Us military budget could be trimmed severely in next decade

[Omega18]

That would be true if you ignore just how fucking insanely stingy the US military establishment had to be in that era. It robbed the forces of any real combat effectiveness. The British were not in a much better situation, but Japan was the utter opposite and built and prepared itself into a position in which they just could not fail, at least for the sweep to the south. Even if the US fleet was intact it wouldn't matter, because it had no bases and nothing able to support it west of Hawaii. If you read the reports and Morrisons on the early USN operations you'll see a steady pattern of a fleet which was unable to hit anything. Our cruisers in one instance failed to sink an anchored Japanese transport in a lagoon. Meanwhile in the Philippines US pilots could not intercept Japanese planes with what few aircraft they had, because they had no oxygen equipment. None had ever been produced. Even when you look at our great victory at Midway, we have a stark contrast an aircraft effectiveness even months into the war. US surface forces would get kicked around into 1943 until we just basically dominated the Japanese with radar equipped aircraft, preventing almost all further surface battles. That kind of advantage is not to be expected, all the more so if you want defense spending scaled back.

You're talking about a different period than I just was among other things.

The US was in fact doing much better in surface engagements by the 1943 period, and in fact generally decisively won the late war conflicts.

Your last observation is accurate, but it does depend on what your priorities were. In spite of fears to the contrary, the US proper was never actually under threat of invasion during WW2. The isolationists were correct from that perspective, even with the Pearl Harbor attack occurring, its just a matter of the long term strategic implications of doing so and the reality about not being able to protect the Philippines. (I'm not saying they were right in what they advocated, just that their viewpoint was not in fact really that irrational since the US did have time to buildup its military to protect itself even once WW2 had started. Without carriers altering the greater picture, the naval strength of the US from the start would have been even stronger, and an effective surprise strike can't be pulled off the same way with merely surface ships.)

[Medic]

Pfft, even during the height of the Surge, FY 2009, the DoD's share of the federal budget was 3.3 times less than social and economic spending. In other years, it would be nearly 4 times as small. (this all gleaned from the FY 2009 Defense Budget "Green Book") Stated another way, social and economic spending represent the greatest sinkhole of the federal budget, not the defense budget, which in 2009 only accounted for %21 of all federal spending; I say "only" because again, FY2009, the peak of the Surge, represents the peak military spending during the Bush Era. It took years to hit that high and we're going to be slowly coming down from it, as well.

Furthermore, in that year, you could literally remove the DoD & emergency war-time spending, a total of $707b, and still run the budget in the red. (i.e., deficit; I'm looking at what was spent versus the deficit)

I will restate this one more time for the dense: we can spend not-a-one dollar on defense, join hands and sing kum by yah my lord, smoke pot and embrace peace, and still run a budget deficit. Pretending in other words, the Department of Defense spending itself is a unique boondoggle is patently and ludicrously false. Any criticism of it must be a criticism of the status quo in it's entirety. Social security, Medicare, Medicaid, everything we think deserves funding, all can't coexist at the current tax rate and spending demands.

So yeah, evil DoD, if only for it...

[Coyote]

Cutting back manpower isn't going to happen, either-- if we go back to rotating troop sin and out of danger areas every 6 months, we're going to see pissed-off families hounding Congressmen, and re-enlistment rates plummeting, and more stress, suicide and discipline problems, and we'll have to fill the gap with less-than-ideal troops (like recruiting felons and people who were obviously gang members , Nazis, etc).

Now, obviously we could shut down a lot of overseas deployments (Iraq is approaching that point) but A-stan looks like it's going to be a long hard slog for awhile to come, and with NATO allies jumping ship or cutting back, the burden will fall, once again, to the US.

But I do agree, we need energy independence to make overseas deployments less necessary. That means weaning politicians off of military bases and military manufacturing for their voting districts and replacing it with energy projects. In theory, sure, we'd only need a military capable of protecting sea lanes for trade and the energy stranglehold would end, but it is far easier said than done.

[Starglider]

The feeling is that the LCAC, which is due for an upgrade, can deliver more relevant troops and material ashore much faster (carrying up to 75 tons at 40 knots) than a gaggle of EFVs.

I thought a replacement for the LCACs was already in development, by Textron if I recall? Certainly if it's a choice between canceling that and canceling the EFV the EFV should be the one to go.

[Illuminatus Primus]

Total disarmament in the 1930s? What a load of bullshit - having the most powerful Navy on Earth and describing this as "total disarmament" is just preposterous.

Also, if you're not really supporting foreign adventurism or hegemonism, the US really doesn't need such a massive military. It's location provides enough protection against smaller nations; the homeland would rarely be threatened if ever (only by deterrence weapons like ICBMs and nuclear-armed bombers and submarines).

You only need the military if you still plan on invading other nations, blowing up shit in the Middle East, et cetera. For other tasks, you hardly need a military that large. In fact, if a large part of the US Navy's non-strategic component vanished overnight, almost nothing would've changed.

The United States did not have the most powerful navy on Earth in the 1930s. It was only during WW2 that the US Navy emerged as the most powerful.

At the beginning of World War 2, the USN was not yet a match for the Japanese. The Army was pathetically small. The Airforce? The US built 12,000 B-17s in WW2. The US had 155 B-17s when Pearl Harbor happened.

Before World War 2 the US had potential, but was not yet a powerful entity. Its strength lay in its Industrial base which had yet to be put to the test.

The Washington Naval Treaty guaranteed the U.S. fleets to a higher level than the Japanese fleet; it contributed to their conception of the West as racists who only respected force and would only give them a spot at the dinner table if they were assholes to get it. Incidentally, they were correct in thinking so.

[Illuminatus Primus]

The U.S. was not at serious risk from Japan compared to Imperial Japan from the U.S., as is blatantly obvious. Even shortly after their victory, we were able to mount (admittedly, a merely propaganda blow) a bombing raid on their domestic homeland; they were not. We had colonies and troops (apparently too few) in their backyard, they had none in ours. The war almost immediately shifted to fighting within their sphere of influence and not ours. The war was almost entirely on the offensive for the U.S. Note that Hawaii at this point was an insular area, not a State of the Union, and was basically a colonized shithole for the native population, under basically a Hawaiian Republican Party one-party state operated by the Big Five business interests. I don't see how the Philippines qualifies as a legit U.S. security risk, it was some far-flung colony in East Asia that we subjugated through concentration camp, atrocity, and collective punishment tactics. I suppose one can lament the "vulnerability" to our imperial domination there in the same sense one can lament the vulnerability of socialist brotherhood with regard to Czechoslovakian contamination by Radio Free Europe.

The reason our policy was "stupid" in the sense that those who call it that mean, was that we were unable to cow universal and reflexive submission through fear of force for our imperial interests. The Pacific was supposed to be our lake, and East Asia mostly ours to exploit. The yellow zip-heads could get fucked. In essence: our Tarkin Doctrine was too weak.

[Simon_Jester]

Total disarmament in the 1930s? What a load of bullshit - having the most powerful Navy on Earth and describing this as "total disarmament" is just preposterous.

Skim's referring to the various naval disarmament treaties which kept the IJN at a near parity (or close enough) that the random loss of a few ships could swing the balance of power in favor of the Japanese.

Also; the treaties also prohibited us from fortifying our various pacific holdings -- same for the Brits and Hong Kong.

That's not total disarmament though. "We might lose a few ships and have an inferior fleet for a year while our new aircraft carriers are finished!" is not the same as "Alderaan is a peaceful planet, we have no weapons!"

Also, the relative power gap between the US and Japan during the 1920s and '30s is much smaller than that between the US and any non-nuclear power today. And if the nuclear powers can match us in conventional forces it hardly matters, because we can't fight a major conventional war with them anyway because we all die.

We could probably survive as a nation quite well with a solid nuclear deterrent force, a modest (by our current standards) conventional navy designed to patrol the sealanes, and not much else. What we could not do is "protect our interests" in every corner of the globe whenever it struck our fancy to do so, no matter who or what stood in our way. And I think it's a valid question whether or not we need that capability.

I'm not saying we don't need it, but I definitely think it needs to be asked. Is it in the US's best long term interests to maintain itself as a valid competitor to anyone, anywhere, any time, no matter where they are or whether we're fighting the war in their backyard? There are many prosperous and happy countries that don't demand that capability from their military, after all.

[Ralin]

The Washington Naval Treaty guaranteed the U.S. fleets to a higher level than the Japanese fleet; it contributed to their conception of the West as racists who only respected force and would only give them a spot at the dinner table if they were assholes to get it. Incidentally, they were correct in thinking so.

My understanding was that the treaty actually favored the Japanese, as they didn't have to maintain fleets in the Atlantic as well and hence had local superiority.

[Bakustra]

The Washington Naval Treaty guaranteed the U.S. fleets to a higher level than the Japanese fleet; it contributed to their conception of the West as racists who only respected force and would only give them a spot at the dinner table if they were assholes to get it. Incidentally, they were correct in thinking so.

My understanding was that the treaty actually favored the Japanese, as they didn't have to maintain fleets in the Atlantic as well and hence had local superiority.

They had local superiority, but the treaty still made them second-class citizens by limiting their total tonnage to 60% of the British/American allowances. They also were forbidden to construct or expand naval bases or fortifications in any of their island possessions, while the British and US had exceptions for their coastal islands and Hawaii. Note that Japan had had less time to fortify these possessions than had Great Britain and the US as well. In the matter of retaining current ships, they were also treated as a second-class naval power. While they were such in raw comparison of warmaking ability, the Washington Treaty was meant as a permanent or long-term status quo, relegating Japan as the junior partner in the Pacific indefinitely if followed, regardless of economic growth or development.

[Lonestar]

And yet, they were still granted higher tonnage than France or Italy.

Hmmmmm....

[Bakustra]

And yet, they were still granted higher tonnage than France or Italy.

Hmmmmm....

I was just looking at Japan's position, rather than considering Italy's need for a massive Regia Marina to patrol its vast array of overseas possessions, such as Libya, Somalia, and Libya. As for France... pfft, what Atlantic-bordering country with large African, American and Asian possessions could possibly need a fleet for all that? Simply ridiculous!

[Lonestar]

I was just looking at Japan's position, rather than considering Italy's need for a massive Regia Marina to patrol its vast array of overseas possessions, such as Libya, Somalia, and Libya. As for France... pfft, what Atlantic-bordering country with large African, American and Asian possessions could possibly need a fleet for all that? Simply ridiculous!

Point is Japan needed a fleet for the Western Pacific, France needed a much larger fleet because it had a more dispersed empire, and Italy wanted a fleet at least compareble to France so they wouldn't be up the creek in the Med. While the Anglo powers *were* racist, there are much better examples than "hurr hurr naval treaty" to point to.

The Naval Treaties artificially inflated the IJN's strength, and the Japanese knew it. The Japanese were pushing for parity with the Anglo countries, but we knew through the Black Room that they would have accepted the 5:3:1.75 instead of not abiding by the treaty, because either Britain or the US could have out produced the Japanese in a naval race.

[Bakustra]

I was just looking at Japan's position, rather than considering Italy's need for a massive Regia Marina to patrol its vast array of overseas possessions, such as Libya, Somalia, and Libya. As for France... pfft, what Atlantic-bordering country with large African, American and Asian possessions could possibly need a fleet for all that? Simply ridiculous!

Point is Japan needed a fleet for the Western Pacific, France needed a much larger fleet because it had a more dispersed empire, and Italy wanted a fleet at least compareble to France so they wouldn't be up the creek in the Med. While the Anglo powers *were* racist, there are much better examples than "hurr hurr naval treaty" to point to.

The Naval Treaties artificially inflated the IJN's strength, and the Japanese knew it. The Japanese were pushing for parity with the Anglo countries, but we knew through the Black Room that they would have accepted the 5:3:1.75 instead of not abiding by the treaty, because either Britain or the US could have out produced the Japanese in a naval race.

I'd rather say that the Anglo powers used the treaty to shut the other naval powers out of being able to match them, and that this, combined with Western racism, lead Japan to conclude that it would have to force its way into becoming a global power. This isn't necessarily incompatible with your argument. The problem with using direct comparisons of strength is that the Washington Treaty was proposed as permanent, not as a temporary measure to be adjusted at a later date, and that it ignores Japan being blocked from constructing overseas naval bases or expanding the ones it had currently established.

The treaty may have inflated the potential strength of the IJN in ships, but it also sought to limit the range of the IJN and put Japan as a permanent secondary power in the Pacific.

[Lonestar]

I'd rather say that the Anglo powers used the treaty to shut the other naval powers out of being able to match them, and that this, combined with Western racism, lead Japan to conclude that it would have to force its way into becoming a global power. This isn't necessarily incompatible with your argument. The problem with using direct comparisons of strength is that the Washington Treaty was proposed as permanent, not as a temporary measure to be adjusted at a later date, and that it ignores Japan being blocked from constructing overseas naval bases or expanding the ones it had currently established.

1. It was always a naval holiday to be re-voted on later, and it didn't explicitly ban new capital ship construction
2. Other countries(the UK, US) had restrictions on new forts as well.
3. The big loser in the Naval treaty system was the BIGGEST naval power, the UK. The Anglo powers ended up artificially restricted, and in Britain's case, with a swarm of "pre-Jutland" warships to make up their tonnage. The WNT ELEVATED Japan's strength, it didn't shut them out. Again, we knew that the Japanese had this opinion through the Black Room, so it isn't a unreasonable statement for me to make.

The treaty may have inflated the potential strength of the IJN in ships, but it also sought to limit the range of the IJN and put Japan as a permanent secondary power in the Pacific.

No more so than the UK and the US. I might add that there was nothing preventing the IJN from using anchorages in their Pacific mandates, they just couldn't fortify them(much). Of course, Scapa Flow wasn't fortified in 1914 and it was much closer to the UK's likely enemies than any IJN anchorage in the Pacific Mandates.

[Bakustra]

I'd rather say that the Anglo powers used the treaty to shut the other naval powers out of being able to match them, and that this, combined with Western racism, lead Japan to conclude that it would have to force its way into becoming a global power. This isn't necessarily incompatible with your argument. The problem with using direct comparisons of strength is that the Washington Treaty was proposed as permanent, not as a temporary measure to be adjusted at a later date, and that it ignores Japan being blocked from constructing overseas naval bases or expanding the ones it had currently established.

1. It was always a naval holiday to be re-voted on later, and it didn't explicitly ban new capital ship construction
2. Other countries(the UK, US) had restrictions on new forts as well.
3. The big loser in the Naval treaty system was the BIGGEST naval power, the UK. The Anglo powers ended up artificially restricted, and in Britain's case, with a swarm of "pre-Jutland" warships to make up their tonnage. The WNT ELEVATED Japan's strength, it didn't shut them out. Again, we knew that the Japanese had this opinion through the Black Room, so it isn't a unreasonable statement for me to make.

1. The earliest date it could be terminated was 1936. Fourteen years is a long time for a "naval holiday". It also explicitly banned new capital ship construction in Article III, except for replacement tonnage, which was helpfully restricted by Chapter 2, Part 3 of the treaty. Japan was specifically bound to a set number of ships by Part 3, as were the UK and US.
2. Their restrictions limited new forts and naval bases for insular possessions to Australia, New Zealand and the Canadian coast for the UK, and Hawaii, the Canal Zone coast, and the Alaskan coast for the US, in the area between 110° E and the US coast. Japan, meanwhile, was restricted to its main islands and the Korean coast for new naval bases and forts under the terms of the treaty.
3. There were other factors involved in making the treaty. It would be foolish to pretend otherwise. However, the US and UK severely cutting their naval strength does not preclude them from taking actions to prevent other naval powers from being able to challenge them, or the treaty having this effect unintentionally (unlikely though I believe that to be). "Shutting them out" refers mainly to the restrictions on naval facilities and their perceived status as a junior partner, but I will withdraw it if you prefer.

The treaty may have inflated the potential strength of the IJN in ships, but it also sought to limit the range of the IJN and put Japan as a permanent secondary power in the Pacific.

No more so than the UK and the US. I might add that there was nothing preventing the IJN from using anchorages in their Pacific mandates, they just couldn't fortify them(much). Of course, Scapa Flow wasn't fortified in 1914 and it was much closer to the UK's likely enemies than any IJN anchorage in the Pacific Mandates.

They couldn't establish permanent maintenance and repair facilities either, nor expand the ones already present. Meanwhile, the US and UK could freely fortify and build up Hawaii and Australia, New Guinea, New Zealand, and Singapore respectively. The US and UK could threaten Japan far more than Japan could threaten them, and this state of affairs was intended to continue, under the treaty as written.

[Admiral Valdemar]

The US military-industrial complex may be in dire need of a slashing, but as others have stated, the US is an island surrounded by bounty and pirates. The only reason the US isn't some third world is precisely because it CAN force project so effectively for the resources it so requires. Unlike even prior to WWII, the US is no ever more reliant on outside sources for energy and minerals and the idea that energy independence can occur at all, not in some realistic time frame we can peg a date to in my lifetime, is fanciful rhetoric peddled by those uneasy about foreign leverage. Iran may very well despise the US for having an iron fist to slam down should they stop the oil flow, but until it vanishes, they'll have to accept it. This is why the bigger problem now is economic clout, of which the US still has much, albeit, waning against a background of ever more powerful economic entities like Chindia.

Exploits in areas like Afghanistan and Iraq have served a purpose far more useful than simply bringing lovely American freedom and democracy and capitalist delight to the unwashed mud people. They've secured one of the largest lithium and oil reserves on Earth, and guaranteed further staging in the theatre to protect such assets and enable R&D into newer projects to keep the edge. The improvement in UAVs alone is worth the effort, and hey, we ever get to kill a few terrorists and make the media feel like the world is getting safer.

The tearing down of the machine that is the US military would signify the end to any real presence the US has in the world. It'd be open season for everyone else if the US just receded back into a gated community, except, one where you're now worrying about the postman being lynched for all your goods ordered prior to reaching your door, rather than just bought off as would be the case now. For that reason alone, the cuts won't be massively deep into existing capability. The UK couldn't run an empire without a world class navy, and Rome couldn't run an empire without an incredible army. The US is no different.

[Lonestar]

1. The earliest date it could be terminated was 1936. Fourteen years is a long time for a "naval holiday". It also explicitly banned new capital ship construction in Article III, except for replacement tonnage, which was helpfully restricted by Chapter 2, Part 3 of the treaty. Japan was specifically bound to a set number of ships by Part 3, as were the UK and US.

So? Didn't mean it wasn't a naval holiday. And the RN was allowed to build two BBs (so were Italy and France, but that's a whole 'nother story) before dismantling much of their fleet. I would also add that the first group of Fast battleships in the USN(the North Carolinas) were designed as treaty battleships. Sort of.

2. Their restrictions limited new forts and naval bases for insular possessions to Australia, New Zealand and the Canadian coast for the UK, and Hawaii, the Canal Zone coast, and the Alaskan coast for the US, in the area between 110° E and the US coast. Japan, meanwhile, was restricted to its main islands and the Korean coast for new naval bases and forts under the terms of the treaty.

Still a whopper of a distance involved in those cases(Japan to Australia/Hawaii) which greatly mitigates and "unfair" fort placements. And creating forts around anchorages quickly isn't that hard, as the RN showed with Scapa Flow.

3. There were other factors involved in making the treaty. It would be foolish to pretend otherwise. However, the US and UK severely cutting their naval strength does not preclude them from taking actions to prevent other naval powers from being able to challenge them, or the treaty having this effect unintentionally (unlikely though I believe that to be). "Shutting them out" refers mainly to the restrictions on naval facilities and their perceived status as a junior partner, but I will withdraw it if you prefer.

The primary "other factors" were sticker shock, not trying to shut other countries out. The UK government didn't really want to spend the cash on the 4-4 plan, and the US government didn't want to build more ships to provide a qualitative advantage over the IJN and RN vessels that were under construction or planned. The Anglo powers insisted that Japan take a smaller ratio, not because they were a "junior partner" but because it would be impossible to present the treaty to their publics if Japan(who only has responsibilies in the Western Pacific) is allowed to maintain a battleline as large as the Anglo powers, who had true global responsibilities.

They couldn't establish permanent maintenance and repair facilities either, nor expand the ones already present. Meanwhile, the US and UK could freely fortify and build up Hawaii and Australia, New Guinea, New Zealand, and Singapore respectively. The US and UK could threaten Japan far more than Japan could threaten them, and this state of affairs was intended to continue, under the treaty as written.

Do you know how far those places are to Japan? Very far. In fact the US wasn't allowed to fortify the Aleutians specifically because they were much closer to Japan than any of the other possessions. This was the era before huge naval logistics trains had been fully developed, and no battlefleet is going to sail from Singapore or Pearl Harbor several thousand miles unmolested.