Intifada 3? Kidnapped Israeli citizens might be a flashpoint

[Thanas]

http://www.dailydot.com/politics/israel ... naccurate/

The recent explosion of violence in Gaza may have been initially sparked by false or inaccurate claims, according to Israeli police.

The ongoing conflict began last month when three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped from a Jewish settlement in the occupied West Bank. Their bodies were later discovered in a field outside the city of Hebron. Before police were able to determine who was responsible, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu placed blame for the tragic deaths squarely on Hamas, Gaza’s elected political leadership—an accusation that may prove to be false.

On Friday, Chief Inspector Micky Rosenfeld, foreign press spokesman for the Israel Police, reportedly told BBC journalist Jon Donnisonhe that the men responsible for murders were not acting on orders of Hamas leadership. Instead, he said, they are part of a “lone cell.” Further, Inspector Rosenfeld told Donnison that if Hamas’ leadership had ordered the kidnapping, “they'd have known about it in advance.”

Naftali Fraenkel, 16, Gilad Shaer, 16, and Eyal Yifrah, 19, were kidnapped on June 12 from Gush Etzion, an Israeli settlement south of Jerusalem. After an exhaustive search that lasted over two weeks, security forces discovered the boys’ bodies in a field just north of Hebron, close to where they were abducted. The night of their disappearance, one of the boys called a police hotline and whispered, “They kidnapped me.” Police speculate that he may have been caught, leading the perpetrators to kill the teenage boys.

Husam Dofsh, a former member of Hamas, was arrested on suspicion of his involvement on July 5. After learning that he was a suspect, Dofsh called the Times of Israel and insisted he’d taken no part in the kidnapping. “I saw online, and people also told me, that I was tied to the mess, but I did not kidnap and didn’t do anything. I just want to continue my life,” Dofsh told reporters.

During the course of Israel’s investigation, some 400 Palestinians were arrested and up to 10 others were killed. Among those detained were Aziz Duwaik, the speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council and West Bank-based member of Hamas; and Mahmoud al-Khatib, a Hamas legislator was also reportedly abducted by the IDF during a dawn raid in the city of Bethlehem.

Israel's crackdown in the West Bank instigated Hamas to begin firing rockets into Israel—a move that quickly escalated the conflict.

In early July, several members or activists connected to Hamas were killed, including a 14-year-old boy, which led the group to intensified their rocket attacks. Although there were no resulting deaths, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) began successive airstrikes on the Gaza Strip.

“Hamas is responsible, and Hamas will pay,” Netanyahu said in reference to the kidnapping. However, Inspector Rosenfeld’s statements, along with a number of reports concerning the identities of known police suspects, seem to indicate that Hamas leadership was not involved in the vicious crime.

The two more-likely suspects are Amer Abu Aysha and Marwan Kawasme, who have been missing from their homes since the night of the kidnapping. Police found cellphones and prepared food caches in their homes. Both had recently opened bank accounts in their wive's names. Palestinian security forces reported that Abu Aysha and Kawasme were missing to the Israelis the day after the kidnapping occurred, according to Al Monitor.

“That was the first clue in the investigation and the reason why Israel pointed an accusatory finger at the Hamas infrastructure in Hebron,” wrote Shlomi Eldar, a veteran journalist who has covered the Palestinian Authority for the past two decades.

Abu Aysha and Kawasme are known members of the Qawasameh tribe, according to Palestinian security forces. While members of Hebron-based Qawasameh clan identify with Hamas, they have a history of undermining its efforts to end violent conflicts with Israel. In 2003, for instance, the family sent two suicide bombers to blow up a bus in Jerusalem after a tahadiyeh (ceasefire) had been successfully negotiated between Israeli and Palestinian fighters, which was endorsed by Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin.

At the time of writing, a reported 848 Palestinians and 35 Israelis have been killed, including 208 children in Gaza, since July 8 when Israel launched Operation Protective Edge.

A number of Middle East journalists have written articles accusing the Israeli government of politicide—launching Israel into renewed conflict with Hamas in order to sabotage the formation of the unified Palestinian government that it so adamantly opposed. Vanetia Rainey, a Lebanon-based correspondent for The Week, wrote: “Israel must have known that [the] Palestinian Authority would not want to be seen to condone violence and would have to cooperate with the campaign of raids, something Hamas has been sharply critical of, calling it ‘harmful to Palestinian reconciliation’.”

This week, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas backed Hamas’ conditions for a ceasefire.

"The Gaza demands of stopping the aggression and lifting the blockade in all its forms are the demands of the entire Palestinian people and they represent the goal that the Palestinian leadership has dedicated all its power to achieve," he said.

The killing of 15 women and children by the Israel Defense Force at a UN elementary school in Beit Hanoun appears to be unifying Palestinians, but not through a shared interest in diplomacy. Roughly 10,000 protesters in the West Bank marched on Jerusalem Thursday after the school bombing. Two were killed and hundreds injured when the march clashed with Israeli police near the Qalandiya refugee camp.

On Friday, Hamas called for a third intifada and Abbas called for a “Day of Rage” marked with increased protests. “This is your opportunity,” a Hamas spokesperson said in response to the protests.

If the reported findings of the Israeli Police hold up and Hamas is officially cleared of any wrongdoing in the case of the three kidnapped Israeli teens, Netanyahu and the Israeli government may have to explain why a massive military operation, with an 80 percent rate of civilian casualties, was instigated under a false premise. And if violence in the West Bank continues to spread, the IDF may find itself divided on two fronts.

Further sources in the link.

[The Grim Squeaker]

A source for the officials admitting would also be useful.

The article links to an Al Jazeera opinions column (http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2 ... tions.html) , which itself links to something called Debka report which has a post-claim without naming or linking, beyond saying "external"/Egyptian sources. Oh, and al-jazeera also links to a site calledPalestinian chronicles, whose source is a Hammas spokesman claiming post hoc (i.e, after the ceasefire broke down due to Hammas's attacks) to not have heard about it directly .
Still, i'm sure there's a proper source from something official. (But it needs more digging for).

http://www.dailydot.com/politics/israel ... naccurate/

If the reported findings of the Israeli Police hold up and Hamas is officially cleared of any wrongdoing in the case of the three kidnapped Israeli teens, Netanyahu and the Israeli government may have to explain why a massive military operation, with an 80 percent rate of civilian casualties, was instigated under a false premise. And if violence in the West Bank continues to spread, the IDF may find itself divided on two fronts.

Further sources in the link.

The "premise" was "They're shooting missiles at our cities and towns at a higher rate than normal, stop that".

[eyl]

This pattern of deception continues under the ongoing military offensive in Gaza. For example, last week in collaboration with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi and Abbas, in its efforts to alienate Hamas, Israel announced a bad-faith cease-fire proposal, which Hamas was not consulted on and never agreed to but whose violation supposedly justified Israel’s expansion and intensification of the military campaign into Gaza.

Israel "justified expansion and intensification of the military campaign into Gaza" by continuing Hamas fire. Whether they broke the cease-fire or rejected it is rather immaterial.

Also, there were a subsequent two temporary truces, one at the UN's request and one at Hamas', both of which Hamas broke.

[The Grim Squeaker]

This pattern of deception continues under the ongoing military offensive in Gaza. For example, last week in collaboration with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi and Abbas, in its efforts to alienate Hamas, Israel announced a bad-faith cease-fire proposal, which Hamas was not consulted on and never agreed to but whose violation supposedly justified Israel’s expansion and intensification of the military campaign into Gaza.

Israel "justified expansion and intensification of the military campaign into Gaza" by continuing Hamas fire. Whether they broke the cease-fire or rejected it is rather immaterial.

Also, there were a subsequent two temporary truces, one at the UN's request and one at Hamas', both of which Hamas broke.

Don't forget the one over the past day. (I had a missile warning in the middle of Friday dinner)

[Omeganian]

This pattern of deception continues under the ongoing military offensive in Gaza. For example, last week in collaboration with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi and Abbas, in its efforts to alienate Hamas, Israel announced a bad-faith cease-fire proposal, which Hamas was not consulted on and never agreed to but whose violation supposedly justified Israel’s expansion and intensification of the military campaign into Gaza.

Israel "justified expansion and intensification of the military campaign into Gaza" by continuing Hamas fire. Whether they broke the cease-fire or rejected it is rather immaterial.

Also, there were a subsequent two temporary truces, one at the UN's request and one at Hamas', both of which Hamas broke.

Don't forget the one over the past day. (I had a missile warning in the middle of Friday dinner)

Well, it lasted the 12 hours intended, but there are currently reports that the attempt to extend it has failed - that is, the rocket alarms are back.

[eyl]

4 mortars, apparently; IDF is currently not calling it a violation of the cease-fire (which was extended to midnight AFAIK)

[Thanas]

A source for the officials admitting would also be useful.

The article links to an Al Jazeera opinions column (http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2 ... tions.html) , which itself links to something called Debka report which has a post-claim without naming or linking, beyond saying "external"/Egyptian sources. Oh, and al-jazeera also links to a site calledPalestinian chronicles, whose source is a Hammas spokesman claiming post hoc (i.e, after the ceasefire broke down due to Hammas's attacks) to not have heard about it directly .

No, open your eyes. The official admitting it is the spokesperson for israeli police. I linked to that in the top post on page 3.

[The Grim Squeaker]

A source for the officials admitting would also be useful.

The article links to an Al Jazeera opinions column (http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2 ... tions.html) , which itself links to something called Debka report which has a post-claim without naming or linking, beyond saying "external"/Egyptian sources. Oh, and al-jazeera also links to a site calledPalestinian chronicles, whose source is a Hammas spokesman claiming post hoc (i.e, after the ceasefire broke down due to Hammas's attacks) to not have heard about it directly .

No, open your eyes. The official admitting it is the spokesperson for israeli police. I linked to that in the top post on page 3.

What post by you on page 3?
http://bbs.stardestroyer.net/viewtopic. ... 3&start=50

[Thanas]

Page 6.

[eyl]

Latest news on the Abu Khdair murder.

I'm not sure if Ben David is really quite this crazy or it's an act to better the chances of an insanity plea...

[Ace Pace]

A source for the officials admitting would also be useful.

The article links to an Al Jazeera opinions column (http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2 ... tions.html) , which itself links to something called Debka report which has a post-claim without naming or linking, beyond saying "external"/Egyptian sources. Oh, and al-jazeera also links to a site calledPalestinian chronicles, whose source is a Hammas spokesman claiming post hoc (i.e, after the ceasefire broke down due to Hammas's attacks) to not have heard about it directly .

No, open your eyes. The official admitting it is the spokesperson for israeli police. I linked to that in the top post on page 3.

This is where Israel again acts it's "age". The attack on Gaza would have been fully justified (in the eyes of many nations if we go back to the start of Cast Lead in 2008) using just the constant rocket attacks, more so if the tunnel threat would have materialized in a successful fashion.

However, Israel felt it needed to stake an even stronger solid ground (*) for the attack or more likely, this was an inevitable result of Bibi claiming Hamas did it right off the bat, using it to try and collapse the Palestinian unity government.

I.E another amazing opportunity taken by Israel to shoot itself in the foot. Not that this is rare in this region...

[Ace Pace]

War on the Rocks

A pretty good article on precisely why a ceasefire does not seem likely. Too many conflicting interests.

From President Barack Obama, to the U.N. Secretary General, to the U.N. Security Council, there has been no scarcity of calls for a ceasefire to end the fighting between Israel and Hamas; yet, there are few signs that these attempts have made significant progress. Previous rounds of the Hamas-Israel conflict have all ended with ceasefires fairly soon after the conflicts escalated. In the last six years there have been four major increases in the tempo of fighting. Operation Hot Winter in March 2008, Operation Cast Lead less than eleven months later, Operation Returning Echo in March 2012, and Operation Pillar of Defense roughly nine months after that, all ended with an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and a ceasefire which returned the situation more or less to the status quo ante bellum. Three of the four ended with a relaxation of border restrictions. So if all of the previous flare-ups ended this way, why is this time around different? Why is a ceasefire proving so difficult to attain?

Part of the problem lays in the pattern. Euphemistically called “mowing the grass”, the Israeli military responses to Gaza flare-ups seek to denude Gaza-based militant capabilities before declaring the job done and returning to the pre-war situation. After many years of this, the Israeli public seems weary and eager for something more definitive. Since 2012, Hamas has stockpiled missiles and built tunnels and other infrastructure. Through its current operations, the Israeli military can probably reduce the stockpiled weapons and tunnels to a level that will deliver another period of respite for the Israeli population, but this will not be enough. Even in the face of mounting casualties and international condemnations, the majority of the Israeli public has remained relatively calm and supportive of the ongoing operations in Gaza. They expect a strategic payoff, a tangible victory that makes their perceived sacrifices worthwhile. For the Israeli public, such a victory must not be ephemeral; it must be immediate and not indefinitely postponed. Without such a victory, at least one recent poll has shown that the Israeli public overwhelmingly supports continuing the operation.

This desire for what many Israelis conceive of as a real victory, combined with their frustrations about the repeated cycle escalations from Gaza, and the recent casualties explains Israeli discussions about reoccupying the entirety of Gaza. While full reoccupation is unlikely, any ceasefire that looks like it fulfills Hamas’ operational objectives, and thus might constitute a Hamas victory, would be unacceptable to the Israeli public. Moreover, as criticism of Israel’s policy of slow escalation has already surfaced from notable individuals, any such ceasefire will likely push Israel to intensify combat operations to a greater level early in any future period of escalation.

Hamas’ reasons for not accepting a ceasefire are largely unchanged since its rejection of the Egyptian ceasefire proposal earlier this month, as I discussed in a previous article at War on the Rocks. For Hamas, a ceasefire must at the very least see Egypt reopen the Gaza border to trade and cease interference with Hamas’ ability to import weapons and financial resources. Failure to achieve these concessions may jeopardize Hamas’ ability to maintain its power in Gaza and perhaps its role as a major player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, as the conflict continues, Hamas needs an even bigger payoff to justify the war to the population of Gaza. This at least in part explains Hamas’ recent insistence that all its conditions including the release of prisoners be met before any ceasefire can take place. The needs of Israel and Hamas have become so zero sum that envisioning a mutually acceptable ceasefire package is difficult.

The situation in Egypt further complicates any effort to make a lasting ceasefire. Egypt has its own needs and objectives that a ceasefire must address. In practice, Hamas’ ceasefire demands require concessions from both Israel and Egypt. Hamas was allied with the Morsi regime in Egypt. The current el-Sisi government is therefore concerned that a strong Hamas will pose a threat. It fears that an open border with Gaza will allow weapons and money to flow both ways. Weapons from Gaza could find their way to Muslim Brotherhood members opposed to the regime or into the already unstable Sinai Peninsula. Finally, the Egyptian regime is concerned that a more open border will allow for spillover. Already during the current round of fighting, Egypt foiled attempts to attack Israel from Sinai. When the Gaza border was more open, militants used Sinai to attack across the Israeli border and Israel retaliated. The net effect not only risked Egyptian relations with Israel, but threatened to further destabilize Sinai. In a regional sense, Egypt also has something to lose from an unshackled Hamas. In the competition among Middle Eastern states for regional power, Qatar and Turkey are attempting to step into the void left by Iran as Hamas’ backer. Both are rivals to Egypt for regional influence. Egypt, therefore, has good reason to be wary of any ceasefire that opens border and strengthens Hamas. However, given the nature of Egyptian concerns, it may be possible for the United States and members of the international community to provide Egypt with incentives and guarantees to make it feel comfortable taking the risk. If Egypt proves unwilling to make major concessions on the border, then the international community would struggle to find anything to offer Hamas and even more so anything they could offer that Israel would also accept.

At this juncture, finding a formula to which all three involved parties would agree is unlikely. While Egypt has its own concerns, Hamas needs a victory and Israel will not accept a defeat. So what other options exist? As I noted above, there have been suggestions in Israel that a unilateral solution involving a reoccupation of Gaza might provide the answer. While the Israeli population might support an expansion of the ground operation, there is no evidence of widespread support for an indefinite occupation. Furthermore, to do so would be tantamount to international political suicide and imperil Israel’s relationship with the United States. A more modest unilateral solution might be the reoccupation of some of the border areas and the Philadelphi Corridor, which runs along the Egyptian border. Such a move would carry significant military and political risks, and in effect, continue the current round of fighting.

There is another way Israel could unilaterally act to effect a ceasefire. If Israel manages to erode Hamas’ capabilities to a degree that resembles a long term strategic impact rather than another round of ‘mowing the lawn’, it may be able to withdraw unilaterally claiming that it accomplished its mission. This could be made more likely with a sweetener provided by the United States or the European Union – though in the current situation the nature of a sweetener sufficient to do the job is admittedly hard to fathom. In any case, this arrangement would be contingent on Hamas not receiving any significant concessions and carries the risk that major rocket salvos or a tunnel-based attack from Gaza could immediately restart the conflict. Even without such an eventuality, if the quiet that such a withdrawal brings proves short lived, then the Israeli public will most likely demand a far greater response to future flare-ups. While a unilaterally declared Israeli ceasefire is unlikely, a unilaterally declared Hamas ceasefire at this stage without Israeli and Egyptian concessions is all but impossible. Hamas simply cannot afford it. On the other hand, any ceasefire agreement that meets many of Hamas’ demands not only runs risk of rejection by Israel and Egypt, but makes it more likely that Hamas will use employ this kind of flare-up to achieve goals in the future and that Israel will respond with more force earlier in the escalatory process. Furthermore, relaxing the restrictions on the Gaza-Egyptian border is a move which in and of itself carries the risk recreating the current the situation however in an even worse form. Relaxing the border restrictions give Hamas a chance to rebuild their capabilities and infrastructure including tunnels. A better equipped, better financed, and resurgent Hamas would having achieved its demands in this conflict would have little reason to avoid future escalation. Moreover, once the escalation happens a Hamas which benefited from a relaxed border would be in a position to make the conflict more difficult which in turn will have a net effect of making the conflict more deadly for Israelis and Palestinians alike.

An agreement wherein the Egyptian border is open but monitored by an international force, or one guaranteeing that tunnels do not cross under the border into Israel, might allow for sidestepping Hamas, but will still gain little traction with the Israeli public. In general, the Israeli public has little faith in international forces. Very public failures such as the pull out of U.S. and UK monitors from a prison in Jericho have eroded Israeli confidence in such measures. A European Union force is already tasked with monitoring the Rafah crossing, however, it by its own admission, it could not act to prevent smuggling. Moreover, the Israelis do not trust the E.U. Over the years, statements from the E.U together with actions, such as the E.U. countries decision not to oppose the UNHRC resolution on the current Gaza conflict, have left Israelis with the impression that the E.U. is pro-Palestinian and cannot be trusted as a guarantor of Israeli security. Yet, the E.U. has more credibility in Israel than the U.N. The chance that the Israelis will agree to any formulation that relies on the U.N. is negligible. The Israelis see little difference between UNHRC, which often appears bias against them, and any other U.N. body. This has been made still worse by the events surrounding the rockets found in UNRWA schools during the current fighting.

There is another path that might provide for some form of ceasefire without needing to meet Hamas’ demands. It is an unlikely road that leads through Ramallah and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA could take control of the border areas Israel now occupies and the Philadelphi Corridor in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal. This, however, would put the PA forces in an impossible situation. Eventually they would either have to turn a blind eye to Hamas activities — thus further reducing Israel’s trust of the PA and harming the possibility of an eventual peace agreement covering the West Bank — or confront Hamas. Such confrontation would lead to a repeat of the Palestinian civil war that took place, primarily in Gaza, in June 2007. This is something the PA certainly does not want to see and might not win either in Gaza or the West Bank. Finally, the PA cannot afford to be seen as a tool of the Israelis against other Palestinians. For these reasons the PA will be reluctant to agree to a significant role in Gaza. Furthermore, even if it did, many Israelis do not trust cooperative security arrangements. This mistrust stems in part from incidents such as those at the beginning of the Second Intifada wherein Israelis were killed by their joint security patrol counterparts. Together these factors mean that a ceasefire achieved through the PA is quite unlikely. So if a negotiated ceasefire that addresses the concerns of all of the involved parties is less than probable, and many of the options that bypass one or another of the parties are also improbable, then what remains? The only possibility which seems to exist on the immediate horizon is a series of humanitarian truces. However, unless Hamas can address the problems that motivated it to choose escalation in the first place, or Israel can achieve a tangible victory, these truces will be no more than temporary. Unless something significant changes, Israel and Hamas will continue to engage in a war of psychological and diplomatic attrition. To the victor goes the ceasefire.

[Ace Pace]

I'll try to give some updates about the events, I can back up much of this with links but it's fucking midnight and I finished work late.

1) Gaza's Shijaiyah neighborhood was pretty much a "den of terrorist buildings, tunnels and rocket launchers". More precisely, it featured as one of the main rocket launching pads, the source of multiple attack tunnels (those leading into Israeli territory) and dozens of buildings with bombs placed inside the foundations to collapse on Israeli soldiers. It was the scene of some of the worst fighting so far. The Israeli response during the fighting was pretty much to flatten the neighborhood. During that action, 13 Israeli soldiers died (with one body still missing) and the entire neighborhood was pretty much turned into a junkyard.

2) There are conflicting reports regarding Palestinians approach to the fighting. Hamas and other official channels claim wide support. Israeli and some other sources claim otherwise, with anecdotal evidence of Hamas kneecapping protesters and other more extreme things. I think if the Hamas leadership left the tunnels and the hospitals/schools where they are holding up and looked at what they're causing their citizens they might have a change of heart.

3) Israeli citizens are so far firmly backing the operation not out of bloodlust (yes, there are fanatics), but out of some sort of determination to somehow break the cycle of "mowing the grass" and coming back every year and a half.

4) I'm not sure how unique this is compared to prior operations, but anecdotal evidence of Hamas scaring international reporters into ignoring their own war crimes is showing up. Whether it's photographing Hamas firing from inside schools or ignoring rockets which hit their own refugee camps.

[cosmicalstorm]

Good overview on the war from Janes.

http://www.janes.com/article/41421/pale ... s-in-gaza/

Palestinian militants have killed at least 53 Israeli soldiers since the launch of Israel's latest offensive targeting the Gaza Strip. Mohammed Najib reports from the West Bank on the tactical and operational advances made by militants that have led to this relatively substantial death toll.

A total of 10 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers were killed in heavy fighting in and around the Gaza Strip on 28 July. Five soldiers were killed when unidentified Palestinian militants used a tunnel to infiltrate into Israel from Gaza and attacked the IDF unit near the Nahal Oz settlement in Israel's Southern district. Separately, four soldiers were killed when a mortar, launched from Gaza, landed in the Eshkolot area of Southern district, while another soldier was killed when his armoured bulldozer was struck by an anti-tank missile, fired by Palestinian militants, in the town of Khan Younis in southern Gaza.

The 10 fatalities on 28 July brought the total number of IDF fatalities to 53 following the launch of a ground incursion into the Gaza Strip on 17 July as part of Operation Protective Edge, which began with a concerted series of air, naval, and artillery strikes from 8 July onwards and has since killed more than 1,100 Palestinians. In clashes across Gaza since the launch of the ground offensive, Palestinian militants - and Hamas in particular - have utilised relatively sophisticated tactics and weaponry to embroil the IDF in heavy close-quarters fighting and have inflicted substantial casualties.

A key element of Hamas's performance in this regard appears to be its emulation of the tactics of Lebanese Islamist group Hizbullah. A senior official in Hamas's armed wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, speaking to IHS Jane's on condition of anonymity on 22 July, stated, "We have benefited from all the Iranian, Syrian, [and] Hizbullah tactical combat schools, and finally formulated [a] Qassam independent one that matches our situation and [leaves us] capable to respond to our enemy's challenge."

Indeed, the day before, on 21 July, Hizbullah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah telephoned the head of Hamas's Political Bureau, Khaled Mashal, and the leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, offering Hizbullah's support and expressing his admiration of the two groups' performance and tactics during the ongoing conflict.

Hamas's tactics and high morale have also attracted recognition from Fatah and Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) officials in Ramallah, in the West Bank, who fought the IDF in southern Lebanon in 1982. A major-general in the Palestinian Authority (PA) security apparatus told IHS Jane's on condition of anonymity on 21 July, "The casualties that the [Izz al-Din al-] Qassam fighters caused since the eruption of this operation… are more than what we caused in all [the] PLO wars in southern Lebanon."

Going underground

Hamas's continued launching of rockets into Israel during the initial air strike phase of Operation Protective Edge, in addition to infiltration attempts into Israel itself, seemed designed to try and provoke the IDF into a ground incursion, a situation the group had seemingly been preparing itself for. Reports in Israeli newspaper The Times of Israel on 25 July claimed that Hamas had invested "millions of dollars" in digging a significant network of large and wide tunnels beneath Gaza City - referred to as "Gaza Underground" - as well as inside Israeli territories around Gaza that have played a key role during the ongoing clashes.

Not only has the tunnel network provided refuge from Israeli air strikes, allowing Hamas's command and control network to remain intact and operational, but it also allows a certain freedom of movement for Hamas fighters. This enables them to infiltrate positions - in Gaza and on the border with Israel, as well as into Israeli territory itself - to launch surprise attacks targeting the IDF.

In so doing, Hamas appears to be attempting to create the spectre of a continual potential threat to IDF ground units in Gaza, thereby undermining IDF morale. Hamas is also keenly aware of the impact of inflicting casualties on the IDF - not just in the Palestinian Territories and Israel, but in the wider Middle East region - and so it and the PIJ are striving to combine tactics and their geographical knowledge and advantage to inflict maximum casualties on the IDF.

A highly notable and successful example of this occurred on 19 July, when Izz al-Din al-Qassam militants lured a force from the IDF's Golani Brigade into a minefield in the Shujaiya area of Gaza, before then attacking the unit's Merkava Mk 4 main battle tanks (MBTs) and M113 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) with anti-tank missiles. Six IDF soldiers were killed in the attack, while a seventh soldier - Sergeant Oron Shaul - went missing. While Hamas subsequently claimed that Shaul was alive and had been captured by its fighters, Israel stated that the soldier was likely to be dead. A further six Golani Brigade soldiers were killed in separate clashes in Shujaiya on the same day, and the unit's commander, Colonel Rasan Aliyan, was also wounded, underlining the intensity of the fighting.

The significance of the IDF death toll of 53 soldiers becomes greater when compared with the last major IDF air and ground offensive in Gaza - the three-week Operation Cast Lead from December 2008 to January 2009 - in which 10 IDF soldiers were killed, four of whom died in friendly fire incidents. Meanwhile, the IDF has claimed to have killed more than 200 Hamas and PIJ militants, although as expected, both groups have claimed to have suffered far fewer casualties.

Tactical emulation

The greater IDF death toll in Operation Protective Edge to date is in no small measure attributable to the refined tactics utilised by Hamas. Indeed, a senior IDF commander told IHS Jane's on 22 July, "The IDF has expected Hamas fighters' surprises, but they have succeeded in showing distinguished capabilities and fighting tactics."

Unsurprisingly, Hamas's military performance has led to comparisons with Hizbullah, and in particular the latter's tactics and operational methods during the 2006 war with Israel. A senior PA military officer, speaking to IHS Jane's on condition of anonymity on 24 July, stated, "It's very clear that Hamas has adopted Hizbullah fighting tactics in tunnels digging and fighting in urban areas."

Hamas has further replicated other aspects of Hizbullah's operational methods, such as the attempted use of naval commandos to infiltrate Israel by sea, the launching of two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into Israel - which were shot down with Patriot missiles on 14 and 17 July - and the use of mobile or concealed rocket launch sites. Hamas has also shown that its rocket capabilities are approaching those of Hizbullah, with rockets reaching almost 120 kilometres from Gaza. Furthermore, the targeting of Tel Aviv airport with rockets - with a rocket landing one mile from the airport's runway on 22 July, leading the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) to temporarily ban flights to Israel - underlines Hamas's ability to inflict economic damage on Israel.

Another tangential explanation for the high rate of IDF casualties during Operation Protective Edge is the fact that the armed wings of Hamas and the PIJ have co-operated and co-ordinated strongly, rather than competing, during the fighting on the ground, enhancing both groups' already substantial capabilities.

Outlook

With a political resolution to the conflict seemingly distant as of 28 July, heavy fighting is highly likely to continue in the short term, especially as Hamas and Israel maintain diametrically opposing views on the basis of any ceasefire agreement. Hamas's objectives will be to inflict maximum damage and casualties on Israel - both against military forces operating inside Gaza and through rocket attacks on Israeli territory - to exact political concessions in return for any ceasefire agreement, and to maintain its offensive and operational capabilities.

The extent to which the group will be successful in this regard remains to be seen, but the course of the fighting to date has seemingly done much to raise the group's morale and prestige - both domestically and regionally - at a time when it was suffering as a consequence of the election of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt and his government's subsequent isolation of Gaza.

The impact the IDF offensive in Gaza has on Palestinians in the West Bank will also be significant. Hamas is likely to be attempting to use the clashes to inspire and catalyse a third intifada (uprising) in the West Bank in order to stretch the IDF and occupy its forces across two fronts. The IDF has moved its key operational elite brigades, such as the Golani Brigade, into Gaza as part of Operation Protective Edge, with reservists deployed to the West Bank. A significant upsurge in violent protests, even if it does not develop into an intifada, would create a substantial security issue for the Israeli government and could lead to violent unrest among the Palestinian population in Israel itself.

A senior PA intelligence officer in Ramallah, speaking to IHS Jane's on 27 July on condition of anonymity, claimed that it is only a matter of time before there is an upsurge in violent activity in the West Bank. The officer stated that as the conflict in Gaza continues, and Palestinians in the West Bank become cognisant of the scale and severity of casualties and damage caused by the IDF offensive, there will be no credible choice but the eruption of violent unrest against IDF targets in the West Bank.

[cosmicalstorm]

If Gaza can build so many tunnels, there must be entire cities hidden under many other countries by now. North Korea and Iran being the main suspects, but I wonder what else is out there

The Latest Intelligence Failure. And the Next One

Posted By Michael Ledeen On July 30, 2014 @ 6:32 pm In Uncategorized | No Comments


I’d been reading about those Hamas tunnels, and I certainly noticed that the Israelis lost plenty of their boys in the ground campaign to destroy the tunnel work, and I wondered if there had been some sort of intelligence failure. As usual in such cases, I turned to a higher authority–or maybe it’s a lower authority, since I don’t know which area of the nether regions is inhabited by the spirit of my old friend, James Jesus Angleton, the late chief of CIA counterintelligence. So I set up the notoriously unreliable ouija board, and lo and behold, there was the gravelly voice (decades of Camels will do that).

JJA: “Nice to be remembered.”

ML: “Good to talk to you, as always.”

JJA: “What’s up? Snowden, I suppose.”

ML: “Not really, I wanted to talk about the tunnels in Gaza. However it all turns out, the Israelis were pretty clearly surprised. It seems they didn’t know the full details, even including Hamas’s plot to send hundreds of killers into Israel via the tunnels for a mass massacre next Rosh Hashanah. They were in a terrific position to know what was going on in Gaza, but they seem to have missed a biggie. It sounds like an intelligence failure, so here I am…”

JJA: “It does, indeed. But careful with those broad brushes…everybody knew there were tunnels into Gaza from the south, against which Israel and Egypt were operating. Those tunnels were used, inter alia, to smuggle weapons from Iran and other suppliers through Sudan into Gaza. And the Israelis say they knew there were tunnels across the Israel/Gaza border as well. And they also say that they knew some of those tunnels were designed to infiltrate Hamas forces into Israel to attack and kidnap Israelis, especially if they were in uniform.”

ML: “Gilad Shalit being the obvious case in point.”

JJA: “But obviously they didn’t know all the details. Which should not totally surprise US. It’s normal, intelligence is invariably imperfect, even in this case, where the Israelis had exceptional coverage–aerial, electronic, agents on the ground etcetera etcetera.”

ML: “I’ve heard anecdotes about Israelis in the south, next to Gaza, who heard digging, grinding and scraping at night. They reported it, of course, but in at least some cases the authorities decided they were disturbed, and provided psychiatric care…”

JJA: “Heh. Not the best way to do intelligence. You’ve got to take reports seriously unless there is a strong reason to dismiss them. If the stories are true, the intel people were sloppy and lazy, which again is normal enough, albeit deplorable. But it seems to me that this discussion should lead elsewhere.”

ML: “Fine with me. Lead on.”

JJA: “It should lead us to ask ourselves about the limits of our knowledge. What can we know and what can’t we know? So: the Israelis, as you said, were in an enviable position for spying on Gaza. It was right next door. The Israelis had controlled the place for many years. They knew many many people on the ground. They had drones, satellites, sigint monitoring a la NSA. And they were surprised when they attacked.”

ML: “So you’re saying that if Israel, with top-notch intelligence services, and very favorable conditions…”

JJA: “Precisely. If THEY couldn’t get reasonably complete coverage THERE, then how can anyone in his right mind believe that we have, or can have, reasonably complete coverage of Iran?”

ML: “Good question. A lot of the Iranian nuclear project is inside…”

JJA: “Tunnels! You think the Gazans are unique? You think that ‘dark city beneath the one we see’ that the Israelis are talking about is limited to Gaza? No way. The Iranians have surely done the same.”

ML: “Yeah, years ago I was told that there was a clandestine city beneath Parchin, for example.”

JJA: “And Parchin just happens to be one of those military sites that the Iranians have made off-limits to the inspectors. You can be sure that there are others, probably inside some mountains or the like. The point is that we cannot reasonably expect to know enough about Iranian activities, whether nuclear or conventional or terror training, to be confident they are actually carrying out their promises. We can’t check it…”

ML: “So the intelligence lesson of Gaza is?”

JJA: “Don’t ever believe you know everything that’s going on. Even small gaps in our understanding can be fatal to our people.”

ML: “Is there any way to put ourselves in a stronger position regarding Iran?”

JJA: “Yes, but it’s costly and painful. The Israelis in Gaza only learned the full story of the tunnels when they fully engaged. It took the lives of Israeli soldiers to learn what they learned…are we…”

At which point there was a veritable static storm, and he was gone.

Article printed from Faster, Please!: http://pjmedia.com/michaelledeen

[eyl]

Good overview on the war from Janes.

http://www.janes.com/article/41421/pale ... s-in-gaza/

Palestinian militants have killed at least 53 Israeli soldiers since the launch of Israel's latest offensive targeting the Gaza Strip. Mohammed Najib reports from the West Bank on the tactical and operational advances made by militants that have led to this relatively substantial death toll.

A total of 10 Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers were killed in heavy fighting in and around the Gaza Strip on 28 July. Five soldiers were killed when unidentified Palestinian militants used a tunnel to infiltrate into Israel from Gaza and attacked the IDF unit near the Nahal Oz settlement in Israel's Southern district. Separately, four soldiers were killed when a mortar, launched from Gaza, landed in the Eshkolot area of Southern district, while another soldier was killed when his armoured bulldozer was struck by an anti-tank missile, fired by Palestinian militants, in the town of Khan Younis in southern Gaza.

The 10 fatalities on 28 July brought the total number of IDF fatalities to 53 following the launch of a ground incursion into the Gaza Strip on 17 July as part of Operation Protective Edge, which began with a concerted series of air, naval, and artillery strikes from 8 July onwards and has since killed more than 1,100 Palestinians. In clashes across Gaza since the launch of the ground offensive, Palestinian militants - and Hamas in particular - have utilised relatively sophisticated tactics and weaponry to embroil the IDF in heavy close-quarters fighting and have inflicted substantial casualties.

A key element of Hamas's performance in this regard appears to be its emulation of the tactics of Lebanese Islamist group Hizbullah. A senior official in Hamas's armed wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, speaking to IHS Jane's on condition of anonymity on 22 July, stated, "We have benefited from all the Iranian, Syrian, [and] Hizbullah tactical combat schools, and finally formulated [a] Qassam independent one that matches our situation and [leaves us] capable to respond to our enemy's challenge."

Indeed, the day before, on 21 July, Hizbullah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah telephoned the head of Hamas's Political Bureau, Khaled Mashal, and the leader of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, offering Hizbullah's support and expressing his admiration of the two groups' performance and tactics during the ongoing conflict.

Hamas's tactics and high morale have also attracted recognition from Fatah and Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) officials in Ramallah, in the West Bank, who fought the IDF in southern Lebanon in 1982. A major-general in the Palestinian Authority (PA) security apparatus told IHS Jane's on condition of anonymity on 21 July, "The casualties that the [Izz al-Din al-] Qassam fighters caused since the eruption of this operation… are more than what we caused in all [the] PLO wars in southern Lebanon."

Going underground

Hamas's continued launching of rockets into Israel during the initial air strike phase of Operation Protective Edge, in addition to infiltration attempts into Israel itself, seemed designed to try and provoke the IDF into a ground incursion, a situation the group had seemingly been preparing itself for. Reports in Israeli newspaper The Times of Israel on 25 July claimed that Hamas had invested "millions of dollars" in digging a significant network of large and wide tunnels beneath Gaza City - referred to as "Gaza Underground" - as well as inside Israeli territories around Gaza that have played a key role during the ongoing clashes.

Not only has the tunnel network provided refuge from Israeli air strikes, allowing Hamas's command and control network to remain intact and operational, but it also allows a certain freedom of movement for Hamas fighters. This enables them to infiltrate positions - in Gaza and on the border with Israel, as well as into Israeli territory itself - to launch surprise attacks targeting the IDF.

In so doing, Hamas appears to be attempting to create the spectre of a continual potential threat to IDF ground units in Gaza, thereby undermining IDF morale. Hamas is also keenly aware of the impact of inflicting casualties on the IDF - not just in the Palestinian Territories and Israel, but in the wider Middle East region - and so it and the PIJ are striving to combine tactics and their geographical knowledge and advantage to inflict maximum casualties on the IDF.

A highly notable and successful example of this occurred on 19 July, when Izz al-Din al-Qassam militants lured a force from the IDF's Golani Brigade into a minefield in the Shujaiya area of Gaza, before then attacking the unit's Merkava Mk 4 main battle tanks (MBTs) and M113 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) with anti-tank missiles. Six IDF soldiers were killed in the attack, while a seventh soldier - Sergeant Oron Shaul - went missing. While Hamas subsequently claimed that Shaul was alive and had been captured by its fighters, Israel stated that the soldier was likely to be dead. A further six Golani Brigade soldiers were killed in separate clashes in Shujaiya on the same day, and the unit's commander, Colonel Rasan Aliyan, was also wounded, underlining the intensity of the fighting.

The significance of the IDF death toll of 53 soldiers becomes greater when compared with the last major IDF air and ground offensive in Gaza - the three-week Operation Cast Lead from December 2008 to January 2009 - in which 10 IDF soldiers were killed, four of whom died in friendly fire incidents. Meanwhile, the IDF has claimed to have killed more than 200 Hamas and PIJ militants, although as expected, both groups have claimed to have suffered far fewer casualties.

Tactical emulation

The greater IDF death toll in Operation Protective Edge to date is in no small measure attributable to the refined tactics utilised by Hamas. Indeed, a senior IDF commander told IHS Jane's on 22 July, "The IDF has expected Hamas fighters' surprises, but they have succeeded in showing distinguished capabilities and fighting tactics."

Unsurprisingly, Hamas's military performance has led to comparisons with Hizbullah, and in particular the latter's tactics and operational methods during the 2006 war with Israel. A senior PA military officer, speaking to IHS Jane's on condition of anonymity on 24 July, stated, "It's very clear that Hamas has adopted Hizbullah fighting tactics in tunnels digging and fighting in urban areas."

Hamas has further replicated other aspects of Hizbullah's operational methods, such as the attempted use of naval commandos to infiltrate Israel by sea, the launching of two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into Israel - which were shot down with Patriot missiles on 14 and 17 July - and the use of mobile or concealed rocket launch sites. Hamas has also shown that its rocket capabilities are approaching those of Hizbullah, with rockets reaching almost 120 kilometres from Gaza. Furthermore, the targeting of Tel Aviv airport with rockets - with a rocket landing one mile from the airport's runway on 22 July, leading the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) to temporarily ban flights to Israel - underlines Hamas's ability to inflict economic damage on Israel.

Another tangential explanation for the high rate of IDF casualties during Operation Protective Edge is the fact that the armed wings of Hamas and the PIJ have co-operated and co-ordinated strongly, rather than competing, during the fighting on the ground, enhancing both groups' already substantial capabilities.

Outlook

With a political resolution to the conflict seemingly distant as of 28 July, heavy fighting is highly likely to continue in the short term, especially as Hamas and Israel maintain diametrically opposing views on the basis of any ceasefire agreement. Hamas's objectives will be to inflict maximum damage and casualties on Israel - both against military forces operating inside Gaza and through rocket attacks on Israeli territory - to exact political concessions in return for any ceasefire agreement, and to maintain its offensive and operational capabilities.

The extent to which the group will be successful in this regard remains to be seen, but the course of the fighting to date has seemingly done much to raise the group's morale and prestige - both domestically and regionally - at a time when it was suffering as a consequence of the election of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt and his government's subsequent isolation of Gaza.

The impact the IDF offensive in Gaza has on Palestinians in the West Bank will also be significant. Hamas is likely to be attempting to use the clashes to inspire and catalyse a third intifada (uprising) in the West Bank in order to stretch the IDF and occupy its forces across two fronts. The IDF has moved its key operational elite brigades, such as the Golani Brigade, into Gaza as part of Operation Protective Edge, with reservists deployed to the West Bank. A significant upsurge in violent protests, even if it does not develop into an intifada, would create a substantial security issue for the Israeli government and could lead to violent unrest among the Palestinian population in Israel itself.

A senior PA intelligence officer in Ramallah, speaking to IHS Jane's on 27 July on condition of anonymity, claimed that it is only a matter of time before there is an upsurge in violent activity in the West Bank. The officer stated that as the conflict in Gaza continues, and Palestinians in the West Bank become cognisant of the scale and severity of casualties and damage caused by the IDF offensive, there will be no credible choice but the eruption of violent unrest against IDF targets in the West Bank.

That article seems to have some problems. Off the top of my head:

1) The article compares casualties with previous operations, but fails to note one important fact - in Cast Lead, the IDF didn't send infantry anywhere near as deep as in Protective Edge.
2) It describes the battle on July 19th as the Golani brigade being lured into a minefield and the unit's tanks being shot at; AFAIK it wasn't a minefield and there weren't tanks at that particular battle, at that point they were all on the outskirts (and the Golani brigade doesn't have tanks in the first place)

[bobalot]

The Times of Israel advocates genocide and later removes the article after the shitstorm that followed.

Here is the original article.

[eyl]

I'd be a lot more concerned if not for the fact the the writer is a (now-ex) blogegr who I've literally never heard of before.

[Welf]

Interesting article how this conflict plays out compared with the ones in 2008/9 and 2012.

Spoiler alert: It's always the same.

[Ace Pace]

Interesting article how this conflict plays out compared with the ones in 2008/9 and 2012.

Spoiler alert: It's always the same.

Hint: Looking at meta-data may not always provide good conclusions.

This conflict is different for multiple reasons. One is the lack of a clear victory "picture" for any side. The rocket attacks against Israel are not stopping, but none of the Hamas special forces are really doing anything against Israel. The second is the reactions of the Arab world, specifically Egypt, which is not backing Hamas and therefore have the peace negotiations play out quite differently.
Last and more interesting is the very different internal reactions to the fighting, both in Israel and in the Gaza strip compared to prior rounds.

[Pelranius]

I'd be a lot more concerned if not for the fact the the writer is a (now-ex) blogegr who I've literally never heard of before.

Speaking as someone who blogs for a magazine, I have two points. 1) Does the Times of Israel simply not read what their contributing bloggers put out first? 2) What the hell qualifies Mr. Gordon to write for the Times? Far as I can tell, he's an accountant and his only qualification is that his father set up a moderately sized newspaper in New York.

The NYT has mentioned that some of the people on Egyptian television are actually calling for Egypt to strike at Hamas as well. And even accounting for anti-protest laws and crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood, protests in Egypt on the Gaza business are decidedly anemic, and a lot less intense than I expected in the West Bank, compared to several years ago.

[eyl]

I'd be a lot more concerned if not for the fact the the writer is a (now-ex) blogegr who I've literally never heard of before.

Speaking as someone who blogs for a magazine, I have two points. 1) Does the Times of Israel simply not read what their contributing bloggers put out first?

According to them:

The Times of Israel on Friday removed an unacceptable blog post, entitled “When genocide is permissible.”

This blog post, which was described by our Ops & Blogs editor as both damnable and ignorant, blatantly breached The Times of Israel’s editorial guidelines.

We have discontinued the writer’s blog.

The Times of Israel maintains an open blog platform: Once we have accepted bloggers, we allow them to post their own items. This trust has rarely been abused. We are angry and appalled that it was in this case, and will take steps to prevent a recurrence.

We will not countenance blog posts that incite to violence or criminal acts.

—

(The blogger concerned has issued a public apology for his post.)

2) What the hell qualifies Mr. Gordon to write for the Times? Far as I can tell, he's an accountant and his only qualification is that his father set up a moderately sized newspaper in New York.

No idea; like I said, I've never heard of him before this. Possibly his dad knew someone there who did him a favor?

The NYT has mentioned that some of the people on Egyptian television are actually calling for Egypt to strike at Hamas as well. And even accounting for anti-protest laws and crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood, protests in Egypt on the Gaza business are decidedly anemic, and a lot less intense than I expected in the West Bank, compared to several years ago.

There have been numerous complaints from Gaza, both from Hamas and the civilians, on the decidely weak support from the rest of the Arab world this time round. You see commentators in Egypt and even, as I understand, people from Saudi Arabia openly coming out against Hamas, which is something I can't remember ever seeing (at least when they're in a conflict with Israel).

[Elfdart]

The Times of Israel advocates genocide and later removes the article after the shitstorm that followed.

Here is the original article.

As usual, the most repulsive advocates for Israel's Lebensraum/ethnic cleansing policies are Americans -whether it's American immigrants to the country, or the ones who remain stateside and whack off to the carnage from afar.

[AniThyng]

I'm curious, what is the actual state of Arab political parties in Israel and are there any truly mixed parties? How impossible is it to change Israel policy via democracy?

[eyl]

I'm curious, what is the actual state of Arab political parties in Israel and are there any truly mixed parties?

There are currently three Arab parties in the Knesset:

Balad - secular Arab party, 3 seats
Raam-Taal - a more religous party, 4 seats
Hadash - basically the Israeli Communist party, 4 seats. Hadash is a bit different as unlike the previous two, whcih are explicitly sectarian parties, Hadash is explicitly a binational party (although most of its MKs and constituents are Arab). In fact, one seat in their list (the 3rd, IIRC) is explicitly reserved for a Jew (a mirror of most of the other parties, where specific slots in the list are reserved for women or minorities).

Other than that, all the other parties in Israel are predominantly Jewish. This Knesset has a particularly low number of non-Jews (outside of the above three parties, I think the only one is a Druze in Israel Beitenu), partly, I suspect, due to the fragmentaiton of the Knesset which means you need to be in a high slot to get in.

How impossible is it to change Israel policy via democracy?

Not quite sure what you mean, could you elaborate?