Axis Kast wrote:Um no, that's your problem, Comical Axi, not mine. And according to the actual situation, Hussein showed rationality in not undertaking action which would result in the immediate destruction of his regime for twelve years and knowing when to get out of Dodge. And for somebody arguing that we can't trust Saddam's word at face-value, I find it most amusing that you trust Saddam's word at face-value to support your argument that he was delusional.
How many times must this be made patently clear to you? Acts of elf-preservation do not a rational individual make. Somebody can display good – or rather, obvious – judgement in one specific situation, but fail to do so – to the point of delusions – in the next.
And how many times must it be made clear to you that assesments of a person's mental state cannot be complete or accurate without taking in a whole picture of words and actions? Once more, you try basing an entire chain of "proof" on selected bits of material which fit with your predetermined conclusions while ignoring all evidence which is inconvenient. Especially if said individual is known to be duplicitous in the first place.
Accepting Saddam’s word at face value? No, merely drawing conclusions from an article published in the Los Angeles Times.
At this point, it's become painfully obvious that your conclusions are worthless.
You SURE you want to keep hanging your hat upon the alledged credibility of Tony Blair?
He ignored the advice of one aide. It’s a warning sign, but by no means the final nail in anyone’s coffin. You’re also speaking to his claim that Iraq could deploy weapons in forty-five minutes (but, of what?) rather than the actual issue at hand, which is the SOTU address.
What a pathetic dodge! It was
you who kept insisting that Bush didn't lie because he trusted Tony Blair, who "stood by" his own word for the extent of the Iraqi threat. It was Bush who cited the Tony Blair version of what British Intelligence said in the SOTU speech.
YOU, Comical Axi, put forth the "Bush didn't lie because Blair didn't lie" formulation, just before you took off on your now famous exercise to attempt to redefine the word "lie". And as for the SOTU speech, it has become painfully clear to anyone with even a quarter-brain that Bush's statements were as unsupported by fact as Blair's —particularly in regards to the Niger yellowcake issue and Iraq's nuclear capability which this White House is now desperate to distance itself from. All of this spells
LIE! Your denials of these realities have surpassed dishonesty and even idiocy and are approaching the level of lunacy.
See above news item. You make yourself more ridiculous with each post.
The above news item has nothing to do with the context of the original statement.
As it impeaches Blair's credibility, it has
EVERYTHING to do with it.
Was that before or after Blair lied to the Commons and the people about the vast Iraqi WMD arsenal ready to launch on 45-minute notice?
Blair’s 45-minute claim (a subjective affair from the start) is again not the focus. His credibility has absolutely nothing to do with the context of the anthrax statement. Point to me the quotation in which he points to their actual existence rather than wherein you infer his demand that they be accounted for equals affirmation of their existence in his book.
You are insane if you can actually make that assertion with a straight face. He is already on
PUBLIC RECORD asserting that the anthrax weapons exist and is now demanding accounting for those same weapons whose existence is based on what has now been revealed to have been a gross exaggeration if not a baldfaced
LIE!
Was this before Blair decided to deliberately lie?
Irrelevant. This is, I believe, a textbook example of Red Herring behavior. Tony Blair’s analysis as regards the threat posed Iraq is not contingent on the value of his 45-minute claim alone.
Too bad the analysis disagrees with you on every count.
Which did not present anything like an "imminent threat" justifying war.
That depends; as you have been reminded time in and time out, the lack of evidence regarding those stockpiles – whether or not they were actually sitting in a vault somewhere – represented a very great dilemma for investigators.
Burden of Proof fallacy.
That Iraq refused to come out and offer physical evidence was an extremely suspicious move.
Suspicion does not equal evidence. Nor does it make a case for war.
Bush and Blair – along with Straw, clearly – are staking their claim to the danger posed by Iraq on the fact that certain items remains missing without explanation.
So you admit that they're staking a claim on a total lack of hard evidence. Concession Accepted.
It makes a full accounting of Iraq’s weapons programs impossible unless one takes in good faith the claims made by Saddam Hussein, Tariq Azziz, and others.
Red Herring fallacy.
Iraqi defectors did not bring physical proof. Kemal’s word was vindicated only from the point of view that inspectors discovered some kind of disarmament – but not to any specific extent. Progressive destruction and observation by Blix and Ritter never uncovered the fate of those 10,000 liters of missing anthrax - and more. You have no solid evidence of their fate.
And you have no solid evidence of their existence to start with. Another Burden of Proof fallacy on your part.
Nice strawman, there.
So, Kemal is, in your opinion, a credible analyst of events even after his having left Iraq?
Since that was not was what I was arguing, I can only chalk up another strawman to you.
No, I did not say anything about the anthrax stocks. That was a quote regarding the fact of the anthrax stocks' status as contradicting the now-increasingly dubious word of Blair and Straw.
There was a quotation regarding the anthrax
factory, not the anthrax
stockpiles – and an addition that began with the word, “Really.” You either made a clear mistake in culling your example or are an outright liar.
Amusing —the very man who's laboured to redefine the word "lie" to suit his own purposes and hyperextends himself to defend evident liars is accusing me of dishonesty. How droll.
The laws of physics are different in Iraq as opposed to the west?! You're insane if you think that the actions and duration of known chemical agents cannot be calculated according to known physical parametres. They're industry-standard materials Their formulae and composition are well-known.
Provide for me a list of exactly what chemicals escaped our detection.
And yet another Burden of Proof fallacy on your part...
An issue rendered moot the day the materials exceed their use-by date and become inert.
And yet still proof of long-standing obfuscation and successful contravention by Saddam Hussein’s régime.
Only in your tiny mind, perhaps.
Fifty one old Mig 21s, three Foxbats, and ammunition in the one protected bunker in the entire country, left there for an indeterminate period of time, and this adds up to vast hidden WMD arsenals how, exactly?
This has absolutely nothing to do with WMD. It’s got more to do with the value of Hussein’s own orders.
Oh right, the orders you insist prove Hussein's insanity yet show signs that he's cogent of the need to protect his remaining useable military assets from destruction... Excuse me, what point were you trying to make again?
Another of your pathetic strawmen, Kast? That is not what I argued and you damn well know it. Or do I have to connect all the fucking dots for you? The point was that with the intensified preinvasion scouting, movement of anything would have been observed.
Speculation based on faith – regarding technology already proven fallible.
Since we did not use the same technology as in Gulf War I in carrying out preinvasion surveillance, your statement is invalid.
Handwaiving does not advance your case. Nor does pretending that the surveillance failures of 1991 applied in 2003. Furthermore, we encountered very little artillery in the late war and what pieces were deployed fell into our hands. No Iraqi units were equipped with chemical weapons in this fight.
What about surveillance failures of 2003 that apply in 2003?
You mean your faith-based speculations?
Again, Hussein’s lack of tube artillery might explain why Iraq didn’t launch. It doesn’t vindicate the argument that he was not in possession of WMD at all.
Leap of Logic fallacy.
So every single vehicle and every last piece of equipment were left on the battlefield by every single unit?
And your evidence for the contrary is...?
Except that they didn't. i'm sorry if the reality of the situation is inconvenient for you.
Because preconditions of a specific contingency plan were unmet. It doesn’t absolute Hussein of having made the plan in the first place.
Which is meaningless in terms of the reality which actually unfolded. Please stick to actualities.
Not quite, Comical Axi. The UN documents presented stated that the precusor was a offensive nuke attack on Baghdad This does not address Hussein's evident restraint in not provoking an American nuclear retaliation.
No, the precursors was
a march on Baghdad. You should have read the entire debate before jumping in near the end.
I did, Mr. Clueless.
Vympel wrote:I looked up the NPR article. I don't see how Pollack can possibly reference it with a straight face, given it's conclusions.
"Immediately following the April 2, 1990 speech, in which he threatened to 'burn' half of Israel, Saddam performed a policy reversal in response to growing international concern. After the US and Egypt expressed concern ... Saddam announced he would only use CW only in retaliation for an Israeli nuclear attack on Baghdad [goes on to say that he told 5 US senators that it was actually a nuclear weapon on Iraq]."
- points to role of Iraqi NBC programs against it's two traditional enemies, Iran and Turkey- citing Israel and Pan-Arab leadership as *not* being the primary concern. (p 32)
- a deliberate Iraqi disinformation campaign was undertaken during Desert Storm to deter the Allied forces from launching a ground offensive (they were not deterred)
- US spokesmen began a deterrence campaign of their own: warning that Iraqi use of WMD might force Israel to use "unconventional weapons" as well (Cheney)
- and this one: "If Saddam ever seriously contemplated the use of WMD during the Gulf War against armed forces or states that possessed, or were believed to be in possession of, far more potent WMD arsenals than that possessed by Iraq, he clearly reconsidered. At least as long as his own life and rule in Baghdad were not directly threatened, there was little sense in using such weapons ... In short, as long as there was a good chance that the Allied ground offensive would end once Kuwait was liberated, not all was lost, and thus there was no point in employing doomsday weapons"
- referencing the Iraqi Baghdad 'doomsday' predelegation of launch authority: there were two predelegations- the one where he threatened WMD retaliation when attacked with WMD (makes sense, as the author averrrs)
- the predelegation of launch in case Baghdad was invaded/besieged: it seems that his approach was that if he were to lose Baghdad, no one else would have it either ... It would be wrong, however, to view the predelegation orders as a sign that SH was ready to commit suicide ... Saddam may have believed ... he could smuggle himself out of the capital city to one of his underground shelters ... if the United States or Israel had retaliated against Baghdad with nuclear weapons, Saddam could later emerge from the rubble to declare victory. The civilized world would be repulsed by the punishment wreaked on the millions of innocent inhabitants of Baghdad. Regardless of what happened in Tel Aviv, the Arab world would be in a state of shocked outrage, the war would come to an abrupt end, the coalition would immediatley disintergrate, and Saddam and his regime would survive."
The conclusion of the entire piece is very enlightening: "Having realised that he faced enemies who could retaliate in kind, it appears that he decided not to risk it" It goes on to mention what may or may not happen if Iraq had nukes, warning of renewed Iraqi ambitions against Kuwait, for example, but that's out of the scope of his 'delusional' state, and I don't see how Iraqi could impose anything on Kuwait considering the continued decrepit state of it's military.
FYI:
http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/ds-threats.htm
excerpt:
The threat of Israeli retaliation was not the only deterrent to Saddam's use of chemical-armed rockets. On 14 August 1991, Defense Secretary Cheney stated that "t should be clear to Saddam Hussein that we have a wide range of military capabilities that will let us respond with overwhelming force and extract a very high price should he be foolish enough to use chemical weapons on United States forces."(12) The American government reportedly used third-party channels to privately warn Iraq that "in the event of a first use of a weapon of mass destruction by Iraq, the United States reserved the right to use any form of retaliation (presumably up to and including nuclear weapons)."(13)
After the initiation of hostilities in January, American officials continued to stress the risk of retaliation. Defense Secretary Cheney warned that "were Saddam Hussein foolish enough to use weapons of mass destruction, the US response would be absolutely overwhelming and devastating." Cheney also noted that "I assume (Saddam) knows that if he were to resort to chemical weapons, that would be an escalation to weapons of mass destruction and that the possibility would then exist, certainly with respect to the Israelis, for example, that they might retaliate with unconventional weapons as well." General Schwarzkopf added that "if Saddam Hussein chooses to use weapons of mass destruction, then the rules of this campaign will probably change."(14)
While one might question whether the United States would actually have used nuclear weapons in response to a chemical attack,(15) Saddam Hussein obviously could not have been confident that we would not. As Bruce Blair noted, "There's enough ambiguity in our deployments of nuclear weapons at sea and our ability to deliver nuclear weapons by air and quickly move them into the region to plant the seeds of doubt in Hussein's mind."(16) The effectiveness of the threat of chemical or nuclear retaliation was confirmed by Lt. Gen. Calvin Waller, deputy commander of Desert Storm, who stated that "we tried to give him (Saddam) every signal that if he used chemicals against us that we would retaliate in kind and may even do more, so I think he was hesitant to use it there."(17)
The British also made several threats to respond harshly to an Iraqi chemical attack. On 30 September 1990 it was reported that a senior officer with the British 7th Armored Division, being deployed to Saudi Arabia, claimed that British forces would retaliate with battlefield nuclear weapons if attacked by Iraqi chemical weapons.( 18 ) On 1 October 1990, British Prime Margaret Thatcher noted that "[y]ou'd have to consider at the time, if chemical weapons were used against us, precisely what our reply should be."(19) Several days later, British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd stated that an Iraqi chemical attack would "provoke a response that would completely destroy that country."(20)
And
During the war, the judgement of the US intelligence community was that these deterrent threats were effective in discouraging Iraqi chemical weapons use. According to one document declassified for GulfLink:
"The fear of retaliation is one of the reasons that nations have not used chemicals, even when they had such weapons. Other factors such as sustainability and political consequences have been contributing factors. The decision by Iraq not to use chemical weapons thus far in the war is probably driven by all these considerations.... Israel's policy to retaliate strongly for any provocation is well established and must be considered. Baghdad is convinced Israel has nuclear and chemical weapons which would be used against Iraq...... Iraq also appreciates that Coalition member states have chemical and nuclear weapons that it can deliver anywhere in Iraq or the KTO. This impression has been reinforced by public statements by Coalition leaders, and has probably led Iraq to conclude the consequences of any chemical attack would be severe.... Iraq's leaders almost certainly intend to employ CW if the borders of Iraq are breached by Coalition ground forces, and if the viability of the Baath regime is seriously threatened."(21)
This remained the view of the Defense Intelligence Agency at the conclusion of the war:
"Iraq's failure to use its chemical weapons cannot be completely understood without a full accounting of the Iraqi military and political leadership's plans in preparation for the war and the execution of those plans. Information on this subject remains limited, and analysis of the reasoning is still preliminary. The following is an estimate of the influence of several factors that may have contributed to Iraq's failure to use these weapons:
"If Iraq did not deploy its chemical weapons to the KTO, two possible explanations are likely. First, Iraq believed that both Israel and the Coalition had chemical and nuclear weapons and would use them if provoked. Iraqi leaders also realized that these weapons could be delivered anywhere in Iraq with accuracy. Saddam probably concluded that the consequences of attacking with chemical weapons would be too severe to justify their use, and this may have led to an early decision not to use them. Saddam may also have assumed that Iraqi use of CW weapons would cause Coalition forces to seek his removal as a top priority including the liberation of Kuwait...."(22)
This continues to be the view of the US intelligence community, as noted in Defense Intelligence Agency responses to Senator Donald W. Riegle in August 1994:
"Even though at the time, many analysts expected and warned against potential Iraqi use of CBW, it is our position now, and has been since the end of the war, that Iraq did not intend to use CBW because of the fear of massive retaliation, and the conclusion that Coalition troops Were too well prepared to fight in a CBW environment, if not, far better prepared than Iraqi troops, thus eliminating their advantage."(23)
This view was reinforced by statements made by a senior Iraqi official with direct knowledge of Iraqi deliberations on this subject. Husayn Kamil Hasan al-Majid, Saddam's son-in-law, was the pre-eminent military industries official and a fundamental player in Iraq's efforts to procure weapons of mass destruction before his defection to Jordan in August 1995. Kamil took charge of Iraq's efforts to develop its weapons of mass destruction around 1987. As the head of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization until 1990, he oversaw Iraq's nuclear weapons research, continued Iraq's development of biological and chemical weapons, and supervised the successful development of the Al-Husayn missile. On 7 August 1995, General Kamil defected from Baghdad, arriving in Amman, Jordan the following day. He was subsequently interviewed by a number of western organizations, including the US intelligence community.
"Husayn Kamil Hasan al-((Majid)), former Iraqi Minister of Industry and Minerals, flatly and emphatically denied that Iraq used chemical or biological weapons during the Gulf War. Kamil stated that in several meetings a proposal to use chemical weapons against the coalition was tabled, and perhaps (his recollection was somewhat unclear on this point) the proposal was advocated by Saddam's sons 'Uday Saddam ((Husayn)) and Qusay Saddam ((Hhusayn)) and by Saddam's brother-in-law Sabbawi al-((Tikriti)). Kamil claimed he strongly opposed using chemical or biological weapons during the gulf war. He said that the Iraqi command became convinced that the United States would use tactical nuclear weapons against Iraq if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons against the coalition. He said that Iraq was aware of the dangers of using chemicals and that therefore "nothing happened.""(24)
Bravado about "burning half of Israel" made in 1990 is a very different matter from actually attempting to effect any such plan.
We cannot address Hussein’s restraint in not provoking an American nuclear retaliation (which I challenge would have struck only military targets, not a major city – likely acceptable to Hussein) because the actual preconditions of the original plan were never met in the first place.
See above..
No, to ignore what really unfolded in Gulf War I is the height of willful ignorance. There was never any substantive indication that Hussein's plans made it off paper. Stick to actualities, please.
Because the contingencies never played out. The fact that this was drawn up is damning in the first place however.
See above.
Never made it off paper? Your point? War Plans Crimson and Orange never “made it off paper.” Are you now going to tell me that they weren’t contingencies developed by the United States prior to the Second World War?
Are you trying to win the "Village Idiot" title? War Plans Crimson and Orange were already considered obsolete by the War Department even before hostilities broke out in 1941. Why?
BECAUSE THE CHANGING REALITIES OF THE NATURE OF WARFARE AND QUALITATIVE STATES OF THE ENEMY FORCES negated all the assumptions behind Crimson and Orange. Get that? Changing realities make plans obsolete. And Saddam was very cognizant of the real WMD threat from the Coalition.
And this helps your argument how, exactly?
It proves the utter worthlessness of his original plan, which can thus be explained as a thing or personal glory rather than apt strategy.
The DIA assessment and Hussein Kemal's testimony says otherwise.
No, we know plans were drafted. Period.
And Hussein thus bears responsibility for.
Another of your glaring irrelevancies. We already know Saddam was a very very very bad man.
Which tells us how capable Iraq was to carry out an aggression —which is not at all. Thus one of the primary criteria for the war fails.
Not unconventionally. See, Afghanistan.
Which has fuck-all to do with Iraq, no matter what your Voices tell you to the contrary.
Ah, because spare parts = WMD capability. You really can't see how foolish you make yourself, can you?
Because the smuggling of certain specific items leaves open the possibility that others were smuggled as well. It is a potential we must never discount.
Leap of Logic fallacy again.
Because it doesn't jibe with your bullshit redefinitions? Sorry, but that's not how the game works.
Because it’s nebulous. Hell, the Chinese assisted Iraq as late as 2000. Now kindly answer the question.
Asked and answered. Moving along...
Which remains meaningless in terms of capability to do anything.
But very important in determining the danger posed in the first place. Just because he does not have a realistic chance for success doesn’t mean he wouldn’t take a gamble.
With what, exactly? The danger-level of a threat is counted on the basis of the capacity to carry it out. To give a somewhat simplified example which even a retard might understand, one would not have to worry about the threat of one's ass getting kicked when that threat comes from a quadruple amputee.
Your belief that Iraq posed no threat to any one is erroded by the fact that Hussein was not fully rational.
YOUR assumption.
He was not making the same basic analysis about cost and benefit that are generally the hallmark of most leaders.
Oh really? He tried starting a war with the Coalition after getting his ass kicked out of Kuwait when, exactly...?
The issue is capability to present a credible threat. When exactly does that sink in?
The lack of real-time communication impedes his ability to act. It does not however indicate complete inability to do anything whatsoever.
The evident decrepitude of his entire war machine does that. I'm sorry if reality doesn't suit you.
Unfortunately, the "gift-wrapped opinion" (Attacking The Messenger) is based upon the evidence of Iraq's incapacity to threaten the region or seize control of geopolitical objectives. It is you who is being presumptive, constantly invoking phantom WMD arsenals, what-if scenarios as fact, and simply ignoring the realities on the ground.
In this case, the “messenger” is worthy of the assault. His opinion is not fact.
Unfortunately for you, the editorial is based upon fact, the mountain-of-evidence supporting it being already cited. I'm not responsible for your fantasies to the contrary.
Iraq was incapable of fulfilling the objective of holding Kuwait in 1991 – something that should have been evident when he first intended to go up against the 82nd Airborne. That didn’t stop him.
He pulled back his forces at the first combat to preserve the bulk of his troop strength. That indicates that he was stopped. FACT.
This is whole situation stems from a series of very important, “What if?” scenarios. It’s how we determine policy.
Um, no we don't actually. Policy is shaped by realistic threat-assessment based upon observable capabilities of threat-forces, not paranoid delusional fever-dreams about phantom war machines and conspiracies.
My, what breathtaking oversimplification on your part —particularly considering that the only bona-fides of Saddam's alledged delusional state is Saddam's word, which you insist elsewhere can't be taken at face-value.
… or that of his war plans, that of his commanders – in rank and file -, and that of the Los Angeles Times article.
NONE of which speak definitevly to state of mind, whether or not he truly believed in his own plans and pronouncements, and ignores his having the good sense to not share the fate of his army. Saddam was not Hitler in the Bunker. So kindly stop treating your opinions and projections as extant fact.
No equation between the two situations, particularly since the Taliban/al-Qaeda alliance was known and active, and the terms of the resulting war different.
Absolutely relevant from the point of view that Afghanistan’s conventional threat was less than Iraq’s. The search for WMD is still underway in Iraq, mind you.
What part of "Iraq is not the same as Afganistan" eludes your intellectual grasp, exactly? And what does Afganistan have to do with Iraq's alledged vast hidden WMD arsenal? Even for a spinner of sophistries such as yourself, this strains credulity.
Which Iraq was incapable of.
Conventionally? Temporarily. Unconventionally? The jury is still out.
Only in your fantasy-addled mind, perhaps.
Again, if he is not rational, the lack of capability won’t restrain him as it otherwise might.
So if a quadruple amputee threatens to kick your ass in, you'll take his threat seriously? How many times must this be said and in how many different ways
—A THREAT IS ONLY AS GOOD AS THE CAPACITY TO ACTUALLY CARRY IT OUT!
No, the opinions of UNMOVIC's critics are irrelevant —the extant progress of UNMOVIC in its mission, judged by objective criteria, is all that counts. I'm sorry if you can't tell the difference between "opinion" and "fact".
Opinion.
No —fact. We've already addressed your confusion of the two concepts.
Wrong. The dilapidated state of the Iraqi war machine already gives us the picture of Iraq's ability to threaten anybody prior to Gulf War II. Exaggerated prewar statements which increasingly go unsupported by hard evidence does not change this, no matter how much you wish it could. Especially as its looking more and more that those prewar statements were lies.
The dilapidated state of the conventional Iraqi war machine is a world apart from their unconventional arsenal, which is still the subject of investigation.
Appeal to Ignorance fallacy. Must've been a kick in the balls when the Air Force exploded the myth of the Iraqi UAV threat yesterday.
Ridiculous. Iraq's ability to carry out any attacks is DIRECTLY relevant to the justification for war, which was always based on the threat America was supposedly under.
I fail to see how it is at all acceptable that Iraq possess unconventional weapons
Your unsupported opinion.
but escape consequences simply because it lacked the launchers to deploy them at this particular point in time.
In other words, it matters not whether a country can actually attack anybody or not or present any actual threat or not in terms of justifying a war.
So long as Iraq has stockpiles – assuming it does, of course
You're just a bear for assuming things, aren't you?
it is in contravention of the United Nations and a potential danger to neighboring countries.
By that logic, we must attack Israel at once, since it just meets your stated criteria: It posseses WMD, is in violation of multiple UN resolutions, and presents a clear danger to neighbouring states by virtue of the first two conditions stated above.
So you can justify a war in the present (while lying to the public of course to say otherwise) based on what might happen in the future? Would you like some lebensraum to go with that?
We’ve done that successively throughout history, Vympel. See, Vietnam. If the future threat is sufficiently justified, it is quite acceptable.
Um, Vietnam isn't exactly an ideal example to hold up for examination.
North Korea was caught. North Korea owned up to it. And the IAEA never even had a full mandate. North Korea had the facilities, the working reactor, the raw materials to enrich, etc. Totally unlike Iraq.
AND YET IT ESCAPED DETECTION BETWEEN 1994 AND 2002.
Um, no it didn't. Hence the entire discussion about Yongbong in 1996.
Blix acknowledged that they were unaccounted for, hence the words “stockpiles in question.” They were undeniably part of Iraq’s stockpiles at one point in time.
He also said something about "not leaping to the conclusion that they exist"
And yet inspectors remained on the ground for a further seven or so years (depending on exact dates). No one's talking about taking Iraq's word for it. No one's arguing the inspectors shouldn't have been there.
Irrelevant to (A) the UN’s inability to put precise data with the limited physical evidence, and (B) the fact that North Korea escaped detection so long, or that Iraq went virtually four years without inspectors on-site.
(A) Physical evidence was being gathered successfully by UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection teams, (B) We knew all about ongbong, and in any case North Korea was not under UN sanction or prohibition, and (C) Iraq certainly remained under intelligence shadow and satellite observation, as the 1998 Operation Desert Fox bombings of suspected Iraqi WMD sites demonstrated. Furthermore, the UNMOVIC inspectors found no indication that any progress had been made or even attempted in reconstituting WMD research and development.
