Slavery & the South (split from Eric Garner thread)

[Patroklos]

The result of not having it would have been 1.) No republic in the first place which wouldn't have been good for slaves or 2.) more likely a far earlier secession attempt with a far less industrial and populous North and probably Southern win or unopposed separation, also not good for slaves. Both might have been good regarding saving white men from war death, but that's just one human factor to worry about.

Which is not to say the 3/5s compromise was some moral good, but sometimes history has an odd way of working out.

[Ziggy Stardust]

The result of not having it would have been 1.) No republic in the first place which wouldn't have been good for slaves or 2.) more likely a far earlier secession attempt with a far less industrial and populous North and probably Southern win or unopposed separation, also not good for slaves. Both might have been good regarding saving white men from war death, but that's just one human factor to worry about.

Which is not to say the 3/5s compromise was some moral good, but sometimes history has an odd way of working out.

I dispute the notion that the United States would have been irrevocably sundered just over the 3/5 Compromise. I mean, even as it was, historically, the Southern delegates at the time were actually more concerned about how the slave population affected their proportion of the tax burden, with the issue of representation actually coming in second. Considering how much vested interest the delegates had in actually coming to a consensus Constitution, I have a had time believing that it would have been completely and 100% impossible to work out some other deal with the slave states. Honestly, I wouldn't be surprised if simply throwing them tax and economic incentives rather than political ones would have worked.

[Alyrium Denryle]

The result of not having it would have been 1.) No republic in the first place which wouldn't have been good for slaves or 2.) more likely a far earlier secession attempt with a far less industrial and populous North and probably Southern win or unopposed separation, also not good for slaves. Both might have been good regarding saving white men from war death, but that's just one human factor to worry about.

Which is not to say the 3/5s compromise was some moral good, but sometimes history has an odd way of working out.

I dispute the notion that the United States would have been irrevocably sundered just over the 3/5 Compromise. I mean, even as it was, historically, the Southern delegates at the time were actually more concerned about how the slave population affected their proportion of the tax burden, with the issue of representation actually coming in second. Considering how much vested interest the delegates had in actually coming to a consensus Constitution, I have a had time believing that it would have been completely and 100% impossible to work out some other deal with the slave states. Honestly, I wouldn't be surprised if simply throwing them tax and economic incentives rather than political ones would have worked.

Even had it worked then, the union would have sundered sooner. After the War of 1812 or so, the southern delegation to congress became increasingly obstinate. With less representation in congress, they would have taken their brinksmanship even further. In order to pass the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 (which nullified the right to a trial of accused escaped slaves, thus permitting southern slave owners to go shopping in the northern states at said northern state's public expense. Yes, that happened. A lot), they threatened to invade and occupy the District of Columbia.

With less representation, that sort of shit would have been done more frequently, and they likely would not have accepted various other compromises (like the Missouri compromise of 1820).

[Edi]

Split from the Eric Garner thread

[cmdrjones]

The result of not having it would have been 1.) No republic in the first place which wouldn't have been good for slaves or 2.) more likely a far earlier secession attempt with a far less industrial and populous North and probably Southern win or unopposed separation, also not good for slaves. Both might have been good regarding saving white men from war death, but that's just one human factor to worry about.

Which is not to say the 3/5s compromise was some moral good, but sometimes history has an odd way of working out.

I dispute the notion that the United States would have been irrevocably sundered just over the 3/5 Compromise. I mean, even as it was, historically, the Southern delegates at the time were actually more concerned about how the slave population affected their proportion of the tax burden, with the issue of representation actually coming in second. Considering how much vested interest the delegates had in actually coming to a consensus Constitution, I have a had time believing that it would have been completely and 100% impossible to work out some other deal with the slave states. Honestly, I wouldn't be surprised if simply throwing them tax and economic incentives rather than political ones would have worked.

Even had it worked then, the union would have sundered sooner. After the War of 1812 or so, the southern delegation to congress became increasingly obstinate. With less representation in congress, they would have taken their brinksmanship even further. In order to pass the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 (which nullified the right to a trial of accused escaped slaves, thus permitting southern slave owners to go shopping in the northern states at said northern state's public expense. Yes, that happened. A lot), they threatened to invade and occupy the District of Columbia.

With less representation, that sort of shit would have been done more frequently, and they likely would not have accepted various other compromises (like the Missouri compromise of 1820).

An earlier civil war would have meant a much more likely southern victory as well....

IN any case, I freely admit that the 3/5ths compromise was not PRIMARILY written to entice the south to give up slavery, BUT, that incentive was built in. It's not the law's fault or the circumstances fault that Southern racism and obstinacy kept them from taking advantage of the opportunity to avoid civil war... But, as with most things, hindsight is 20/20.

[Alyrium Denryle]

IN any case, I freely admit that the 3/5ths compromise was not PRIMARILY written to entice the south to give up slavery, BUT, that incentive was built in. It's not the law's fault or the circumstances fault that Southern racism and obstinacy kept them from taking advantage of the opportunity to avoid civil war... But, as with most things, hindsight is 20/20.

Do you not understand what the word "incentive" means? The southern slave owners gain NOTHING by freeing their slaves, from their own perspective. Even if they were completely dispassionate calculators of their own power. At that point racism has nothing to do with it. No matter what their positions regarding black people are, if they free their slaves and count them in the population, the white elites who held power in the south lose power instead of gaining it.

You cannot treat the state itself as a separate entity seeking to maximize its power. You have to look at it as the collection of individuals with interests of their own attempting to maximize their own power by way of the state.

[Rogue 9]

I can sort of see his point - it's obviously wrong, but it's there. From the perspective of a Southern statesman who is primarily concerned with increasing the clout of his state as a whole in Congress, the incentive he's talking about is certainly there. The trouble is that these theoretical high-minded statesmen did not exist, a fact that everyone at the time would have been aware of if they even gave the knock-on effect of the compromise he proposes any thought at all - which they almost certainly didn't. Antebellum Southern politics were driven entirely by the Slave Power, and manumission of slaves to increase the voting bloc of the Deep South would have completely defeated the purpose of seeking a larger voting bloc, from their view.

[cmdrjones]

I can sort of see his point - it's obviously wrong, but it's there. From the perspective of a Southern statesman who is primarily concerned with increasing the clout of his state as a whole in Congress, the incentive he's talking about is certainly there. The trouble is that these theoretical high-minded statesmen did not exist, a fact that everyone at the time would have been aware of if they even gave the knock-on effect of the compromise he proposes any thought at all - which they almost certainly didn't. Antebellum Southern politics were driven entirely by the Slave Power, and manumission of slaves to increase the voting bloc of the Deep South would have completely defeated the purpose of seeking a larger voting bloc, from their view.

Exactly! That view, however is/was morally wrong. It becomes non-sensical: "manumit slaves, to get more votes and more power, to expand slavery... wait... what?" The whole idea presupposes that they would/should/could have had the foresight/strength of character to say: "Hey, this whole slavery thing won't work out well for us, the north will out grow us, it is inefficient, evil, and dangerous, let's chuck it and create a 'southern' identity, or hell, let's all be americans."

Even if they weren't even aware of it, rejected it, or couldn't understand it, the fact remains... the out was there and they could have taken it.

Thier fault was seeking power at the expense of Black men whom they regarded as chattel even though they had ample biological evidence that black people were human, and thus, should have had inalienable rights by thier own words! Yes, to go along with the idea that you manumit the slaves to get 2/5ths more representation would have been, against their own interests, but it would have been the morally correct thing to do, no?

[LaCroix]

Well, yes.

But the fact they were slave holders also is ample proof that they didn't really subscribe to that set of moral principles, to begin with. And they got rich by doing so. You forget that while these states were poor in comparison to northern states, the slave owners lived in an aristocratic paradise. So they most likely didn't see the problems of their state as a symptom of them relying on slaves, but a symptom of other people in their states not owning enough slaves.

To them, owning slaves was directly correlated to getting rich and staying rich. Abolishing slavery would cause the rich people to get poor, and would rob people of the possibility to get slaves and get rich, themselves.

And since even the northern states did not really have a "blacks are kind of ok" sentiment until 196x (and it's still far from social equality, right now), it's quite a stretch to think that the slave-dependend south would have such an enlightenment far ahead of the curve, when even Lincoln and his circle did not really think of blacks as "humans like you and me".

[cmdrjones]

Well, yes.

But the fact they were slave holders also is ample proof that they didn't really subscribe to that set of moral principles, to begin with. And they got rich by doing so. You forget that while these states were poor in comparison to northern states, the slave owners lived in an aristocratic paradise. So they most likely didn't see the problems of their state as a symptom of them relying on slaves, but a symptom of other people in their states not owning enough slaves.

To them, owning slaves was directly correlated to getting rich and staying rich. Abolishing slavery would cause the rich people to get poor, and would rob people of the possibility to get slaves and get rich, themselves.

And since even the northern states did not really have a "blacks are kind of ok" sentiment until 196x (and it's still far from social equality, right now), it's quite a stretch to think that the slave-dependend south would have such an enlightenment far ahead of the curve, when even Lincoln and his circle did not really think of blacks as "humans like you and me".

Again... all true, but what if? sigh.
Another object lesson: Even in a republic, an entrenched oligarchy will seek its own interests before that of the nation as a whole. Ignore such corruption at your peril.

Also: i'd edit that statement about not owning enough slaves to: not enough LAND under the control of the slave economy for other (white) people to be fully employed as slaveholders.

[LaCroix]

Again... all true, but what if? sigh.

What if my grandma had wheels? Would she become an omnibus? You never posed that would be a what if, but claimed that this was a planned incentive, when the ones giving that incentive never intended to do so, and the ones to reap the benefits would never benefit from it.

Also: i'd edit that statement about not owning enough slaves to: not enough LAND under the control of the slave economy for other (white) people to be fully employed as slaveholders.

Not really. There was more than enough land left in the southern states. But coincidentally, that's also why the southern states were so adamant in demanding that the new states in the west would be slaver states - land to turn into plantations, more rich white people owning slaves voting for the continuation of slavery.

[Zinegata]

An earlier civil war would have meant a much more likely southern victory as well....

Ergh, what? The South lasting as long as it did owed a lot to sheer luck already, and quite bluntly I suspect the South would in fact have fallen apart even in the most improbable scenario of it winning (there is a reason why the southern victory fantasy of Robert E Lee taking command of the entire southern military didn't happen - and would have just demonstrated why he's terribly overrated). The support of the south for secession is simply massively overstated, and people forget that a third of Virginia literally seceded to become West Virginia or that the single most populous city in the South (bigger than the next two combined) surrendered without a fight.

An earlier Civil War also meant a much poorer south, since this would be before the boom in the demand for cotton. And that also meant fewer slave owners, which meant southern armies (which were in fact staffed primarily by slave owners or sons of slave owners despite southern apologist attempts to pretend otherwise; with those who weren't deserting in rates much higher than the Union Army) would be much weaker.

====

And since even the northern states did not really have a "blacks are kind of ok" sentiment until 196x (and it's still far from social equality, right now), it's quite a stretch to think that the slave-dependend south would have such an enlightenment far ahead of the curve, when even Lincoln and his circle did not really think of blacks as "humans like you and me".

It has to be noted though that racism really got worse in America after the Civil War (blame the Western world as a whole for going radically racist to justify its imperialism and hyper-nationalism in this period), and that the nadir of race relations in the 1870s-1920s is often exaggerated as extending to prior the Civil War by southern apologists to play up the "the north was as racist as we were!" narrative.

[Patroklos]

Ergh, what? The South lasting as long as it did owed a lot to sheer luck already, and quite bluntly I suspect the South would in fact have fallen apart even in the most improbable scenario of it winning (there is a reason why the southern victory fantasy of Robert E Lee taking command of the entire southern military didn't happen - and would have just demonstrated why he's terribly overrated).

You realize the Union had its army subdivided as well, right?

The support of the south for secession is simply massively overstated, and people forget that a third of Virginia literally seceded to become West Virginia or that the single most populous city in the South (bigger than the next two combined) surrendered without a fight.

Which still allowed four plus years of war despite that.

An earlier Civil War also meant a much poorer south, since this would be before the boom in the demand for cotton. And that also meant fewer slave owners, which meant southern armies (which were in fact staffed primarily by slave owners or sons of slave owners despite southern apologist attempts to pretend otherwise; with those who weren't deserting in rates much higher than the Union Army) would be much weaker.

And earlier war means 1.) The North misses out on the bulk of the Irish and other immigration to some extent depending on how early we are talking which formed the backbone of their enlistments 2.) the industrialization advantage of the North is very much less if we are talking 1840 or prior and 3.) if the war takes place before the Egyptian cotton industry can adequately fill in for the drop in Southern supply the likelihood of foreign intervention or at least support for the south goes up greatly.

Its not a sure thing, but no matter how you cut it the South is in a better position the earlier the war takes place.

[Simon_Jester]

Ergh, what? The South lasting as long as it did owed a lot to sheer luck already, and quite bluntly I suspect the South would in fact have fallen apart even in the most improbable scenario of it winning (there is a reason why the southern victory fantasy of Robert E Lee taking command of the entire southern military didn't happen - and would have just demonstrated why he's terribly overrated).

You realize the Union had its army subdivided as well, right?

There is a subset of Confederacy fanboys who are convinced that Lee was one of the greatest military geniuses of all time, and that it would therefore have been a good idea to make him supreme commander of all Confederate armed forces.

This is wrong for two reasons.

One, the communications of the day did not permit a general to coordinate an army over an area much larger than could be covered in a day's ride. Taking your best general and sticking him in your capital to send telegraphic messages to his subordinates is a catastrophic waste of talent.

Two, while Lee may have been the Confederacy's best general (a matter open for dispute that I'm not weighing in on), he wasn't a super-general.

He had successes, and failures. Many of his greatest successes were the result of particularly ferocious fighting by his own soldiers, which he can only take some credit for. A general should inspire loyalty and ferocity in his troops, but much of that fighting ability comes from them, not from him. And many of Lee's other successes were the result of incompetent or at best mediocre generalship on the other side of the line. Almost any adequate general in history would look good if he'd gotten the chance to fight a couple of campaigns against McClellan. And just about any adequate general would have handed Lee a defeat at Antietam at least as comprehensive as the one he suffered at Gettysburg the next year.

The support of the south for secession is simply massively overstated, and people forget that a third of Virginia literally seceded to become West Virginia or that the single most populous city in the South (bigger than the next two combined) surrendered without a fight.

Which still allowed four plus years of war despite that.

Well yes, mainly because the ratio of force to space was so low. The sheer volume of territory that had to be cleared meant that the Confederates really didn't need more than to be able to muster armies to oppose the large, concentrated Union armies threatening them at a few points.

So as long as armies of sufficient size could be kept in the field, the Confederacy could endure. Moreover, the Confederacy was in the process of being decisively defeated as early as 1863, although he 1862 campaign season was more or less a wash except for the capture of New Orleans (which was a major victory in its own right, and one made easier by the citizenry's lack of support for the Confederate cause).

So while the war continued for four years, the part of it where the Union was actually exerting its military power in an organized fashion while not making major progress really only lasted about 12-15 months.

[Patroklos]

This is wrong for two reasons.

One, the communications of the day did not permit a general to coordinate an army over an area much larger than could be covered in a day's ride. Taking your best general and sticking him in your capital to send telegraphic messages to his subordinates is a catastrophic waste of talent.

Two, while Lee may have been the Confederacy's best general (a matter open for dispute that I'm not weighing in on), he wasn't a super-general.

He had successes, and failures. Many of his greatest successes were the result of particularly ferocious fighting by his own soldiers, which he can only take some credit for. A general should inspire loyalty and ferocity in his troops, but much of that fighting ability comes from them, not from him. And many of Lee's other successes were the result of incompetent or at best mediocre generalship on the other side of the line. Almost any adequate general in history would look good if he'd gotten the chance to fight a couple of campaigns against McClellan. And just about any adequate general would have handed Lee a defeat at Antietam at least as comprehensive as the one he suffered at Gettysburg the next year.

While I hold Lee in greater regard than you I agree with most of what you said that isn't veering into idle speculation (Antietam). He was not a God amongst Generals. He also had the advantage of being on the defense and largely picking his battles.

However, the original criticism was that he was kept from commanding the entire CSA armed forces because he wasn't that good. Good or bad that is not why the CSA had a divided command geographically just like the Union. It was for the reasons you stated.

The sheer volume of territory that had to be cleared meant that the Confederates really didn't need more than to be able to muster armies to oppose the large, concentrated Union armies threatening them at a few points.

So as long as armies of sufficient size could be kept in the field, the Confederacy could endure. Moreover, the Confederacy was in the process of being decisively defeated as early as 1863, although he 1862 campaign season was more or less a wash except for the capture of New Orleans (which was a major victory in its own right, and one made easier by the citizenry's lack of support for the Confederate cause).

So while the war continued for four years, the part of it where the Union was actually exerting its military power in an organized fashion while not making major progress really only lasted about 12-15 months.

All true, but in 1830 would the North have had the industry and population to support a war for years after that 12-15 months had events transpired the same? Probably not, and the further away from 1861 we get the less united the country was in general and the North (including the Midwest) in particular. The population disparity at that time was still in the North's favor but not by nearly as significant a margin. The western states were largely unorganized (same with the South). Probably most importantly the nations railways were far less developed which was a far greater concern for the North than the South with their long LOCs.

Part of Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania was that he knew domestically the war would collapse if the North were going to have to fight it on their territory. He figured one good victory, I think it would have taken more. But the North was not fighting for a "way of life." Whether you agree with that or consider it propaganda the South at the time agreed with that, the North had no such bedrock motivation to sustain a war on their front porches. That becomes doubly true the further back in time you go. The point being the motivation level of both forces were not the same and were susceptible to being undermined differently.

[Simon_Jester]

While I hold Lee in greater regard than you I agree with most of what you said that isn't veering into idle speculation (Antietam)...

Oh come on,

McClellan pulled out of his hat reasons to imagine the Confederate army to be three times stronger than it really was. He did not brief his own corps commanders on his battle plans, he did not issue his battle plans, and he did not implement his plan effectively. Orders were issued slowly and unclearly, and troops were handled indecisively and with excessive caution. In addition, McClellan fought the battle without using either his cavalry or his reserves- the equivalent of getting into a fistfight with one arm tied behind your back.

Battles have been mismanaged more seriously in the history of warfare... but not often.

It is reasonable to suppose that a merely average general who did normal things like telling his corps commanders about his plans, or using cavalry to screen his flanks, or committing at least part of his reserves when the enemy line broke, would have won the battle rather handily.

However, the original criticism was that he was kept from commanding the entire CSA armed forces because he wasn't that good. Good or bad that is not why the CSA had a divided command geographically just like the Union. It was for the reasons you stated.

I would argue that he also wasn't that good. Again, it's easy to look like a military genius when you're up against opposition of McClellan's caliber.

...the North had no such bedrock motivation to sustain a war on their front porches. That becomes doubly true the further back in time you go. The point being the motivation level of both forces were not the same and were susceptible to being undermined differently.

[/quote][/quote]I would debate this; the damage caused by rebel armies might well tend to galvanize Union opposition rather than making the North wonder why they were fighting at all.

[Alyrium Denryle]

I would debate this; the damage caused by rebel armies might well tend to galvanize Union opposition rather than making the North wonder why they were fighting at all.

Every time you go and attack the enemy on their own ground, it never works to demoralize the civilian population. It pisses them off. It pissed off the Gauls when he romans did it, it pissed off the romans when the Carthaginians did it, it pissed off the French when the English then the Germans then the Germans again did it. The Blitz pissed off the Brits and the bombing of Berlin pissed off the Nazis and Barbarossa got the Russians mad enough they raped their way across eastern europe. The Vietnamese spent several hundred years in a perpetual state of rage.

It is militarily effective because you cut supply lines and damage means of production, not because of any morale effect. Just the opposite.

[Zinegata]

You realize the Union had its army subdivided as well, right?

The Union had its political generals and command divisions, but ultimately it had a unified command in the form of Scott and then Halleck serving as the army's overall strategic commander. This is why the Union had actual war plans to win the conflict. The south merely had random thoughts and prayers.

The South moreover was always a mess with state militias not really following the commands of a central body... which in any case did not really exist unless you consider Davis to be the South's equivalent of Scott or Halleck (which he really wasn't).

The ugly reality is that the South was extremely divided even among themselves and was only tenously linked by slavery; and in the areas where there were few slaces the secessionists were in fact largely ignored or were seen as traitors requiring the South to continue using gangs to intimidate and on occassion massacre pro-Union supporters.

Which still allowed four plus years of war despite that.

The parts of Virginia which seceded alone are almost as big as France. Never mistake imponderables like "will to combat" as being the more likely answer to questions like "why did the south last so long" when actual, verifiable, and factual factors like the sheer size of the operating theater can be measured and compared to other conflicts.

Indeed, Texas, which was larger than any other southern state, spent much of the war as a totally independent fiefdom (Kirbysmithdom) that neither side bothered to contest due to the sheer size of the theater and the pointlessness of the Union trying to hunt down a Smith's meager army when they already severed Texas completely from the rest of the Confederacy.

An earlier Civil War also meant a much poorer south, since this would be before the boom in the demand for cotton. And that also meant fewer slave owners, which meant southern armies (which were in fact staffed primarily by slave owners or sons of slave owners despite southern apologist attempts to pretend otherwise; with those who weren't deserting in rates much higher than the Union Army) would be much weaker.

And earlier war means 1.) The North misses out on the bulk of the Irish and other immigration to some extent depending on how early we are talking which formed the backbone of their enlistments 2.) the industrialization advantage of the North is very much less if we are talking 1840 or prior and 3.) if the war takes place before the Egyptian cotton industry can adequately fill in for the drop in Southern supply the likelihood of foreign intervention or at least support for the south goes up greatly.

Its not a sure thing, but no matter how you cut it the South is in a better position the earlier the war takes place.

That's just hogwash, because you're not taking into account that 40% of the manpower of the southern armies came from the slave-owners and sons of slave owners, who would not be as prominent or powerful in the periods prior to 1840. The main reason why the slavery issue was put off for so long in the first place was the fact that the Royal Navy had shut down the slave trade in the early 1800s and it was widely believed that the institution would already die out; and indeed the plantations were in dire straights during this period.

It was in fact the industrialization that saved the institution by stimulating cotton demand; and development in any case had completely missed the Southern port cities (except New Orleans, which again surrendered without a fight to a handful of gunboats) which would have been vital in any war to keep the South supplied with armaments. Much has been made of the Union blockade stopping shipments, but people forget that the North had all the big harbors too (New York, Boston) while the south had pittances like Charleston. This was why the Union blockade was so effective despite the enormous size of the American coast and the limited size of the historical Union Navy - they didn't need to blockade the whole coast, it was mostly undeveloped to begin with. Only a handful of harbors needed to be guarded.

Hence, in any earlier war, the North would retain access to industrial goods and weapons because it had real ports. The South would remain as starved for all kinds of war material as always.

...the North had no such bedrock motivation to sustain a war on their front porches. That becomes doubly true the further back in time you go. The point being the motivation level of both forces were not the same and were susceptible to being undermined differently

Yes they did. The bedrock was the seizure of Federal property - paid for by the monies collected from all states - which constituted a gross violation of the state and property rights of Northern states. That the South committed this act of grand thievery because they're sore losers in an election where they used pretty much every dirty trick to try and win and yet still loss catastrophically counts very much as a valid casus belli for war.

[Zinegata]

So while the war continued for four years, the part of it where the Union was actually exerting its military power in an organized fashion while not making major progress really only lasted about 12-15 months.

Yep, people simply do not realize that the Civil War was not as hard-fought as the apologists make it out to be. We still get "more Americans died in the Civil War than in the two World Wars" argument despite the fact that the majority of Civil War fatalities was due to disease, and actual battle deaths was closer to just a quarter of a million.

Campaign-wise, those four years were marked by enormously long periods of inactivity - the buildup after the First Bull Run and the Siege of Petersburg both often getting barely a mention in the histories despite them taking months; not to mention winter shutting down military operations in conflict that was far from "total war".

The most brutal portion of the entire conflict - in terms of casualties and number of battles - was in fact the Wilderness Campaign. Cold Harbor alone was as bad as Fredricksburg or Antietam, yet it's barely ever mentioned in the histories because the Union finally started suffering serious losses proportionate to the size of their army (their previous battles, while resulting in heavy loss of life, was followed by long periods of refit and inactivity. Grant put an end to this and kept advancing even when the army was hurting), and Lee was finally demonstrated to be far from a "brillant" general when Grant simply overpowered the AVN and pushed it to Petersburg.

[Simon_Jester]

The parts of Virginia which seceded alone are almost as big as France. Never mistake imponderables like "will to combat" as being the more likely answer to questions like "why did the south last so long" when actual, verifiable, and factual factors like the sheer size of the operating theater can be measured and compared to other conflicts.

Uh... while you're not wrong about the area of the whole theater of war, West Virginia alone is only about 10% of the area of France. The entire state of Virginia (plus West Virginia) is roughly 30% the size of France.

On the other hand, West Virginia (and considerable parts of Virginia proper) are so mountainous that actually fighting a military campaign through it would be very, very time-consuming.

Indeed, Texas, which was larger than any other southern state, spent much of the war as a totally independent fiefdom (Kirbysmithdom) that neither side bothered to contest due to the sheer size of the theater and the pointlessness of the Union trying to hunt down a Smith's meager army when they already severed Texas completely from the rest of the Confederacy.

Yes. This is one of the very good reasons why Winfield Scott made such a point of trying to seize and hold the Mississippi Valley. By doing so he neutralized a large part of the South's riverine communications and access to the sea, and prevented any significant flow of troops and manpower from the western Confederate states to the eastern ones.

I'm not sure he envisioned the second stroke by which Union forces trisected the Confederacy (Sherman's march through Georgia), but it was a logical 1864 follow-on to the 1863 unvexing of the Father of Waters.

So while the war continued for four years, the part of it where the Union was actually exerting its military power in an organized fashion while not making major progress really only lasted about 12-15 months.

Yep, people simply do not realize that the Civil War was not as hard-fought as the apologists make it out to be. We still get "more Americans died in the Civil War than in the two World Wars" argument despite the fact that the majority of Civil War fatalities was due to disease, and actual battle deaths was closer to just a quarter of a million.

The men who died of plague are just as dead as the men who died of bullet. I would argue that casualties due to disease should be counted because they played a large role in determining the war's impact on civilians.

Campaign-wise, those four years were marked by enormously long periods of inactivity - the buildup after the First Bull Run and the Siege of Petersburg both often getting barely a mention in the histories despite them taking months; not to mention winter shutting down military operations in conflict that was far from "total war".

During that era it was nearly impossible to maintain a military campaign during winter due to the primitive character of the transportation infrastructure. In the Deep South winters are warm enough that war could go on- but aside from coastal action, the war didn't reach the Deep South until mid-1863 and later.

Likewise huge periods of time were necessary for buildups because much of the task of moving goods and men around was still done on foot, even for the railroad-heavy Union. Marching men from New York to Petersburg takes a while...

So there were inevitably long operational pauses for refit, recruitment, and making sure the supplies were in place, especially because the American countryside was lightly populated and in many areas could not support an army that attempted to forage.

Grant put an end to this and kept advancing even when the army was hurting), and Lee was finally demonstrated to be far from a "brillant" general when Grant simply overpowered the AVN and pushed it to Petersburg.

To be fair, it's very hard to defeat a larger army that doesn't stop when you inflict a serious defeat on it. I'm not entirely clear on in what regards Lee actually did anything wrong in 1864.

[Isolder74]

On the subject of Antietam, McClellan proved why the only thing he ever should have been in charge of was the logistics command of the Union Armies. HE was a master of getting forces where They NEEDED TO BE but when it came time to actually USE the armies once they got there he was completely INEPT. There is a reason that Lincoln's description of McClellan is "He has the slows." When the best course of action was to advance, he refused to advance fearing casualties. When the worst course of action was to defend he would defend, fearing casualties but ending up causing them due to disease and desertion. McClellan was an inept field commander and only won the day at Antietam because of the actions if his lower ranking officers and because of Lee's own glaring mistakes during the battle!

Hooker for instance reached his objectives early in the day to find that the forces suppose to be following up on his advance with a flanking attack had not been committed, resulting him him having to retreat losing a valuable position. Lee failed to capitalize on this Union failing and then allowed Mead to almost block his line of retreat. If McClellan had used the reserve forces he had available, the assault of the Irish Brigade on the sunken road, sometimes called bloody lane, would have been accomplished much sooner in the day. It can easily be said that the only reason that Antietam didn't end up being the death nail of the Confederacy was because of McClellan! Antietam ended up being the bloodiest day of the war but a large part of those losses were in part to Hooker almost being cut off and surrounded after taking the southern banks of the Antietam creek and not having the flanking support he was suppose to get. It's only gravy on the ineptitude of McClellan that he refused to pursue Lee during his now piecemeal retreat from the battle. It's only a Union victory because of Lee's need to retreat with his now mostly decimated army!

It can easily be pointed out that almost any other Union commander would have have made this battle go from a draw to a massive Union victory. Hell, Grant and Sherman would have curb stomped Lee at Antietam!

[Civil War Man]

Yep, people simply do not realize that the Civil War was not as hard-fought as the apologists make it out to be. We still get "more Americans died in the Civil War than in the two World Wars" argument despite the fact that the majority of Civil War fatalities was due to disease, and actual battle deaths was closer to just a quarter of a million.

Not only that, but that statistic quietly ignores the fact that one of the reasons more Americans were killed in the Civil War was that, by virtue of being a civil war, both sides were American. It's comparing only American deaths in the World Wars to all deaths in the American Civil War. It's an interesting statistic, but it's comparing apples to oranges.

On the subject of Antietam, McClellan proved why the only thing he ever should have been in charge of was the logistics command of the Union Armies. HE was a master of getting forces where They NEEDED TO BE but when it came time to actually USE the armies once they got there he was completely INEPT. There is a reason that Lincoln's description of McClellan is "He has the slows." When the best course of action was to advance, he refused to advance fearing casualties. When the worst course of action was to defend he would defend, fearing casualties but ending up causing them due to disease and desertion. McClellan was an inept field commander and only won the day at Antietam because of the actions if his lower ranking officers and because of Lee's own glaring mistakes during the battle!

A lot of the commanders of the Army of the Potomac would have made a much more positive contribution if they had been in any position other than the one they were in. Besides McClellan, there's also Ambrose Burnside, who's often been cited as the most incompetent general of the war. He came up with absolutely brilliant plans, but was incapable of adapting when anything went wrong. His plan to try to break through the Confederate lines at Petersburg by tunneling under them and blowing them up was absolutely brilliant, but he was forced to change the order of battle at the last minute (because his decision to have a division of black troops lead the charge made a lot of people uncomfortable), which resulted in a bunch of union troops who had not properly prepared for the assault just running straight into the crater that the explosion caused and getting stuck.

[Zinegata]

Uh... while you're not wrong about the area of the whole theater of war, West Virginia alone is only about 10% of the area of France. The entire state of Virginia (plus West Virginia) is roughly 30% the size of France.

On the other hand, West Virginia (and considerable parts of Virginia proper) are so mountainous that actually fighting a military campaign through it would be very, very time-consuming.

Blargh I was thinking Texas when I said Virginia with regards to the state as big as France.

I'm not sure he envisioned the second stroke by which Union forces trisected the Confederacy (Sherman's march through Georgia), but it was a logical 1864 follow-on to the 1863 unvexing of the Father of Waters.

That one can be attributed to Sherman and Grant. And from outside observers, Marx ironically proposed the same strategy.

The men who died of plague are just as dead as the men who died of bullet. I would argue that casualties due to disease should be counted because they played a large role in determining the war's impact on civilians.

Except of course those casualties did not come due to direct conflict, and the disease was not necessarily due to plague but problems with the soldier's diets. When the Union suffered more casualties due to them eating leftover hardtack from the Mexican War (a hyperbole but it was a leading cause of disease) rather than the bullets of Southern armies then it's easy to see how this "south fought hard" narrative is nonsensical. They didn't. Only a small minority did.

During that era it was nearly impossible to maintain a military campaign during winter due to the primitive character of the transportation infrastructure. In the Deep South winters are warm enough that war could go on- but aside from coastal action, the war didn't reach the Deep South until mid-1863 and later.

Which is the point. People try to treat the Civil War as though it's comparable with the World Wars. It wasn't. In character and pace it was still a Napoleonic-style conflict than a "total war" conflict. Heck, given the numbers mobilized, it is arguable the conflict didn't even reach the same scale of intensity as the Napoleonic Wars to begin with.

To be fair, it's very hard to defeat a larger army that doesn't stop when you inflict a serious defeat on it. I'm not entirely clear on in what regards Lee actually did anything wrong in 1864.

Lee demonstrated in 1864 that he didn't actually have any of the powers of superior maneuver that he supposedly had at Chancellorsville. The Union advanced, and he ran. That requires no maneuvering genius; despite attempts by Confederate wags to pretend that the retreat was somehow a brillant feat of maneuvering.

Again, when you subject every battle credited to Lee's genius to careful analysis it becomes blatantly clear that he didn't actually perform any rabbit tricks like say Fredrick the Great's flank attack at Leuthen (where he won outnumbered 3:1). His men simply won local successes despite Lee sending them outnumbered against the Union troops, and until Grant the Union high command simply lost its nerve and fell back. Which I think really has more to do with the Union's overall reluctance to shed blood - Grant after all was nearly cashiered after Shiloh due to the bloody nature of the battle despite him winning it.

[Zinegata]

On the subject of Union Generals...

Hooker for instance reached his objectives early in the day to find that the forces suppose to be following up on his advance with a flanking attack had not been committed, resulting him him having to retreat losing a valuable position. Lee failed to capitalize on this Union failing and then allowed Mead to almost block his line of retreat. If McClellan had used the reserve forces he had available, the assault of the Irish Brigade on the sunken road, sometimes called bloody lane, would have been accomplished much sooner in the day. It can easily be said that the only reason that Antietam didn't end up being the death nail of the Confederacy was because of McClellan! Antietam ended up being the bloodiest day of the war but a large part of those losses were in part to Hooker almost being cut off and surrounded after taking the southern banks of the Antietam creek and not having the flanking support he was suppose to get. It's only gravy on the ineptitude of McClellan that he refused to pursue Lee during his now piecemeal retreat from the battle. It's only a Union victory because of Lee's need to retreat with his now mostly decimated army!

Hooker gets a bad reputation primarily because there is so much wanking in favor of Lee, and Chancerlorsville was supposed to be Lee's shining moment instead of him recklessly almost getting the ANV destroyed if he hadn't gotten two strokes of luck - the first being that Jackson attacked the weakest Union Corps (Howard) and routed it albeit losing 25% of Jackson's Corps in the process despite the Confederates attacking the Union troops in camp conditions. The second was a lucky artillery shot that left Hooker dazed and unable to properly issue orders, which resulted in indecision among the Union generals leading to the retreat.

Cue the Confederate wags claiming that the Army of the Potomac could have been surrounded and destroyed in this battle, despite the fact that Reynold's Corps still solidly held the army's main retreat route through the US ford and showed no signs of budging in the face of Jackson's much-reduced Corps. Meanwhile The ANV's main retreat route - Fredricksburg - had already been captured by the Union army (Sedgwick's Corps) and the only reason Sedgwick didn't smash into Lee's rear was another bit of luck wherein Sedgwick failed to receive his orders to attack.

Hooker actually performed pretty well in all of his other battles, but history will forever associate him with Chancelorsville if the Lee worshippers have their way.

A lot of the commanders of the Army of the Potomac would have made a much more positive contribution if they had been in any position other than the one they were in. Besides McClellan, there's also Ambrose Burnside, who's often been cited as the most incompetent general of the war. He came up with absolutely brilliant plans, but was incapable of adapting when anything went wrong. His plan to try to break through the Confederate lines at Petersburg by tunneling under them and blowing them up was absolutely brilliant, but he was forced to change the order of battle at the last minute (because his decision to have a division of black troops lead the charge made a lot of people uncomfortable), which resulted in a bunch of union troops who had not properly prepared for the assault just running straight into the crater that the explosion caused and getting stuck.

Burnside to be fair never wanted command of the Army of the Potomac. He knew he wasn't cut for army command. He was at his best as a Corps commander, particularly his oft-forgotten battles in Tennessee wherein he actually completely outfoxed Longstreet and ensured Knoxville remained in Union hands.

[Simon_Jester]

Except of course those casualties did not come due to direct conflict, and the disease was not necessarily due to plague but problems with the soldier's diets. When the Union suffered more casualties due to them eating leftover hardtack from the Mexican War (a hyperbole but it was a leading cause of disease) rather than the bullets of Southern armies then it's easy to see how this "south fought hard" narrative is nonsensical. They didn't. Only a small minority did.

Ah. Now that is a fair point; I'd misunderstood your argument. The Confederates really only had about... what, three armies' worth of soldiers prepared to fight seriously? Northern Virginia, the Tennessee, and... whatever the name of the army Grant whupped in the West in 1862-63.

Of course, the Union was in much the same position for quite a while, as illustrated by draft riots and as you say by the fact that in early 1862 it was still shocking for an army of sixty-six thousand men to lose two thousand dead, eight thousand wounded, and three thousand captured or missing.

To be fair, it's very hard to defeat a larger army that doesn't stop when you inflict a serious defeat on it. I'm not entirely clear on in what regards Lee actually did anything wrong in 1864.

Lee demonstrated in 1864 that he didn't actually have any of the powers of superior maneuver that he supposedly had at Chancellorsville. The Union advanced, and he ran...

Again, when you subject every battle credited to Lee's genius to careful analysis it becomes blatantly clear that he didn't actually perform any rabbit tricks like say Fredrick the Great's flank attack at Leuthen (where he won outnumbered 3:1). His men simply won local successes despite Lee sending them outnumbered against the Union troops, and until Grant the Union high command simply lost its nerve and fell back. Which I think really has more to do with the Union's overall reluctance to shed blood - Grant after all was nearly cashiered after Shiloh due to the bloody nature of the battle despite him winning it.

Although that would then tend to support the premise that the Union would have been more likely to fold if invaded- except that as Stas notes, being invaded usually tends to galvanize a nation's will to resist, not weaken it.