Trench warfare as Coalition forces try to secure Helmand

[Dartzap]

Telegraph

Afghanistan battle like First World War
British, Afghan and coalition forces battled the Taliban at close quarters, knee-deep in mud, over Christmas in fierce trench battles reminiscent of the First World War, it has emerged.

The offensive in Afghanistan's central Helmand province involved more than 1,500 troops and was one of the largest operations mounted by Royal Marines since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) said.

It was fought over 18 days around the town of Nad-e-Ali to capture four key Taliban strongholds.

Some of the Royal Marines taking part trudged more than 60km through mud with packs on their backs while also fighting insurgents at close quarters, the MoD revealed.

A Lance Corporal, signaller with the 77th Armoured Engineer Squadron, said: "I was in Nad-e-Ali for just over two weeks ... Some of the places we stayed in were a nightmare - sleeping in the mud was the worst.

"(At times) we were exposed and moving ahead of our infantry protection. It felt like we were being watched and it was difficult to tell who the enemy was - it was pretty scary."

The operation, which culminated in a battle on Christmas Day, claimed the lives of five British servicemen and wounded scores of others.

Around 100 Taliban fighters were killed, including a senior commander.

Operation Sond Chara - Pashto for Red Dagger - was named after 3 Commando Brigade's shoulder badge.

Describing Sond Chara, Captain Dave Glendenning, commander of the marines' artillery support team, said: "Almost every day we were involved in intense fire-fights ranging from rocket-propelled grenades and small arms 'shoot-and-scoots' to four-hour battles with the enemy forces as close as 30 metres."

The operation aimed to provide better security in the provincial capital Lashkar Gah following Taliban attacks in October, and to pave the way for a voter registration programme due to start early this year.

The commander of Task Force Helmand, Brigadier Gordon Messenger of the Royal Marines, said: "This was a very successful operation that demonstrated the ability of the task force to surprise, overmatch, manoeuvre and influence over a huge area.

"Whilst our efforts have made a significant contribution to the overall Nad-e-Ali security plan, it has not been without sacrifice, and we will forever remember the contribution of those who died."

The operation, which also involved Danish, Estonian and Afghan troops, was unleashed in full on December 7 with an assault on insurgent positions in a village south of Nad-e-Ali.

A highly mobile team of Afghan and British reconnaissance troops, supported by Danish Leopard tanks, attacked under the cover of darkness, taking the Taliban by surprise.

The insurgents responded with 107mm rockets, but were forced to flee after being pounded with mortars, missiles and tank fire.

In a raid to the south of Lashkar Gah, troops also discovered a cache of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and drugs, including 400kg of opium with a street value of £2 million.

The offensive was put on hold from December 8 to 10 out of respect for the Muslim festival of Eid al-Adha.

But on the night of December 11, it began again in earnest when Royal Marines from 42 Commando launched a ground and air assault on Nad-e-Ali, securing an area which had previously been a key insurgent base.

Over the following days, K Company, known as the Black Knights, waged battles in ditches and trenches to push back insurgents as Royal Engineers struggled to build patrol bases in terrain which had been turned into a sea of mud by heavy rain.

A Corporal, the section commander of the 77th Armoured Engineer Squadron, which was tasked with constructing a patrol base to the south of Nad-e-Ali, said: "Working in these conditions was really difficult - at times we were constructing in torrential rain with mud up to our knees.

"At others, whenever the enemy saw us building they would have a go. There were a couple of close calls."

Meanwhile on December 11, 42 Commando's J Company, C Company and the 2nd Battalion The Princesses of Wales's Royal Regiment and soldiers from the Afghan National Army captured the town of Shin Kalay, west of Lashkar Gah.

The most ferocious fighting of the operation took place during the battle for Zarghun Kalay, north of Lashkar Gah, from December 17 to 19.

Troops had "yomped" through mud to get to the town before encountering a "canny and determined enemy".

They fought hand-to-hand in a "360-degree battle" which brought their "commando qualities to the fore", the MoD said.

On December 18, the insurgents fled to the north as the attack continued with support from Apache helicopters and artillery.

The two-day battle claimed the life of Australian national Rifleman Stuart Nash, 21, from the 1st Battalion The Rifles, who died after he being hit by enemy fire.

On December 21, 33-year-old Corporal Robert Deering, from Solihull in the West Midlands, was killed by an apparent booby trap while trying to help fellow soldiers who had been wounded by an explosion.

Early on Christmas morning (local time), marines began a helicopter assault on Chah-e-Anjir, a key Taliban command and control post from where the October attacks on Lashkar Gah are thought to have been directed.

But before Chah-e-Anjir fell to the British, Lance Corporal Ben Whatley, 20, of Tittleshall, Norfolk, was killed leading his men into action.

Two other marines Tony Evans, 20, from Sunderland, and Georgie Sparks, 19, from Epping, were killed in November during intelligence gathering for Sond Chara.

Good grief. I'm not envious of the lads out there at the moment, that's for sure.

[Kane Starkiller]

If the Coalition manages to do with 50,000 troops what Soviet Union failed to do with 300,000 I will be extremely impressed. But far more likely is that they'll ultimately pull out and Taliban will move in just like before.

[Darksider]

props to the brits, danes, and afgani soldiers fighting in this battle.

Where the hell are the godammned American troops? isn't this our godamn mess?

[Black Admiral]

props to the brits, danes, and afgani soldiers fighting in this battle.

Where the hell are the godammned American troops? isn't this our godamn mess?

Deployed elsewhere in the country, I believe; as far as I'm aware, of ISAF troops it's principally British and other EU ground forces in Helmand (although the USAF provides by far the greater part of their air support and so on).

[Lonestar]

props to the brits, danes, and afgani soldiers fighting in this battle.

Where the hell are the godammned American troops? isn't this our godamn mess?

American troops are deployed in their own sector. Just like, you know, Iraq.

[Medic]

If the Coalition manages to do with 50,000 troops what Soviet Union failed to do with 300,000 I will be extremely impressed. But far more likely is that they'll ultimately pull out and Taliban will move in just like before.

They have their plans and we have ours: by the time we may be pulling out of Afghanistan (not before 2009, not very soon after probably, either) there will be an Afghan National Army of 120,000 soldiers. Furthermore, even under a broad-based pullout, there would undoubtedly be SOME remnant American presence -- advisers and major combat multipliers like Apaches, fixed wing assets, be it close-support fighters or Specter gunships and American financial and logistical aid, technology, SIGINT capability and aerial reconnaissance. A small, but capable follow-on force can do a great deal in buttressing Afghanistan's indigenous military and police forces.
*I'll sneak in the edit* Any detailed reading of innumerable battles in Iraq and Afghanistan reveal the importance of American air support, fixed and rotary wing, in winning pitched battles and breaking up enemy formations. That's why remnant American forces, however few in number, if it includes a combat aviation brigade and some fighter support, can go a long way. We only need to get the Afghan Army and police trained up to a certain level of proficiency -- they needn't imagine life without any continued support from us, whatsoever. We've supplied their arms, equipment, billeting and vehicles -- we have a lot invested in them. It has to be noted too that Afghanistan is relatively fertile ground for laying the professional seeds of a military -- society there is not as corrupt as Iraq, where bribes seem a daily part of life.

Besides, it was 300,000 Soviet soldiers versus the mujahideen, aided by the West, and the Afghan populace -- the latter were on the Islamic fighters' side, not the Soviets. Here, it's the Coalition, the ANA and the better-wishes of the populace versus foreign fighters who've arrayed themselves against the most technologically-laden enemy the 21st century has to offer. On paper the numbers are impressive but it's not too apt a comparison.

What makes them think they can beat the West when they only beat the Soviets with Western aid? Allah, of course. Their misplaced faith may bring bodies to the conflict but there is not an atheist / Muslim dichotomy for them to exploit this time, they do not get the Afghani's support just for showing up. Americans, Canadians and the British may be infidels -- but the Taliban screwed the pooch when they held the reins of power, we are better by comparison, we're bringing money and Viagra. Additionally, Afghanistan's sent ANA Soldiers to FOB Army Strong to work directly with advisers training to go into that theater. There can be no better cultural preparation in training than communicating directly with Afghani nationals.

[Psychic_Sandwich]

It's also worth noting that the mujahideen wouldn't have enjoyed anywhere near the success they did if the US hadn't been supplying them with stuff like anti tank missiles. The guerrillas don't have an outside force supplying them with the weapons they need to win this time, so not only is their enemy better equipped than the Soviets were, they themselves are far worse off than the mujahideen.

[Lonestar]

Are you really saying that sophisticated weapons(of which, big picture, we gave out very little of) that stopped arriving in '88 are still having a big impact on the conflict today?

[Samuel]

Are you really saying that sophisticated weapons(of which, big picture, we gave out very little of) that stopped arriving in '88 are still having a big impact on the conflict today?

No, he is saying they don't have the weapons and that the US has an even bigger advantage than the Soviets.

[Lonestar]

No, he is saying they don't have the weapons and that the US has an even bigger advantage than the Soviets.

Ah, I had misread that as success against the US, not the Soviets(there are some folks who refer to Taliban fighters as "Mujahideen"). Also, I didn't think he was, well, basically saying the same thing that the Specialist had said as if he was making a new point. Guess I was wrong.

[K. A. Pital]

They have their plans and we have ours: by the time we may be pulling out of Afghanistan (not before 2009, not very soon after probably, either) there will be an Afghan National Army of 120,000 soldiers.

Najibullah also had an Army, and it was equipped and trained, I might add, in my view slightly better than the current narco-collapsed state army of the lawless wasteland called "Afghanistan" just to maintain some sort of legal name.

Their national Army was ineffective back then, which is why we had to intervene in the first place; it hardly looks effective now. You're saying the majority of the population was against us and it was just us versus the Muj. But that's wrong. Najibullah stood against the Muj even after we left, indicating that he had a sizeable popular base and his army was enough to hold at least for a while.

[Medic]

They have their plans and we have ours: by the time we may be pulling out of Afghanistan (not before 2009, not very soon after probably, either) there will be an Afghan National Army of 120,000 soldiers.

Najibullah also had an Army, and it was equipped and trained, I might add, in my view slightly better than the current narco-collapsed state army of the lawless wasteland called "Afghanistan" just to maintain some sort of legal name.

Their national Army was ineffective back then, which is why we had to intervene in the first place; it hardly looks effective now. You're saying the majority of the population was against us and it was just us versus the Muj. But that's wrong. Najibullah stood against the Muj even after we left, indicating that he had a sizeable popular base and his army was enough to hold at least for a while.

That tempers my assessment of the situation, but only inasmuch as it doubly reinforces the importance of stay-on Coalition assets to reinforce the ANA. America has the great advantage of possessing an unequaled expeditionary capability and ability to dole out foreign aid. Unless someone's taking the tact that war (weapons, in other words) isn't one of our greatest exports -- that's manifestly untrue. It was (along with the Soviet Union) the entire Cold War and remains so.

Besides, I'm a product of the Army which took on the job of building up the modern ANA -- I've seen a lot of the training and appreciate the degree of effort that's gone into it. Biased? Grossly, but also informed enough to be so.

Time will tell anyway, unfortunately, we still don't frankly know quite how Obama will play all the cards dealt him when he swears in. It goes beyond the obvious of manpower and aid in dollars, but other ideas (maybe he'll look at the drug trade in Afghanistan differently, too) like the Army institutionalizing a permanent advisory corps, something posited by retired Army LTC, Dr. John A. Nagl, not supported by the Army though. The Army has it's own ideas on how it will proceed with advisory missions but a new POTUS could decide for sure which side wins out. There are advantages and drawbacks to both approaches but right now we're at a crossroads with a new POTUS. It's always a surer thing to make predictions when there's consistency in leadership, for better or for worse though, new leadership just throws so many things into doubt or reconsideration.

[Sidewinder]

They have their plans and we have ours: by the time we may be pulling out of Afghanistan (not before 2009, not very soon after probably, either) there will be an Afghan National Army of 120,000 soldiers.

Najibullah also had an Army, and it was equipped and trained, I might add, in my view slightly better than the current narco-collapsed state army of the lawless wasteland called "Afghanistan" just to maintain some sort of legal name.

Their national Army was ineffective back then, which is why we had to intervene in the first place; it hardly looks effective now. You're saying the majority of the population was against us and it was just us versus the Muj. But that's wrong. Najibullah stood against the Muj even after we left, indicating that he had a sizeable popular base and his army was enough to hold at least for a while.

It didn't help that the Soviets made the same damn mistakes the US made in Vietnam, i.e., back a jackass head of government (Diem in America's case, Taraki in the Soviets'), assassinating this jackass when he made his own people hate him and became a liability, only to replace him with another jackass (Minh and Amin) while making only half-hearted attempts to fix the pandemonium resulting from these violent changes of leadership, and repeating this process (Khanh and Thieu, Karmal and Najibullah), all while their (America and the Soviets') troops were killing citizens of their allies' state, the citizens they were supposed to protect.

[Artemas]

If I recall, weren't the 300,000 soviet troops only the total numbers that served in Afghanistan, and not the actual troops numbers at any given point? Which I believe topped out at only 110,000.

[Sea Skimmer]

Yeah it was only around 110,000 in Afghanistan at the peak, and lower for most years. The initial invasion involved only about 40,000 troop. However like the ISAF today the Soviets based a large quantity of supporting airpower outside of the country so the true commitment of manpower to the fighting was higher. The ground force in country normal comprised of six motor rifle divisions and several independent brigades, all and all this wasn’t a very large force considering the size of even the active duty Soviet ground army, but it was still a huge drain on resources.

[Pelranius]

They have their plans and we have ours: by the time we may be pulling out of Afghanistan (not before 2009, not very soon after probably, either) there will be an Afghan National Army of 120,000 soldiers.

Najibullah also had an Army, and it was equipped and trained, I might add, in my view slightly better than the current narco-collapsed state army of the lawless wasteland called "Afghanistan" just to maintain some sort of legal name.

Their national Army was ineffective back then, which is why we had to intervene in the first place; it hardly looks effective now. You're saying the majority of the population was against us and it was just us versus the Muj. But that's wrong. Najibullah stood against the Muj even after we left, indicating that he had a sizeable popular base and his army was enough to hold at least for a while.

I was under the impression that Najibullah's forces after the Soviet withdrawal were somewhat competent but like the AVRN during 1975, they simply didn't have the supplies to mount any meaningful resistance to their opponents once their patron states got tried of the whole quagmire.

[HMS Vanguard]

I get the impression the coalition is doing a lot better in Afghanistan than the Soviets. They were winning, afterall, before we decided to give the Afghans Western weaponry...

[Coyote]

Najibullah stood against the Muj even after we left, indicating that he had a sizeable popular base and his army was enough to hold at least for a while.

Wasn't that one of those "there's the capitol city... and then there's everyone else" type things? A lot of these countries have one major city worth note, with a large chunk of population, and the President/Strongman whatsit will have a strong power base there while the rest of the country challenges his legitimacy? I got the feeling that there was a similar mood about Karzai, being referred to as "the President of Kabul" while the rest of th ecountry ignored him...

Other countries like Panama come to mind, where there was Panama City (pro-Noriega, anti-American, etc) and then everywhere else, small cities with scattered populations of rural types who didn't support him but didn't make a fuss of it overmuch, either.

[Medic]

I get the impression the coalition is doing a lot better in Afghanistan than the Soviets. They were winning, afterall, before we decided to give the Afghans Western weaponry...

I really should read these two books I have on the old Afghanistan war... (The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan and it's companion The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War; you'd find both under Jester W. Grau) which contains vignettes of battles from the perspective of both sides.

Okay, I read the conclusion's of both [NOTE: they're products of US military professionals institutions -- the one from the Mujahideen perspective from Marine Corps Combat Development Command and the one from the Russian perspective the Foreign Military Studies Office @ Ft. Leavenworth, KS, where Army field-grade officers earn their oak leaves] and there's a lot of good stuff.

1st off, it's a guerrilla war. That favors certain things (long term commitment and light infantry) and technology can ameliorate only so many problems for the Soviets. Technology extended the range of battles, and introduced widespread Soviet mining and the availability of strategic airpower and tactical gunship support, but on balance didn't prevent the Mujahideen from adopting tactics used a century earlier against Britain. Terrain, more than anything dictated the terms of battles. 1st though, Soviet failings throughout the war:

They were armed for the wrong fight. The Soviet military was armed to direct huge amounts of artillery at defensive NATO positions on European plains, then plow tanks and motorized rifle units through the gaps, long and deep. They'd envelop and cut off units which could be dealt with piecemeal and hopefully get to rear-echelon targets along the way, blah blah blah. Everything flowed from that but unfortunately, the Mujahideen did not present an appropriate target list for Soviet air power and didn't dig in and wait to be crushed by Soviet artillery. The Soviet airborne, air assault, SPETSNAZ and the two separate motorized rifle brigades displayed the most tactical innovation, especially in comparison to the motorized rifle regiments, but were too few in number and in the whole conflict, there never were enough Soviet forces.

It goes beyond the obvious because often regiments were only at one battalion strength, battalion's at one company strength, and so on. Replacements too were very biased towards AFV crew replacement, leaving too-few dismounts to pursue Mujahideen light infantry. Soviet mounted infantry carried heavy armor and a lot of ammo for their automatic weapons and could not tactically pursue Mujahideen -- again noting, if they had even the forces in a fight, to commit to such an action. Neither was their gear sufficient for prolonged field use outside of a vehicle -- 50's era sleeping bags weren't waterproof, when wet added great weight to a Soldier's load and it didn't keep him warm well. "The premier trophy for a Soviet soldier was a mujahideen sleeping bag from the West. They were lightweight, waterproof and warm."

RATIONS were a problem. They were unpalatable and consisted of shiny metal cans; it's hard to dig in the Afghan mountains and garbage littered about aided Mujahideen reconnaissance.

Most surprising to me, disease practically crippled Soviet end-strength. Poor field sanitation and diet meant up to 1/4 or 1/3 of a unit was normally sick with hepatitis, typhus, malaria, amoebic dysentery and meningitis. Units only replaced in fall and spring draft call-ups. The 40th army was always short of resources too, something which can squarely be blamed on political leadership well above any Soviet officers' ability to correct.

Morale among conscripts -- told they would fight American & Chinese mercenaries, and instead found themselves occupiers in an unwelcome land -- was poor. Narcotics became a problem, funded by selling issued gear. Afghans stopped at checkpoints carrying a lot of cash would be "sent to Kabul" -- or isolated, killed and pilfered. Officers morale too was poor. They found they didn't have the resources to carry out their mission and that they would be the scapegoats for its failure. What few women did work in Soviet base camps fueled fierce and sometimes violent competitions between officers, at times settled with "grenades and small arms." In the field, villages could be razed in retaliation for ambushes or suspected aid of guerrillas.



MOST significant among the list though is the poor manning of line units, a result of poor replacement planning, disease and Soviet political leadership constantly shortchanging them. I'm going to the gym now and will detail Mujahideen strengths then.