the other way around, or label them with Greek letters, or call one "red" and the other "blue," or give them improbably obscene nicknames, or whatever. It doesn't matter. The point is that, unlike electrons, there is some physical difference between them that we can (in principle) use to tell them apart.

They are not identical, even though we cannot tell which of them (if either) was the original.

There's also the whole other question of why anyone ever dies in Trek since the transporter could offer you unlimited Spocks or Data's.

I'm guessing energy or data storage constraints. Under normal operating conditions (no legendary genius to rig the system) they lack the equipment to create hundreds of kilograms from nothing in one go, or the storage to keep people's patterns in long term memory indefinitely.

[Wyrm]

Why? Because you say so? I don't have to be revived in the same location to reverse clinical death. Why should I expect it to be the same for any other form of death, including transporter death?

I did not mean movement to a new location, what I meant was that your matter needed to be put back in its original configuration. Nothing more nothing less.

First off, I think ST transporters do use your original matter for the reconstruction, if possible. Otherwise, we would have to use matter in the immediate surroundings of the remote site to reconstruct the individual, and there is no evidence of nearby objects corroding away to make a six-person away team. You must realize that the only instances of residue being left on transporter pads are the results of clear (apparent) accidents, where the pattern is lost and there is absolutely no grounds for anything other than a death, and the only incidents of fewer or more people coming out of the transport than in are also in clear malfunctions. Normally functioning transporters just don't do this.

Second, while it is your definition, you have still not given me any reason to accept it is valid. Taking a sample down to subatomic particles, or even small molecules completely obviates any identity they might have had as your body stuff. It is not your organic soup, it's just organic soup, unqualified. Thus, it is still a kind of death only you care about.

And what difference does it make, physically, if I use the same matter or some similar matter for the reconstruction? If I put the raw matter I was disassembled from into a container, an identical amount of similar matter put into another container, mixed them up and then chose one canister from which my pattern would be reassembled from, what physical test can you perform on me to decide whether or not if the canister used was the original stuff or the similar but different stuff?

I seriously want an answer to this question. No, simply being done in a different place is not enough. The point of a transporter is to bink me from place to place, and if I agreed that being reconstructed in a different place was enough to kill me, we wouldn't be having this... discussion.

If you mixed the containers I believe it is likely that the interactions would alter both groups of matter possibly making any test a moot point.

It is unnecessary to resort to interaction. The two samples are already physically identical and no test will allow you to point at one and say, "That's the original stuff."

However I can't think of any test that would allow me to test the matter. (especially since I don't know what kind of matter it is. A bunch of protons, molecules, sub atomic particles,whole cells, or what?)

Subatomic particles. If the original matter is used to reconstruct, even atoms are too big and fragile to be slammed intact through the various impediments that we know transporters can get past. If the original matter is not used, you have a distinct lack of human cells and even biomolecules to reconstruct your party from, whereas subatomic matter can be made just about anywhere.

However I believe that it would be likely "in universe" to be able to test for such things after all the transporter has to scan you and take you apart so it is likely that the transporter might need to know such things to be able to put you back together properly and not confuse your pattern with someone else's patterns. Otherwise you might end up with something like Tuvix every time you tried to transport more than one person at a time.

Bull. Subatomic particles, and even small molecules, are in and of themselves far too simple objects to encode that kind of thing. You don't resemble a cow even though you've eaten hamburgers because your digestive system takes the meat down to the level of individual peptides, whereupon they lose all identity as "cow". Thus, even if there wasn't that damned flower, Tuvok and Neelix would still have individual particles that used to be a part of the other fellow and it wouldn't mean a damned thing. The action of that damned flower was to cram a pattern of two localizations into a pattern of one localization.

As to whether or not there is an "in universe" way to test which matter came from where, I submit that "in universe" every possible test has failed to detect a difference between transport subjects. About the closest thing I can get is in "Data's Day", where Data deduced that the Vulcan ambassidor(Romulan spy) deduced that the ambassidor was beamed away by the Romulans' own transporter because the transporter residue turned out to be replicated (which is a similar but sublty different process).

Did my original die on the transporter pad, or did my existence get transmitted to the remote site as the matter of that original body utterly lose that identity to be gained by another bit of matter?

As mention. in the "Whole of X" concept that Simon and I managed to agree on your original dies and his life is taken up by the copy it is as though there are two of you but one dies to give life to the other. The original dies but since the clone takes up the original's life it is as if his life has not been discontinued.

Except I don't really accept Simon's answer either. I regard the person as a separate (although related) concept from the indivudal. Also, your definition of "death" that you use in transporters seems custom-made to make transportation fatal, and as such I find it indistinguishable from a "special pleading" fallacy.

What if that matter was used to reintegrate a woman — am I that woman now?

An interesting question that has two answers from the matter perspective alone then yes, however since you did not mention what "OS" is driving that body a semi-layman answer may apply. Namely it depends on weather it's your mind or "OS" running the body in this second case your average person will see it as the woman if it is her "OS" running it or you if it is still your "OS" running the body.

...What? None of my pattern is used to reconstruct the woman: her own pattern was used to reconstruct her body, only using matter that was once mine.

If I was copied, is it meaningful to talk about an original me and a clone me, or has my existence instead split into two beings that are (for the moment) identical, interchangable and as much claim on my identity as my pre-copy self? Or were there somehow two people in my body originally that now can lead separate existances?

Is it meaningful to talk about original and clone? I believe so as the original already was existing before and thus would have priority and seniority over and above any duplicate no matter how perfect.

But how do we test the claim that someone is the original or duplicate without any physical basis for it? Even the original and dup have no idea: they both think —and claim— they are original!

The words "original" and "copy" only have physical meaning outside PCMs because we can otherwise test for features that original and copy do not share: the original bears a special mark; the duplicate has shoddy manufacture, or lack distinctive wear. But a perfect copy —absolutely perfect— will have all the features of the original, such as the special mark, the superior quality, and have that distinctive wear.

Without that physical basis for comparison, "original" and "copy" become arbitrary labels that are completely unconnected with any physical reality.

As for your existence being split into two beings it might be possible although it hearkens back to my "Soul Fragmentation" concept so I don't know if its applicable here. The only way I see you possessing two people in your body being separated is if you had a split or multiple personality syndrome.

Bullshit. Existence ≠ personality, and "Soul Fragmentation" only matters to people who think they have souls. While me and my copy (assuming for a second we know what that means) will start out completely identical, we will evolve away from each other depending on our individual circumstances. But that's a quite different thing from saying that I had two personalities to begin with, and furthermore a psyche test on my previous self will reveal that that scenario is obviously wrong.

====

THIS is the question I want answered, Simon: Is the original/copy distinction even physically meaningful in a world with perfect copy machines? If so, how? If not, why is it so "blindingly obvoius" that the two verions are "unique" — that is, distinguishable?

I would argue that the original/copy distinction is, as you imply, meaningless given perfect copying.

The reason it's obvious that the versions are unique is that they are only going to be perfect copies for however long it takes for the first carbon-14 atom to decay.

Whether Kirk-A and Kirk-B are unique objects has nothing to do with whether one of them is the original and one is the copy, or with whether I can tell which is original and which isn't. All that matters is that the Kirks be mechanically different in some sense, so that we can tell that one of them is not the other.

And it therefore follows that being unique in this sense does not imply "unique persons" as the term is commonly understood to mean. I am not identical to my past self in exactly the same way as Kirk-A is not identical to Kirk-B at some time after the split, yet I am still the same person in the sense that I am the guy who earned a masters in mathematics at UT at Austin.

If that condition is satisfied, then whatever arbitrary label we choose to hang on the individual Kirks, they are still clearly different objects. They are NOT indistinguishable particles, because they cannot be interchanged freely without affecting the overall system anymore, because they no longer have exactly the same mass, electric charge, magnetic moment, and so on.

And I agree with this:

I recognize the limits of the comparison. I realize that macroscopic objects are made from shittons of particles that are jostling around and doing their own thing.

I was focusing on the seeming interchangability of the two Kirks, at least initially, and as such, this is where the comparison to subatomic particles ends.

My point in all of this is that we are ramming headlong into discussing whether transporters kill without carefully defining what we mean by "kill", along with the intellectual aparatus we use to understand that word, such as "original/copy", and "person". No one has bothered to figure out if the phrase "individual person" makes sense with the existence of PCMs, and noting the disparaging difference between destroying an individual when copies exist and when they don't exist — indicating strongly that the individuals don't matter so much as access to what the individuals represent/instantiate. So far, the definitions you and Sapphire have come up with in regards to individuals being destroyed by transporters are definitions of "kill" that have no more meaning to me than a heated shout of, "I'll kill that twerp!"

They are not identical, even though we cannot tell which of them (if either) was the original.

Thank you.

[SapphireFox]

First off, I think ST transporters do use your original matter for the reconstruction, if possible. Otherwise, we would have to use matter in the immediate surroundings of the remote site to reconstruct the individual, and there is no evidence of nearby objects corroding away to make a six-person away team. You must realize that the only instances of residue being left on transporter pads are the results of clear (apparent) accidents, where the pattern is lost and there is absolutely no grounds for anything other than a death, and the only incidents of fewer or more people coming out of the transport than in are also in clear malfunctions. Normally functioning transporters just don't do this.

While you might be right, it begs the question have we ever seen them check or even look for residue after a normal transport? If not then how can you know or assume that there is no residue?

Second, while it is your definition, you have still not given me any reason to accept it is valid. Taking a sample down to subatomic particles, or even small molecules completely obviates any identity they might have had as your body stuff. It is not your organic soup, it's just organic soup, unqualified.

If its taken down to sub atomic particles I doubt it qualifies as organic any more merely particles. It seems rather plain now that you don't give a rats ass about what your made of or not only that there seems to be a whole "Wyrm" after transport.

Thus, it is still a kind of death only you care about.

I have not seen anything that would make your definition of death in this case any more valid then the one Simon_Jester and I agree on.

Subatomic particles. If the original matter is used to reconstruct, even atoms are too big and fragile to be slammed intact through the various impediments that we know transporters can get past. If the original matter is not used, you have a distinct lack of human cells and even biomolecules to reconstruct your party from, whereas subatomic matter can be made just about anywhere.

"Barclay: I can still remember the day in Doctor Olafson's transporter theory class when he was talking about the body being converted into billions of kiloquads of data zipping through subspace and I realized there's no margin for error one atom out of place and puff, you never come back. It's amazing people aren't lost all the time."
Assuming that this quote is to be taken literally then the transporter uses subspace to bypass some of those physical impediments.

Except I don't really accept Simon's answer either. I regard the person as a separate (although related) concept from the indivudal. Also, your definition of "death" that you use in transporters seems custom-made to make transportation fatal, and as such I find it indistinguishable from a "special pleading" fallacy.

Special pleading fallacy? I'm not sure I've heard of that one could you describe it, because I would prefer not to run headlong into stupidity if I can avoid it.

But how do we test the claim that someone is the original or duplicate without any physical basis for it? Even the original and dup have no idea: they both think —and claim— they are original!

The words "original" and "copy" only have physical meaning outside PCMs because we can otherwise test for features that original and copy do not share: the original bears a special mark; the duplicate has shoddy manufacture, or lack distinctive wear. But a perfect copy —absolutely perfect— will have all the features of the original, such as the special mark, the superior quality, and have that distinctive wear.

Without that physical basis for comparison, "original" and "copy" become arbitrary labels that are completely unconnected with any physical reality.

I don't know. If they are truly well and perfect there might not be a test so that we can tell which one is which. They are separate physical entities separated in space time and thus not identical in that sense but we don't have a test to differentiate between the two individuals.

As for your existence being split into two beings it might be possible although it hearkens back to my "Soul Fragmentation" concept so I don't know if its applicable here. The only way I see you possessing two people in your body being separated is if you had a split or multiple personality syndrome.

Bullshit. Existence ≠ personality, and "Soul Fragmentation" only matters to people who think they have souls. While me and my copy (assuming for a second we know what that means) will start out completely identical, we will evolve away from each other depending on our individual circumstances. But that's a quite different thing from saying that I had two personalities to begin with, and furthermore a psyche test on my previous self will reveal that that scenario is obviously wrong.

If that's the case then the answer is NO I don't believe that you had two people inside you because that makes no sense to me on any level. The only thing that would make sense would be one person split into two rapidly differing individuals thus one person creating two different people.

[Wyrm]

First off, I think ST transporters do use your original matter for the reconstruction, if possible. Otherwise, we would have to use matter in the immediate surroundings of the remote site to reconstruct the individual, and there is no evidence of nearby objects corroding away to make a six-person away team. You must realize that the only instances of residue being left on transporter pads are the results of clear (apparent) accidents, where the pattern is lost and there is absolutely no grounds for anything other than a death, and the only incidents of fewer or more people coming out of the transport than in are also in clear malfunctions. Normally functioning transporters just don't do this.

While you might be right, it begs the question have we ever seen them check or even look for residue after a normal transport? If not then how can you know or assume that there is no residue?

I see. I now have to prove to you that redshirts don't sweep in and mop up the transporter pad after every transport. I'm sorry, but I don't play that game. The burden is on you to prove these mop-up crews exist, not on me to prove that they don't.

Also, you haven't answered the question what happens at the remote site: if the matter doesn't go with the beam, then it has to go and come from somewhere else. The matter from the transporter pad can go into the ship's matter stockpiles, but that leaves the problem of where the matter comes from at a remote site, with absolutely no support equipment or ready raw matter stockpiles. Why don't we see rock, plants, and people at the remote site corrode and die horrible screaming deaths to be reconstituted as our away team, and why don't we see great piles of gelatinous lumps left behind when they beam out?

If its taken down to sub atomic particles I doubt it qualifies as organic any more merely particles. It seems rather plain now that you don't give a rats ass about what your made of or not only that there seems to be a whole "Wyrm" after transport.

I thought that was obvious, with the caveat that I demand I have the same chemical constituents. And you have yet to explain, clearly, why this is unreasonable.

I have not seen anything that would make your definition of death in this case any more valid then the one Simon_Jester and I agree on.

I've explained exactly what I think is wrong with your definition. Quit dodging the issue and explain what's wrong with mine.

"Barclay: I can still remember the day in Doctor Olafson's transporter theory class when he was talking about the body being converted into billions of kiloquads of data zipping through subspace and I realized there's no margin for error one atom out of place and puff, you never come back. It's amazing people aren't lost all the time."
Assuming that this quote is to be taken literally then the transporter uses subspace to bypass some of those physical impediments.

Since when have we taken any throwaway line by a Federation person literally, especially when in the context of the line, he was speaking casually and perhaps a bit imprecisely? Also, there is the plain fact that they cannot beam through dense materials and strong electromagnetic fields. Even if some componts of the transport process travel through subspace, it doesn't mean they all do.

Except I don't really accept Simon's answer either. I regard the person as a separate (although related) concept from the indivudal. Also, your definition of "death" that you use in transporters seems custom-made to make transportation fatal, and as such I find it indistinguishable from a "special pleading" fallacy.

Special pleading fallacy? I'm not sure I've heard of that one could you describe it, because I would prefer not to run headlong into stupidity if I can avoid it.

"Special pleading" means that you say that there is an exception for a particular case you're arguing, without giving good reason why it should be an exception. An example is saying that everything needs a designer, yet saying God does not need to be designed.

The principle problem is that you focus on "original matter" in this definition of transporter death, when to normal life processes the crude matter is completely fungible. The death of an individual, conventionally defined, refers rather straighforwardly as the irreversable cessation of that person's life processes. Preserving the original matter is not an intrinsic part of this definition.

There are many treatments that involve adding, subtracting, and substituting matter — indeed, I would dare say that most medical treatments involve one of these three processes. All drug administrations are adding matter to your body to stave off death. Blood transfusions are another. Removing gangrenous material is a subtraction of matter that is a treatement. A heart transplant exchanges a non-working heart for a working one. While this treatment is not without its limitations, you need a heart.

If you believe that you must preserve the integrety of your body's matter to preserve your life, then a large number of treatments —both actual and potential— will be closed to you. What is a full-body transplant to you, treatement or euthenasia? By your "original matter" notion, it's almost certainly euthenasia, as none of your matter is original except the brain. What is brain regeneration technology to you, treatment or euthenasia? By your "original matter" notion, it's almost certainly euthenasia, as regeneration with very little doubt requires cleaning out the dead neurons and replacing them with new ones — and the new neurons will certainly not be the original matter.

Furthermore, your body replaces every atom of your body on a periodic basis all by itself. There are probably more original parts in my 12 year old shitbox of a car than there are in myself, every atom having been replaced maybe three times over the course of that time (while individual long-lived cells in the brain may still be around, their individual atoms are replaced). We have organelles dedicated to refuse collection, and cells are programmed to die on a pretty timely schedule. If any definition of continued life we take seriously requires we keep our original parts, everyone older than three is already dead and a zombie walking the earth.

Although that would explain my observations rather well.

This is why your defintion of transporter as a means of death is special pleading. Of all the definitions of death that matter, this is the only one that requires I keep my original matter to keep alive. You have to explain why this is the case for me to take the argument seriously; it may seem blindingly obvious, but not to anyone who knows that life itself treats matter as fungible.

I don't know. If they are truly well and perfect there might not be a test so that we can tell which one is which. They are separate physical entities separated in space time and thus not identical in that sense but we don't have a test to differentiate between the two individuals.

You keep harping on the fact there are two individuals separated in space and time and that they are not identical in that they do not share location. Well, no shit. I agree to that point, as this was besides the point of my argument. That's why I also tried to find words that get closer to the meaning of what I was getting at, like 'interchangability'.

Can we now table this part of the discussion?

If that's the case then the answer is NO I don't believe that you had two people inside you because that makes no sense to me on any level.

Sorry, I meant "two existences" in my original question. Even I can't keep my terminology straight sometimes. (Although truthfully, I was expecting you to grok that from the context.) I'll ask again:

"If I was copied, is it meaningful to talk about an original me and a clone me, or has my existence instead split into two existences that are (for the moment) identical, interchangable and as much claim on my identity as my pre-copy self? Or were there somehow two existences in my body originally that now can have separate histories?"

The only thing that would make sense would be one person split into two rapidly differing individuals thus one person creating two different people.

You mean, creating two people by the same mechanism that one person becomes a different person over the course of his life? Yes, totally agreed on that point. But that doesn't make the past person dead, does it? Nor does it make him a different person the same way we mean you are a different person from I, precisely.

This means that there is something funny with our notion of what a person is. This definition may work well enough in normal circumstances, but it seems to be at least fraying along the edges here. We need to nail down what we mean by a person before we can use it meaningfully in the discussion.

[Simon_Jester]

Except I don't really accept Simon's answer either. I regard the person as a separate (although related) concept from the indivudal.

I do not precisely understand how this differs from my answer. For instance, imagine that an hour ago, the transporter beaming up Riker hiccuped, producing Riker-1 and Riker-2. Riker-1 and Riker-2 will not be physically identical at the atomic level. They are two different individuals, and if you look closely enough you can tell them apart. But they two different individual instances of one person: Riker.

Now, if one Riker has a traumatic experience, shaves his beard, and starts behaving completely un-Riker-like, then we might say that the two individuals are no longer the same person, because they act so differently. But that's a much higher degree of divergence than transporters normally give us: in normal operation, the transporter-copy is the same person as the original, even if it is possible (in principle) to tell that they are not the same body as the original.

Without that physical basis for comparison, "original" and "copy" become arbitrary labels that are completely unconnected with any physical reality.

Well... sort of. You can still make a valid claim about "original" and "copy," such as: "The original James T. Kirk was seen in Iowa in 2235 (as a toddler); the copy was not because the copy was not created until such time as Kirk beamed down to some random planet in the 2260s" The statement is factually true, but it doesn't tell you whether you're looking at the original or the copy today. It's purely a historical statement: go back far enough into the past and there will be times when the copy simply did not exist.

And it therefore follows that being unique in this sense does not imply "unique persons" as the term is commonly understood to mean. I am not identical to my past self in exactly the same way as Kirk-A is not identical to Kirk-B at some time after the split, yet I am still the same person in the sense that I am the guy who earned a masters in mathematics at UT at Austin.

...Sort of.

I was not trying to refute what you have just wrote. I am claiming that the two Kirks are not completely indistinguishable, in the sense that electrons or helium-4 nuclei are. I am not claiming that they are noticeably different in personality or macroscopic structure.

Physically, Kirk-A and Kirk-B are unique in that there is only one Kirk-A, only one Kirk-B, and a viable way to tell which of them is which.* On the zoomed-out level at which we normally identify people, though, both Kirks are (different instances of) the same person: any honest test would reveal that both Kirks are in fact Captain Kirk. So I suppose I agree with what you said above, because you are no longer implying that the two Kirks must be physically identical.

*Not that this tells you which is "original" or anything. Remember that A and B are arbitrary labels.

I was focusing on the seeming interchangability of the two Kirks, at least initially, and as such, this is where the comparison to subatomic particles ends.

The trouble is that this interchangability is so short-lived: the timescale is somewhere between femtoseconds and nanoseconds; I'd have to give a lot of thought to nailing it down precisely. By the time the shimmering has stopped, the two Kirks are no longer interchangeable in the statistical-mechanics sense of "interchangeable particles" like fermions or bosons. They are merely really really similar, more so than identical twins.

My point in all of this is that we are ramming headlong into discussing whether transporters kill without carefully defining what we mean by "kill", along with the intellectual aparatus we use to understand that word, such as "original/copy", and "person".

Since I've been saying something along these lines for about the past week, I'm inclined to agree.

So far, the definitions you and Sapphire have come up with in regards to individuals being destroyed by transporters are definitions of "kill" that have no more meaning to me than a heated shout of, "I'll kill that twerp!"

Yes, and if you look back you'll find that I've already said something very much along those lines. The death of individual instances of a person is trivial if the person themself does not go away. This is why belief in an afterlife (or reincarnation) motivates people to do very strange things: the conviction that you are merely one instance of an ongoing individual has a huge effect on how you view your own situation.

The existence of perfect copy machines takes the idea of a person having more than one individual instance out of the realm of mythology and into the realm of everyday fact.

[SapphireFox]

Also, you haven't answered the question what happens at the remote site: if the matter doesn't go with the beam, then it has to go and come from somewhere else. The matter from the transporter pad can go into the ship's matter stockpiles, but that leaves the problem of where the matter comes from at a remote site, with absolutely no support equipment or ready raw matter stockpiles. Why don't we see rock, plants, and people at the remote site corrode and die horrible screaming deaths to be reconstituted as our away team, and why don't we see great piles of gelatinous lumps left behind when they beam out?

I always thought it was the atmosphere in the area being converted and altered after all it is present at the exact transport site and it would would likely be easier and more efficient to change the simpler atoms and molecules then to change the more complex molecules in rocks and plants. As for the gelatinous mass you said it yourself that the transporter works down to sub atomic particles so we would end up with a mass of sub atomic particles that would likely disperse in a puff that might also explain the sparkly glowing transporter effect.

I thought that was obvious, with the caveat that I demand I have the same chemical constituents

Given, though I don't know why this would be important if you have been assembled properly.

I've explained exactly what I think is wrong with your definition. Quit dodging the issue and explain what's wrong with mine.

The part of the whole thing that irks me the most is not about the matter as I will explain further on, but the part of the transport where the subject is fully dismantled into sub atomic particles at this point there the subject literally has no life functions or body to support those life functions. At that point the subject is both clinically dead and brain dead and can not be meaningfully called alive having been reduced to a stream/cloud of disconnected sub atomic particles. Because if I recall correctly your statement handwaves this part away saying that because there is a product at the end that can be called the subject that the earlier subject has not experienced death. To me that part is more important than any argument about matter.

"Special pleading" means that you say that there is an exception for a particular case you're arguing, without giving good reason why it should be an exception. An example is saying that everything needs a designer, yet saying God does not need to be designed.

The principle problem is that you focus on "original matter" in this definition of transporter death, when to normal life processes the crude matter is completely fungible. The death of an individual, conventionally defined, refers rather straighforwardly as the irreversable cessation of that person's life processes. Preserving the original matter is not an intrinsic part of this definition.

There are many treatments that involve adding, subtracting, and substituting matter — indeed, I would dare say that most medical treatments involve one of these three processes. All drug administrations are adding matter to your body to stave off death. Blood transfusions are another. Removing gangrenous material is a subtraction of matter that is a treatement. A heart transplant exchanges a non-working heart for a working one. While this treatment is not without its limitations, you need a heart.

If you believe that you must preserve the integrety of your body's matter to preserve your life, then a large number of treatments —both actual and potential— will be closed to you. What is a full-body transplant to you, treatement or euthenasia? By your "original matter" notion, it's almost certainly euthenasia, as none of your matter is original except the brain. What is brain regeneration technology to you, treatment or euthenasia? By your "original matter" notion, it's almost certainly euthenasia, as regeneration with very little doubt requires cleaning out the dead neurons and replacing them with new ones — and the new neurons will certainly not be the original matter.

Furthermore, your body replaces every atom of your body on a periodic basis all by itself. There are probably more original parts in my 12 year old shitbox of a car than there are in myself, every atom having been replaced maybe three times over the course of that time (while individual long-lived cells in the brain may still be around, their individual atoms are replaced). We have organelles dedicated to refuse collection, and cells are programmed to die on a pretty timely schedule. If any definition of continued life we take seriously requires we keep our original parts, everyone older than three is already dead and a zombie walking the earth.

Although that would explain my observations rather well.

This is why your defintion of transporter as a means of death is special pleading. Of all the definitions of death that matter, this is the only one that requires I keep my original matter to keep alive. You have to explain why this is the case for me to take the argument seriously; it may seem blindingly obvious, but not to anyone who knows that life itself treats matter as fungible.

Very well given your persuasive arguments and a few episodes of Ghost in the Shell, I rescind my statements on the original matter being important.

You keep harping on the fact there are two individuals separated in space and time and that they are not identical in that they do not share location. Well, no shit. I agree to that point, as this was besides the point of my argument. That's why I also tried to find words that get closer to the meaning of what I was getting at, like 'interchangability'.

Can we now table this part of the discussion?

Agreed

Sorry, I meant "two existences" in my original question. Even I can't keep my terminology straight sometimes. (Although truthfully, I was expecting you to grok that from the context.) I'll ask again:

"If I was copied, is it meaningful to talk about an original me and a clone me, or has my existence instead split into two existences that are (for the moment) identical, interchangable and as much claim on my identity as my pre-copy self? Or were there somehow two existences in my body originally that now can have separate histories?"

It depends on how the other is formed, if for example a perfect copy of you is beamed down in front of you then you know that that you are the original and the other is other is a copy.(Although I I'm sure you might be questioning that in your mind) If you have just been beamed and found another you that had just been beamed as well then you may have been split into two existences. I can't any logical reason for the last one so I don't think it's possible unless someone can think of a persuasive argument otherwise.

You mean, creating two people by the same mechanism that one person becomes a different person over the course of his life? Yes, totally agreed on that point. But that doesn't make the past person dead, does it? Nor does it make him a different person the same way we mean you are a different person from I, precisely.

This means that there is something funny with our notion of what a person is. This definition may work well enough in normal circumstances, but it seems to be at least fraying along the edges here. We need to nail down what we mean by a person before we can use it meaningfully in the discussion

Agreed. Unfortunately what defines "person" seems to vary with the individual. Simon_Jester and I tried earlier and I'm not to sure we were able to come to any solid agreement. This is made especially difficult because the existence of a perfect copy machine in this argument muddies the issue and makes it more difficult to nail down.

[Wyrm]

Without that physical basis for comparison, "original" and "copy" become arbitrary labels that are completely unconnected with any physical reality.

Well... sort of. You can still make a valid claim about "original" and "copy," such as: "The original James T. Kirk was seen in Iowa in 2235 (as a toddler); the copy was not because the copy was not created until such time as Kirk beamed down to some random planet in the 2260s" The statement is factually true, but it doesn't tell you whether you're looking at the original or the copy today. It's purely a historical statement: go back far enough into the past and there will be times when the copy simply did not exist.

Except you're still left with the insistence that the truncated history (which you claim attaches to the copy) attaches to the object you claim to be the copy. You're still assuming that "original/copy" has physical grounding in order to prove that physical grounding: you state that "the copy" has appeared out of nowhere without a history. But that requires you to decide that "the copy" does not own any of the history without which it could not exist any more than "the original" would. On what do you base this decision on? The label, "the copy"? That means you have merely taken the label, "the copy", and stuck it on this Kirk and hope that you have not chosen wrong.

Now, you might say that the Kirk was transported, and therefore it's not the original item, but in many ways this is the entirety of what our argument is about. In other words, such an assertion is begging the question.

And it therefore follows that being unique in this sense does not imply "unique persons" as the term is commonly understood to mean. I am not identical to my past self in exactly the same way as Kirk-A is not identical to Kirk-B at some time after the split, yet I am still the same person in the sense that I am the guy who earned a masters in mathematics at UT at Austin.

...Sort of.

I was not trying to refute what you have just wrote. I am claiming that the two Kirks are not completely indistinguishable, in the sense that electrons or helium-4 nuclei are. I am not claiming that they are noticeably different in personality or macroscopic structure.

Physically, Kirk-A and Kirk-B are unique in that there is only one Kirk-A, only one Kirk-B, and a viable way to tell which of them is which.* On the zoomed-out level at which we normally identify people, though, both Kirks are (different instances of) the same person: any honest test would reveal that both Kirks are in fact Captain Kirk. So I suppose I agree with what you said above, because you are no longer implying that the two Kirks must be physically identical.

Yes, I presupposed that the two Kirks were initially physically identical for the sake of argument, which they evolve past by the simple processes of physics. I think I was careful to specify that the identicallity of the two Kirks applied only in the instant they were duplicated, and not any point afterward — for that moment, they are completely interchangable. Even if we do not suppose perfect copies, the two may vary to within some epsilon and still be practically interchangable.

I was focusing on the seeming interchangability of the two Kirks, at least initially, and as such, this is where the comparison to subatomic particles ends.

The trouble is that this interchangability is so short-lived: the timescale is somewhere between femtoseconds and nanoseconds; I'd have to give a lot of thought to nailing it down precisely. By the time the shimmering has stopped, the two Kirks are no longer interchangeable in the statistical-mechanics sense of "interchangeable particles" like fermions or bosons. They are merely really really similar, more so than identical twins.

Except that argument was framed in the context of a sort of idealized transporter, or a perfect copy machine (PCM), which does copy instantly, and I would leave the timescale effects for later — right now we have quite enough on our plate.

So far, the definitions you and Sapphire have come up with in regards to individuals being destroyed by transporters are definitions of "kill" that have no more meaning to me than a heated shout of, "I'll kill that twerp!"

Yes, and if you look back you'll find that I've already said something very much along those lines. The death of individual instances of a person is trivial if the person themself does not go away. This is why belief in an afterlife (or reincarnation) motivates people to do very strange things: the conviction that you are merely one instance of an ongoing individual has a huge effect on how you view your own situation.

I hesitate to call the disassembly of the individual a "death," as it is a massive poisoning of the well. Certainly, this is an extreme state that is long-term incompatible with continued biological function, but whatever is disasembled may be reassembled — especially with such fine control of matter. Furthermore, since all matter is fungible, we may use different atoms when reassembling the individual, and it would make no difference in the resulting object's physics. When one can treat individual atoms as one would building blocks, it's a game-changer. Was the individual one object, or was it a massive collection of individial atoms bound into a confined volume?

Of course, it's both, but what is the essense of its "objectness"? What makes the individual an object rather than a collection of atoms? Is it the pattern of atoms within that volume? Then "objectness" is preserved with transportation, including all that it implies including its individual history. Is an object a fixed sator of atoms that do not change? Then living matter does not possess "objectness" as it is constantly exchanging atoms with its environment, and will eventually widdle itself away to nothing that is original.

The existence of perfect copy machines takes the idea of a person having more than one individual instance out of the realm of mythology and into the realm of everyday fact.

It does more than that. It strikes at seemingly familiar concepts such as an object.

[Wyrm]

I always thought it was the atmosphere in the area being converted and altered after all it is present at the exact transport site and it would would likely be easier and more efficient to change the simpler atoms and molecules then to change the more complex molecules in rocks and plants. As for the gelatinous mass you said it yourself that the transporter works down to sub atomic particles so we would end up with a mass of sub atomic particles that would likely disperse in a puff that might also explain the sparkly glowing transporter effect.

It does not. At 1.2 kg/m³ for STP atmosphere, a six-man party beaming in should evacuate a volume of air nine meters across. It would set up an appreciable wind at the very least, and depressurize completely small confined spaces. For dissolution, unbound subatomic particles would rocket away from each other via the virial theorem, and manifest as a certainly fatal radiation dose to everyone around them, if they don't cook everyone around them outright. They would not simply "puff" away, and if the sparkling of the transporter effect was really Cherenkov radiation from escaping subatomic particles, the people around them would have literally minutes to write their wills before their central nervous systems turn to liquid shit.

The part of the whole thing that irks me the most is not about the matter as I will explain further on, but the part of the transport where the subject is fully dismantled into sub atomic particles at this point there the subject literally has no life functions or body to support those life functions. At that point the subject is both clinically dead and brain dead and can not be meaningfully called alive having been reduced to a stream/cloud of disconnected sub atomic particles. Because if I recall correctly your statement handwaves this part away saying that because there is a product at the end that can be called the subject that the earlier subject has not experienced death. To me that part is more important than any argument about matter.

I do not deny that being a disassociated cloud of subatomic particles is an extreme condition which will lead to final death if unremedied. However, you have been disassembled in such a way that you may be reassembled at will given that you haven't been disassembled too long. You can be reassembled and your life functions continued as if they were never interrupted with the flick of a switch on the transport console. Hence it is not the permanent cessation of life processes it would be required for what we would call "final death," only if it were prolonged longer than it would be during transport — which in the case of ST transporters would be "total loss of pattern integrity."

If a definition of a word is at odds with the properties of what you are describing, then the word should not be used to describe it. "Death," as understood by the context of this discussion, doesn't fit the definition of a subject mid-transport.

Further, you admit that the subject in transport resembles "clinical" and "brain" death, which are medical definitions of body states and used as criteria by which we continue or cease medical intervention, and do not resemble the notion of "death" as we understand the term. Otherwise, you'd have an argument with every person brought back by a defibrilator, and you would be compelled to go around hospitals and forcibly disconnect vegitative patients from their ventilators on the grounds that they are in fact corpses, and I don't think you're seriously about to do that. Which was rather the point: clinical death is not real death as we understand the term.

This is not handwaving. "Transport death" does not resemble what is commonly meant by the word "death." It really is that simple.

It depends on how the other is formed, if for example a perfect copy of you is beamed down in front of you then you know that that you are the original and the other is other is a copy.(Although I I'm sure you might be questioning that in your mind) If you have just been beamed and found another you that had just been beamed as well then you may have been split into two existences. I can't any logical reason for the last one so I don't think it's possible unless someone can think of a persuasive argument otherwise.

In ST, we have never seen a reconstitution of a person and his twin without the original being dissolutioned first. Thus, I think the second is the only important case.

This means that there is something funny with our notion of what a person is. This definition may work well enough in normal circumstances, but it seems to be at least fraying along the edges here. We need to nail down what we mean by a person before we can use it meaningfully in the discussion

Agreed. Unfortunately what defines "person" seems to vary with the individual. Simon_Jester and I tried earlier and I'm not to sure we were able to come to any solid agreement. This is made especially difficult because the existence of a perfect copy machine in this argument muddies the issue and makes it more difficult to nail down.

This is the reason why we have philosophy departments in university. They make it their business to crack open familiar notitions and see what wierdness is hiding within. However, they do it in a way that is ass-backwards and ungrounded in reality, which is why you see nothing but bullshit from their side. It reminds me of the joke about physicists, mathematicians and philosophers.

It's too late to think about it right now, so I'll just sign off here. Meanwhile, you can start brainstorming about what salient properties a "person" should have. In particular, I want you to think about whether or not "individual" must be separated from "person" as distinct concepts. That's all I ask for the moment.

[Simon_Jester]

But that requires you to decide that "the copy" does not own any of the history without which it could not exist any more than "the original" would. On what do you base this decision on? The label, "the copy"? That means you have merely taken the label, "the copy", and stuck it on this Kirk and hope that you have not chosen wrong.

Now, you might say that the Kirk was transported, and therefore it's not the original item, but in many ways this is the entirety of what our argument is about. In other words, such an assertion is begging the question.

...Maybe.

Though, the transporter definitely disintegrates the subject, and it's not at all clear to me that it puts the subject back together out of the same material. There seems to be continuity of experience, but there doesn't seem to be physical continuity. IF the transporter does not use matter from the subject to rebuild the subject (and the possibility of duplication argues against it very strongly), this would provide a basis for an original/copy distinction, were it not for the fact that the "original" is now missing.

To be blunt, I don't really care about the original/copy distinction. This argument applies equally to copy/copy cases: Riker-1, Riker-2, and Riker-3 are still physically distinct and are not strictly identical, even if they were all created in a single transporter hiccup that accidentally beamed down three Rikers, one after another.

Yes, I presupposed that the two Kirks were initially physically identical for the sake of argument, which they evolve past by the simple processes of physics. I think I was careful to specify that the identicallity of the two Kirks applied only in the instant they were duplicated, and not any point afterward — for that moment, they are completely interchangable. Even if we do not suppose perfect copies, the two may vary to within some epsilon and still be practically interchangable.

Well, that depends heavily on your definition of interchangeable. They'll be able to wear each other's uniforms for a long time to come, so for that value of "epsilon" they're liable to be interchangeable for weeks, months, or years.

However, your argument that the Kirks need not be unique simply because they are separated is, in my opinion, too strong to be supported by that observation alone. Yes, for infinitesimal time around the moment of transportation, if transporters created multiple copies simultaneously (have we ever seen them do this), then we would briefly have truly identical Kirks/Rikers/Datas/whatever. But except for this special case, which occurs only for something like a few picoseconds around the instant of transportation, we will have physically distinct (and almost certainly unique) Kirks/Rikers/Datas/whatever.

Except that argument was framed in the context of a sort of idealized transporter, or a perfect copy machine (PCM), which does copy instantly, and I would leave the timescale effects for later — right now we have quite enough on our plate.

I feel that the timescale effects make the question of "are ideal copies perfectly interchangeable and therefore not unique" irrelevant, and are therefore important. Men are not hydrogen atoms.

I hesitate to call the disassembly of the individual a "death," as it is a massive poisoning of the well.

I'm willing to do so, but only while noting that this is a far more trivialized form of "death" than we normally deal with, so I prefer to avoid using the term.

Of course, it's both, but what is the essense of its "objectness"? What makes the individual an object rather than a collection of atoms? Is it the pattern of atoms within that volume? Then "objectness" is preserved with transportation, including all that it implies including its individual history. Is an object a fixed sator of atoms that do not change? Then living matter does not possess "objectness" as it is constantly exchanging atoms with its environment, and will eventually widdle itself away to nothing that is original.

Sator?

Anyway, there's an intermediate possibility, based on the concept of physical continuity, that plays a large role in our intuitive notions of "objectness." This is where we have trouble with the Ship of Theseus I mentioned earlier:

The Athenians keep an old ship that they believe belonged to the hero Theseus.
The ship being wooden, parts have to be replaced periodically to keep the hull from rotting through.
After a century or two, every part of the ship has been replaced.
Is this still the ship of Theseus?

Meanwhile: imagine that the old parts are taken away and stored.
When every part of the ship has been replaced, we use the old parts to assemble a new ship.
Is this the ship of Theseus?

Finally, and just for laughs:
Assume we craft identical replicas of every part of the ship, and build such a ship.
Is this the ship of Theseus?

Our intuition tells us that the first ship has physical continuity, because we could watch it from the time of Theseus to the present and observe it being there at all times. It was there all along and never left. Even if no specific part of the assembly-that-is-the-ship dating back to Theseus's ownership remains, it's a continuously existing assembly that once belonged to Theseus. And thus the first ship is still the ship of Theseus.

But the second ship also has physical continuity (at least until the rotten old timbers fall apart), because it shares all the same parts and the same configuration, even though it was dismantled and put back together. And so the second ship can also be called the ship of Theseus.

The third ship is generally thought not to be the ship of Theseus, any more than the battleship Iowa is the battleship Missouri, even though they are sister ships built to the same basic plan.

Now, there are surely inconsistencies and problems with this, but it's an interesting starting point. Because transporter copies are probably in the same class as the third ship, but might be in the same class as the second ship if they use the original matter*. Whereas your actual body over long, un-teleported time periods, is more like the first ship, because bits of it are continuously replaced but there is a physically continuous assembly that we could trace all the way from your birth to the present.

*And, again, there are strong arguments against that.

[SapphireFox]

It does not. At 1.2 kg/m³ for STP atmosphere, a six-man party beaming in should evacuate a volume of air nine meters across. It would set up an appreciable wind at the very least, and depressurize completely small confined spaces. For dissolution, unbound subatomic particles would rocket away from each other via the virial theorem, and manifest as a certainly fatal radiation dose to everyone around them, if they don't cook everyone around them outright. They would not simply "puff" away, and if the sparkling of the transporter effect was really Cherenkov radiation from escaping subatomic particles, the people around them would have literally minutes to write their wills before their central nervous systems turn to liquid shit.

DAMN! That would be some nasty shit! It's obvious what I thought wouldn't work. Makes me wonder why the transporter doesn't "cook" the surroundings or the subject during transport. If the escape of particles would naturally release or be radiation then would a subject or transport site be more radioactive after transport.

If a definition of a word is at odds with the properties of what you are describing, then the word should not be used to describe it. "Death," as understood by the context of this discussion, doesn't fit the definition of a subject mid-transport.

Then what exactly would you call it? Because having no body functions is what I would call dead at that point I can't point to it and say it's any more alive than my desk. I can't define a disasociated cloud of sub atomic particals as alive so what is it then?
Temp zombie?

This is the reason why we have philosophy departments in university. They make it their business to crack open familiar notitions and see what wierdness is hiding within. However, they do it in a way that is ass-backwards and ungrounded in reality, which is why you see nothing but bullshit from their side. It reminds me of the joke about physicists, mathematicians and philosophers.

It's too late to think about it right now, so I'll just sign off here. Meanwhile, you can start brainstorming about what salient properties a "person" should have. In particular, I want you to think about whether or not "individual" must be separated from "person" as distinct concepts. That's all I ask for the moment.

Ill think about it but I make no promises. Philosphy is not a subject I hold near and dear to my heart.

[SapphireFox]

edit: doubble post

[Simon_Jester]

Then what exactly would you call it? Because having no body functions is what I would call dead at that point I can't point to it and say it's any more alive than my desk. I can't define a disasociated cloud of sub atomic particals as alive so what is it then?
Temp zombie?

Ghost? That's what I'd pick, but I have a bad habit of taking nonscientific terms and repurposing them to describe new concepts.

[Wyrm]

Though, the transporter definitely disintegrates the subject, and it's not at all clear to me that it puts the subject back together out of the same material. There seems to be continuity of experience, but there doesn't seem to be physical continuity. IF the transporter does not use matter from the subject to rebuild the subject (and the possibility of duplication argues against it very strongly), this would provide a basis for an original/copy distinction, were it not for the fact that the "original" is now missing.

It is likely in the case of ST transporter that the original matter is used when possible and supplementing from its own stores when necessary. I say this because of the problem of mass balance at remote sites (see my responses to SapphireFox). The mass for reconstruction will probably have to come from the ship, and... well, by Jimminy, we have all this matter already demateralized in the exactly correct amount, almost as if we'd taken apart a body which is now ready to put back together! Hell, there's probably a small mass loss anyway, but that happens anyway when you breathe. The subject is mostly original material, and probably more original material than after an equivalent time living.

In every case of transporter "cloning," there is no account for where the original matter has gone, but I find it very hard to believe that its nowhere to be found or is confined exclusively to one of the resultant individuals.

Well, that depends heavily on your definition of interchangeable. They'll be able to wear each other's uniforms for a long time to come, so for that value of "epsilon" they're liable to be interchangeable for weeks, months, or years.

However, your argument that the Kirks need not be unique simply because they are separated is, in my opinion, too strong to be supported by that observation alone. Yes, for infinitesimal time around the moment of transportation, if transporters created multiple copies simultaneously (have we ever seen them do this), then we would briefly have truly identical Kirks/Rikers/Datas/whatever. But except for this special case, which occurs only for something like a few picoseconds around the instant of transportation, we will have physically distinct (and almost certainly unique) Kirks/Rikers/Datas/whatever.

<snip>

I feel that the timescale effects make the question of "are ideal copies perfectly interchangeable and therefore not unique" irrelevant, and are therefore important. Men are not hydrogen atoms.

All of the differences you described are introduced by exposure to the environment and quantum happenstance, and thus have nothing at all to do with the Kirks themselves — they would happen regardless of the particular Kirk, or indeed, if there were additional Kirks in the first place. The copies are not identical, but they are not different in a way that allows us to say anything more than that there are two Kirks now, and they would evolve away from each other... but this was never in dispute! Therefore, I feel that while you are technically correct, your point is nonetheless irrelevant to our discussion about the (non)fatality of the transporter.

Sator?

The stationary, immobile part of a motor, co-opted by the Conway's Game of Life community to mean the parts of an oscillator that do not change state.

Anyway, there's an intermediate possibility, based on the concept of physical continuity, that plays a large role in our intuitive notions of "objectness." This is where we have trouble with the Ship of Theseus I mentioned earlier:

The Athenians keep an old ship that they believe belonged to the hero Theseus.
The ship being wooden, parts have to be replaced periodically to keep the hull from rotting through.
After a century or two, every part of the ship has been replaced.
Is this still the ship of Theseus?

Meanwhile: imagine that the old parts are taken away and stored.
When every part of the ship has been replaced, we use the old parts to assemble a new ship.
Is this the ship of Theseus?

Finally, and just for laughs:
Assume we craft identical replicas of every part of the ship, and build such a ship.
Is this the ship of Theseus?

Our intuition tells us that the first ship has physical continuity, because we could watch it from the time of Theseus to the present and observe it being there at all times. It was there all along and never left. Even if no specific part of the assembly-that-is-the-ship dating back to Theseus's ownership remains, it's a continuously existing assembly that once belonged to Theseus. And thus the first ship is still the ship of Theseus.

But the second ship also has physical continuity (at least until the rotten old timbers fall apart), because it shares all the same parts and the same configuration, even though it was dismantled and put back together. And so the second ship can also be called the ship of Theseus.

The third ship is generally thought not to be the ship of Theseus, any more than the battleship Iowa is the battleship Missouri, even though they are sister ships built to the same basic plan.

Now, there are surely inconsistencies and problems with this, but it's an interesting starting point. Because transporter copies are probably in the same class as the third ship, but might be in the same class as the second ship if they use the original matter*. Whereas your actual body over long, un-teleported time periods, is more like the first ship, because bits of it are continuously replaced but there is a physically continuous assembly that we could trace all the way from your birth to the present.

But you didn't think about it until someone pointed it out to you, did you? Just watching the show, our intuition is that the individual arriving at the remote site is the individual that stepped onto the transport pad. I have no doubts that if you were a close personal friend of Picard, and you talked to him just after beaming down, you would NOT treat him any differently than you would if you had done so as he was stepping onto the pad. Yet you just saw him appear out of thin air in a sparkly snowstorm that reconstructs him atom by atom.

There is a psychological disorder called Capgras syndrome where you hold the delusion that familiar people or objects are replaced by identical-looking impostors. This delusion is bulletproof to any and all forms of evidence — fingerprints, intimate knowledge and so on only convinces the patient how solid the imposter's acting and research has been. THis syndrome is caused by the fact we have two visual pathways into the brain, one conscious and completely based on what we consciously acknowledge, and the other an unconscious emotional pathway. You recognize your mother because it both looks and feels like your mother. In Capgras, the unconscious pathway is ruptured, and the emotion does not swell forth. You see your mother and recognize her as her mother consciously, but no feeling is forthcoming, so you resolve the dilemma by thinking she's an imposter.

This is the intuition you claim to be a guide to figuring out whether people stepping off the transport pad are the people that stepped on? The ship of Theseus exists in the heads of the Athenians as a group of feelings they place on a particular assemblage of ship-parts. Picard exists as a group of feelings we place on a particular assemblage of atoms, regardless of whether the atoms are or are not original parts of the original Picard. The only continuity here is a continuity of those emotions, linked to a conscious recognition of a familiar form. If you rely on intuition, then the transport subject is indeed legit and the discussion may be settled here and now.

*And, again, there are strong arguments against that.

I'd like to see them, because all the arguments I find fail to deal with the problem of where the matter comes from at the remote site, which doesn't have a ready matter store nearby, and where drawing matter from the surrounding environment and returning to that environment would have many interesting side-effects.

====

Then what exactly would you call it? Because having no body functions is what I would call dead at that point I can't point to it and say it's any more alive than my desk. I can't define a disasociated cloud of sub atomic particals as alive so what is it then?
Temp zombie?

It's some kind of (particle beam-based) suspended animation. It's qualitatively similar to the Sleeper option for colonization to other planets, during which there are no life processes in the colonists' bodies any more than in your table. Only the details of the suspended animation is different. That form of preserving life is quite reversible (unless you do it wrong), for obvious reasons... unless you insist that the extrasolar colonies are to be inhabited by freezer-zombies.

Hmmm, I think we have the makings of a good first-person shoot-'em-up!

[SapphireFox]

It's some kind of (particle beam-based) suspended animation. It's qualitatively similar to the Sleeper option for colonization to other planets, during which there are no life processes in the colonists' bodies any more than in your table. Only the details of the suspended animation is different. That form of preserving life is quite reversible (unless you do it wrong), for obvious reasons... unless you insist that the extrasolar colonies are to be inhabited by freezer-zombies

Some how the term does not convey the feeling of lacking a body but it's still rather accurate. On the other hand Simon_Jesters word concept doesn't give the correct feel to me either. (being a Ghost in the Shell fan using the term ghost in this way feels wrong) Would "suspended existence" work?

Hmmm, I think we have the makings of a good first-person shoot-'em-up!

I can just see it done as an X-Com style game shooting down incoming sleeper ships full of zombies and having to take care of infestations when they land or survive a crash.

[Simon_Jester]

All of the differences you described are introduced by exposure to the environment and quantum happenstance, and thus have nothing at all to do with the Kirks themselves — they would happen regardless of the particular Kirk, or indeed, if there were additional Kirks in the first place. The copies are not identical, but they are not different in a way that allows us to say anything more than that there are two Kirks now, and they would evolve away from each other... but this was never in dispute! Therefore, I feel that while you are technically correct, your point is nonetheless irrelevant to our discussion about the (non)fatality of the transporter.

This side topic only came up because I disagreed with your contention that a pair of Kirks in separate places could be identical. From my point of view that isn't really true, not by the definition of "identical" that you implied by using examples like electrons. Electrons aren't just functionally interchangeable. They're all the same, uniformly and without exception.

But I don't think we disagree on any essential matter of fact here, no. And I do admit that it was always a side topic.

Sator?

The stationary, immobile part of a motor, co-opted by the Conway's Game of Life community to mean the parts of an oscillator that do not change state.

Hmm. I'd think that would be called a "stator" or something. Strange.

This is the intuition you claim to be a guide to figuring out whether people stepping off the transport pad are the people that stepped on?

No, but I think it's an interesting intermediate position. Because there's a philosophical position that lies halfway between the two extremes of "any Riker configured approximately like our Riker is really Riker" and "only Riker as he is now is really Riker, and replacing any part of him makes him less of a Riker."

And that position ties identity to physical continuity. It happens to line up more closely with our intuition than either of the extreme positions. But it claims that a transporter copy is not really Riker, because (many believe) there is a physical discontinuity: that there is no part of Riker which you can follow from the Riker who beamed down to the "Riker" that arrives at the destination.

This is where a lot of people are coming from when they say that transporters kill. They would have no problem with the idea of replacing individual bits of Riker with cybernetics or cloned body parts; that would not break the thread of continuity. But a transporter that completely disintegrates the subject and puts a copy back together (possibly from the same atoms)? That's a much more drastic process.

So a person who thinks this way would say that transporters kill, because they cause a physical discontinuity. That was my point, because it's worth trying to address it directly: is physical continuity of some sort a necessary condition for identity?

*And, again, there are strong arguments against that.

I'd like to see them, because all the arguments I find fail to deal with the problem of where the matter comes from at the remote site, which doesn't have a ready matter store nearby, and where drawing matter from the surrounding environment and returning to that environment would have many interesting side-effects.

The two I can think of off the top of my head:

-Star Trek isn't up to storing power on that scale, or transmitting it over long distances. The energy in a transporter beam that actually provided the mass-energy to create the subject would be a far more powerful weapon than anything we've seen transporter-armed ships deploy in combat. There may be an explanation for that... but it's still at least a decent argument, if not a decisive one.
-The transporter can, in potential, create multiple copies that contain far more mass-energy than you could get from the original- again, the ship isn't supplying it, and it has to come from somewhere.

[Wyrm]

All of the differences you described are introduced by exposure to the environment and quantum happenstance, and thus have nothing at all to do with the Kirks themselves — they would happen regardless of the particular Kirk, or indeed, if there were additional Kirks in the first place. The copies are not identical, but they are not different in a way that allows us to say anything more than that there are two Kirks now, and they would evolve away from each other... but this was never in dispute! Therefore, I feel that while you are technically correct, your point is nonetheless irrelevant to our discussion about the (non)fatality of the transporter.

This side topic only came up because I disagreed with your contention that a pair of Kirks in separate places could be identical. From my point of view that isn't really true, not by the definition of "identical" that you implied by using examples like electrons. Electrons aren't just functionally interchangeable. They're all the same, uniformly and without exception.

I only referred to electrons as a demonstration that the proposition "two entities localizable to different volumes, therefore they are not identical" is a logical fallacy, given that it doesn't hold for at least one class of objects, subatomic particles. Any definition of "identical" that I would apply to people like Kirk would be more on the line of "no intrinsic difference." And the Kirks' differences are due to solely extrinsic factors.

Hmm. I'd think that would be called a "stator" or something. Strange.

You're right. I'm not an electician.

No, but I think it's an interesting intermediate position. Because there's a philosophical position that lies halfway between the two extremes of "any Riker configured approximately like our Riker is really Riker" and "only Riker as he is now is really Riker, and replacing any part of him makes him less of a Riker."

And that position ties identity to physical continuity. It happens to line up more closely with our intuition than either of the extreme positions. But it claims that a transporter copy is not really Riker, because (many believe) there is a physical discontinuity: that there is no part of Riker which you can follow from the Riker who beamed down to the "Riker" that arrives at the destination.

This is where a lot of people are coming from when they say that transporters kill. They would have no problem with the idea of replacing individual bits of Riker with cybernetics or cloned body parts; that would not break the thread of continuity. But a transporter that completely disintegrates the subject and puts a copy back together (possibly from the same atoms)? That's a much more drastic process.

So a person who thinks this way would say that transporters kill, because they cause a physical discontinuity. That was my point, because it's worth trying to address it directly: is physical continuity of some sort a necessary condition for identity?

A more basic question: is identity a physically relevant property in the first place, or is it just something we made up? I think it's something we made up. Your "ship of Theseus" example essentially proves the case that the ship of Theseus is a mental construct. It is a mental construct that we attach to real objects, but still a mental construct.

Death, on the other hand, is a quite physically relevant condition. Death is one of the mechanisms of natural selection, which physically pushes populations to adapting to their environment to stave it off. Creatures with no intelligence, or even nervous systems, actively deploy strategies to stave off death by any means at their disposal.

The topic of this thread is "do transporters kill?" That implies that we're talking about a physical condition. Since whatever the transporter does is quite reversible, it lacks the irreversability condition we ascribe to death. So-called "transporter death" lacks the physical consequences we ascribe "death for real". Someone who argues physical discontinuity means the person is killed is going beyond the definition of "death", and is using a definition that can only be meaningfully applied to transporters — disassembling someone down to their atoms and reintegrating them somewhere else is the definition of a transporter. As such, it's equivalent to saying, "Transporters kill because I say so!" which is a logical fallacy.

-Star Trek isn't up to storing power on that scale, or transmitting it over long distances. The energy in a transporter beam that actually provided the mass-energy to create the subject would be a far more powerful weapon than anything we've seen transporter-armed ships deploy in combat. There may be an explanation for that... but it's still at least a decent argument, if not a decisive one.

You're still left with the question, "if not from the ship, where?!" As such, it is not a "decent" explanation in the first place. Further, the net energy change during the beaming process is zero, less potential energy changes from dragging a body into and out of a gravity well. As such, it is entirely conceivable that the exact process actually involves comparatively little energy. We already have precident with phaserization of objects. Also, you're dreaming if you imagine that being able to manipulate arbitrary matter at a fine scale from many kilometers distant would not in itself be a weapon of comparable power.

-The transporter can, in potential, create multiple copies that contain far more mass-energy than you could get from the original- again, the ship isn't supplying it, and it has to come from somewhere.

In all of the examples of transporter copying the specific interaction with the environment is noted as irregular — that is, not the normal operation of the machine. The extra stuff comes from the (irregular) interaction of the phenomenon and the transport process. In the absence of such wierdness, you have a distinct lack of matter sources/drains at the remote site.

[Simon_Jester]

Death, on the other hand, is a quite physically relevant condition...

The topic of this thread is "do transporters kill?" That implies that we're talking about a physical condition. Since whatever the transporter does is quite reversible, it lacks the irreversability condition we ascribe to death.

Which I've been saying for over a week. I even got mocked by Stark for saying it badly.

You're still left with the question, "if not from the ship, where?!" As such, it is not a "decent" explanation in the first place. Further, the net energy change during the beaming process is zero, less potential energy changes from dragging a body into and out of a gravity well. As such, it is entirely conceivable that the exact process actually involves comparatively little energy. We already have precident with phaserization of objects. Also, you're dreaming if you imagine that being able to manipulate arbitrary matter at a fine scale from many kilometers distant would not in itself be a weapon of comparable power.

Oh, it would be, but at least it's a weapon with the same limits imposed on it that we see with normal transporter operation- not working through shields or in the face of serious interference. Whereas the ability to beam energy in the gigaton range from one place to another is... somewhat more far-ranging in consequences. At least when it comes to the kind of space combat we see.

In all of the examples of transporter copying the specific interaction with the environment is noted as irregular — that is, not the normal operation of the machine.

Yes, but the interaction shouldn't even be possible unless the matter to make the second (third, fourth) copies is coming from somewhere.

Machines can only fail in ways that are energetically possible. For example, your car engine could conceivably hiccup and cause you to accelerate out of control. But it could not hiccup and "accidentally" drive your car past the sound barrier. The engine cannot generate the forces it would take to accelerate the car to Mach 1. Likewise, a nuclear reactor can fail in ways that spread radioactive contamination, but it cannot fail in ways that create a highly energetic explosion (a mushroom cloud).

In the same way, a transporter that necessarily transmits large amounts of energy to produce a copy should not be capable of "accidentally" transmitting two or three times more energy to make two or three copies. Not unless the energy reserves to make that happen are casually available. and we know from numerous other lines of evidence that the ship cannot generate that kind of power, not casually.

So where is the energy to make the second copy coming from? You can say "this is a failure mode," but the failure modes a piece of machinery is capable of sets bounds on what the machine is capable of in normal operation.

Somehow, in some way, the machinery of a transporter can hiccup and assemble a second copy of a human being from its existing data and (limited) energy reserves. This strongly implies that a large proportion of the energy needed to assemble the second copy is coming from somewhere not on board the ship. Maybe it's more subspace technomagic; I don't know. But it's got to be coming from somewhere.

And since transporter-copying hiccups are not extremely uncommon (we see several on the shows), it strikes me as odd that the transporter could do this unless its normal mode of operation did the same thing. It's much easier for a machine to fail by doing what it was designed to do "too well" than for it to fail by doing something completely different that it was never designed to do.

[Wyrm]

In all of the examples of transporter copying the specific interaction with the environment is noted as irregular — that is, not the normal operation of the machine.

Yes, but the interaction shouldn't even be possible unless the matter to make the second (third, fourth) copies is coming from somewhere.

Like, say, the environment?

Machines can only fail in ways that are energetically possible. For example, your car engine could conceivably hiccup and cause you to accelerate out of control. But it could not hiccup and "accidentally" drive your car past the sound barrier. The engine cannot generate the forces it would take to accelerate the car to Mach 1. Likewise, a nuclear reactor can fail in ways that spread radioactive contamination, but it cannot fail in ways that create a highly energetic explosion (a mushroom cloud).

In the same way, a transporter that necessarily transmits large amounts of energy to produce a copy should not be capable of "accidentally" transmitting two or three times more energy to make two or three copies. Not unless the energy reserves to make that happen are casually available. and we know from numerous other lines of evidence that the ship cannot generate that kind of power, not casually.

So where is the energy to make the second copy coming from? You can say "this is a failure mode," but the failure modes a piece of machinery is capable of sets bounds on what the machine is capable of in normal operation.

Somehow, in some way, the machinery of a transporter can hiccup and assemble a second copy of a human being from its existing data and (limited) energy reserves. This strongly implies that a large proportion of the energy needed to assemble the second copy is coming from somewhere not on board the ship. Maybe it's more subspace technomagic; I don't know. But it's got to be coming from somewhere.

Right, and all the known incidents involved interaction with highly energetic environments, the obvious place where the mass/energy for the extra copies to come from. It seems to be a prerequisite for the copying. But the transporter works fine outside these highly energetic environments — indeed, it works better without these highly energetic environments.

And since transporter-copying hiccups are not extremely uncommon (we see several on the shows), it strikes me as odd that the transporter could do this unless its normal mode of operation did the same thing. It's much easier for a machine to fail by doing what it was designed to do "too well" than for it to fail by doing something completely different that it was never designed to do.

Bullshit. Transporter technology is rather widespread in the Trek universe, with a healthy majority of every sentient race having its own version. This would easily amount to millions of transports per day. Yet the number of cloning incidents can be counted on one hand in two (maybe three) hundred years of history. This makes this kind of accident occur one part in >100 billion. That is extremely uncommon. Not practically impossible, but still, extremely uncommon by any definition. This has nothing to do with the normal operation of the device.

[PayBack]

Sorry I haven't ready through everything here, but for me, yes they kill. The reason I fear death most is because I like living.. I like experiencing life. If I get teleported I stop experiencing life when I'm disintegrated. Game Over, life for me ends. Then my matter is used to create a copy. Sure he's happy with my memories, thinking as I do, living life.. but for me it ended at disintegration.

So if I would never wish to be teleported as I will cease to experience life.

Actually I thought we'd called bullshit on the claim that "A is identical to B so A is B" years ago.

[PayBack]

And since transporter-copying hiccups are not extremely uncommon (we see several on the shows), it strikes me as odd that the transporter could do this unless its normal mode of operation did the same thing. It's much easier for a machine to fail by doing what it was designed to do "too well" than for it to fail by doing something completely different that it was never designed to do.

Bullshit. Transporter technology is rather widespread in the Trek universe, with a healthy majority of every sentient race having its own version. This would easily amount to millions of transports per day. Yet the number of cloning incidents can be counted on one hand in two (maybe three) hundred years of history. This makes this kind of accident occur one part in >100 billion. That is extremely uncommon. Not practically impossible, but still, extremely uncommon by any definition. This has nothing to do with the normal operation of the device.

This is true.. there are millions of transports each day, but all accidents only happen on the enterprise, ipso facto accidents are rare cos we haven't seen many.