You can't ignore multipliers and the effect on interest rates - depending on the elasticity of money demand, a 1.7% monetary base decrease can have much larger effects on the interest rate, which in turn has compounded effects on aggregate demand. For instance, according to The Great Depression (Hall & Ferguson), the Fed also raised the discount rate from 3.5% to 5% at all banks. 1928-9 monetary policy was highly contractionary, even if the money supply fell by a "mere" 1.7%.J wrote:You mean generally agreed upon by Keynesians & Freidman-ites, yes? In his book Competition and monopoly in the Federal Reserve System, 1914-1951 as well as his 1989 research paper on the effectiveness of the Fed's open market operations, professor Mark Toma argues that the Fed's policies had very little effect on the money supply. This is supported by the St. Louis Fed's monetary base statistics, the monetary base fell a mere 1.7% from the beginning of 1928 to the end of 1929.
Interestingly, what prompted the Fed to pursue this policy was member banks using Fed funds to speculate in the stock market. So, basically, they shut off the tap, which put the brakes on the economy.
So here's a way to test your hypothesis: in every recession, do interest rates and the debt:GDP ratio behave as expected? Interestingly, the Fed controls the bond markets indirectly through the money supply: the way the quantity of money demanded and interest rates adjust to shifts in the money supply is by people moving funds to and from securities and bonds.If I knew the complete answer I'd have a Nobel prize. But one of the key pieces in the puzzle is interest rates, for instance "easy Al" Greenspan and "helicopter" Ben have thus far managed to keep interest rates near zero as has the Bank of Japan for the past 15-20 years, this has enabled us to carry greater amounts of debt in relation to GDP. For example, at an interest rate of 1%, you can take out a 20 year mortgage that's over twice as large as one with the same term where the interest rate is 10%. And the same is true if you're a company or nation selling bonds, lower rates translates to an ability to float more bonds issues, and hence a greater amount of debt. Same with credit cards, car loans, lines of credit and so forth.
Quite possibly. I am taking issue with the notion of the debt:GDP ratio as the root cause of the business cycle, not with the idea of the bond market reacting to economic conditions and exacerbating downturns.I think we're looking at two sides of the same coin, the dislocation was a reaction to market conditions and it's also a positive feedback mechanism which made the depression great and lasting. The bond market doesn't dislocate by itself for no reason, but if it does let go will take down everything else with it by driving lending costs through the roof and freezing the flow of credit.