LadyTevar wrote: ↑2024-04-11 10:59am
There was a bit where Ukraine claimed to have blown up some planes and damaged others at a Russian base, but nothing that was really newsworthy
And today, a
Key Ukrainian Power Plant was destroyed by Russian air strikes.
Usually when the Ukrainians claim an airfield hit, its at least partially substantiated by satellite photos, but in this instance everyone (in the West) checked the day after satellite photos of the airfield and found no evidence that a single drone had hit anything at all Silly thing for them to talk up in all the circumstances:
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/30684
According to the latest report from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), there is no visual evidence suggesting Ukrainian troops damaged or destroyed aircraft or infrastructure at any of the four air bases targeted by drones early morning Friday, April 5.
Military analysts at ISW highlighted that geolocation footage revealed only explosions and activation of Russian air defence systems near all air bases, except for the one near Yeisk.
KraytKing wrote: ↑2024-04-10 12:33am
Alright, yes, I'll give you this one. In the literal sense, Ukrainian defenses have been compromised due to the loss of Avdiivka. That was a defensive position, it was lost, and so it is true by definition that defenses have been compromised.
However, the implication that I took from your post a month ago, which may not have been charitable towards you I admit, was that there should exist some expectation of continued breakthrough and exploitation. The evidence of the last month is clear: the loss of Avdiivka was a tactical, not operational, victory for Russia, and resulted in Ukrainian casualties but NO larger breakthrough. Russian forces advanced quickly-by the standards of this war alone-for several days, and then reached the next line of defensible towns and were slowed to a crawl. Those towns have since largely been captured, at a visually confirmed ENORMOUS cost in machinery and, it is likely, manpower, but the Russian advance has not resumed the pace exhibited in late February and early March. To me, the most likely explanation is that Ukraine abandoned the non-defensible terrain during a hasty retreat, then was able to buy enough time in Orlivka, Tonenke, and Lastochkyne to emplace some defensive positions further west. Russia did NOT have the capacity to both break through Avdiivka AND effect a proper exploitation maneuver, despite indications that Avdiivka was more troublesome for the Ukrainian defenders than some would admit.
Ukrainian retreat across the front is generally what you would expect to see from a military in defensive posture that is a close match for its enemy. Holding positions against a positionally superior enemy is not advisable, as you yourself point out with regards to Bakhmut and other defensive battles. Nothing in the last two months indicates Russian capacity to inflict a major breakthrough, save Avdiivka; as outlined above, the breakthrough in Avdiivka indicates that even when the Russian military can effect a breakthrough, it lacks capacity for exploitation. The risk of Ukrainian collapse lowers further.
I don't think mooting a big Russian breakthrough after the fall of Avdiivka was the point of the tweet in question. In any event, the conditions for dramatic 'big arrow' breakthroughs in this war simply do not exist (yet, if ever?). As for 'enormous' costs in machinery, this is the same song and dance that is always sung whenever there is a defeat by either side - "yes, we lost, but look at the casualties the enemy took!"
This would only be significant if such claims were a. generally reliable (see above) and b. if reliable, greatly exceeded the capacity of the force to replace them and continue and the side inflicting them can replace their own losses. Both of which are dubious propositions. There's more waking up to this now in the pundit-sphere, but the "any day now" attitude towards Russian losses when Ukraine is by all metrics in a much worse position in terms of force generation and replacement has always been an extremely weird hope to cling to IMO.
The Ukrainian retreat confirmed what we already know--that Ukraine is generally reluctant to abandon a position unless forced. The Russian tunneling operation takes time to pay off--they had time to gather exploitation forces. Ukraine, once COMPELLED to abandon Avdiivka by total collapse, potentially suffered a few hundred captured and YET was able to completely blunt Russian exploitation.
Objectively, the loss of Avdiivka in chaos is a bad thing for Ukraine, no contest. But in terms of what it reveals to us non-military observers, I find it promising. It was a pell-mell retreat, there might have been a pocket formed, and YET, Russia could not advance further. Dozens of armored vehicles, doubtless the armored reserve gathered for exploitation, have been observed destroyed in the small towns to the west. If this is the success Russia achieves when breakthrough aligns fairly well, what should we expect across the front?
The lines are by no means static. Russian advances have continued regardless - the pace is slow, but what else is new.
I did not imply that Russia was burning up manpower RATHER than Ukraine. Only that it is broadly known that relentless counterattacks are usually detrimental, especially when the enemy has local artillery superiority. If you are attacked, and you have strategic depth, then it is usually advisable to take the hit and let the enemy keep moving. Incremental gains are seldom important, as the Pro-Rus crowd has been shouting all year.
God fucking damn it.
This is in general terms correct, however
Russian war casualty tracking (by Mediazona, a western funded anti-Putin regime outlet over the course of Ukraine's summer counter-offensive do not at all substantiate the idea that Russia was losing disproportionately large numbers of troops doing relentless counterattacks over the course of Ukraine's offensive (compared to the period before and after). This is probably related to the claim pro-Ukraine commentators made as it was clear that the counteroffensive was obviously being defeated - i.e. that the Russians were losing XYZ so many artillery pieces, this 'artillery genocide' was all part of the plan, and soon the Ukrainians would romp to victory off the back of that. It was narrative management for morale purposes, rather than being based on anything verifiably going on.
America bitching to Ukraine would be hilarious if it wasn't life-or-death, what are they going to do, stop supplying Ukraine? Oh, wait... 
