The effectivness of sanctions?

[ray245]

Sanctions has been used again and again on rouge states, in hopes of forcing those nations' leaders to relent on their policies or demand release of certain political leaders.

However, it seems to me that most sanctions didn't affect nations to such a huge extend where they bothered to listen to the rest of the world. The leaders like Kim Ju-Ill still managed to live a life of relative luxury, while the population are the ones suffering the most out of any economic sanctions.

Furthermore, despite these sanctions and suffering, it does not led to a successful rebellion or revolution in a nation.

So in other words, just how effective sanctions really is?

[Rochey]

It really depends a lot on what the sanctions are, and just how well the country in question can go on with those sanctions in place.
For example, cutting off supplies of oil to Italy will cause the country major problems. But cutting off supplies of oil to Saudi Arabia isn't going to do all that much.

[ray245]

It really depends a lot on what the sanctions are, and just how well the country in question can go on with those sanctions in place.
For example, cutting off supplies of oil to Italy will cause the country major problems. But cutting off supplies of oil to Saudi Arabia isn't going to do all that much.

Ah, just a side note, I am mainly talking about nations like Myanmar, North Korea and Iran.

[Juubi Karakuchi]

The effectiveness of sanctions is often overstated, as is the economic cost involved. Just about every time something involving Burma/Myanmar, Darfur, or Tibet comes up, it is accompanied by shrieking demands for disinvestment from China and boycotts of its products. When governments to do so, they are labelled as caring more about money than human rights.

These people often point at South Africa, claiming that disinvestment and sanctions brought down Apartheid. Apart from this issue, they forget that South Africa was geopolitically and economically small and unimportant, a country that national economies could remove themselves from without great loss. China, by comparison, is a soon-to-be superpower and a global economic powerhouse. No sane government will wreak havoc on its own economy by annoying China, at least not over some 'far away country of which we know nothing.' Then again, the importance of China's support for these governments is also overstated. China only supports the Burmese/Myanmarese Junta because it gives China what it wants, not out of any ideological concern.

No, sanctions don't really work. They are usually only employed when the economic opportunity cost is minimal, and their purpose is only really to put pressure on the government by making it harder to look after its citizens, and win brownie points with the 'Human Rights NOW!!!!" crowd.

[Stuart]

So in other words, just how effective sanctions really is?

Completely and utterly ineffective. Everybody knows it so why do people keep calling for them? Equally easy and well-known answer, because they are a great excuse for doing nothing. A country does something unspeakable, the world is up in arms but a body of opinion (of varying sizes depending on the situation) doesn;t actually want anything done about it. So they propose (or impose) sanctions. This is amarvellous way of convincing people that something was being done when it wasn't. Then, whenever anybody actually tried to do something, the cry would go up "Give sanctions time to work!" In the end they could turn around and say "Well, sanctions didn't work but its too late to do anything now." Look at the political machinations that went on before Operation Desert Storm for this tactic being (unsuccessfully) used.

Sanctions don't work and can't work. One might as well try to bail out the Pacific Ocean with a tea-strainer.

[ray245]

So in other words, sancitons is only causin more needless suffering for the people in those screwed up nations? A completely immoral actions that allows you to pretend you are moral?

[K. A. Pital]

Sanctions are a political cop-out, exactly like Stuart said. They only make people suffer for no reason other than politicos' fuzzy feelings of activity.

Sanctions haven't done one bit of useful stuff in history.

[Axis Kast]

Assuming that a nation cannot be self-sufficient, the effectiveness of any external sanction is inversely proportional to the possibility of defection. What I mean to say is, when "cheating" can occur, sanctions are not a viable form of pressure. They are also likely to fail when they become just one more cost, short of the straw that breaks the camel's back.

Case-in-point? Rhodesia. Until 1974, sanctions against Rhodesia were a nuisance, but not a deal-breaker: the Smith government could rely on sympathetic defection from both the South Africans and the Portuguese. After the collapse of the Portuguese African empire, however, Rhodesia's fortunes were tied almost inextricably to those of South Africa. When the South Africans cut the umbilical cord, that was the end - the tiny Rhodesian settler colony couldn't sustain its war effort at a cost that white society was willing to pay.

Another, stronger case in which sanctions worked - Biafra. Arguably a ready-made state (not least in part because British colonial policy and mass pogroms had solidified a reactionary "Igbo" identity) with a coherent administration and plenty of fighting spirit, Biafra collapsed for want of essential resources. For all intents and purposes, defection was impossible: the British and Soviets were backing the Nigerians; the United States and others were disinclined to act one way or another; and its only allies, mostly pariah states (Portugal, Israel, South Africa, and Rhodesia) were incapable of rendering very effective aid.

In some cases, sanctions can create hardship. This may or may not correlate with success. If the United States can put the thumb-screws on enough banks to make investment in the Iranian gas industry a financial death sentence, Tehran will probably suffer. Whether they will capitulate is another question altogether. Sudanese economy been hurt by divestment campaigns; by the reputational penalty paid by energy firms that do business there (at least one of which was forced to sell out because of public uproar); and by inability to trade in the American dollar. The key in the later case is defection. Sudan can weather sanctions because the Chinese and others are still willing to trade.

Iran is a slightly different case. Like Sudan, they have relied upon willing defectors to help them mediate the effects of American sanctions. That plan isn't necessarily foolproof: the Libyans suffered for years, and then eventually reappraised their situation. Maybe the Iranians haven't reached the practical limit of what they consider acceptable suffering. So long as they haven't, each new punitive measure is just a benchmark, not victory assured.

Applying truly effective sanctions can be prohibitive. Maybe, with a great deal of effort and a willingness to make concessions through linkage, the United States could mobilize the world against Iran. Perhaps it could keep the Russians, the Chinese, and others from helping Iran take the vital step of revitalizing is natural gas infrastructure. But then what? Sanctions don't always lead eloquently to policy reversals or regime change. Sometimes, they lead to unknowns -- which could be scarier than just welcoming them to the Nuclear Club and even helping implement safeguards.

[K. A. Pital]

Very small states could be pushed around by sanctions, but the ratio of success even in such cases wouldn't be overwhelmingly large. Cuba has experienced lots of suffering as a result of a totally insane embargo. No political goals whatsoever have been achieved by that embargo, and Fidel outlived most of the people who devised that measure in the first place.

For embargo to be effective, the nation needs to be completely alone, and even then the limits of suffering would be tested. It can actually radicalize and alienate the population of said nation, not to mention the obvious hardships, than achieve the goals it was set to achieve.

[Axis Kast]

South Africa couldn't rightly be called a "very small state." National Security Strategy Memorandum 39 (NSSM-39), the foundation of the Nixonian approach to Africa - it would be incorrect to say that the administration had coherent policy for the continent - reminds us of the significance of the whole region. South Africa was on the very point of the Cape Route sea lanes, which grew enormously in importance during the time that the Suez Canal was either closed or imperiled. South Africa was also an important source of gold and other strategic minerals, as well as a strategic ally to the West against Communist encroachment in the former Portuguese dominions. Neither is Iran a "very small state."

South Africa, better than most, had a chance for self-sufficiency. In fact, it is probably about as close as a developing state will ever come to the emulating what might be called the autarkic readiness of the two superpowers. The hardship was simply more than the whites were willing to bear.

For embargoes to be effective, the punitive "power" of withholding needs to exceed the soothing effects of access to alternative markets and resources. This equation takes into account both the degree of isolation as well as the chance for self-sustenance.

Also, just as an interesting aside, there is such a thing as effective unilateral embargo. The withholding of unique items, available only from a single supplier, or else not immediately replaceable, can have very significant geopolitical outcomes. Witness the Falklands, 1982. Although Argentina could acquire military equipment comparable or better than what was in British arsenals just prior to the fighting in the South Atlantic, its human rights record had prompted the Carter administration to suspend transfers of after-market support on arms transfers. Thus, the Argentinians did not receive manuals explaining how to fuse their iron bombs for low-altitude operations, which were the norm in that war.