FP: Ask Not What Europe Can Do for You

[Natorgator]

Article from Foreign Policy magazine that will probably rankle our Europeans around here.

For any U.S. president, the trick to dealing with Europe is to politely ignore its advice.

Barack Obama is in Europe this week, for meetings in which America's allies are likely to tell him that they can't contribute much more to the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan, and don't want to re-float the world economy through government deficits. He shouldn't take it personally. And we shouldn't treat it as the end of the story.

For half a century and more, in good times and bad, European leaders have advised new American presidents not to bother them with big, risky, expensive Washington ideas. They almost always prefer the status quo -- or, at most, very incremental change. But, having said their piece, they then usually come around. (Sometimes -- very rarely, it has to be said -- they're right to begin with.)

Obama's four immediate predecessors all had deep disagreements with major European allies early in their presidency. George W. Bush's feud with Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac over Iraq was only the most recent of these. Bill Clinton came to office wanting a more activist approach to contain ethnic warfare in the Balkans, but couldn't sell the idea in Europe and had to back off. Two years later, ironically, it was Chirac's taunt -- "the position of leader of the free world is vacant" -- that helped to reignite Clinton's determination to stop the killing.

On his own first European trip George H.W. Bush urged NATO leaders to counter Mikhail Gorbachev's "peace-offensive" with bold proposals to overcome the division of Europe and reunify Germany. Too bellicose, the Europeans said. That had, of course, also been their reaction when Ronald Reagan began his presidency by insisting that the East-West détente of the 1970's wasn't working and had to be scrapped.

Such a record of disagreement may make us think that Americans always take the hard line; Europeans, the soft. But it hasn't always been so. The single nastiest transatlantic split of the entire Cold War was probably the one between John Kennedy and Charles De Gaulle over whether to negotiate with the Soviets about West Berlin. Kennedy -- in this case, the soft-liner -- hoped a compromise settlement would reduce the risk of nuclear war and let the United States stand down from an exposed and indefensible position. De Gaulle, calling it foolish to talk about ceding Western rights in the city just because "Mr. Khrushchev had whistled," refused to take part -- and persuaded the West Germans to join him in opposition.

Kennedy was furious. He told a French emissary that he felt "like a man carrying a 200-pound sack of potatoes, and other people, not carrying a similar load ... keep telling us how to carry our burden." The United States, he warned, would be "glad to get out of Europe." Dean Rusk, his mild-mannered secretary of state, fumed that it was unclear whether the best way to deal with De Gaulle was through "an ambassador or a psychiatrist."

As models for how American presidents should treat European leaders, George W. Bush and John Kennedy stand out as the angriest -- and the least successful. Kennedy became so unwilling to confide in allied governments that he actually gave Rusk oral rather than written instructions for his talks with the Soviets. Otherwise, he feared, Bonn and Paris would learn of the concessions he was prepared to make. Not until the run-up to the invasion of Iraq did transatlantic trust drop so low again.

By contrast, Ronald Reagan, the elder George Bush, and Bill Clinton seemed to grasp that European governments lacked confidence in their own approaches, and would gravitate toward U.S. policy if Washington stood firm. Once they decided what they wanted to do, all three presidents refused to let consultations with allies water down their strategy. (Clinton concluded that a successful turn-around of Balkans policy would occur only if the U.S. told the Europeans what it was going to do, rather than asking their opinion.) But all three of them -- unlike Kennedy and the younger Bush -- managed to wear down allied opposition to American policy without an open or acrimonious break.

For decades after the Second World War, the great achievement of U.S. foreign policy was precisely to channel -- and sometimes, to ignore -- European preferences, while patiently calming the resentments that followed. This was true even when Washington spoke loudest about multilateralism. The designers of the Marshall Plan, for example, stressed that they wanted European governments to devise their own plans for American assistance. But they feared that our allies were not really able even to understand their own needs. In George Kennan's patronizing words, Europe wanted "guidance, not responsibilities." Its economies were too weak; its political institutions, too dysfunctional; its politicians, too parochial in their thinking. The principal author of the Marshall Plan, undersecretary of state Will Clayton, laid down the key requirement of success in the very first memo he wrote on the subject: "The United States must run this show."

Ask President Obama's advisers privately to describe European policies toward Afghanistan or the global economy, and the words you hear will not be so different: weak, dysfunctional, parochial, unable to summon the unity and resolve to deal with a large problem. If he comes away from this week's summits with little to show for his urgings, many will read the trip as a sign of the new administration's own weakness -- and of a changing balance of power. Perhaps. But there's a much older story line here, and the Europeans probably know it better than Obama himself. They always brush off new American presidents. Then, fearing they cannot succeed on their own, they start to reconsider.

Stephen Sestanovich is senior fellow for Russian and Eurasian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and professor of international diplomacy at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs.

Thoughts?

[Thanas]

Yes, of course America should ignore Europe while asking them to commit more resources to Afghanistan.

You know, the article kinda strikes me as condecending and rude. Of course America is the leader of Nato, but the other people are not there to just follow american policies (nevermind that this hasn't worked out so great over the past decades and people are quite fed up with it).

I also like how the article omits that the Europeans already got stuck with keeping the Balkans in order and shouldering the whole costs there.

[Kane Starkiller]

Far be it from me to question yet another American attempt at psychoanalysis of Europe (e.g. France refused to join us on the Iraq adventure? They must be jealous of American power!) however as long as Americans don't comprehend that Europe is not a single political, cultural or even economic entity none of those "theories" will make sense.
Why is "European" policy on many issues "dysfunctional"? Because Europe consists of many countries whose interests do not always coincide. If you want a consistent policy deal with Australian continent.

[Edi]

Simplified and condescending bullshit, I'd say. Dictating to Europe will not get anywhere. Suggesting and then making clear US what US policies are will mean that it will be accepted that such and so will happen and it will not necessarily make large waves and then European governments will go along with it if they see it to be in their best interest.

Get enough of the population angry and it will not be possible without severe repercussions to go along.

[Darth Wong]

In many ways, this article could have been written in 2002 or 2003. It has the same sound, the same feel as the "help us or get out of the way" American political rhetoric of that time: "We're right, they're generally wrong, and they'll either fall in line or destroy themselves sooner or later so just ignore their prattlings."

[Coyote]

From an American perspective, NATO hasn't been much more than a political talking committee for figuring out how to reduce defense costs through various attempts at standardization (many of which, ironically, end up costing more). These international standardization ventures by themselves aren't necessarily bad, but let's face it, the Yugoslavian meltdown was right on NATO's doorstep and no one was going to lift a finger, except perhaps Italy which provided refugee relief.

There's what, 20+ countries in NATO, now? Each with different ideas about what they need for their defense money, each with different concerns and different political and social reasons for making these decisions. It doesn't help that in America, we see terrorism as a military problem, whereas in Europe it seems that terrorism is considered more of a law-enforcement problem (please correct me if I'm wrong).

I think the big mistake with NATO as a whole is that it has been couched as a defense force for mutual combat operations, when in truth it is really more of a committee to agree on standardization of training, techniques, logistics, transport, supply, and communications. Beyond that, everyone is kinda still operating on their own perceived needs. Again, nothing necessarily wrong with that, but if that's what is expected from NATO, we should all agree to stop expecting it to act like a truly robust, deployable combat force. The organization also lacks a solid defineable enemy, like the USSR, to force agreement and cooperation-- which of course isn't NATO's "fault".

There's a lack of clear definition of what NATO is, is supposed to be, and how it sees its challenges in the world today... and what being a member of the alliance truly means and requires.

[Darth Wong]

It doesn't help that in America, we see terrorism as a military problem, whereas in Europe it seems that terrorism is considered more of a law-enforcement problem (please correct me if I'm wrong).

You're right as long as you replace "Europe" with "most of the civilized world".

[Starglider]

In many ways, this article could have been written in 2002 or 2003. It has the same sound, the same feel as the "help us or get out of the way" American political rhetoric of that time: "We're right, they're generally wrong, and they'll either fall in line or destroy themselves sooner or later so just ignore their prattlings."

I haven't noticed much change in US conservative thinking in general since 2002. Meanwhile the UK conservative party has changed quite a lot in that time. I suspect that a party has to be out of power for a few years before its supporters genuinely begin reconsidering their attitudes (and even then, the process isn't guaranteed).

[Tanasinn]

The whole piece smacks of self-superior exceptionalist thinking of the same sort that wasted billions of dollars and thousands upon thousands of lives so a chimp could play War President.

This reminds me of my unacted-upon desire to post "not news, needs pruning" in every op/ed thread that came through news.

[Stark]

Whoa, are you saying the US has a massive superiority complex and treats it's 'allies' like obedient ciphers without considering their voice?

This must be that 'realpolitik' I've heard about. So cold and based on necessity and realism... it destroys relationships and alienates allies. I hear it's all fine so long as they do what you say, and this could NEVER be related to ANY powerful nation losing it's status.

Foreign policy = forcing your neighbour to mend the fence. EXACTLY THE SAME.

EDIT - Tannasin, did you forget they cleaned up N&P?

[Skgoa]

Please note that its the middle of the night over here. So if I sound especially loony, thats the tiredness (is that even a word?) speaking.

There's a lack of clear definition of what NATO is, is supposed to be, and how it sees its challenges in the world today... and what being a member of the alliance truly means and requires.

Actually no, NATO's job was pretty certain until it's raison d'etre - the threat of an expansionist and belligerent Sovjet Union/Warsaw Pact - vanished in the early '90s. Since then the US has propagated the idea of an "humanitarian war", culminating in George W. having the nerve to DEMAND that NATO members go to war on his whim. But there is a little problem americans seem to be unable to get into their heads: (most) europeans DON'T think that dropping bombs on everone who looks at you funny is a good/fruitfull/moral way to conduct foreign policy.
Basicly we (as in the european nations) cofounded/joined NATO as a defensive alliance against the very real threat of Stalin flipping of the handle* for good and invading western europe. We looked away when the US ran amok in middle america and asia, since we didn't really have choice - there were exactly two sides in the cold war and we didn't want to be on the other one. But now we find ourselves with an US that is trying to change the deal, trying to change NATO's mission exclusivly for it's own ends. To be frank: we don't really see why we should just accept that. What reason do we have to support this new "out of area" NATO when the US and Brittain clearly aren't in it for common defense? IMHO the US should be happy that so many other nations even so much as send small token support forces to Afganistan.


*forgive me if I butchered that idiom.

[Falkenhayn]

Skgoa, "fatigued" or "exhausted" are better word choices than "tiredness", which certainly is not a word one uses, if it is a word at all.

Apologies, but this picture had to be posted. Barack Obama, Silvio Berlusconi and Dmitri Medvedev, from the G20 Summit. Especially in contrast with the sentiments of the article author.

[Tanasinn]

EDIT - Tannasin, did you forget they cleaned up N&P?

Oh, I recall - hence the past tense. Definitely a move for the better.

[Lord of the Abyss]

Please note that its the middle of the night over here. So if I sound especially loony, thats the tiredness (is that even a word?) speaking.

Yes, it is. merriam-webster.com

[Darth Wong]

Skgoa, "fatigued" or "exhausted" are better word choices than "tiredness", which certainly is not a word one uses, if it is a word at all.

Apologies, but this picture had to be posted. Barack Obama, Silvio Berlusconi and Dmitri Medvedev, from the G20 Summit. Especially in contrast with the sentiments of the article author.

http://images.politico.com/global/news/ ... ev_350.jpg

The problem with the article author is that he starts from the assumption that the American is always right, and the European is always wrong. Of course, he's cagey enough to try and forestall criticism on that score by pointing out that "Sometimes -- very rarely, it has to be said -- they're right" (talk about a half-hearted concession).

But his actual strategy of completely ignoring European ideas and opinions (until they "come around") would make no sense if one did not start from the basic assumption that the Americans always have good ideas and Europeans don't. He's a dishonest sack of shit.

[Stark]

The best part is that from an American perspective, the Europeans are short-sighted and selfish, often trapped in their own agendas and priorities which make no sense to Americans... and they honestly can't see how this exact attitude explains the diplomatic situation.

Then again I've learned this week that people are surprised that various bodies made up of groups with different goals are actually difficult to coordinate, hold together or get things done with. Who knew? I thought the Americans were just the chiefs and everyone else was the indians?!

[Coyote]

Please note that its the middle of the night over here. So if I sound especially loony, thats the tiredness (is that even a word?) speaking.

There's a lack of clear definition of what NATO is, is supposed to be, and how it sees its challenges in the world today... and what being a member of the alliance truly means and requires.

Actually no, NATO's job was pretty certain until it's raison d'etre - the threat of an expansionist and belligerent Sovjet Union/Warsaw Pact - vanished in the early '90s.

Like I said-- it's purpose is ill-defined in the world today. It is an organization in search of a mission.

Since then the US has propagated the idea of an "humanitarian war", culminating in George W. having the nerve to DEMAND that NATO members go to war on his whim. But there is a little problem americans seem to be unable to get into their heads: (most) europeans DON'T think that dropping bombs on everone who looks at you funny is a good/fruitfull/moral way to conduct foreign policy.

Well, I agree. To me, if Europe didn't want to get involved in the Balkans, and since it was on their doorstep, I figured there was no reason for us to get involved in the Balkans. To this day I honestly don't know what the Yugoslav meltdown was supposed to be for us. I'm sure many there were quite happy to have us intervene; many were not.

Basicly we (as in the european nations) cofounded/joined NATO as a defensive alliance against the very real threat of Stalin flipping of the handle* for good and invading western europe. We looked away when the US ran amok in middle america and asia, since we didn't really have choice - there were exactly two sides in the cold war and we didn't want to be on the other one. But now we find ourselves with an US that is trying to change the deal, trying to change NATO's mission exclusivly for it's own ends. To be frank: we don't really see why we should just accept that. What reason do we have to support this new "out of area" NATO when the US and Brittain clearly aren't in it for common defense? IMHO the US should be happy that so many other nations even so much as send small token support forces to Afganistan.

I think Afghanistan is different. The Taliban and al-Quaeda did, in fact, plot and carry out an attack. Article 5 was invoked, since it was stated that an attack on one is an attack on all. One can argue that "America's evil foreign policy fomented this" but with Afghanistan, we pretty much left them alone after the Soviets left.

I don't think we should look upon NATO as a reserve force for America to draw from without argument, but at the same time, Afghanistan was a pretty obvious case with little moral ambiguity to it, I think. I can see being unsupportive of the Iraq war, however.

[bobalot]

Then again I've learned this week that people are surprised that various bodies made up of groups with different goals are actually difficult to coordinate, hold together or get things done with. Who knew? I thought the Americans were just the chiefs and everyone else was the indians?!

When American governments talk of friendship and alliances, they generally mean "We say what to do, and you do it", kind of like a master/slave relationship. When they come up with monumentally stupid ideas like the Iraq war, they act all hurt that most of Europe thought it was a retarded idea.

I remember the Bush Administration talking about "reforming" the U.N when they didn't get their way, it basically amounted to turning the entire thing into a rubber stamp for American policy.

The U.S is stuck in a quagmire in Iraq, its economy is in shambles, and its prestige is at an all time low. It's a bit hard to believe that there still condescending douchebags like Stephen Sestanovich around who think the U.S is right nearly all the time, and the rest of us just don't "get it" and like petulant children we will eventually come around to his way of thinking.

[K. A. Pital]

Wait, he is comparing the war-ravaged, occupied by the US and USSR Europe to... modern Europe when he brings up the Marshall Plan? Good lord.

Modern Europe is a highly industrialized union of nations, the EU is the world's largest economy, and they all have First World standard of life, haven't seen war for more than 50 years!

Yeah, the US should totally try to act like the King. Except this time there are no destroyed cities to restore and no people waiting for SPAM in rows to get their food; Europe isn't ravaged, it's fine without the USA.

And that's what irritates these assholes. That Europe is no longer a pawn of the United States, it's no longer that easy to convince Europeans to support a new idiotic policy by the US administration. Wow.

[Skgoa]

I think Afghanistan is different. The Taliban and al-Quaeda did, in fact, plot and carry out an attack. Article 5 was invoked, since it was stated that an attack on one is an attack on all. One can argue that "America's evil foreign policy fomented this" but with Afghanistan, we pretty much left them alone after the Soviets left.

I don't think we should look upon NATO as a reserve force for America to draw from without argument, but at the same time, Afghanistan was a pretty obvious case with little moral ambiguity to it, I think. I can see being unsupportive of the Iraq war, however.

The problem is that it is NOT obvious. Europeans found themselves asking the question: "How exactly does it make us any safer if we bomb a far of little nation and radicalize the muslim youth?" You wrote earlier that you think europeans and US citizens see different solutions to terrorism and I believe you are right. My reaction to 9/11 was that the government dropped the ball and that we should focus on improvements in law enforcment to make sure nobody could ever do that again. But it seems to me that americans mostly thought that another strategy would be better: go to their (the terrorists) homes, kill their families, kill their neighbours, bomb the whole fucking town, so that they never dare do it again. Of course thats hyperbole, but its exactly how George W. sounded to europeans after the attack. I don't want to drag the thread into a discussion about Afganistan, but that is how we percieve it. Just look at this little fact: since 2001 I could use "to liberate" in any context I like and most people I know (mostly people in their teens and twenties) would understand that I mean kill, destroy, etc.

[Broomstick]

Skgoa, "fatigued" or "exhausted" are better word choices than "tiredness", which certainly is not a word one uses, if it is a word at all.

[Language note] Tiredness is a word, it's used, though typically more verbally than in writing. In this context, "fatigue" or "exhaustion" is actually the proper form of the other terms mentioned and in a formal context would probably be preferred. [/language note]