Frustration with nonproliferation.

[Ryan Thunder]

Nuclear weapons are owned by an elite handful of nations (including India and Pakistan and probably some shithole former Soviet Bloc countries... Whoops.) but using them would bring down complete condemnation and purging atomic fire on the country that employed them first, most likely from all quarters.

Wait, what? Why would it cause that? A nation as just demonstrated the capability and will to use a WMD and and now other countries are going to risk attacking it?

That's exactly why they're going to risk attacking it. Before it gets the chance to attack them, too.

[MKSheppard]

If Iran does get the bomb, we should give Iraq about oh, 50 nukes on some surplused F-16As under dual key arrangement, like in the bad days of NATO and Warsaw pact.

[Darth Wong]

Nuclear weapons are owned by an elite handful of nations (including India and Pakistan and probably some shithole former Soviet Bloc countries... Whoops.) but using them would bring down complete condemnation and purging atomic fire on the country that employed them first, most likely from all quarters.

Wait, what? Why would it cause that? A nation as just demonstrated the capability and will to use a WMD and and now other countries are going to risk attacking it?

That would depend on how many more they have in reserve. If they only have one or two other devices, it might be considered worthwhile to nuke them in order to prevent further unilateral nuclear strikes. Or, to put it in more stark relief, the nuclear deterrent of the more powerful nations becomes an empty threat if the trigger which would supposedly release it ... does not.

[Stark]

Particularly with nations who have just reached nuclear capability, it's very possible they'd have bugger-all in the way of nukes in either yield or number. If Iran built a nuke, and detonated it in (say) Israel somehow, they'd be totally fucked if they didn't have more and a more reliable delivery method than 'terrorists'.

However, in the paranoid scenario that a country is giving nukes to terrorists/etc, nuking the country to the ground and killing everyone may not necessarily help without good intel on where the weapons are at the time.

[Lord of the Abyss]

If Iran does get the bomb, we should give Iraq about oh, 50 nukes on some surplused F-16As under dual key arrangement, like in the bad days of NATO and Warsaw pact.

Which would accomplish what ? What's the point of putting nukes in an occupied enemy country, handing keys to them to people who hate us, to protect against what from Iran ?

[MKSheppard]

What's the point of putting nukes in an occupied enemy country, handing keys to them to people who hate us, to protect against what from Iran ?

So by your definition, Germany in the 50s, was an occupied enemy country -- nevermind that we had signed treaties with them, same way we've signed treaties with the Government of Iraq.

[Lord of the Abyss]

What's the point of putting nukes in an occupied enemy country, handing keys to them to people who hate us, to protect against what from Iran ?

So by your definition, Germany in the 50s, was an occupied enemy country -- nevermind that we had signed treaties with them, same way we've signed treaties with the Government of Iraq.

Did the majority of the population at the time hate us, and support killing us ? Were they the victims of an war of aggression by the US ? Was their country still in a shambles that could be laid at our feet ? Was the country still worse off than before we invaded ?

The two situations are not remotely alike.

[MKSheppard]

Did the majority of the population at the time hate us, and support killing us ?

They hated the Soviets more.

Were they the victims of an war of aggression by the US ?

Yes. (because in LoA land, the US is an evil warmongerer)

Was their country still in a shambles that could be laid at our feet?

A lot of it was still in shambles from STRATEGIC BOMBARDMENT.

Was the country still worse off than before we invaded?

1945 Germany was probably the lowest point you can get as a country, unless you start feeding orphans into mechanized orphan killing machines. So they had nowhere to go but up.

The two situations are not remotely alike.

[/quote]

Actually yeah, they are. We're now friends with the Republic of Iraq, in the same way we became friends with the Federal Republic of Germany.

[Lord of the Abyss]

Did the majority of the population at the time hate us, and support killing us ?

They hated the Soviets more.

In other words, no they didn't.

Were they the victims of an war of aggression by the US ?

Yes. (because in LoA land, the US is an evil warmongerer)

Wrong. They declared war on us, we were drawn into the war by an attack by one of their allies, AND they started the war in general. The opposite of our attack on Iraq.

It's amusing that you couldn't even come up with a weasel worded excuse for that one, and had to try to pretend that I think that America was a warmonger in WWII to divert attention.

Was their country still in a shambles that could be laid at our feet?

A lot of it was still in shambles from STRATEGIC BOMBARDMENT.

In other words, it still had some damage from a war they started. Not at all the same as being devastated by a war of conquest by an aggressor.

The two situations are not remotely alike.

Actually yeah, they are. We're now friends with the Republic of Iraq, in the same way we became friends with the Federal Republic of Germany.

What in the world makes you think we are their friends ? We are their enemies. They justifiably hate us and want us gone or dead.

[loomer]

Do you have any idea how badly damaged Germany was post-WW2, LoA? It was amazingly bad. People were starving to death on a daily basis in the country as well as the city. Given ten years, shit was still pretty bad - definitely not 'some' damage.

[Coyote]

LoA, he said a "dual-key arrangement", so the Iraqis have one launch key and the US personnel have the other. They couldn't launch unilaterally; anything they want to launch on would need US compliance.

And, no not "all Iraqis hate the US". Some do, some don't. Some dislike us less than they dislike the other foreigners, etc, stomping about over there. I'm sure there's a few who'd be happy to have us stay, actually. Many Kurdish areas were quite happy to have us there, for example.

[Lord of the Abyss]

Do you have any idea how badly damaged Germany was post-WW2, LoA? It was amazingly bad. People were starving to death on a daily basis in the country as well as the city. Given ten years, shit was still pretty bad - definitely not 'some' damage.

But that's not the point. The point is that it was largely destruction that they drew down on their own heads, and they knew it - we'd never have invaded if they hadn't started the war. As opposed to our war on Iraq, which was pure aggression on our part. And not to mention the fact that we did at least try to reconstruct Germany.

LoA, he said a "dual-key arrangement", so the Iraqis have one launch key and the US personnel have the other. They couldn't launch unilaterally; anything they want to launch on would need US compliance.

Which is what would make it useless. Iran isn't going to nuke Iraq; the only reason we'd put nukes there is for an attack on Iran ourselves. And the Iraqis aren't going to willingly condemn what's left of their country by acting as our launch platform.

And, no not "all Iraqis hate the US". Some do, some don't.

The majority do. And should.

[Coyote]

Which is what would make it useless. Iran isn't going to nuke Iraq; the only reason we'd put nukes there is for an attack on Iran ourselves. And the Iraqis aren't going to willingly condemn what's left of their country by acting as our launch platform.

It really depends on the situation. Iraqis (Arabs and Kurds alike, and this runs across the Sunni-Shia'a divide a lot too) and Iranians have been involved in border wars for years-- there is a long-running ethnic feud between them that predates Islam. This is one of the few areas of the world where there actually has, indeed, been WMD use in recent memory-- mostly chemical. Don't count them out just yet on their willingness to direct savagery towards Iran. They know that Iran and America are very much at odds and it would not surprise me if some elements of Iraq would be willing to make a deal with anyone if it meant finally having the upper hand over those evil Persians.

[Axis Kast]

The potential drawbacks of horizontal proliferation are enormous, far outweighing any potential benefit.

Many of the arguments in favor of “leaving it to deterrence” make essentially the same arguments as Kenneth Waltz: that the leaders of states are rational (indeed, the difficult road to achieving political power is a form of rigorous selection that “weeds out” any candidates playing without full sets of cards); that the destructive power of nuclear weapons is so great that misapprehension of the consequences of an exchange is simply impossible; and that discounting the capacity of developing nations to discharge competent stewardship is simple chauvinism. Proponents of opening the exclusive circle make a variety of additional arguments about the potential utility of nuclear weapons. A small, survivable arsenal will usually be cheap by comparison to conventional military equipment. The threat of nuclear retaliation will promote “hard thinking” before seriously aggressive action – many fewer will trifle so readily, and those that do will either watch their every step, or fight limited or proxy war under the long shadow of potential mushroom clouds.

Almost none of these presumptions are actually supported by the historical record, which offers important evidence on the limits of rationality; the unsuitability of certain organizations to be vested with the nuclear trigger; and proof that miscalculation can occur even when nuclear weapons are “on the table.” I also review the prerequisites of stable deterrence and reveal some additional problems with the mechanism itself. I begin, however, with an important explanation of what stable deterrence is, and why it is not always possible (or easy) to have it.

Stable deterrence is first of all dependent upon secure second-strike capability. If an adversary believes that he can strike first, wreck horrendous damage, and reliably eliminate your retaliatory capability, he will have enormous incentive to do so during a crisis. As Sagan points out, small, unsophisticated arsenals will tend not to meet the high bar of guaranteed resilience. In his essay, “Nuclear Instability in South Asia,” published in the edited volume, Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, 6th ed., Eds. Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), Sagan described the substantial shortcomings of the Pakistani nuclear command:

First, there is evidence that the Pakistani military … deployed its missile forces, following standard operating procedures, in ways that produce signatures giving away their deployment locations. (p. 377)

Specific communication infrastructure and wide-radius roads co-located with the “secret” weapons were the tell-tale sign.

In another published set of essays on the topic, again in juxtaposition with Kenneth Waltz, Sagan explained that military bureaucracies are rarely interested in survivable weapons. The United States military historically preferred to opt for larger numbers before increased survivability when it came to warheads, for example – it was Congress that sometimes mandated hardening.

Depending upon the rationality of state actors is equally problematic. First, there are problems of communication. Saddam Hussein alleged in 2003 that he was cooperating fully with United Nations weapons inspectors. Western intelligence agencies made judgments to the contrary. Because Saddam had already squandered his social capital during long years of deception, honest exchange was impossible. This wasn’t, of course, the first time that miscommunication and misperception had serious battlefield consequences. During the Korean War, the Indian government passed along a Chinese warning meant to convince Truman of the seriousness of MacArthur’s advance. Washington doubted that the Chinese had such mettle. But even if one insists that national leaders will always know the stakes during a genuine nuclear crisis, the decision about whether and how to initiate a nuclear exchange may actually be out of their hands. Second, pre-delegation may devolve authority to individuals at far remove from the capital who must use their own judgment as to when red-lines have been breached. Third, Sagan convincingly argues that militaries maintain their own strategic culture, preferring first action. In Iran, the Revolutionary Guards, which enjoy control of that country’s nuclear arsenal, self-select on the basis of ideology and political loyalty rather than military competence. In 1986, the Indian military’s “Brasstacks” exercise was actually intended by General Krishnaswami Sundarji, Army Chief of Staff, to spark a general war with Pakistan during which India would be able to mount a preemptive strike against its rival’s nuclear research program. Fourth and finally, although it is impossible to conduct a “hard” test of whether the threat of nuclear exchange is sufficient, in and of itself, to promote clear thinking, the experience of conventional war offers little hope. If leaders are particularly sensitive to high costs, what explains Georgia’s decision to try a short, sharp war over South Ossetia in August 2008, with a Russian army just over the border?

Misapprehension of the consequences of a nuclear exchange is actually a second-order problem. More important is whether both sides agree that potential nuclear weapons use is on the table. In 1973, Egypt and Syria drove into Israel, which responded by placing nuclear weapons on standby.

Whether or not non-proliferation is possible -- and I would submit, given the independent success of the South African nuclear weapons program while under embargo, that it is not -- the expansion of "the Nuclear Club" is not something about which to be happy.

[Guardsman Bass]

Stable deterrence is first of all dependent upon secure second-strike capability. If an adversary believes that he can strike first, wreck horrendous damage, and reliably eliminate your retaliatory capability, he will have enormous incentive to do so during a crisis.

What type of crisis are we talking about here? You don't necessarily need nukes as a way to hit back at an enemy's homeland and territory; you could keep them for use against an enemy army in case of war, to drive the cost of any proposed action up.

[Axis Kast]

What type of crisis are we talking about here? You don't necessarily need nukes as a way to hit back at an enemy's homeland and territory; you could keep them for use against an enemy army in case of war, to drive the cost of any proposed action up.

The "rational" user of nuclear weapons is somebody who never intentionally puts another nuclear weapons power in the position to have to "use it or lose it." He neither initiates, nor contributes to, existential crises. He will only initiate total war against another nuclear power if he is absolutely positive of being able to deliver a first-strike that neutralizes the enemy's nuclear weapons before they can be employed.

I think it is fair to say that proponents of nuclear proliferation don't regard nuclear weapons as either "really powerful conventional bombs" or potential vehicles for self-aggrandizement. That is, they don't expect anybody to use them on the assumption that they don't really do more damage than is really desirable or morally acceptable in a "normal" conflict. Nor do they consider nuclear weapons very useful for purposes of blackmail. I assume that they would make two arguments in that regard. First, that the international socio-political cost of using nuclear weapons to pursue "casual" objectives unrelated to the ultimate continuity of the state is so high that nobody would contemplate it for fear the whole world would turn on them; second, that such threats, for the reason just mentioned, would be incredible even if made, against a non-nuclear state, and are incredible when somebody else has nuclear weapons, since carrying out the threat would consign one to doom.

Of course, all of this depends on the idea that both sides agree that the other could really punish them. If I perceive that your arsenal isn't everything you say it is, I might play hard and fast with you.

[K. A. Pital]

Depending upon the rationality of state actors is equally problematic. First, there are problems of communication. Saddam Hussein alleged in 2003 that he was cooperating fully with United Nations weapons inspectors. Western intelligence agencies made judgments to the contrary.

Using forgeries, no less.

But even if one insists that national leaders will always know the stakes during a genuine nuclear crisis, the decision about whether and how to initiate a nuclear exchange may actually be out of their hands.

National leaders and military leaders alike might have a great reluctance for use of nuclear weapons.

If leaders are particularly sensitive to high costs, what explains Georgia’s decision to try a short, sharp war over South Ossetia in August 2008, with a Russian army just over the border?

The knowledge that Georgia won't be nuked because in the worst case it will be defeated conventionally?

Misapprehension of the consequences of a nuclear exchange is actually a second-order problem. More important is whether both sides agree that potential nuclear weapons use is on the table. In 1973, Egypt and Syria drove into Israel, which responded by placing nuclear weapons on standby.

Knowledge of the other's nuclear arsenal is important. If no one knows what you have, it's nigh useless as a deterrent weapon.

[Axis Kast]

Using forgeries, no less.

Quoted in the other thread is a 2004 extract from congressional testimony by David Kay. Foreign intelligence agencies judged that Saddam probably had chemical and biological weapons, and production capability, even before the infamous Niger yellowcake letter and the public relations ramp-up for war.

National leaders and military leaders alike might have a great reluctance for use of nuclear weapons.

But military leaders usually diverge from civilians when it comes to subject likes arsenal composition and appropriate nuclear strategy, two factors that make a heck of a lot of difference in the end. Nobody wants war, but certain behaviors prejudice the outcome in one direction or another.

The knowledge that Georgia won't be nuked because in the worst case it will be defeated conventionally?

Waltz's contention is that a nuclear weapon is so powerful, nobody could possibly miscalculate the stakes. Syria and Egypt did just that. Yet beyond that example, all we have are crises that ended well.

But we can see echoes of rationality (or irrationality) in the behavior that leaders make toward other very large and supposedly obvious threats. If leaders are risk-averse such that they will not gamble unless (A) they have no choice but to make war, as Finland against the Soviet Union, or (B) there is a significant chance of achieving success, then nothing can explain Saakashvili's decision. The relative material capabilities of both Georgia and the Soviet Union were clear. Georgia was sure to incur extensive damage. He based his thinking on some "X-factor." That's not a definitive defeat for Waltz's argument, but it sure isn't good.

Knowledge of the other's nuclear arsenal is important. If no one knows what you have, it's nigh useless as a deterrent weapon.

Correct.

[loomer]

Having production capability for chemical weaponry isn't exactly hard, though. I could make some mustard gas in my shed, for christ's sake - pretty much every single nation in the world has that capacity.

Just a nitpick, and the only one I have with your post, Axis.

[Ender]

By the way, I was busy watching the Olympics, anything newsworthy happen in your neck of the woods this summer?

Georgia knew it won't get nuked for attacking SO.

You miss my point. The argument of safety through nuclear weapons is that the stereotypical Mad Dictator (TM) become sane as soon as he gets nuclear weapons because he realizes the cost if they are used. Being in charge of a country is quite fun, being in charge of a cinder is not. This induced strategic paralysis, limiting the responses they can make to incidents.

With Georgia, they knew they would not be nuked, true. But it should have been blatantly clear to everyone on the globe that the only thing stopping Russia from burning Georgia down and salting the earth conventionally is whether or not they felt like doing it. If Russia had wanted to roll its tanks through the capital, swallow the entire country whole, and execute Saakashvili, Georgia couldn't have done a thing to stop them. Utter destruction through conventional means is still utter destruction. And it is the threat of utter destruction that is expected to hold leaders in check, to prevent them from using them. Georgia is just the most recent example of leaders willing to chance it all for their own glory.

[Ender]

Having production capability for chemical weaponry isn't exactly hard, though. I could make some mustard gas in my shed, for christ's sake - pretty much every single nation in the world has that capacity.

Just a nitpick, and the only one I have with your post, Axis.

Actually, if you have a refrigerator you can make it. Freon, when exposed to a flame, recombines with the air molecules to create Phosgene gas. Hence why you use a soap bubble test rather than a smoke test when looking for leaks in cooling systems.