Thanas, do us all a favor and read the fucking thread.
Thanas wrote:As to the topic at hand, a few relevations:
- the drone strike did not just kill Al Awlaki, but another american citizen as well.
Yes. This was discussed at considerable length, earlier in the thread. Thanks for that "revelation."
- I reject the argument that the US acted in self defence here because no evidence has been posted that he represented a threat and no such evidence is forthcoming.
The self defense claim is much broader than you are implicitly claiming it to be. National self-defense requires that there be a group engaged in an ongoing armed struggle against that nation (here: Al Qaeda). Members of that group are legitimate military targets. Since the UNSC had declared al Awlaki to be a member of Al Qaeda, that is definitive insofar as national action is concerned.
- Again, a lot of people seem to be missing the point, which is:
The central question in the death of American extremist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki is not his innocence. That really misses the point.
This part is true. Awlaki was never accused of having committed a crime.
Awlaki was the only publicly known name on a covert list of American citizens the US government believes it can legally kill without charge or trial. Awlaki's killing can't be viewed as a one-off situation; what we're talking about is the establishment of a precedent by which a US president can secretly order the death of an American citizen unchecked by any outside process. Rules that get established on the basis that they only apply to the "bad guys" tend to be ripe for abuse, particularly when they're secret.
This is absurd. It's not like the US is claiming some new power which is unprecedented in international law. Indeed, the US went to significant lengths
in this particular case to conform its actions with international law. The US is
not "establishing" some new rule--it is only operating within the clear bounds of existing rules.
Terrorism, as compared to traditional warfare, naturally brings up different legal and moral issues. Chief among these is the fact that because terrorists don't wear uniforms, they're hard to identify as terrorists. Those kinds of questions become somewhat easier in a theater of active military combat. No one's questioning, for example, whether or not Awlaki could be legally killed if he were in Afghanistan holding a rifle and firing at a US soldier, simply because he happens to be a citizen. It gets much harder when you start talking about killing people in countries like Yemen where the US can't be said to be fighting anything resembling a traditional military conflict. Courts become much more important in this context precisely because they help credibly determine who is actually a combatant and who isn't.
So... why isn't the UNSC's resolution on the matter conclusive, for the purposes of state action?
Uncritically endorsing the administration's authority to kill Awlaki on the basis that he was likely guilty, or an obviously terrible human being, is short-sighted. Because what we're talking about here is not whether Awlaki in particular deserved to die. What we're talking about is trusting the president with the authority to decide, with the minor bureaucratic burden of asking "specific permission," whether an American citizen is or isn't a terrorist and then quietly rendering a lethal sanction against them.
This totally misses the point: Awlaki was never accused of committing a crime. It's not an issue of criminal "guilt" or innocence. It's a matter of whether or not he was a legitimate military target.
The question is not whether or not you trust that President Obama made the right decision here. It's whether or not you trust him, and all future presidents, to do so—and to do so in complete secrecy.
That's not remotely what anyone is claiming, but I
guess it's a decent enough strawman to fool the credulous.
So far, the only evidence I have seen are his own words, which are basically enemy propaganda.
What about the UN Security Council? Is that "enemy propaganda?"
What chocula missed is the question how much propagandists now count as enemy combatants, especially in an organizations as diverse and bereft of an organizational structure as Al-Quida. That is why I made the Fox News analogy - they make propganda for the US, call for attacks on enemies etc. What is the differentiating criteria here?
Uh... among others... Fox News is not engaged in an ongoing armed conflict?
Even further:
If Awlaki was in fact the architect of terrorism attacks inside the United States, as officials maintain he was, then perhaps his demise is to be welcomed. But we don't really know, do we? There was no transparent, legal, reviewable process by which he was placed on the list of those targeted for killing by the U.S. government. There was no judicial procedure, nor any public airing of the charges against him. He had no opportunity to respond to specific allegations.
Even in wartime, the killing of a U.S. citizen — or anyone else — who poses no immediate danger is morally obnoxious. It also is impossible to harmonize with the U.S. Constitution. The 5th Amendment says that no citizen should be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. If Awlaki had been arrested in America, rather than assassinated in Yemen, he would have had an incontestable right to a trial.
Every single thing here is based on the false premise that there is some underlying requirement to grant due process to legitimate military targets. I have discussed this at length earlier in the thread, but this is a totally backwards way of examining the issue: a legitimate military target is not entitled to some sort of judicial review of his status. That's part of what it means to be a legitimate military target. The rules of what is a legitimate military target are designed to be applied quickly, in the field, by people with little or no legal training. They are meant to be easy, but they are also meant to be decisive. The US, under the IHL, is not required to warn a legitimate military target, to pause and give an opportunity to surrender, or to try to effect a capture. Legitimate military targets are legitimate military targets.
I agree that had he been arrested, he would have had the right to a trial. But he wasn't arrested--he was killed in a military operation that was directed against him. There is no way to analogize the two situations and to claim that what is right in one circumstance is also right in the other.
The Obama administration's interest in Awlaki is understandable. The charismatic preacher, an American-born Muslim, is said to have incited the attempted Christmas Day bombing in 2009 and may have directed a plot to blow up a cargo plane bound for Chicago. He also was in touch with Nidal Hasan, the Army psychiatrist accused of killing 13 people at the Ft. Hood Army base.
We understand the government's conundrum. In this dangerous new world, our enemies don't wear uniforms, threats cross national borders, and an order given abroad can quickly lead to devastation at home. The U.S. has struggled for a decade with how to safeguard people without crossing moral lines or violating individual rights.
But if the United States is going to continue down the troubling road of state-sponsored assassination, the government should, at the very least, provide a clear understanding of the criteria used to decide who should be placed on the target list. And there must be some form of judicial review of those decisions; why should a judge's approval be required to place a wiretap on a suspected terrorist but not to kill him? Since Sept. 11, 2001, the U.S. has detained many alleged terrorists, only for courts to discover that the evidence against them was unreliable or wrong.
False analogy fallacy. Had Awlaki been captured then an entirely different process would have applied, just as POWs are treated differently than enemy soldiers in the field. Why does this article have so much trouble with simple distinctions?
Moreover, there
cannot be judicial review for these decisions in the form that the article appears to demand. You
cannot have a judge standing around, looking over a soldier's shoulder, telling him when he's entitled to fire or not. The soldier
must be able to exercise his judgment in determining whether or not a target is a legitimate military one or not, just as a police officer
must be entitled to decide when he has to use deadly force in defense of himself and others. The rules defining legitimate military targets are specifically designed by the ICRC to be useful for these circumstances.
As for the US not providing "a clear understanding of the criteria used to decide who should be placed on the target list," that would be International Humanitarian Law, and its definition of what is or is not a legitimate military target. In what possible way do these require even further clarification?
Last year, Awlaki's father asked a federal judge to rule that the United States may not assassinate an American citizen outside a war zone "unless he is found to present a concrete, specific and imminent threat to life or physical safety, and there are no means other than lethal force" to neutralize the threat. The judge declined, saying the issue was a political question best left to the president. But President Obama should be pressed to abide by those guidelines.
The war on terror is not a free-for-all in which the United States may behave as it wishes without accountability or adherence to principle. We would have been pleased if Awlaki could have been captured and brought to this country for trial, because the promise of due process is a fundamental, bedrock American value.
Source is latimes.com.
And here we see the even
stupider contradiction in the article: after demanding some process of judicial review for such actions it suddenly turns around and concludes that there
was a judicial examination of the case. And guess what? The judge agreed with the government! Awlaki was given due process, but the law applicable to him is very different from the criminal statutes on which the entire article rests its false analogy.
Both of these articles are based on the
incredible claim that the principles of proportionality and distinction somehow require that no civilians be harmed in the making of your ongoing armed conflict.
To say that this is false, that this is not what the law compels, is an understatement. Let's look at the Geneva Convention's actual words in evaluating these claims.
Here's the Geneva Convention on distinction.
Geneva Convention wrote:Article 51 -- Protection of the civilian population
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules, which are additional to other applicable rules of international law, shall be observed in all circumstances.
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate:
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Here, the US has two compelling justifications for the action against al Awlaki in spite of the death of Samir Khan (which I discussed earlier in the thread that you failed to read). First, Khan is not a civilian: he is also a member of Al Qaeda. Second and perhaps more informatively, the attack was not indiscriminate and complied with international law standards of proportionality.
The attack was not indiscriminate because, it was directed specifically against him (with a precise and relatively small ordinance), and struck a single military objective. In fact, the attack was specifically delayed to
prevent civilian deaths when it was postponed until Awlaki left the town in which he had been hiding.
The attack was also not disproportionate because, even if it was believed that it would cause incidental loss of civilian life it hardly seems "excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." Not only were only a very few civilians (if any) present (and, incidentally, it does seem reasonable to believe that a Hellfire missile would kill only a very limited number of people even if there were several in close proximity to the blast), but since the death of Awlaki and the destruction of AQAP leadership is considered an important objective in the War on Terror it doesn't seem "excessive" in relation to eliminating an AQAP leader.