In what possible sense is this true? There are entirely separate rules for how legitimate military targets are treated as compared with capital offenders, as well as separate procedures for handling such people. You are falsely equating the two to create a mix-and-match legal system, when the two are in fact completely separate for a reason.Simon_Jester wrote:Deciding that he is a legitimate military target is equivalent to deciding that he's committed a capital offense.Master of Ossus wrote:The question is not whether it's impractical to arrest him. The question is whether or not he's a legitimate military target.
What? Are you seriously questioning the US Government's determination that it is in an ongoing armed conflict with Al Qaeda?The US government now asserts the power to decide, in secret council, that American citizens are legitimate military targets by virtue of affiliation with private organizations it has decided to be "at war" with.
This should not reassure you.
So in other words, you'd be MORE comfortable with a decision that had been made by a nameless cold, tired, scared, hungry, stressed out and confused soldier than you would be if it had been made by a large group of calm, rational people after reviewing an extensive intelligence file, the requisite international legal standards as put forth by the ICRC? This makes absolutely no sense. None. If a decision can be made using standards that are designed so they are easy to apply, why can that same decision not be made by an officer or group of officers who have time to think it over?I would be far more comfortable with this decision if it had been made in the field or on short notice. Instead, the decision was made in cold blood, we knew for months that the US government wanted al-Awlaki dead, and yet there was no attempt to observe or even consider any kind of review process.
If al-Awlaki had been shot, rifle in hand, trying to attack US troops in Afghanistan, I would not have a problem with that. Because then there's no question of him being uniquely targeted for death by the government, and by its very nature his actions make his intent to kill Americans as blatant as possible.
It's when it's possible for someone to sign a document saying "kill this man" and have the government adopt a systematic policy of carrying out that order no matter how long it takes, no matter where the man chooses to go or what he chooses to do, that I think there's a chilling effect. Especially when that decision can be made without proof, or without a need to present that proof for examination later on, as is the case with al-Awlaki.
To whom? Who would defend such a "case?" You are simply going about this entire situation in an ass-backwards manner and assuming that your solution is correct. There is no legal, doctrinal, or moral reason for the judiciary to be involved in such a decision, and the law is very clear in these regards.The review of the proof might be an open-and-shut case, but in this case there was plenty of time for there to be such a case. The decision to kill al-Awlaki was not made under any kind of time pressure or urgency, nor was there any obvious danger from taking some time several months ago to present the case for why he needs to die.
It may well be, because the information that they relied upon may well have been gathered by identifiable intelligence agents whose lives would be endangered by the presentation of such evidence.If he's so obviously a "legitimate military target" that you are prepared to accept his status as such without even seeing the evidence the state has against him, then surely it wouldn't be hard for the state to prove his status by presenting the evidence, right?
I guess that I think that it would be retarded. I'm not opposed to it because I think this falls outside the ICJ's jurisdiction, or anything, but rather because I cannot see any purpose at all to this particular hearing.Would you be opposed to a case being brought against the US government in that court, then, under the circumstances?
There may well be difficult cases under international law, where someone stretches the boundaries of the definition of a legitimate military target, but Awlaki was not one of them, and the US obviously complied with rules of proportionality and distinction. According to WikiLeaks, there's not even a question of sovereignty with respect to Yemen because the Yemenese Government actually green-lighted these types of operations. Bringing a case could not possibly clarify the law in this respect because none of the legal determinations that the US made when selecting Awlaki as a military target fall anywhere close to any legal boundaries. I don't see any purpose to wasting resources in this manner. Awlaki is self-evidently a legitimate military target, even from the publicly available information out about the guy. He was known to be involved in Al Qaeda operations and had published materials in Al Qaeda's magazine. More to the point, he had been listed by the UN as an individual associated with Al Qaeda (see UNSC Resolution 1267), conclusively establishing such a link for the purposes of state action under international law.
Frankly, if it came down to it, the strike would probably have been legal even if Awlaki hadn't been a legitimate military target, because Samir Khan was also present, also killed, and very obviously a lawful military target. (Let's ignore the issue that Awlaki was actually the target and simply assume that he was a bystander who happened to be present). The rules of distinction and proportionality would probably have allowed the US to carry out an attack on Khan, even knowing that another person was present, because this was likely their only opportunity to execute such a strike with so few civilians present (since Khan was presumably also holed up for months in a city or township surrounded by human shields).
This is true when the individual in question is accused of committing a crime. Even then, it's true only when the person is captured--people who are resisting arrest using deadly force, for example, can be killed.That's the really disturbing part. Normally you have to have some kind of trial before you can mark a citizen for lawful death at the hands of the state.Only after the state had already decided that al-Awlaki had committed a potentially capital offense, by crossing that line, could they decide whether or not to try to arrest him. And only after deciding it would be hard to arrest him could they decide to assassinate him. By the time we got to the "it would be difficult to arrest him in Yemen" step, the government has already decided it's OK to kill al-Awlaki.
But the statement is completely false when the person in question is a legitimate military target.
The government never determined that he had committed "a potentially capital offense." He was a legitimate military target from the get-go.
We've talked about this issue before, Simon. Shall I respond with links to the relevant threads, or shall I assume that you are trolling because no matter how often I try to beat this into you your response is to forget the discussion the next time we have such a talk? The ICRC sets the standards for what is a legitimate military target and what is not. Awlaki isn't even close to the boundary between target and not-target.Again, what concerns me is the limit of the state's power to label individuals as "legitimate military targets." What is the limit? How wide a net can the state cast when looking for such?
Well, obviously there's more to it then this, but people can only be eligible to become legitimate military targets when they're affiliated with a group that is involved in an ongoing armed conflict with the government in question. Again, we've had this discussion repeatedly.When dealing with a tangle of loosely connected international (or domestic) groups, some of which are violent and some of which aren't, which members of which groups become "legitimate military targets?"
Like when? You mean like during the Civil War? Because that is literally the only time that leaps to mind in which the US has been involved in an ongoing armed conflict which was even arguably the product of civil unrest.What would it look like if the current US government policy about "legitimate military targets" who can be assassinated at will had been applied to previous eras when the US was experiencing civil unrest?
Like when? You mean like in a redux version of the Civil War?What will it look like in the future, if this thinking is applied to civil unrest in the US in the future?
[/quote]Al-Awlaki's death raises all these questions, and the government's refusal to acknowledge hard limits on its own power in these matters is what disturbs me more than the man's death itself does.
The government hasn't refused to acknowledge such limits at all. Indeed, we know that they wrote an extensive legal memo detailing those limits and determining whether Awlaki fell within them or not. Awlaki's death raises none of these questions because he's not a close case. He's a clear affiliate with al Qaeda, al Qaeda is self-evidently involved in an ongoing armed conflict with the US, and he was targeted with clear attention to distinction and proportionality. Moreover, he was a lawful and legitimate military target because he was making an effective contribution to military action and his destruction, capture or neutralization offered a definite military advantage.