we have lift off Falcon 9

[Sarevok]

On top of my head reducing vibration is one. The Ares rocket failed man rating tests due to vibration issues.

[Dave]

Man-rating would also probably include the requirement for an escape option, redundancy/reliability assurances, human interaction tests (having astronauts and other UX experts show that the spacecraft is safe and easy to use, even (and especially) in an emergency), obvious things like environmental systems, and so on.

[Simon_Jester]

Acceleration isn't really an issue- most orbital rocketry is based on big liquid fuel rockets that generate pretty limited accelerations (say, 3g to 5g) which can be sustained. We don't have chemical rockets that can put large payloads into orbit at accelerations too high for humans to survive.

So yes, man-rating a rocket is mostly a question of making it safe, going from (say) 95% reliability to 99% reliability, which is hard. Also, yes, of reducing vibration and anything else that might injure or abuse crewmen, but which a satellite that's basically a block of metal and electronics could ride out gracefully.

[MKSheppard]

An extra heat shield would have been prohibitely costly, greatly extended turnaround time and frankly made the entire historical Shuttle configuration pointless.

look up project MOOSE. Basically bail out from orbit with an inflatable foam heatshield strapped to your back. some materials flew on gemini as a test.

[MKSheppard]

NASA did not build its own Atlas or Titan boosters. It did not own the facilities to build its own Saturn rockets or space shuttles.

Some more checking has yielded the fact that YES the Government owned the facilities that built the Space Shuttles.

Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) previously used to build Saturn first stages, was used to build the External Tank (ET), while the orbiters themselves were assembled at....

Air Force Plant 42 - Site 9.

AFP 42 is a huge complex that was bought by the USAF in 1953/1954 and then contracted/leased out to corporations when necessary.

In the 1970s/80s, North American Rockwell was the assigned tenant to the Site 9 area, and built all the space shuttles there, along with every single B-1A/B-1B. Literally across the runway was AFP 42 Site 4, where the B-2A was constructed, also in a GOCO (Government Owned Contractor Operated) plant.

Damn librul commie homobortionists, twisting the free market like that!
(sorry, can't do it as well as shroomy)

[MKSheppard]

If that really was the case, then I guess style points really do count.

Here's the revelant bits from his memoir Moon Lander:

LM-1 Customer Acceptance Readiness Review (CARR) on 21 June 1967 at Grumman's main plant in Bethpage, Long Island, NY.

Grumman's senior vice president, George Titterton, handled the meeting arrangements. A five-foot-two blustery man who was determined to prove he could take on any challenge, he decided to pattern the CARR on the annual Grumman stockholders' meeting. The day before the meeting, airplanes were moved out of the Plant 4 flight operations hangar onto the adjacent apron and a wooden dais was assembled at one end of the cavernous space. The hangar had a vaulted elliptical roof, and its end walls nested ceiling-high sliding doors that could be fully opened to allow the crowd to assemble and disperse easily. Several hundred folding wooden chairs were set up in rows facing the dais, and a portable sound system and several large trumpet-shaped loudspeakers on collapsible metal stands were provided to penetrate the acoustically dead environment. Behind the last row of folding chairs there was a food catering area, complete with serving counters and dining tables and chairs. A large projection screen was positioned catty-cornered on the stage, where it could be viewed by both the CARR Board and the audience, and lecterns and microphones were provided for the board chairman and the briefer.

The CARR Board was chaired by Bob Gilruth, director of NASA's Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) in Houston. NASA members of the board included George Low, Apollo spacecraft program manager at Houston; Gen. Samuel C. Phillips, Apollo program director; Eberhard Rees, deputy director of the Marshall Spaceflight Center at Huntsville; Kurt Debus, director of Kennedy Space Center; and Chris Kraft, flight operations director at MSC. Grumman members included George Titterton; Joe Gavin, vice president of Space Programs; Ralph Tripp, LM program director; Bill Rathke, LM program manager; Edward Z. Gray, assistant to Grumman's president; and me. The senior NASA people flew into the Grumman airport at Bethpage in the morning.

We enjoyed a pleasant though crowded lunch, served on real china and flatware at the tables in the catering area. Shortly before one o'clock we took our places around the large U-shaped table on the stage. As we mounted the stage we were hit by a solid roar of sound rising from below. Above the drone of many conversations rose the clatter of china and clinking of table silver. Three times I tried to talk to Chris Kraft across the table but gave up, hoping that the din would subside when the microphones were activated.

Gilruth called the meeting to order. Normally soft-spoken, he had to shout into the microphone before the hubbub subsided. Then the sound system broke into an ear-piercing feedback squeal. As the participants filed into the rows of seats the babble of conversation diminished, but on the stage the clanging of the tableware seemed louder and more distracting. Titterton motioned for a young engineer to quiet the caterers.

...

This logical but arduous process was hampered by the noise level and the hangar's sound-swallowing acoustics. We could hardly hear one another across the table, even when we shouted into the microphone. Another loudspeaker was added on the front of the stage, not facing the audience like the others, but turned around to face the board table, but it did not solve the problem.

Despite these difficulties the board soldiered onward. I was torn between suppressed glee at Titterton's growing discomfort and concern that at some point the NASA board members might simply get up and leave. Gilruth, Low, and Phillips were patient, repeating questions two or three times. Finally, though, Gilruth had had enough. He shouted into the microphone sarcastically, "If it's not asking too much, would you people in the audience please stay in your seats and be quiet, so the board can hear the speaker and each other?"

...

The board had displayed remarkable patience and adaptability and was making steady progress down the agenda when an overwhelming, deep-throated roar engulfed the hangar. Titterton jumped up, angry and embarrassed. A flight line engine test crew had started testing a new Gulfstream II executive jet outside the hangar, the usual place for such tests.

Using hand signals and shouting into the microphone, Gilruth declared a break in the meeting. Titterton first ordered the four ceiling-high hangar doors closed. That hardly affected the noise level, but the temperature soared.

As Low and Gilruth started toward him, probably to ask that the meeting be adjourned, Titterton hurried outside to order the Gulfstream captain to halt his tests. I watched the NASA officials desultorily thumbing through some of the briefing handout material and looking at their watches every minute or two. Surely in another few minutes they would leave, the CARR Board would have to find a new date in their busy calendars, and we would lose a week or more of precious LM schedule.

Suddenly the din ceased. Silence was like a release from pain. Titterton strode briskly in from the runway apron, sweating, his lace a rosy pink, his glasses fogging. The hangar doors were reopened, and air circulated. A cathedral silence settled over the crowded hall as we held our breath. Gilruth leaned into the microphone and, from newly formed habit, shouted in his reedy voice, "I guess that's over." Then, realizing he was shouting into silence, he dropped into a normal tone to finish: "George assures me it won't happen again."

Four hundred pairs of eyes turned to Titterton, who excelled in having the last word. This time he could only muster a wan smile and nod assent.

The CARR Board resumed its deliberations. Our working conditions steadily improved as the DRs for each LM-1 system were dispositioned and the panel members and others concerned with those items left. The crowd thinned, the background noise lessened, and the temperature dropped. After several hours of watching the board, the panel members gained a sense of the probable outcomes of the DRs. Plaintiffs and defendants began to negotiate "out of court" settlements. Our pace accelerated, and the impossible agenda was completed shortly after 8:00 p.m.

Then came the grand moment: Gilruth declared that the CARR Board had found LM-1 ready for formal acceptance and delivery to KSC, subject to the satisfactory completion of the assigned action items.

Of course, LM-1 when it arrived at TEDDY SPACE CENTER, was found to be full of flaws, and leaked like a sieve by the TEDDY SPACE CENTER PEOPLE...so not good there.

[Simon_Jester]

NASA did not build its own Atlas or Titan boosters. It did not own the facilities to build its own Saturn rockets or space shuttles.

Some more checking has yielded the fact that YES the Government owned the facilities that built the Space Shuttles...

There go my expectations.

And yes, that famous bastion of liberal statism in action, the B-1 bomber...

[hides all records of Reagan's 1980 campaign]

[MKSheppard]

Dragon has been grappled and latched onto by the ISS canadarm as of about 40 minutes ago.

[MKSheppard]

Dragon is now berthed at the ISS, opening to happen next flight day.

[MKSheppard]

Dragon hatch opened, good air quality, the astronauts remarked on the new car smell. Unloading will be around monday.

[MKSheppard]

Dragon splashdown 500 miles off california, craft in stable one

[PeZook]

Holy crap. This was basically a perfect mission, wasn't it?

[MKSheppard]

Actually, there were some problems repacking the Dragon for the trip home -- someone forgot to remember that the Dragon's storage cubbies are rigid box shaped holes; and there was much repacking and kicking shit to make it fit.

[Ellindsey]

Holy crap. This was basically a perfect mission, wasn't it?

Almost. The only problems were the first aborted launch attempt (leaking check valve in an engine, computer aborted the launch half a second before liftoff, SpaceX replaced the valve on the pad and launched a few days later) and the problems they had with the LIDAR when the capsule was approaching the station.

[someone_else]

Regarding spaceplanes I have been wondering about Skylon and like.

Skylon relies on a glorious jet engine advancement, which would also make possible a mach 5-ish passenger aircraft (much more likely way to make money for them btw).
They are working on the new jet engine components at the moment (so far their stuff is working), since nothing else on that craft is really revolutionary (it is a granny's space shuttle, so to speak).

Still has the significant issue of "how the hell you save humans if it goes kaboom if they are closed in a space-rated shipping container in its payload bay?".

I keep hearing about man-rating. What's the difference between a man-rated and a non-man-rated rocket?

This paperwork tells you all. That's the US government's man-rating papaerwork, if they are selling their services to others, can they can do what they want? Has Soviet Russia to comply to those man-rating standards (I think it does not care)?

In short, they have to implement more checks to make sure they catch fuckups BEFORE liftoff, and to place more safety systems to avoid losing the capsule/people.

Reliability of course rises, as does cost. The bigger the rocket, the higher the cost of man-rating (duh!). That's why smart mission architectures prefer SMALL man-rated rockets to put the capsules in orbit and then boosting the rest of the vehicle with whatever cheap crappy rocket from Soviet Russia/Ukraine.


As a side note, Shuttle and ISS don't comply to those man-rating standards (they predate most of the man-rating papaerwork).

SpaceX rockets are designed to be pretty damn safe from the start though.

-After first stage engine start, the launcher is held down and not released for flight until all propulsion and vehicle systems are confirmed to be operating normally, an automatic safe shut-down and unloading of propellant occurs if any abnormal conditions are detected. So if there is an issue the thing survives to be fired another day. (also in Satrun V and Shuttle)

-The use of multiple first stage engines allows for mission completion even if one of the first-stage engines fails mid-flight. (also in Saturn V)

-Triple-redundant electronics and navigation systems, but that's kinda cheap these days. I don't think they need to be rad-hardened to any real degree (capsule stuff should though) so they are really fucking cheap.

Add an escape tower on top, do some minor tweaks and the rocket is man-rated.

[PeZook]

It must also be capable of having manual overrides etc. installed for the crew to use - most cargo rockets don't have those, or even provisions to have them installed. Which is why nowadays it's cheaper to just designed a new manned rocket from the ground up than take, say, a Delta IV and man-rate it