Ukraine War Thread

[Esquire]

None; who's going to start one over eastern Ukraine? There's no more political capital for miitary adventures in the US, Europe hasn't got enough of a consensus even for broader sanctions, and Russia is already winning as is.

[The Romulan Republic]

See, I'd like to think that, and on the surface it sounds sensible, but when you have actual European officials saying there may be a war with Russia, I feel like I have to take it seriously.

[GuppyShark]

slim to nil

[Simon_Jester]

Vanishingly small chance of any real war, since neither side has an incentive to directly attack the other or do anything that might escalate into such an attack.

The basic issue here is that 'Europe' as a unified political entity is trying to incorporate all the polities running clear up to the Russian border, which makes them a lot more vulnerable to Russia's efforts to assert some kind of influence over the nations on that border.

We saw something similar happen when Russia and Georgia clashed over Ossetia in 2008; the Russians wound up making the international community look stupid over that too.

What it comes down to is that if the Russians say "we wish to assert control over the Crimea and the Don basin, territories that were historically part of Russia for most of the last several centuries," the only realistic way to stop them is by waging a war. They may not be a superpower with global ambitions anymore, but they certainly have enough economic and political might that they can exert more control over places literally next door than a remote foreign country can.

Just as the US has more direct leverage over, say, Mexico than a country like China does. Even if China's economy booms to something like four times its current wealth, and even if the US just isn't the powerhouse thirty years from now that it is today... well, the US still has that major advantage of proximity.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Fundamental problem is that Russia does not trust the West, and neither does the West trust Russia. While this state of affairs continues to exist, clashes of this sort, however bloody, will happen. Russia is still too tainted by the Great Patriotic War, where 1 in 5 died in that war alone. The post-war generation that is now in change were filled with stories of the horrendous in their youth and they distrust the West. Historical and cultural scars of the Patriotic War and the Great Patriotic War remains, and buffer zones remain essential to the National Security of Russia. America itself has the Monroe Doctrine, even though it doesn't quite enforce it as much, though it still has sanctions on Cuba and it remains to be seen if Obama can even pull it off, or will his successor reverse those achievements. Flip the coin, and we have the American government with an incredible amount of self-belief, and has no hesitation to cloth their geopolitic power play with romantic notions of democracy (while certain powerful elements do their best to disenfranchise the poor, and refuse to implement decent healthcare), and is looking for an opportunity to assert itself in the backyard of its former rival, and aided on by Eastern European nations who harbor fears of their former overlord.

While this dynamic exist, and probably will for several generations, well, you get what you see. Many would like to think that democracy will make people more "friendly" but that doesn't always work that way. There are some democracies where the elite, supported by the masses, extol a far more aggressive foreign policy than others. The world ultimately, is still a world divided between super-tribes.

[The Romulan Republic]

It almost makes me wish that someone could conquer the world and put an end to it. But you'd probably have to fight a nuclear war to do it, and afterward we'd probably replace conflict between states with constant internal revolts.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

It almost makes me wish that someone could conquer the world and put an end to it. But you'd probably have to fight a nuclear war to do it, and afterward we'd probably replace conflict between states with constant internal revolts.

Sadly, the notion that "I am Special" has its way of starting up quite a few wars.

[Vympel]

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/f ... ar-ukraine

Well, this is the most terrifying article I've read in a while.

Anyone care to comment on the likelihood of nuclear war?

Its absolute fearmongering rubbish. He's quoting Carl Bildt and Anders Fogh Rasmussen two of the most notorious Russophobes of the European elite, so the bias is palpable. Basically, the author is trying to drum up rhetorical support for the danger of Russia (and in the predictable attempt to make the political personal, "Putin's Russia". Ever heard of "Merkel's Germany"? Of course not) and concern-trolling the prudent voices of Europe trying to actually reach a peace by calling them scared and Putin a paranoid lunatic gambler whose goals are inscrutable.

[Simon_Jester]

To be fair, Russia is a lot closer to belonging to Putin than Germany is to belonging to Merkel...

But yes, there's a lot of idiocy in that article, I think. It's fair to say that Russia's recent conduct would ring a lot of people's alarm bells, but that doesn't mean the continent is gearing up for war.

[Mange]

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/f ... ar-ukraine

Well, this is the most terrifying article I've read in a while.

Anyone care to comment on the likelihood of nuclear war?

Its absolute fearmongering rubbish. He's quoting Carl Bildt and Anders Fogh Rasmussen two of the most notorious Russophobes of the European elite, so the bias is palpable. Basically, the author is trying to drum up rhetorical support for the danger of Russia (and in the predictable attempt to make the political personal, "Putin's Russia". Ever heard of "Merkel's Germany"? Of course not) and concern-trolling the prudent voices of Europe trying to actually reach a peace by calling them scared and Putin a paranoid lunatic gambler whose goals are inscrutable.

I wouldn't call Carl Bildt Russophobe, but Putinphobe, and who can blame him? Russia has conducted live simulated air attacks on Swedish military installations, repeatedly violated Swedish airspace and was, without a doubt, responsible for the submarine violation in October 2014. Putin's erratic behavior, his support for the separatists in Ukraine, Russia's role in the Georgian war 2008, that Russia has said it will "protect" not only Russian citizens abroad, but ethnic Russians as well, the revanchism and the Russian incitement campaign against the Baltic states would make any neighbor concerned. Then factor in the Russian/Soviet imperialism which has proved difficult for the neighboring countries to forget.

I do agree however that the article is rubbish.

[Edi]

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/f ... ar-ukraine

Well, this is the most terrifying article I've read in a while.

Anyone care to comment on the likelihood of nuclear war?

Its absolute fearmongering rubbish. He's quoting Carl Bildt and Anders Fogh Rasmussen two of the most notorious Russophobes of the European elite, so the bias is palpable. Basically, the author is trying to drum up rhetorical support for the danger of Russia (and in the predictable attempt to make the political personal, "Putin's Russia". Ever heard of "Merkel's Germany"? Of course not) and concern-trolling the prudent voices of Europe trying to actually reach a peace by calling them scared and Putin a paranoid lunatic gambler whose goals are inscrutable.

Putin's motives are easy enough to understand: He wants to restore Russia to the same pre-eminence it enjoyed during Soviet times and he views the other former Soviet states as part of Russia, not as really sovereign independent states. That's quite enough reason for anyone in the west to view him with extreme suspicion and it is entirely reasonable to expect him to do whatever he is allowed to get away with in pursuit of that goal, with his past actions standing as plentiful evidence.

No scaremongering needed, there is an easily understandable calculus behind it all and a very sad truth that far too many in the west have forgotten is that the state of Russia has never understood any language other than a fist in the face. That's why the Baltic states joined NATO the first chance they got and were wise to do so.

[Purple]

So what in your opinion is Europe supposed to do? We can't well go to war over this. And frankly it would be stupid to sacrifice the economy of our own nations at the altar of stopping Putin. So what measures could you propose that would result in a win and not cost Europe much?

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Putin's motives are easy enough to understand: He wants to restore Russia to the same pre-eminence it enjoyed during Soviet times and he views the other former Soviet states as part of Russia, not as really sovereign independent states. That's quite enough reason for anyone in the west to view him with extreme suspicion and it is entirely reasonable to expect him to do whatever he is allowed to get away with in pursuit of that goal, with his past actions standing as plentiful evidence.

No scaremongering needed, there is an easily understandable calculus behind it all and a very sad truth that far too many in the west have forgotten is that the state of Russia has never understood any language other than a fist in the face. That's why the Baltic states joined NATO the first chance they got and were wise to do so.

Every single Russian ruler from Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible has followed the same policy. What's new?

And I don't think many in the West have forgotten. They just didn't care, since they partook in those same policies for a good part of the last few centuries. Even America hasn't stopped its interventions. Libya got bombed to chaos and no one gives a fib about it now because it isn't media prime time.

It's always the small states that get bullied. Nothing has changed. Those Baltic states you speak of? They will forever be subservient to someone simply because they were too small to ever be viable. The question is who.

[Edi]

So what in your opinion is Europe supposed to do? We can't well go to war over this. And frankly it would be stupid to sacrifice the economy of our own nations at the altar of stopping Putin. So what measures could you propose that would result in a win and not cost Europe much?

I'm not advocating going to war with Russia. Right now, the negotiations going on in Minsk are the best bet yet, because the western states have changed their style to something that suits Russia better (i.e. less talking to the press and making grand pronouncements of what is to come etc. and far more of business conducted on the quiet), but whether anything gets resolved still remains to be seen.

In the meanwhile, the current sanctions should be kept in place and expanded where necessary. The idea that the current conflict can be resolved in a satisfactory manner AND not ending up costing someone quite a bit is nothing but plain stupid. It's already cost Europe, or some European countries at least, quite a bit, and it will cost a lot more before its ends, but that's the nature of the beast.

Short of Putin and his administration keeling over from some malady and being replaced by someone less imperialist and more sensible, I don't see a swift solution.

[Purple]

So what in your opinion is Europe supposed to do? We can't well go to war over this. And frankly it would be stupid to sacrifice the economy of our own nations at the altar of stopping Putin. So what measures could you propose that would result in a win and not cost Europe much?

I'm not advocating going to war with Russia. Right now, the negotiations going on in Minsk are the best bet yet, because the western states have changed their style to something that suits Russia better (i.e. less talking to the press and making grand pronouncements of what is to come etc. and far more of business conducted on the quiet), but whether anything gets resolved still remains to be seen.

In the meanwhile, the current sanctions should be kept in place and expanded where necessary. The idea that the current conflict can be resolved in a satisfactory manner AND not ending up costing someone quite a bit is nothing but plain stupid. It's already cost Europe, or some European countries at least, quite a bit, and it will cost a lot more before its ends, but that's the nature of the beast.

Short of Putin and his administration keeling over from some malady and being replaced by someone less imperialist and more sensible, I don't see a swift solution.

That's the thing though. A good argument can be made that if we just hand Putin what he wants (the former Soviet republics) and stop constantly trying to encroach at what has historically always been considered his back yard we can have our cake and eat it too. The only ones who would lose are the people in those regions. So it's a win-win.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

That's the thing though. A good argument can be made that if we just hand Putin what he wants (the former Soviet republics) and stop constantly trying to encroach at what has historically always been considered his back yard we can have our cake and eat it too. The only ones who would lose are the people in those regions. So it's a win-win.

Putin does not want all the former Soviet Republics. No one in Russia wants the Baltic States back. Simply too troublesome to govern, and neither do they want to subsidize them any further. Honestly, the Baltic states are not even worth fighting over. If there's one reason I can think of why Russia meddles in them, is just so that in time of a war, they'd be destablized because of internal fighting and thus not pose an immediate threat.

Ukraine, on the other hand, is another different story.

[Purple]

That's the thing though. A good argument can be made that if we just hand Putin what he wants (the former Soviet republics) and stop constantly trying to encroach at what has historically always been considered his back yard we can have our cake and eat it too. The only ones who would lose are the people in those regions. So it's a win-win.

Putin does not want all the former Soviet Republics. No one in Russia wants the Baltic States back. Simply too troublesome to govern, and neither do they want to subsidize them any further. Honestly, the Baltic states are not even worth fighting over. If there's one reason I can think of why Russia meddles in them, is just so that in time of a war, they'd be destablized because of internal fighting and thus not pose an immediate threat.

Ukraine, on the other hand, is another different story.

That's basically irrelevant to the main argument which is: Lets give Putin what he wants so we can both win and let those poor victims pay the price of our joy as opposed to us paying a price for their salvation.

[Vympel]

Ukraine arrests a journalist on charges of treason for his calls to dodge the draft

Ukraine’s security service arrested a journalist on treason charges Sunday after he posted a video online urging people to dodge the country’s new military draft, his wife and officials said.

Ruslan Kotsaba — a television journalist from the western region of Ivano-Frankivsk — was ordered held in custody for 60 days pending investigations, his wife, Uliana, wrote on Facebook.

A senior official at Ukraine’s SBU security agency, Markian Lubkivskyi, wrote online that Kotsaba was detained on suspicion of treason, an accusation that carries a possible 15-year jail sentence.

Kotsaba published a video on YouTube last month denouncing a new round of military call-ups by Kiev to boost its forces fighting pro-Russian rebels in the east.

“I would prefer to go to prison than to participate in this fratricidal war,” Kotsaba said in the footage, which was viewed more than 300,000 times.

“I refuse to be drafted and call on everyone who is called up to refuse,” he said.

After 10 months of conflict, opinion is split in war-weary Ukraine over the latest government plan to mobilize around 50,000 men.

A senior official has admitted that almost 40 percent of men called up to serve in Kotsaba’s home region have left Ukraine.

Ukraine is desperately trying to bolster its forces as it accuses Moscow of pouring in troops and weapons in support of the pro-Russian rebellion.

Fighting in east Ukraine has killed some 5,400 people and wounded around 12,000 more since April 2014.

Its really important to remember that Ukraine is basically "Russia, but worse in practically every way imaginable", as opposed to this 'European' delusion.

What it comes down to is that if the Russians say "we wish to assert control over the Crimea and the Don basin, territories that were historically part of Russia for most of the last several centuries," the only realistic way to stop them is by waging a war. They may not be a superpower with global ambitions anymore, but they certainly have enough economic and political might that they can exert more control over places literally next door than a remote foreign country can.

A Washington Post opinion piece (speaking against the calls to arm Ukraine) called this "escalation dominance" - i.e. however far the US attempts to go, Moscow can match it and go further with ease.

Also, John J Mearsheimer today:

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/opini ... raine.html

The Ukraine crisis is almost a year old and Russia is winning. The separatists in eastern Ukraine are gaining ground and Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, shows no signs of backing down in the face of Western economic sanctions.

Unsurprisingly, a growing chorus of voices in the United States is calling for arming Ukraine. A recent report from three leading American think tanks endorses sending Kiev advanced weaponry, and the White House’s nominee for secretary of defense, Ashton B. Carter, said last week to the Senate armed services committee, “I very much incline in that direction.”

They are wrong. Going down that road would be a huge mistake for the United States, NATO and Ukraine itself. Sending weapons to Ukraine will not rescue its army and will instead lead to an escalation in the fighting. Such a step is especially dangerous because Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons and is seeking to defend a vital strategic interest.

There is no question that Ukraine’s military is badly outgunned by the separatists, who have Russian troops and weapons on their side. Because the balance of power decisively favors Moscow, Washington would have to send large amounts of equipment for Ukraine’s army to have a fighting chance.

But the conflict will not end there. Russia would counter-escalate, taking away any temporary benefit Kiev might get from American arms. The authors of the think tank study concede this, noting that “even with enormous support from the West, the Ukrainian Army will not be able to defeat a determined attack by the Russian military.” In short, the United States cannot win an arms race with Russia over Ukraine and thereby ensure Russia’s defeat on the battlefield.

Proponents of arming Ukraine have a second line of argument. The key to success, they maintain, is not to defeat Russia militarily, but to raise the costs of fighting to the point where Mr. Putin will cave. The pain will supposedly compel Moscow to withdraw its troops from Ukraine and allow it to join the European Union and NATO and become an ally of the West.

This coercive strategy is also unlikely to work, no matter how much punishment the West inflicts. What advocates of arming Ukraine fail to understand is that Russian leaders believe their country’s core strategic interests are at stake in Ukraine; they are unlikely to give ground, even if it means absorbing huge costs.

Great powers react harshly when distant rivals project military power into their neighborhood, much less attempt to make a country on their border an ally. This is why the United States has the Monroe Doctrine, and today no American leader would ever tolerate Canada or Mexico joining a military alliance headed by another great power.

Russia is no exception in this regard. Thus Mr. Putin has not budged in the face of sanctions and is unlikely to make meaningful concessions if the costs of the fighting in Ukraine increase.

Upping the ante in Ukraine also risks unwanted escalation. Not only would the fighting in eastern Ukraine be sure to intensify, but it could also spread to other areas. The consequences for Ukraine, which already faces profound economic and social problems, would be disastrous.

The possibility that Mr. Putin might end up making nuclear threats may seem remote, but if the goal of arming Ukraine is to drive up the costs of Russian interference and eventually put Moscow in an acute situation, it cannot be ruled out. If Western pressure succeeded and Mr. Putin felt desperate, he would have a powerful incentive to try to rescue the situation by rattling the nuclear saber.

Our understanding of the mechanisms of escalation in crises and war is limited at best, although we know the risks are considerable. Pushing a nuclear-armed Russia into a corner would be playing with fire.

Advocates of arming Ukraine recognize the escalation problem, which is why they stress giving Kiev “defensive,” not “offensive,” weapons. Unfortunately, there is no useful distinction between these categories: All weapons can be used for attacking and defending. The West can be sure, though, that Moscow will not see those American weapons as “defensive,” given that Washington is determined to reverse the status quo in eastern Ukraine.

The only way to solve the Ukraine crisis is diplomatically, not militarily. Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, seems to recognize that fact, as she has said Germany will not ship arms to Kiev. Her problem, however, is that she does not know how to bring the crisis to an end.

She and other European leaders still labor under the delusion that Ukraine can be pulled out of Russia’s orbit and incorporated into the West, and that Russian leaders must accept that outcome. They will not.

To save Ukraine and eventually restore a working relationship with Moscow, the West should seek to make Ukraine a neutral buffer state between Russia and NATO. It should look like Austria during the Cold War. Toward that end, the West should explicitly take European Union and NATO expansion off the table, and emphasize that its goal is a nonaligned Ukraine that does not threaten Russia. The United States and its allies should also work with Mr. Putin to rescue Ukraine’s economy, a goal that is clearly in everyone’s interest.

It is essential that Russia help end the fighting in eastern Ukraine and that Kiev regain control over that region. Still, the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk should be given substantial autonomy, and protection for Russian language rights should be a top priority.

Crimea, a casualty of the West’s attempt to march NATO and the European Union up to Russia’s doorstep, is surely lost for good. It is time to end that imprudent policy before more damage is done — to Ukraine and to relations between Russia and the West.

[Block]

That's the thing though. A good argument can be made that if we just hand Putin what he wants (the former Soviet republics) and stop constantly trying to encroach at what has historically always been considered his back yard we can have our cake and eat it too. The only ones who would lose are the people in those regions. So it's a win-win.

Putin does not want all the former Soviet Republics. No one in Russia wants the Baltic States back. Simply too troublesome to govern, and neither do they want to subsidize them any further. Honestly, the Baltic states are not even worth fighting over. If there's one reason I can think of why Russia meddles in them, is just so that in time of a war, they'd be destablized because of internal fighting and thus not pose an immediate threat.

Ukraine, on the other hand, is another different story.

That's basically irrelevant to the main argument which is: Lets give Putin what he wants so we can both win and let those poor victims pay the price of our joy as opposed to us paying a price for their salvation.

So that we can see even larger civil wars as Putin represses the large majority of the Ukraine, Estonia, Poland, etc. that want to remain sovereign countries?

[The Romulan Republic]

Actually, if the goal was to defeat Russia and advance the interests of the West without regard for morality, that might be a good way to do it. I doubt Russia can afford to put down a dozen civil wars given the state of its economy.

Edit: Just to be clear, I am not advocating this.

[Purple]

So that we can see even larger civil wars as Putin represses the large majority of the Ukraine, Estonia, Poland, etc. that want to remain sovereign countries?

But how is that OUR problem? What practical gain does the average citizen of say Germany have from the welfare of the average citizen of say Estonia? We know that Putin is not going to actually go up against any serious OTAN nation like Germany. So knowing the big pieces are safe, what loss do we have from sacrificing a few pawns?

Edit: Just to be clear, I am not advocating this.

Me neither. But it's an argument I've heard often enough. And I want to see what you guys have to say about it.

[Vympel]

So that we can see even larger civil wars as Putin represses the large majority of the Ukraine, Estonia, Poland, etc. that want to remain sovereign countries?

Won't happen. The argument that Putin needs to be 'deterred' is based on a fundamental misunderstanding about the crisis. This is 'spiral model', not 'deterrence model'. The narrative of Russia as an empire-building, revanchist power is a falsehood.

How not to save Ukraine

Should the United States start arming Ukraine, so it can better resist and maybe even defeat the Russian-backed rebels in its eastern provinces? A lot of seasoned American diplomats and foreign policy experts seem to think so; a task force assembled by the Brookings Institution, the Atlantic Council, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs wants the United States to send Ukraine $1 billion in military assistance as soon as possible, with more to come. The Obama administration is rethinking its earlier reluctance, and secretary of defense nominee Ash Carter told a Senate hearing he was “very much inclined” to favor this course as well.

Unless cooler heads prevail, therefore, the United States seems to be moving toward raising the stakes in Ukraine. This decision is somewhat surprising, however, because few experts think this bankrupt and divided country is a vital strategic interest and no one is talking about sending U.S. troops to fight on Kiev’s behalf. So the question is: does sending Ukraine a bunch of advanced weaponry make sense?

The answer is no.

One reason to be skeptical of the report from the three think tanks is the track record of its like-minded members. The task force wasn’t made up of a diverse set of experts seeking to explore a wide range of options and find some creative common ground. On the contrary, its members were all people who have long backed NATO expansion and have an obvious desire to defend that policy, which has played a central role in creating the present crisis. After all, these are the same people who have been telling us since the late 1990s that expanding NATO eastwards posed no threat to Russia and would instead create a vast and enduring zone of peace in Europe. That prediction is now in tatters, alas, but these experts are now doubling down to defend a policy that was questionable from the beginning and clearly taken much too far. As the critics warned it would, open-ended NATO expansion has done more to poison relations with Russia than any other single Western policy.

Those who favor arming Ukraine are also applying “deterrence model” remedies to what is almost certainly a “spiral model” situation. In his classic book Perception and Misperception in International Politics, political scientist Robert Jervis pointed out that states may undertake what appear to be threatening actions for two very different reasons.

Sometimes states act aggressively because their leaders are greedy, seeking some sort of personal glory, or ideologically driven to expand, and are not reacting to perceived threats from others. The classic example, of course, is Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany, and in such cases accommodation won’t work. Here the “deterrence model” applies: the only thing to do is issue warnings and credible threats so that the potential aggressor is deterred from pursuing its irrevocably revisionist aims.

By contrast, the “spiral model” applies when a state’s seemingly aggressive policy is motivated primarily by fear or insecurity. Making threats and trying to deter or coerce them will only reinforce their fears and make them even more aggressive, in effect triggering an action-reaction spiral of growing hostility. When insecurity is the taproot of a state’s revisionist actions, making threats just makes the situation worse. When the “spiral model” applies, the proper response is a diplomatic process of accommodation and appeasement (yes, appeasement) to allay the insecure state’s concerns. Such efforts do not require giving an opponent everything it might want or removing every one of its worries, but it does require a serious effort to address the insecurities that are motivating the other side’s objectionable behavior.

The problem, of course, is that responses that work well in one situation tend to fail badly in the other. Applying the deterrence model to an insecure adversary will heighten its paranoia and fuel its defensive reactions, while appeasing an incorrigible aggressor is likely to whet its appetite and make it harder to deter it in the future.

Those who now favor arming Ukraine clearly believe the “deterrence model” is the right way to think about this problem. In this view, Vladimir Putin is a relentless aggressor who is trying to recreate something akin to the old Soviet empire, and thus not confronting him over Ukraine will lead him to take aggressive actions elsewhere. The only thing to do, therefore, is increase the costs until Russia backs down and leaves Ukraine free to pursue its own foreign policy. This is precisely the course of action the report from the three think tanks recommends: in addition to “bolstering deterrence,” its authors believe arming Ukraine will help “produce conditions in which Moscow decides to negotiate a genuine settlement that allows Ukraine to reestablish full sovereignty.” In addition to bolstering deterrence, in short, giving arms to Kiev is intended to coerce Moscow into doing what we want.

Yet the evidence in this case suggests the spiral model is far more applicable. Russia is not an ambitious rising power like Nazi Germany or contemporary China; it is an aging, depopulating, and declining great power trying to cling to whatever international influence it still possesses and preserve a modest sphere of influence near its borders, so that stronger states — and especially the United States — cannot take advantage of its growing vulnerabilities. Putin & Co. are also genuinely worried about America’s efforts to promote “regime change” around the world — including Ukraine — a policy that could eventually threaten their own positions. It is lingering fear, rather than relentless ambition, that underpins Russia’s response in Ukraine.

Moreover, the Ukraine crisis did not begin with a bold Russian move or even a series of illegitimate Russian demands; it began when the United States and European Union tried to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and into the West’s sphere of influence. That objective may be desirable in the abstract, but Moscow made it abundantly clear it would fight this process tooth and nail. U.S. leaders blithely ignored these warnings — which clearly stemmed from Russian insecurity rather than territorial greed — and not surprisingly they have been blindsided by Moscow’s reaction. The failure of U.S. diplomats to anticipate Putin’s heavy-handed response was an act of remarkable diplomatic incompetence, and one can only wonder why the individuals who helped produce this train wreck still have their jobs.

If we are in a “spiral model” situation, arming Ukraine will only make things worse. It certainly will not enable Ukraine to defeat the far stronger Russian army; it will simply intensify the conflict and add to the suffering of the Ukrainian people.

Nor is arming Ukraine likely to convince Putin to cave in and give Washington what it wants. Ukraine is historically linked to Russia, they are right next door to each other, Russian intelligence has long-standing links inside Ukraine’s own security institutions, and Russia is far stronger militarily. Even massive arms shipments from the United States won’t tip the balance in Kiev’s favor, and Moscow can always escalate if the fighting turns against the rebels, as it did last summer.

Most importantly, Ukraine’s fate is much more important to Moscow than it is to us, which means that Putin and Russia will be willing to pay a bigger price to achieve their aims than we will. The balance of resolve as well as the local balance of power strongly favors Moscow in this conflict. Before starting down an escalatory path, therefore, Americans should ask themselves just how far they are willing to go. If Moscow has more options, is willing to endure more pain, and run more risks than we are, then it makes no sense to begin a competition in resolve we are unlikely to win. And no, that doesn’t show the West is irresolute, craven, or spineless; it simply means Ukraine is a vital strategic interest for Russia but not for us.

Efforts to resolve this crisis are also handicapped by the U.S. tendency to indulge in “take-it-or-leave it” diplomacy. Instead of engaging in genuine bargaining, American officials tend to tell others what to do and then ramp up the pressure if they do not comply. Today, those who want to arm Ukraine are demanding that Russia cease all of its activities in Ukraine, withdraw from Crimea, and let Ukraine join the EU and/or NATO if it wants and if it meets the membership requirements. In other words, they expect Moscow to abandon its own interests in Ukraine, full stop. It would be wonderful if Western diplomacy could pull off this miracle, but how likely is it? Given Russia’s history, its proximity to Ukraine, and its long-term security concerns, it is hard to imagine Putin capitulating to our demands without a long and costly struggle that will do enormous additional damage to Ukraine.

And let’s not forget the broader costs of this feckless policy. We are pushing Russia closer to China, which is not in the long-term U.S. interest. We have brought cooperation on nuclear security with Russia to an end, even though there are still large quantities of inadequately secured nuclear material on Russian soil. And we are surely prolonging the suffering of the Ukrainian people.

The solution to this crisis is for the United States and its allies to abandon the dangerous and unnecessary goal of endless NATO expansion and do whatever it takes to convince Russia that we want Ukraine to be a neutral buffer state in perpetuity. We should then work with Russia, the EU, and the IMF to develop an economic program that puts that unfortunate country back on its feet.

Arming Ukraine, on the other hand, is a recipe for a longer and more destructive conflict. It’s easy to prescribe such actions when you’re safely located in a Washington think tank, but destroying Ukraine in order to save it is hardly smart or morally correct diplomacy.

Also, the idea that its appropriate to 'deter' Russia from aggression against NATO members it simply has no reason to engage on a mound of corpses in Ukraine is ... problematic.

(I note for the sake of accuracy that Russia is not depopulating presently and hasn't been for some time, but memes about Russia based on obsolete facts are hardly new. One could say its in for a demographic trough as the small 1990s cohort takes over the responsibility of having kids, but this is dependent on immigration and the total fertility rate etc)

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

So that we can see even larger civil wars as Putin represses the large majority of the Ukraine, Estonia, Poland, etc. that want to remain sovereign countries?

The fucking Cold War might be over, but clearly a lot of people in the West have not moved on, not just Putin, which is why we are even having this nonsense in Ukraine happening in the first place.

[Simon_Jester]

Vympel, what does "spiral model" mean?
___________

Also, Fingolfin, I think Putin has moved on from the Cold War. The territories he's been seriously "meddling" in are all territories that were historically part of Czarist Russia before 1917, as far as I can tell.

See... we may argue that they are 'not part of Russia.' But I honestly think the Russian claim to areas like South Ossetia, the Crimea, and the Don Basin are about as solid as, oh, the German claim to Alsace in 1870. Maybe not good enough to justify fighting a war, but good enough that it's not just a naked land-grab in the eyes of an ambitious nationalist leader. Such a might very easily try to wrest control the territory from a weak neighbor, especially if he can do so with the support of the local population.

So I would argue that this is very easily understood purely in terms of the nationalist pre-Communist concept of Russia as a nation-state, and with the regional ambitions of Russia to secure territories that were historically Russian-controlled for centuries and which were only stripped from the core Russian state in the first place by historical happenstance. Such as Khrushchev attaching the Crimea to the Ukraine SSR in the 1950s, at a time when this was an internal political matter and not a serious attempt to redefine the boundaries of politically independent nation-states.

Now, you can certainly disagree with Russian nationalism, or find it a bad justification for violence. There is much to criticize about such an attitude.

But it has nothing to do with the global Cold War that was focused on the Soviets trying to spread a Communist sphere of influence.

[Vympel]

Vympel, what does "spiral model" mean?

To quote the article, its a reference to an action-reaction cycle of growing hostility:

By contrast, the “spiral model” applies when a state’s seemingly aggressive policy is motivated primarily by fear or insecurity. Making threats and trying to deter or coerce them will only reinforce their fears and make them even more aggressive, in effect triggering an action-reaction spiral of growing hostility. When insecurity is the taproot of a state’s revisionist actions, making threats just makes the situation worse. When the “spiral model” applies, the proper response is a diplomatic process of accommodation and appeasement (yes, appeasement) to allay the insecure state’s concerns. Such efforts do not require giving an opponent everything it might want or removing every one of its worries, but it does require a serious effort to address the insecurities that are motivating the other side’s objectionable behavior.