This part of the text is significant as it basically brings the Federal RFRA back into force because it's pretty much a copy of the Federal RFRA law, which was ruled unconstitutional as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores.(3) (a) State action or an action by any person based on state action shall not burden a person's right to exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless it is demonstrated that applying the burden to that person's exercise of religion in that particular instance is both of the following:
(i) Essential to further a compelling governmental interest;
(ii) The least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
RFRA was brought about after the Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith decision, which disfavored religious exemptions in neutral laws of general applicability. Congress specifically sought to go back to a pre-Smith standard of legal precedent, it even says so in the Congressional findings and declaration of purposes section.
The implications of RFRA are brought up by Justice Kagan in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, this is how she responded to Paul Clement arguing for Petitioners:
....Your understanding of this law, your interpretation of it, would essentially subject the entire U.S. Code to the highest test in constitutional law, to a compelling interest standard. So another employer comes in and that employer says, I have a religious objection to sex discrimination laws; and then another employer comes in, I have a religious objection to minimum wage laws; and then another, family leave; and then another, child labor laws. And all of that is subject to the exact same test which you say is this unbelievably high test, the compelling interest standard with the least restrictive alternative....
....with respect, Mr. Clement, I think that that's probably because the Court has had a different understanding of what RFRA does and the kind of analysis that it requires courts to perform than you're arguing for in this case. That if your argument were adopted and there was a strict scrutiny standard of the kind that usually applies and a least restrictive alternative requirement, then you would see religious objectors come out of the woodwork with respect to all of these laws. And because you say that there and I think this is absolutely right when you say it that you you cannot test the centrality of a belief to a religion, you cannot test the sincerity of religion. I think a court would be, you know their hands would be bound when faced with all these challenges if your standard applies.