To summarize my reply to Stas:
I honestly think the US is
not acting as it does in an attempt to keep the Middle East disunited. I think that US actions in each case are decided by idiosyncratic factors relevant only to that case, with very little overall coherence or unified policy.
Stas Bush wrote:Simon, I do see your point, but I cannot help but see at least some sort of consistency in the policy (and yes: the pre-Bush and post-Bush regimes are more aimed towards doing the same thing cheaply, Bush was the only one who directly assaulted the Middle East and Central Asia with military force).
Carter sent commandos to Tehran to rescue hostages. Reagan sent the Marines into Lebanon, the carrier battlegroups to Libya, and American ships to patrol the Persian Gulf. Bush the Elder sent the entire US military against Iraq in the first Gulf War. Clinton bombed Iraq and launched missiles into Sudan and Afghanistan. Obama launched airstrikes against Libya and has a persistent drone-war going on in Yemen, Pakistan, and probably some other places I don't remember at the moment.
Bush the Younger is only unique in that he sent
large invasion forces to occupy Middle Eastern nations. And that he was the first US leader to use military force to attempt regime change, rather than using airstrikes to 'punish' nations who had specifically acted against the US, or to use troops to respond to specific outbreaks of violent 'anarchy' where fighting between two or more sides had broken out.
But prior to Bush the Younger, there was no policy of supporting religious fundamentalists and beggaring the Middle East. There was a policy of supporting whoever did more or less what the US wanted, regardless of what kind of government they had. And many of the US client states in the region were among the richest in terms of per capita GDP and command of high oil prices.
And during Bush the Younger, there was no policy of supporting religious fundamentalists, there was a policy of fighting them because Bush the Younger thought they were anti-American terrorists. Granted that fighting them only makes them stronger in some ways, but by that logic the Soviets can be blamed for the Taliban, which is idiotic. And many of the US client states in the region were
still among the richest in terms of per capita GDP and command of high oil prices.
And after Bush the Younger, there was no
coherent policy of supporting religious fundamentalists, only a
de facto one created by Obama basically deciding to not even have a real Middle East policy and just hoping all problems with the region would somehow go away on their own.
Gaddafi was not bombed because that would make Libyan fundamentalists happy, he was bombed because frankly the US hates Gaddafi even if they didn't act on that hatred for nearly thirty years. The Syrian rebels were likewise supported (a little) because the US hates Assad. There are novels from right-wing hacks in America which quite explicitly fantasize about wrapping Assad into the whole "Axis of Evil" crap... And you'll note that the whole idea of an "Axis of Evil" totally overlooked the brute fact that there was no ideological commonality among the three states- an Arab-nationalist dictatorship, a Shia fundamentalist theocracy, and a pseudo-Stalinist autarky ruled by a dynasty of deified monarchs were all treated as somehow 'together.'
And many of the US client states in the region are
STILL among the richest in terms of per capita GDP and command of high oil prices.
Thanas, Channel and others seem to think that the change of presidents somehow means the US and other nations change foreign policy radically every four years. In fact, the changes are often marginal and the impact of long-standing doctrines is very long-lasting.
I look forward to seeing your examples.
I have a theory as to why this is so: one, the Senate is a gerontocracy full of incumbents that act like a Politbureau echo chamber.
If by 'echo chamber' you mean a bunch of useless noise, that's fairly accurate of the modern era. Otherwise... debateable. It's true that they're basically gerontocratic, and that this probably
does explain why American foreign policy has remained firmly anti-Russian, just to give one example. On the other hand, the Senate's actual power over foreign policy has been rotting away steadily since the Second World War. It has basically reached zero in the modern era because as a
de facto reality, they're too deadlocked to actually change anything significant.
The US pursues a 'consistent' policy on some issues not because of an ongoing plan by a cabal of cynics, but because there is no person or group within the system capable of saying "okay, this is our strategy, all relevant elements of our behavior will be modified to fit the strategy." The closest we've had to that in the past 20-30 years was Bush the Younger and his neoconservatives, who at least
had an ideology that was telling them what to do.
Two, the National Security establlishment (CIA) is an even more of a closed gerontocracy ruled by the very same people with the very same attitudes.
Except that the president actually does get to tell them what to do. The same people* keep cycling back into office because they're part of the intelligentsia of the two American political parties; this is especially true on the Republican side of the aisle.
*(most of them NOT part of the CIA, don't forget the NSA, the National Security Advisor, and the Department of Defense...)
Examples: Jackson-Vanik amendment remaining in force even for successor states of the USSR for a very long time (despite being removed for the PRC as this interferes with WTO rules). The sponsoring of islamists, often of the most dangerous kind, way after the USSR collapsed (so this isn't just a fluke or inconsistent policy, in my view).
The sponsoring of Islamists has been sporadic and accompanied by
active fighting of Islamists in other places.
The attitude of America toward Islamists is, at the most favorable, like that of a European colonial power towards an African tribe in the 1800s: to ally with them when it is convenient, and shoot at them when they do anything disliked. And by default the US's attitude is somewhere between 'neutral' and 'dislike.'
Jackson-Vanik is a good example of gerontocratic inertia in action, I agree... but you will note that in many of the countries that it affects, the nation was repeatedly granted 'waivers.' This is a good example of a basic problem with American governance: we've gotten used to using various workarounds and legal fig-leaves to avoid actually
changing fundamental laws that would otherwise present a problem. This is why the US has a debt ceiling: because we're not willing to admit that the ceiling was a bad idea all along OR to actually balance the budget, so the ceiling remains in force and has to be raised by another congressional vote every six to twelve months.
For that matter, the US congress
has not passed a budget since, what, 2009? Does this really sound to you like an organization capable of pursuing a relevant, intelligently organized foreign policy strategy?
Now, viewing the security establishments and spy organizations as dangerous, self-serving tools that are controlled and steered either by the same people for decades, or by people brought up in the same vein using the very same theories, and considering the fact that these organizations direct the state policy in matters of 'national security' (though it would be much better to honestly call these things a Ministry of War), one can imagine a consistent, even if slightly misguided, policy to ensure non-dominance of the Middle East on the basis of fracturing it through 'islamic identity' (as opposed to national or even pan-Arab identity).
Except that, I would argue, these organizations are NOT controlled and steered by the same people for decades, they are controlled and steered by two or three different cliques with different ideas about which way to steer (and why, and even how the steering wheel
works). All of which are fighting over the steering wheel.
The most likely outcome of this is that the organization thus 'steered' either goes nowhere and continues in a straight line (because the fighting is so fierce no one can even reach the wheel)... Or that the vehicle will veer wildly from crisis to crisis, sometimes heading straight for a dangerous cliff or other obstacle because no one actually has enough control to divert it.
Which ALSO describes the real situation pretty well, if you ask me.
Stas Bush wrote:So again, why strategic relationships are established with Pakistan (a nation known to sponsor the most radical islamist organizations and one of the direct architects of Afghanistan's fall to islamism, also well-known for the massive 2+ million genocide in Bangladesh), Saudi Arabia (nation with death penalty for Sharia 'crimes' like sex with the wrong person, nation known to sponsor the most radical islamist organizations and one of the funders of ISIS, Taliban and Chechen extremists)?
These are not some short-term relationships. They continue for a long time. Explain that to me.
The US has a strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia because:
1) They have lots and lots of oil. Note that this client relationship is not enough to ensure that the US will have
cheap oil, it just ensures that there is
A supply of oil that the US can count on actually getting extracted, shipped, and refined in an orderly fashion. Whereas Saddam's Iraq or the Iranian theocrats might well decide to stop shipping oil to prove some political point, or might get into a war that disrupts shipping (as the Arab-Israeli Wars involving Egypt disrupted shipping along the Suez Canal)
2) There is a wide perception among the US foreign policy establishment that if the Saudis weren't getting aid funneled in from the West, they'd collapse and be replaced by a regime that is more blatantly fundamentalist in character, i.e. the Taliban or ISIL. Under this argument, the Saudis are essentially a group of mercenaries the US pays to keep some kind of fragile, feeble, leaky lid on the situation. This isn't a very smart strategy, because the House of Saud has been collaborating with fundamentalists for 300 years and is quite capable of playing "good cop, bad cop." But I have heard it advocated.
3) Because the US has no actual 'hard power' domination of the Middle East, there is a sense of... well, the expression that comes to mind is "better to have them inside the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in." As an American client state, we can at least keep Saudi Arabia from specifically backing groups we
really want to make sure aren't being backed. In principle. Whereas if they go their own way, well, they still have the oil revenues but we now have no influence over what they do and don't do.
Similar arguments seem to motivate US actions with regards to Pakistan.
And pay attention: I am not saying that all US actions are favoring islamists. They did want islamism to be stronger (that goal arose somewhere in the 1970s, it was nicely tied with both anti-Sovietism (and combatting Russian/Chinese influence), but also good as an independent goal, because it keeps the region disunited. But when the islamists directly attack them (Taliban), it is too much and there's no option but to attack.
I honestly think that the US is not acting out of fear of the region becoming united, but rather out of a hodge-podge of individual local concerns that don't really connect to each other.