Was Hiroshima and Nagasaki necessary?

[Petrosjko]

Yeah, Soviet sealift capacity was rather lacking. Especially if it wasn't coordinated with the rest of Allied forces, their trying to throw an invasion across would've gotten very ugly, very quickly. There were enough stockpiled kamikaze machines (boat and aircraft) to significantly attrite any attempt on their part.

[Arrow]

The argument that the first bomb was inadequate presumes that the Japanese failure to quickly adjust its thinking to this new situation indicates that it would never have done so. What evidence is there to back this up besides this "they were all insane" implication? The fact that some in the government opposed it? Of course; that is normal for any change in policy. But it does not prove that the change would never have happened.

The diaries of some of the officials involved, including the Emperor's right-hand man (I forget his title at the moment), radio intercepts (Japan appeared to be business as usual, with little/no change in diplomatic efforts) and the way the Japanese government was organized (all (6?) members of the council had to agree, otherwise the government was disbanded and reformed with different members - since the fanatics and ultranationalist had a huge amount of influnence, they could insure that policy would not change). Those that wanted peace in the Japanese government preceived a change in government as being the biggest threat to their goal. All things considered, it should be viewed as a miracle that the Japanese surrended after the second bomb - the government almost decided against it, and only the Emperor's urging made it happen.

Why not give them an ultimatum for dropping the second bomb two weeks after the first? They would probably evacuate the targeted city, thus greatly reducing the loss of life, but your demonstration of your willingness to use these things would still be conducted, and I doubt they would blow off the next ultimatum which would not bother naming a city.

Again, to US intelligence, the Japanese didn't seem affected. An ultimatum was debate, IIRC, and even not dropping the second bomb was discussed, but the continuing Japanese build up for the invasion and the lack of serious diplomatic effort convince the US that a second ultimatum would be pointless. Had the US had access to some of the stirrings inside the Japanese government, they might had issued a second warning - but still, most of the military leaders didn't think we had a second bomb.

Would second ultimatum had been the more humane thing do? Yes, but I doubt it would had changed anything.

BTW, the second bomb missed its aim point, and most of a Nagasaki was shielded from the blast by a mountain.

Again, "Downfall" goes into the though processes of the involved leaders, gleaned from what documents are available. It also has a full biblography, for those that want to get a copy of the primary sources. While it may not be the final word on the subject, I'm convinced by its arguments, which are more grounded than the other materials I've read.

[CJvR]

Was in necessary?

Well it depends to what options you would consider instead. If your priority was to end the war quickly with a clear victory and minimum damage then the answer would probably have to be yes.

If you settled for a longer war and accepted much higher casualties and damage as well as Soviet expansion in China then the answer would be no.

If you stepped down from the "Unconditional surrender" demand and allowed the Japanes militants to save themselves you could end it very swiftly but then there would be the risk of having to go back and do it all over again in a generation.

Nuking Hiroshima and Nagasaki was probably the best outcome for all involved with the possible exception of the residents in those cities.

[CJvR]

Why not give them an ultimatum for dropping the second bomb two weeks after the first?

They were given an ultimatum IIRC and they chose not to reply to it. One week or two, what's the difference? A quick second use would strenghten the shock effect considerably and that probably played a part in the Japanese decission to quit.

[Frank Hipper]

The argument that the first bomb was inadequate presumes that the Japanese failure to quickly adjust its thinking to this new situation indicates that it would never have done so.

Why project the assumed perception that the Japanese would never capitulate, when the lack of immediate capitulation was all the rationale needed for the second bomb at the time?

The percieved need for immediate capitulation was also flavored by the fact that the Soviets had just declared war, as well.

[Ma Deuce]

There were enough stockpiled kamikaze machines (boat and aircraft) to significantly attrite any attempt on their part.

And of course, that was before you even reach the beaches: Unlike their typical defence of the Pacific islands where they allowed the Americans to land vitually unnoposed and fought them viciously inland, on their home islands the Japanese intended to repel the invasion at the beaches, and thus had heavily fortified every beach on Honshu and Kyushu that could serve as a suitable landing site (and due to Japan's rocky coasts, there wern't many suitable beaches): Each beach would easily have been much bloodier than Omaha per mile of sand. After you get past the beaches, you run into at least 20 divisions of the best the Imperial Japanese Army has to offer, in addition to tens of millions of civilians willing to fight the invaders armed with as little as bamboo spears, but they also had stuff like lunge mines, satchel charges, and Molotov Cocktails (hell, they even trained children to be suicide bombers using said satchel charges)...

[HemlockGrey]

The argument that the first bomb was inadequate presumes that the Japanese failure to quickly adjust its thinking to this new situation indicates that it would never have done so. What evidence is there to back this up besides this "they were all insane" implication? The fact that some in the government opposed it? Of course; that is normal for any change in policy. But it does not prove that the change would never have happened.

Well, even after the destruction of Nagasaki, the Emperor's council was still totally deadlocked on the issue of surrender. That's two cities smoked by instant sunrise, plus Allied occupation of all important outlying territories, plus a Soviet invasion of Manchuria, plus constant annhilating firebombing raids, plus the looming threat of mass-starvation of the Japanese population, and surrender was still not a sure thing. Only the personal intervention of the Emperor, a very bold step, since the Emperor was chiefly a figurehead, allowed the pro-surrender side to win out.

And then, the widespread announcement of surrender was greeted by the Japanese population mostly with anger and resentment towards the Emperor. Several cabinent members committed suicide, and there was a failed army coup in an attempt to keep on fighting.

So I think the shock of two cities destroyed in quick succession was necessary to ensure the Japanese surrender- this too was the thinking of the highest American leaders, who were aware of the fanaticism of the Japanese cabinent due to MAGIC and ULTRA, and who really did not have any way of knowing the Emperor was going to step in.

[CJvR]

The Emperor didn't exactly intervene. The goverment was deadlocked and decided to ask the Emperor his opinion, something it never did in normal circumstanses.

[Icehawk]

The only thing that I can see being a "negative" of the bombing was that it didnt give the Japanese the option to fight and defend themselves honorably in fair combat. It was like a smack in the face in that regard and they probably thought it cowardly of the americans to resort to using such things instead of facing them man to man in combat where, even though they would have still lost, they could have atleast had the freedom of choice to either defend their lives or to surrender.

But of course in the end, lives saved overall is what truely matters, even though it was kind of unfair in a way on them to force them into surrendering in such a manner.

[CJvR]

The only thing that I can see being a "negative" of the bombing was that it didnt give the Japanese the option to fight and defend themselves honorably in fair combat.

Then the Japanese should be very grateful that Truman decided to slap some sencec into them.

[tharkûn]

The Japanese were alone, starving, and being burnt to hell and back. Everyone with half a brain knew that the war was lost and fighting on would have a hideous death toll. The Japanese kept fighting. After the first bombing they STILL decided to keep on fighting. Seriously how long can it take to adjust your thinking to the concept that those Americans, who have already firebombed the living crap out every city in Japan except 4, can now level a city with one bomber?

[HemlockGrey]

The Emperor didn't exactly intervene. The goverment was deadlocked and decided to ask the Emperor his opinion, something it never did in normal circumstanses.

I'm fairly certain that the Emperor interjected his opinion into the council, but if you could provide some evidence I'll gladly accept it. Either way, it was unprecedented and couldn't have been predicted by the American leaders.

[CJvR]

I did a bit of searching and found sources backing both versions, mostly yours though. I think we would need a seance to get the whole truth...

[Robert Walper]

I'm pretty sure there were other political reasons behind the two nuclear attacks, such as payback for Pearl Harbor.

[HemlockGrey]

I'm pretty sure there were other political reasons behind the two nuclear attacks, such as payback for Pearl Harbor.

I sincerely doubt that. Maybe MacArthur or LeMay thought that way, but Truman wasn't vindictive. Further, Pearl Harbor had been adequately avenged by the sinking of the entire IJN, the firebombing of Tokyo, the capture of Okinawa, and the total disintegration of the Japanese Empire.

[Robert Walper]

I'm pretty sure there were other political reasons behind the two nuclear attacks, such as payback for Pearl Harbor.

I sincerely doubt that. Maybe MacArthur or LeMay thought that way, but Truman wasn't vindictive. Further, Pearl Harbor had been adequately avenged by the sinking of the entire IJN, the firebombing of Tokyo, the capture of Okinawa, and the total disintegration of the Japanese Empire.

However, those were all legitimate targets taken out during war. Pearl Harbor was a sneak attack that shocked and angered the Americans. The nuclear attacks, while an effort to end the war quickly, also undoubtedly inflicted similar kind of shock and horror the Americans felt from the attack on Pearl Harbor (although alot larger in scale, destruction and loss of life).

[HemlockGrey]

Walper, both Nagasaki and Hiroshima were legitimate military targets due to a high concentration of industry and troops in them. And I am not aware of any historical evidence supporting the idea that revenge was seriously entertained as a justification for the bombings, so I request you please turn some up. There may have been some people in the States who went "Hahah, PAYBACK BITCH!", but Truman wasn't looking over official documents going "We must efface the shame of Pearl Harbor! Nuke the motherfuckers!"

[Arrow]

Walper, both Nagasaki and Hiroshima were legitimate military targets due to a high concentration of industry and troops in them. And I am not aware of any historical evidence supporting the idea that revenge was seriously entertained as a justification for the bombings, so I request you please turn some up. There may have been some people in the States who went "Hahah, PAYBACK BITCH!", but Truman wasn't looking over official documents going "We must efface the shame of Pearl Harbor! Nuke the motherfuckers!"

Also, Kyoto was on the list of targets, and Truman passed it by because it didn't have enough military value. The thinking for those wanting to target Kyoto was that the intellicentuals living in the city would be appreciate the power of the bomb. So the fact that it wasn't targetted goes against Walper.

[MKSheppard]

Also, Kyoto was on the list of targets, and Truman passed it by because it didn't have enough military value.

Incorrect. SecState Stimson had worked in Kyoto before the war, and
ha had it scratched from the list.

[Chmee]

Stimson saw Kyoto as too symbolically central to Japanese culture ... that targeting it would be like Japan targeting the Washington monument (I'm paraphrasing, it might have been the Lincoln memorial, don't remember the exact symbol) ....

Although Hiroshima and Nagasaki have become the buzzwords for the issue, it seems like the thread is really skirting the central issue, which is whether the deliberate mass slaughter of civilians is an acceptable tactic of war. The March '45 Tokyo firebombing raids killed on the same scale as Hiroshima, all The Bomb did was allow us to employ the tactic much more efficiently (fewer planes). What the Germans did amateurishly in the Blitz of London, we raised to a level of technical expertise in Japan -- trying to simply kill enough of the other nation's citizens, regardless of their status as soldiers, to make them stop. Terror as instrument of war.

[Aaron]

Although Hiroshima and Nagasaki have become the buzzwords for the issue, it seems like the thread is really skirting the central issue, which is whether the deliberate mass slaughter of civilians is an acceptable tactic of war. The March '45 Tokyo firebombing raids killed on the same scale as Hiroshima, all The Bomb did was allow us to employ the tactic much more efficiently (fewer planes). What the Germans did amateurishly in the Blitz of London, we raised to a level of technical expertise in Japan -- trying to simply kill enough of the other nation's citizens, regardless of their status as soldiers, to make them stop. Terror as instrument of war.

As soon as the Japanese began arming and training their civilians for war, they removed any protection they may have been accorded under the Geneva Conventions. And even despite the conventions, civilian popualtions at the time were considered viable targets. That logic doesn't fly today but those were different times.

[Chmee]

Although Hiroshima and Nagasaki have become the buzzwords for the issue, it seems like the thread is really skirting the central issue, which is whether the deliberate mass slaughter of civilians is an acceptable tactic of war. The March '45 Tokyo firebombing raids killed on the same scale as Hiroshima, all The Bomb did was allow us to employ the tactic much more efficiently (fewer planes). What the Germans did amateurishly in the Blitz of London, we raised to a level of technical expertise in Japan -- trying to simply kill enough of the other nation's citizens, regardless of their status as soldiers, to make them stop. Terror as instrument of war.

As soon as the Japanese began arming and training their civilians for war, they removed any protection they may have been accorded under the Geneva Conventions. And even despite the conventions, civilian popualtions at the time were considered viable targets. That logic doesn't fly today but those were different times.

Only a few years before, both the British and German populations were outraged at the concept of civilians being targeted, although their leaders were more sanguine about it. Hitler and Churchill both claimed that the other side had initiated the practice and then tried to return the favor on a large scale (the British more successfully).

[Aaron]

Only a few years before, both the British and German populations were outraged at the concept of civilians being targeted, although their leaders were more sanguine about it. Hitler and Churchill both claimed that the other side had initiated the practice and then tried to return the favor on a large scale (the British more successfully).

A perfect example of changing priorities. Public outrage at civilians being bombed by the Germans and propaganda published by the government made it acceptable for the British population. And as far as I know, the Germans were the first to use such tactics against the Poles. But the city in question was under siege at the time and considered a valid military target (pm Sea Skimmer for more details.)

I imagine the thought process was the same on the German side.

[Arrow]

Does such a discussion even apply to Japan, given that Japan had moved factors of production into the homes surrounding factories and were using/preparing to use civilians for military construction and combat?

[Master of Ossus]

Incidentally, the US Navy wanted to push for an invasion. They estimated over a MILLION American servicemen would become statistics during an invasion of Japan, and the best estimates placed the number of Japanese dead at around 16 million.

Those estimates, though, were based on a WOEFUL underestimation of the remaining Japanese military strength. I'm not even sure if the US would've succeeded in Operation Downfall, at least until starvation and other factors started hitting the defenders.