Sigh, if only people actually bothered to look into the context and consider the fact that pure idealism alone does not mean it will always lead to a desirable outcome.By HANNAH BEECH Hannah Beech – Tue May 19, 5:45 am ET
There's something about Burma. Zimbabwe, Laos, North Korea, Sudan, Uzbekistan - all these countries are plagued by repressive rulers. But none of these places grips the popular imagination like this isolated nation in the heartland of Asia. With its thuggish ruling junta and defiant, beautiful opposition leader, Burma inspires unparalleled international sympathy and the passions of do-gooders. Only the Dalai Lama rivals fellow Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi when it comes to dissident magnetism - and, even so, the Tibetan monk has not languished under house arrest for much of the past two decades as Suu Kyi has.
Yet it may be the same global allure of the woman who Burmese simply refer to as "the Lady" that, in the strangest of circumstances, landed Suu Kyi in court and on trial on May 18. The 63-year-old democracy activist is charged with violating her house arrest by allowing an American intruder to stay at her lakeside villa after he unexpectedly - and illegally - swam across a lake and snuck into her backyard. John Yettaw of Missouri was arrested as he was paddling back from Suu Kyi's villa in early May. The American was put on trial the same day as Suu Kyi, charged with various crimes, including immigration violations and swimming in a forbidden part of Inya lake in Burma's commercial capital Rangoon. Two of Suu Kyi's aides, who live with her, are also on trial. (See pictures of Burma after Cyclone Nargis.)
The American's rationale for sneaking into the residential compound of the world's most famous political prisoner without her permission is uncertain. But the implications are chilling. Suu Kyi's most recent house-arrest stint was supposed to expire at the end of the month. Now, Burma's generals have a pretext, outlandish as it may be, to keep her locked up anew. The charges against the democracy activist carry a prison sentence of up to five years. "I cannot tell you what he was thinking when he made those swims or whether or not he considered the consequences for anyone but himself," Yettaw's stepson Paul told the Associated Press. "I am very sure it never occurred to him that Suu Kyi or her companions could also suffer from his choices."
A conviction will effectively sideline the Lady from lending her voice to nationwide elections that the junta has announced for next year. Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) won by a landslide the country's last elections back in 1990, but the junta ignored the results. This time around, they have rigged the electoral system with arcane regulations that deliberately exclude Suu Kyi from participating. Other rules specify that top posts must be reserved for members of the military, thereby ensuring the junta's longevity. Nevertheless, many in Burma had hoped that Suu Kyi, in whatever limited form, might be able to influence the political process. It will be near impossible for her to do so from prison.
It is a remarkable irony that an unknown American, who presumably wanted to champion Suu Kyi's democratic cause, was the catalyst for her latest troubles. But so go the unintended consequences of political inexperience. "Burma's pro-democracy movement has long been an attraction for fantasists, fanatics and adventure tourists," writes Aung Zaw, editor of the respected online news magazine the Irrawaddy, sho covers Burma from neighboring Thailand. "Did John William Yettaw consider the consequences [of his swim]? Did he think for a minute that he would do more harm than good? Probably not."
One of Suu Kyi's lawyers branded Yettaw a "wretched American." Inside the country, it can be easy to spot the foreign idealists masquerading as, say, tourists or teachers, who have made it their mission to change Burma. They whisper about regime change and seethe with political indignation. They talk about signature campaigns or the latest effort to get foreign parliamentarians to condemn the Burmese regime's odious behavior.
The impulse to want to rid Burma of its cruel government is understandable. But, so far, the outcome of this imported idealism has been nothing but failure. Since seizing power in 1962, the military regime has only tightened its grip on power. And when foreigners are sentenced to jail in Burma, they have a far better chance of being released early or treated favorably than a Burmese political dissident does. As Aung Zaw noted in the Irrawaddy, two British activists who were convicted for staging separate political protests in Burma in 1999 were both released early after serving only a fraction of their jail sentences. Good news for them. But Burmese can hardly expect the same treatment. If Suu Kyi is convicted - and Burmese courts have a frighteningly high conviction rate - few expect the Lady to taste freedom anytime soon.
Viewpoint: Why Foreigners Can Make Things Worse for Burma
Moderators: Alyrium Denryle, Edi, K. A. Pital
Viewpoint: Why Foreigners Can Make Things Worse for Burma
Time
Humans are such funny creatures. We are selfish about selflessness, yet we can love something so much that we can hate something.
Re: Viewpoint: Why Foreigners Can Make Things Worse for Burma
You are a complete moron if you think the root of these problems is 'foreign intervention' or 'idealism' and not the junta in power.
Apparently nobody can see you without a signature.
Re: Viewpoint: Why Foreigners Can Make Things Worse for Burma
True, except the fact that simple act of activist spreading the ideas of democracy in the region is not even capable of making any major impact in the region.Steel wrote:You are a complete moron if you think the root of these problems is 'foreign intervention' or 'idealism' and not the junta in power.
Humans are such funny creatures. We are selfish about selflessness, yet we can love something so much that we can hate something.
Re: Viewpoint: Why Foreigners Can Make Things Worse for Burma
Except that India managed to pull it off.ray245 wrote:True, except the fact that simple act of activist spreading the ideas of democracy in the region is not even capable of making any major impact in the region.Steel wrote:You are a complete moron if you think the root of these problems is 'foreign intervention' or 'idealism' and not the junta in power.
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Re: Viewpoint: Why Foreigners Can Make Things Worse for Burma
It did?
Have a very nice day.
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Have a very nice day.
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Re: Viewpoint: Why Foreigners Can Make Things Worse for Burma
Is not India a democracy, extremely poor and in Asia? Sure, it is extremely corrupt, but that is a large difference that and military junta.fgalkin wrote:It did?
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Re: Viewpoint: Why Foreigners Can Make Things Worse for Burma
Yes, but was not created by pro-democracy activists, which is what I assume you were referring toSamuel wrote:Is not India a democracy, extremely poor and in Asia? Sure, it is extremely corrupt, but that is a large difference that and military junta.fgalkin wrote:It did?
Have a very nice day.
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Have a very nice day.
-fgalkin
Re: Viewpoint: Why Foreigners Can Make Things Worse for Burma
From reading around a bit it sounds like the man who sneaked into Suu Kyi's house was a nutter. Hardly an indictment of all Western intervention. It also seems a bit naive to think that the junta wouldn't have found some other excuse to keep her locked up. It's pretty clear they have no intention of letting fair elections take place or allowing any threat to their regime.
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Re: Viewpoint: Why Foreigners Can Make Things Worse for Burma
What are the options for dealing with Third World regimes like Burma, Zimbabwe, Sudan, and others of their ilk? Sanctions seem to do nothing at all, since there are always countries *coughChinacough* willing to do business with just about anyone anyone; it worked with apartheid South Africa only because the idea of a white minority ruling over a colored majority is positively unacceptable to literally every country on earth. Brown minorities brutally oppressing other brown people, or black majorities grinding black minority tribes into the dirt will not draw anything like the critical mass of international indignation to bring a regime to its knees. And if the regime is sufficiently entrenched and ruthless, like in North Korea, it's not clear that even cutting off almost all links to the outside will do anything except make the population at large suffer even more.
Ending military rule in Burma would almost certainly require a foreign invasion that could destroy the Burmese army and eliminate the power-base of the junta. Certainly the Burmese army is an entirely parasitic organization that exists only to line the pockets of its generals and to perpetuate its own institutional power. The situation in Iraq however reminds us that you have to replace whatever you sweep away, and no one in their right mind wants to be stuck dealing with the morass of ethnic rebels and repressed Burmans that would be left after the military is dealt with. And far too many nations would be violently opposed to any precedent set by such an invasion to provide the veneer of UN sanction that would grant it legitimacy in the eyes of most Western countries. And then there are the unintended consequences that would follow from the destruction of the junta, which are unpredictable despite the seeming overwhelming moral good that its elimination would seem to entail. More practically still no one has any real reason to invest the sort of blood and treasure that such an adventure would require, and even less so in the expectation that some "national liberation" movement would emerge and drive them out in the end.
The cynical expectation that the majority Burmans would organize themselves on some new model and continue to oppress the hill peoples, if not themselves, is the other kind of reaction. Shrugging one's shoulders and considering it evident that the Burmese are unready for any other kind of government than despotism, and in any case accepting that it is simply none of our business as long as the junta behaves itself internationally. Certainly the most prudent course of action, the wisest, and probably bringing significant economic benefits since the internal conditions of a country are no obstacle to doing business with its government. There is a tacit onus on the population being oppressed for being unable to overthrow their government, when such an action is almost impossible in the face of a military willing to turn its guns on the broader population. Without some kind of international intervention the situation in Burma is unlikely to change, since the regime has proven immune to internal pressure and has been willing even to open fire on Buddhist monasteries and murder monks despite their hallowed place in Burmese society.
Engagement is often presented as a third option but frankly is just a euphemism for "don't really give a damn." Or at the very least, that one's concerns about systematic human rights violations matter nowhere near as much as political, diplomatic, and economic considerations for dealing with the government. The Burmese junta is not going to reform just because it would bring prosperity to their country and because good people behave according to particular ethical and moral rules the generals are just unaware of. Saying we're "engaging" a country is just a way of feeling better for doing nothing substantive. Which is not to say that it can't be the right solution, especially with less odious regimes where sanctions would just make things worse, which is frequently enough. But it is self-deception to pretend that it represents a viable strategy to modify the behavior of another government within its own domain, unless that government is already open enough to such pressure for other reasons. The case of Turkey's modifications to its political and judicial structures in the (completely vain) hope of being allowed into the EU is one example, and Taiwan's moves toward democraticization to present a better picture of itself vis-a-vis the PRC is another. Cuba may very well be another case in point where engagement might produce at least marginal improvements and where sanctions obviously haven't done anything except make the population suffer. But a regime sufficiently dedicated to maintaining its repressive structures and unimpressed by world opinion will not alter its behavior because Westerners try to gently convince it to while giving them all the business contacts they want.
If military intervention is out of the question (and it is), and sanctions seem to accomplish nothing, then perhaps Burma is a case where "engagement" is the least-worst option. There may simply be no states where engagement is not the least-worst option for dealing with them, with South Africa and Rhodesia having been removed as a unique case. It's not a very satisfying conclusion, and of course military and diplomatic concerns (certainly in the case of North Korea) would outweigh the considerations expressed here. But as a basic matter of policy, when all of your choices for modifying a regime's behavior are bad, doing nothing may be the least-worst choice.
Ending military rule in Burma would almost certainly require a foreign invasion that could destroy the Burmese army and eliminate the power-base of the junta. Certainly the Burmese army is an entirely parasitic organization that exists only to line the pockets of its generals and to perpetuate its own institutional power. The situation in Iraq however reminds us that you have to replace whatever you sweep away, and no one in their right mind wants to be stuck dealing with the morass of ethnic rebels and repressed Burmans that would be left after the military is dealt with. And far too many nations would be violently opposed to any precedent set by such an invasion to provide the veneer of UN sanction that would grant it legitimacy in the eyes of most Western countries. And then there are the unintended consequences that would follow from the destruction of the junta, which are unpredictable despite the seeming overwhelming moral good that its elimination would seem to entail. More practically still no one has any real reason to invest the sort of blood and treasure that such an adventure would require, and even less so in the expectation that some "national liberation" movement would emerge and drive them out in the end.
The cynical expectation that the majority Burmans would organize themselves on some new model and continue to oppress the hill peoples, if not themselves, is the other kind of reaction. Shrugging one's shoulders and considering it evident that the Burmese are unready for any other kind of government than despotism, and in any case accepting that it is simply none of our business as long as the junta behaves itself internationally. Certainly the most prudent course of action, the wisest, and probably bringing significant economic benefits since the internal conditions of a country are no obstacle to doing business with its government. There is a tacit onus on the population being oppressed for being unable to overthrow their government, when such an action is almost impossible in the face of a military willing to turn its guns on the broader population. Without some kind of international intervention the situation in Burma is unlikely to change, since the regime has proven immune to internal pressure and has been willing even to open fire on Buddhist monasteries and murder monks despite their hallowed place in Burmese society.
Engagement is often presented as a third option but frankly is just a euphemism for "don't really give a damn." Or at the very least, that one's concerns about systematic human rights violations matter nowhere near as much as political, diplomatic, and economic considerations for dealing with the government. The Burmese junta is not going to reform just because it would bring prosperity to their country and because good people behave according to particular ethical and moral rules the generals are just unaware of. Saying we're "engaging" a country is just a way of feeling better for doing nothing substantive. Which is not to say that it can't be the right solution, especially with less odious regimes where sanctions would just make things worse, which is frequently enough. But it is self-deception to pretend that it represents a viable strategy to modify the behavior of another government within its own domain, unless that government is already open enough to such pressure for other reasons. The case of Turkey's modifications to its political and judicial structures in the (completely vain) hope of being allowed into the EU is one example, and Taiwan's moves toward democraticization to present a better picture of itself vis-a-vis the PRC is another. Cuba may very well be another case in point where engagement might produce at least marginal improvements and where sanctions obviously haven't done anything except make the population suffer. But a regime sufficiently dedicated to maintaining its repressive structures and unimpressed by world opinion will not alter its behavior because Westerners try to gently convince it to while giving them all the business contacts they want.
If military intervention is out of the question (and it is), and sanctions seem to accomplish nothing, then perhaps Burma is a case where "engagement" is the least-worst option. There may simply be no states where engagement is not the least-worst option for dealing with them, with South Africa and Rhodesia having been removed as a unique case. It's not a very satisfying conclusion, and of course military and diplomatic concerns (certainly in the case of North Korea) would outweigh the considerations expressed here. But as a basic matter of policy, when all of your choices for modifying a regime's behavior are bad, doing nothing may be the least-worst choice.
There is the moral of all human tales;
Tis but the same rehearsal of the past,
First Freedom, and then Glory — when that fails,
Wealth, vice, corruption, — barbarism at last.
-Lord Byron, from 'Childe Harold's Pilgrimage'
Tis but the same rehearsal of the past,
First Freedom, and then Glory — when that fails,
Wealth, vice, corruption, — barbarism at last.
-Lord Byron, from 'Childe Harold's Pilgrimage'