Lightsaber or Site-to-site transporter?

[The Grim Squeaker]

Transporter, the lighsaber would just be an overgrown cutting knife for a non jedi and the transporter would let me have a monopoly over earths new transportation system. (teleporting creams carpooling).

[Nieztchean Uber-Amoeba]

Let's see, be able to transport any amount of goods instantly throughout the entire world or even in orbit (take that, Space Elevator!) and get to the opposite side of the world at no cost and without any long boring journey, which would entirely revolutionize almost every science and industry in the world,

vs.

A powerful sword.

Damn, this is some tricky shit, I'm going to have to think about this. Oh wait, no I'm not.

And as for the "YOU DIEZORS!!111oneone11!!wun" argument, first, if it looks, thinks, feels, and in all ways is the same thing that I am, it's me. I think Drachefly put it best.

[Dooey Jo]

Any operation upon me which when it is done leaves me back in the same state (aside from some updating)... does not kill me.

Yes, but that is not how transporters work. If they had merely moved all your atoms from one spot to another, via tunneling or whatever, then it's very probable that "I" would still exist after the process. But unfortunately, transporters are a disintegration and cloning process. This is proven, among other things, by Riker being duplicated twice in an episode.

So look at it this way (although I have already written it, in my other post):
You step into a malfunctioning transporter and it scans you. But instead of recreating you in a far away location, it recreates you right next to you. Your original atoms are not destroyed in this process (because of the malfunction). Is this exact duplicate of you, also you? Yes it is, but only to an outside observer. Other people would not be able to see any difference between the two of you. But the original you sure would. Otherwise, "you" would have to exist in two, identical but separated, nervous systems. Two bodies would have to be controlled by the same mind.

That would only be possible if some sort of soul or something similar existed that could exist outside your brain which could be magically transferred between the two bodies (which would beg the question: Is the original you now soul-less after the soul-transfer). There is no evidence for this. And I think the duplicates of Riker did independent decisions, so there it's even contradicted by the show...

Think to what Yoda said. "Luminous beings are we, not this crude matter." Let go of your body, you are more than that.

That's probably what the Federation's pro-transporter crowd would say. Yes, a mind could probably be moved from a brain to a computer or into an electronic brain-replica, but only through some transitional process.

Actually, now I thought of another analogy. What if some AI researcher manages to create an exact duplicate of your mind inside a computer? There is no way of telling which one is the real you (aside from the fact that you still have a body), and this computer can learn things just like you can. It is a perfect copy. And then the researcher comes up to you and shoots you dead. Do you still exist? No, you do not; your exact duplicate exists. Even if this digital mind is somehow transferred back into a biological body, you would still not exist. You died when the researcher killed you, just like you would when the transporter disintegrates all your atoms to build a copy.

Transporters are evil when used to transport people, and you would have to accept the concept of a soul to say otherwise. I don't, so there is no way in hell I would ever use a Star Trek transporter for that.

[Winston Blake]

Let's see, be able to transport any amount of goods instantly throughout the entire world or even in orbit (take that, Space Elevator!) and get to the opposite side of the world at no cost and without any long boring journey, which would entirely revolutionize almost every science and industry in the world,

vs.

A powerful sword.

Damn, this is some tricky shit, I'm going to have to think about this. Oh wait, no I'm not.

I'm going with the transporter too. The only really useful thing about a lightsaber is it's unbelievably efficiency and energy density, the TPM blast door calcs IIRC were ~100MW or the power of a small nuclear reactor. Besides that, all you have is the fact it can cut through stuff that isn't too dense, which isn't going to be anywhere near as revolutionary as a godtech teleporting machine. I mean, the possibilities are endless with reverse-engineered transporter tech, even completely ignoring transporting people. The physics and capabilities are just so beyond us right now that i wouldn't be surprised if such a thing falling into our laps resulted in an Outside Context Problem-style holocaust.

And as for the "YOU DIEZORS!!111oneone11!!wun" argument, first, if it looks, thinks, feels, and in all ways is the same thing that I am, it's me. I think Drachefly put it best.

I'm firmly in the 'It kills you, thanks but no thanks' camp.

Example: you're kidnapped by mad scientists and when the blindfold is pulled off, a widescreen TV shows your room and perfect copy of you sitting at your computer. Then a transvestite dwarf stabs you in the balls until you're dead. Now, if that perfect copy goes and eats your food and screws your girlfriend and it thinks that it IS you, never having experienced a discontinuity in it's memory, does that make your bizarre and painful death any less real? A perfect copy will look, think, feel and in all ways be the same thing you are (right down to knowing how to make your girlfriend gasp), but you won't be the one doing the thinking or feeling or fucking.

As for the 'seven years replacement' thing, the obvious difference is that being transported involves both a physical and mental discontinuity, whereas long term cell-by-cell replacement doesn't. In the brief moment that you're in itty bitty pieces, your brain both no longer exists and is not functioning (i.e. your mind no longer exists). You cannot be described as being alive in that moment, hence you have died. The fact that a copy can be built to exact specs later on is irrelevant, even if your body's matter is used as raw material [see "transvestite dwarf" above.]

[El Moose Monstero]

The only real argument against all the 'it kills you' side of things is a bit crap, but essentially, if it did kill you each time it transported you, then surely no bugger would use it? Unless we assume that noone has realised that it kills you yet in the ST universe of course.

[drachefly]

But unfortunately, transporters are a disintegration and cloning process. This is proven, among other things, by Riker being duplicated twice in an episode.

First, a nitpick. It isn't cloning. Duplication, maybe.

But even supposing it is...

So look at it this way (although I have already written it, in my other post):
You step into a malfunctioning transporter and it scans you. But instead of recreating you in a far away location, it recreates you right next to you. Your original atoms are not destroyed in this process (because of the malfunction). Is this exact duplicate of you, also you? Yes it is, but only to an outside observer. Other people would not be able to see any difference between the two of you. But the original you sure would. Otherwise, "you" would have to exist in two, identical but separated, nervous systems. Two bodies would have to be controlled by the same mind.

Obviously, in such circumstances, we need to be careful with what we mean by the word 'I'.
My duplicate starts out the same as me and diverges. This process is mutual.
However, even in the absence of duplication, I (1:05 PM EDT) have diverged roughly the same amount from my previous self (1:04 PM EDT).
But this is still me!

There must be flexibility to 'I' once we introduce the possibility of duplication.

What did the duplicated me perceive? He perceived the transporter process operating as normal.
Normally, the non-duplicated 'me' would have been disintegrated. But this cutting off of the future is not abhorrent to me so long as the concept of 'I' continues on into the future roughly in its proper form, and as long as there is no particular suffering for any of my momentary duplicates.

Considering that memories during disintegration are maintained, it's clearly not painful.

Okay, consider these situations. This duplicator acts remotely.

You turn on the duplicator. The other you begins to be built. Then you change your mind and turn the duplicator off. The other you is left unfinished.

You turn on the duplicator. The other you is standing there for one millionth of a second when suddenly, he is phasorized (if you think phasorization is painful, replace with him being in a nuclear explosion or something).

This life of your duplicate that was destroyed... it had potential to become different and unique, but it WAS NOT YET.

Now, switch places with the duplicate. There you go, transporter

That would only be possible if some sort of soul or something similar existed that could exist outside your brain which could be magically transferred between the two bodies (which would beg the question: Is the original you now soul-less after the soul-transfer). There is no evidence for this.

You are falsely assuming that consciousness has to be a thing. If it is an emergent effect of the constituent parts, it is local, not a thing, and automatically 'travels' instantly with the constituent parts... and if the constituent parts happen to be duplicated, so it is as well. If I am transported, it comes with me.

[nightmare]

I'm going with the transporter too. The only really useful thing about a lightsaber is it's unbelievably efficiency and energy density, the TPM blast door calcs IIRC were ~100MW or the power of a small nuclear reactor. Besides that, all you have is the fact it can cut through stuff that isn't too dense,

I would say that a lightsaber can cut through any matter. Particularly dense materials and some funky stuff provides fair to exceptional resistance, but it can still be cut in due time. Of course, that may not be very useful in a battle.

[HSRTG]

Transporter, simply because of the endless pranking possibilities. Feeling down? Transport the engine of a car into the cab. Watch the reaction of the owner when he gets back . Neighbor pissed you off? Transport his toilet and heater/AC unit out to space .

On a more serious note, I probably wouldn't step into it. The possibility of a duplicate kinda freaks me out.

If I used a lightsaber without the years of training and force-enhanced reflexes, the thug attacking me would first kick me in the balls, then take it. Afterwards amusing himself by chopping off my limbs. One finger at a time.

[Winston Blake]

The only real argument against all the 'it kills you' side of things is a bit crap, but essentially, if it did kill you each time it transported you, then surely no bugger would use it? Unless we assume that noone has realised that it kills you yet in the ST universe of course.

It's possible that they simply don't give a damn about any of these implications, since from a 'black box' point of view, disintegration-copybuilding and transporting are functionally identical. In fact, we can see this willful ignorance in the vague and euphemistic name, since 'transporter' roughly implies conventional movement and completely glosses over the technology's mechanism.

Over time, people tend to take the capabilities of the technology around them for granted. Why question it? Everybody else has been using it for ages. The power of social conditioning is clear in the widely accepted prejudices of the past. McCoy's unpopular and 'superstitious' objections have already been mentioned.

[Ford Prefect]

So, how often does a transporter suffer a catastrophic malfunction and create a duplicate of you? I mean, I have to ask it. It certainly doesn't seem like a common occurance. People are saying these freak occurences are a big problem (and I agree. I'd hate to have a duplicate of me around) but they do seem to be just that, freak occurences.

So for someone who has seen the Riker double episode, do they ever mention that sort of malfunction before?

[Bounty]

So, how often does a transporter suffer a catastrophic malfunction and create a duplicate of you?

Riker was copied, but only due to the combination of a funky technobabble field and a transporter operator who bypassed the normal procedure (essentially, he engaged a second transport while the first was still active. The first transport pattern - "Will Riker" - made it back to the ship, the second - "Tom Riker" - was bounced back to the panet by the field)

Tuvok and Neelix were merged into one being, but that was because they were both being beamed up along with an alien plant. The plant messed with the transporter, and the three pattern got merged.

Apart from those, transporter accidents have been quite rare. There's the one from TMP, where the transporter just BSOD'd mid-transport, and the staged accident from somewhere in TNG (the one with the Romulan defector).

[Crown]

Even if it does kill you and what essentially walks out is an identical copy of the you that existed at the point of transport, then as long as it's the only version of me, as far as I'm concerned, it is me.

Um, except that if it kills you the first time you use it, then your copy certainly isn't you. You're still dead.

There was a scientist who esitmated that in every 9 year period there is not one single molecule in your body that was there 9 years ago, and those that were there 9 years ago have been 'shed' (hair/skin/sweat/excrement/etc). So technically 'you' aren't 'you'.

[drachefly]

That argument sucks. As already stated, it's so gradual that at every point in between, what's there is obviously you.

[Noble Ire]

That argument sucks. As already stated, it's so gradual that at every point in between, what's there is obviously you.

Why does the amount of time matter? Whether its a few seconds or seven years, your still not you. Saying just because its more gradual it doesnt count is stupid. If you put a piece of meat in an oven, it doesnt matter whether you put it on a low setting and let it sit for a while, or incinerate it in a few minutes. It's still cooked.

[drachefly]

When an atom leaves my body, it has been (more or less) replaced with another equivalent atom, probably even before it leaves.

Incidentally, that figure is an average... neurons' DNA probably see VERY little exchange, as wouldn't Bone etc.

If you're disintegrated, there is no such overlap.

[Plushie]

I would so do a site-to-site transporter.

Having trouble opening that door? Transport it away. See a hot girl? Transport her clothes a foot to the left (<3 DA). Need a coke? Transport it into the cup-holder of your lazyboy.

[Winston Blake]

That argument sucks. As already stated, it's so gradual that at every point in between, what's there is obviously you.

Why does the amount of time matter? Whether its a few seconds or seven years, your still not you. Saying just because its more gradual it doesnt count is stupid. If you put a piece of meat in an oven, it doesnt matter whether you put it on a low setting and let it sit for a while, or incinerate it in a few minutes. It's still cooked.

Being 'gradual' in this sense is more in the sense of smooth continuity rather than merely a long duration. At no point in that nine years (or whatever the figure is) do all your brain's neurons either cease functioning or are destroyed, so at no point is there a mental and physical discontinuity. During the disintegration part of Trek-transporting, your brain is torn apart into teeny tiny pieces and (hence) those neurons' processes have been stopped. I don't consider a cloud of raw subatomic particles to still be a living person, so death has occurred.

[Dooey Jo]

What did the duplicated me perceive? He perceived the transporter process operating as normal.
Normally, the non-duplicated 'me' would have been disintegrated. But this cutting off of the future is not abhorrent to me so long as the concept of 'I' continues on into the future roughly in its proper form, and as long as there is no particular suffering for any of my momentary duplicates.

You don't think being disintegrated and duplicated is creepy? Sure, the concept of "I", as percieved by other people, would still exist after the process but the original consciousness that was "I" would not, because the mind is, as you say, an emergent effect of the constituent parts, and those parts were destroyed. If you don't have a problem with that, then that's fine, I just think most people would have a problem with it.

Considering that memories during disintegration are maintained, it's clearly not painful.

Okay, consider these situations. This duplicator acts remotely.

You turn on the duplicator. The other you begins to be built. Then you change your mind and turn the duplicator off. The other you is left unfinished.

You turn on the duplicator. The other you is standing there for one millionth of a second when suddenly, he is phasorized (if you think phasorization is painful, replace with him being in a nuclear explosion or something).

This life of your duplicate that was destroyed... it had potential to become different and unique, but it WAS NOT YET.

First of all, I don't see what pain has to do with anything. Being destroyed is still being destroyed, wether it's painful or not, as I see it. Then secondly: Are you saying that the mind of the original and the mind of the duplicate actually are one and the same, and not just identical?

You are falsely assuming that consciousness has to be a thing. If it is an emergent effect of the constituent parts, it is local, not a thing, and automatically 'travels' instantly with the constituent parts... and if the constituent parts happen to be duplicated, so it is as well. If I am transported, it comes with me.

Travel, yes. But there is no travelling going on inside a transporter. You cease to exist in one spot, and a duplictate is brought into existance in another spot. I'm arguing that the only way that duplicate would be anything more than a duplicate is if the mind was not local but a thing. The mind clearly is not a thing, and thus the argument is false, and the duplicate is still a duplicate.

[His Divine Shadow]

Transporter, the atomizing you theory has problems, mentioned in the ST database somewhere.

[applejack]

Transporter, the atomizing you theory has problems, mentioned in the ST database somewhere.

I thought that was about the transporter scanning every part of you down to the last subatomic particle or atom that had problems.

IIRC, the subspace entanglement theory really doesn't do away with the whole body-converted-into-energy bit, which is really what's being discussed as far as those of us arguing "transporters kill you" are saying since that's around the time when you die. There was some mention of data about the pre-energized form in this thread, but I don't think it was necessarily about the atomic scanning thing.

[lumikant]

I think this is a bit off topic. Regardless of the ethical/spiritual question of a transporter, it's still infinately more usful than a lightsaber. The simple cargo moving ability would make it far more useful in every application that a lightsaber might be used for. Not to mention having a transporter would almost instantly lead to a replication device, which is also better than a lightsaber.

[petesampras]

The transporter = death argument simply comes down to whether you believe in a non-material soul. If you don't then nothing is lost in transportation. You can't say you don't believe in a soul and then claim to believe in conciousness (the philisophical rather than medical term), you are just changing the name of near identical concepts.

From a materialist perspective you brain is just a bunch of neurons processing information. There is no ghost in the machine, no secret observer that experiences the redness of red. There are no issues with having multiple copies of yourself. There is no need for continuity of conciousness because conciousness does not really exist.

I suggest reading Daniel Dennett as a good intro to these issues.

[Perseid]

Site-to-site transporter, just so I can eliminate travel costs and time spent travelling, it'd also be practical since my other half lives in a different country but thats besides the point.

[applejack]

The transporter = death argument simply comes down to whether you believe in a non-material soul. If you don't then nothing is lost in transportation.

Erm, don't you mean if one does believe in a non-material soul then nothing is lost in transport? The way you worded your sentence, you make it sound as if the soul itself is killed or lost during the transporter process.

You can't say you don't believe in a soul and then claim to believe in conciousness (the philisophical rather than medical term), you are just changing the name of near identical concepts.

Bull shit. Since when was the concept of a spiritual soul that's somehow transcendant of the brain the same thing as all philosophical ideas of consciousness?

From a materialist perspective you brain is just a bunch of neurons processing information. There is no ghost in the machine, no secret observer that experiences the redness of red. There are no issues with having multiple copies of yourself. There is no need for continuity of conciousness because conciousness does not really exist.

Who says consciousness can't be biologically based? You? Since my particular idea of consciousness, or "self," doesn't rely on some transcendant soul that exists outside of the realm of naturalism, but is intimately related to my physical brain and its functions, there goes your theory.

I suppose it's simply too much of a stretch to think that breaking a brain down to its component parts doesn't say any damn thing about what happens when the whole shebang actually starts working together.

I suggest reading Daniel Dennett as a good intro to these issues.

If it's more mental masturbation, then no thanks.

[petesampras]

Give me one piece of evidence that your biological based conciousness exists. You can't because it is fundamentaly unverifiable, and therefore has no place in a materialist / scientific outlook.

If a theory on something, like conciousness, can not be tested in some manner then the only way to beleive in it is with faith. This is pretty basic stuff. Either give me some evidence (or at the very least a test) for your biological conciousness, or except that you belief in it is paramount to faith.