Israeli forces attack humanitarian convoy in intl. waters

[loomer]

I do see, I think, a knife in the first picture though. The one that caps the news article. IHH could have cropped that to be more effective in their argument.

[Edward Yee]

Photocropping can be part of PR, and is less "intrusive"/overt than Photoshopping...

[eyl]

[
As for the claims that the IDF ground forces are significantly less capable than their western counterparts, and only marginally better than the surrounding Arab forces - that part clearly originated in your anal cavity...
Just look at Cast Lead - that operation was planned was handled by senior officers, not by politicians, and guess what - from a purely military standpoint, it went spectacularly well!

Here's a little bit from the history forum. I took the liberty of citing Stuart's post on the Israeli military (I just hope the Targeteer doesn't send a UAV to my home ). As a defense professional, he knows a lot more than either one of us.

Although preventing Israel from expanding into the West Bank and the Sinai would've spared everyone a lot of trouble (Israel wouldn't have had to deal with Palestinian refugees, or terrorists attacking Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and may be spared the Yom Kippur War), it's hard to imagine a US attack on Israel being anything other than a clusterfuck that'll make Operation Iraqi Freedom look like Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada).

There's no news here; the U.S. has contingency plans for attacking everybody (and so does everybody else) so its not remarkable that they have one for attacking Israel. That plan gets dusted off and updated every so often; it doesn't mean there's a serious intent to use it, its just nice and comforting to have.

As to the result of a 1967 attack on Israel, I'm not as pessimistic as you are. The important thing to note is that the Israelis really aren't very good (then or now); their image of military prowess is entirely due to the fact their opponents have ranged from the imbecilic to the abysmal. Then (as now), the Israelis had a first-class air force, a third-rate army and a Navy that makes McHale's Navy look like the height of competence (in fact, McHale's Navy makes a good template for the Israeli Navy - think of a Navy whose senior ranks consist entirely of Captain Binghamptons whil their junior officers are all Ensign Parkers while the enlisted personnel are all Grubers with not a McHale in sight and you get the picture). The Med fleet in those days was quite powerful so it wouldn't have been such a route to disaster as you think.

Here's the complete threat "US had Emergency plan for attacking Israel in 1976". http://bbs.stardestroyer.net/viewtopic. ... it=Israeli
I don't think I'm taking anything out of context.

Once again, I crave Stuart and Sidewinder's pardon for my liberty in bringing up their posts.

Seems to me that Stuart's analysis is, at the least, doing a dissrevice to the Arab Legion (the Jordanian military)

[Stuart]

Seems to me that Stuart's analysis is, at the least, doing a dissrevice to the Arab Legion (the Jordanian military)

Not really; note that in 1967, the Arab Legion was the only Arab fighting force that gave the Israeli Army much trouble and they weren't that much better than the rest. They didn't do particularly well in border skirmishes against the Syrians and Iraqis for example (they won but they weren't that convincing about it). So, I would suggest that the Arab Legion was a good exemplar of my comment. The Israelis are a bit better than the Arabs and in that environment, a bit better gets one a whole lot of tactical advantage. Their performance against forces that were better than the Arab average (which isn't hard to be; getting worse is hard) shows just how marginal the Israeli advantage is and how poorly they compare with front-rank armies.

[Illuminatus Primus]

This is an aside and hijack, I know, but what are the causal factors at work here? What mechanisms are at play? Is this a kind of institutional dysfunction with a lot of momentum, or in the case of a state like Israel they're subject to crappy economies of investment vis-a-vis fielding different military capacities with countless different needs? I'm kind of in the dark, and would like to understand what's going on better.

[Coyote]

The Arab armies are really more regime-support gendermeries with heavy military equipment. Their focus is to quell internal dissent and to fluff the regime leader. They disdain "boring" stuff like logistics and maintenance as scut-work and see training as a chore to be endured and very pre-scripted to make themsleves look tough. This is mostly extrapolated from Kenneth M. Pollack's book, "Arabs at War" in which he examines various Arab armies involved in different conflicts at different times, mostly against other Arabs or countries like Chad.

Against an actual, organized and competent military force such a model falls apart easily. The Israelis, because they have been invaded multiple times by forces that vastly outnumber them and frequently had higher technology than them, have been forced to assimilate some competency to make up for their lacks.

Now, from here on it is my opinion, but it seems to me that the Israeli forces overall are probably the words foremost experts at taking apart third-world level internal-suppression gendermeries. Would they stack up against a real army, like, say, the US or UK? Probably not. But I think after decades of routinely hammering invaders with long odds, the politicians have started believing their own press about IDF invincibility. Certainly the IDF could defeat a lot of militaries in, say, Africa or other third-world regimes. But the third-world country would have to come to Israel for it to really work; they have limited force-projection ability beyond isolated long-range air or commando strikes. The IDF is more similar to the Swiss home defense militia-- tenacious on home soil, defending their territory, but can't really support long-term, long-range, far-off operations.

A lot of IDF success relies on "soft" things, like giving more initiative to commanders on the ground, and being readily able to adapt more to situations as they unfold and also to adapting equipment to specific, regional needs. They train more and I believe it is less scripted and more open to dealing with the unexpected. Flexibility and initiative goes a long way in the types of wars being fought there.

[Illuminatus Primus]

I meant Israel, not Arab armies. And Stuart seems to strongly imply that the IDF's dysfunctions are indigenous and original to its character, not a result of overspecialization of peculiarly inferior opponents.

[Guardsman Bass]

I meant Israel, not Arab armies. And Stuart seems to strongly imply that the IDF's dysfunctions are indigenous and original to its character, not a result of overspecialization of peculiarly inferior opponents.

Stuart mentioned back in the thread where it first came up that it was likely a combination of 1)Institutional Arrogance, and 2)the way the Israeli system directs recruits/conscripts and resources.

[MKSheppard]

It all goes back to how the State of Israel was created -- there was no large military apparatus that was pre-existing, like the British Army in India that was quickly co-opted by both sides (India and Pakistan).

Paramilitary organizations had to fulfill the purpose of the nascent Israeli state's military in the early years -- and from that, they picked up a lot of bad habits.

Now; this is a problem not endemic to Israel -- you only need to look at American Military History in the years between the end of the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 to see the same issues that Israel faced/faces.

In the US during that time, there was a distrust of a large standing military establishment; so much of US military planning was placed around small "milita" groups which could be formed up and led by a commissioned U.S. officer on both Land and Sea.

This is kind of obvious on land -- e.g. a Company of U.S. Regulars backed up by a battalion or so of Militamen from the surrounding area; but at sea -- it wasn't so obvious.

There was large opposition to big ships of the line -- in particular, the SIX FRIGATES -- and the preferred idea instead was to build a lot of cheap gunboats which would be laid up in between wars; and when war broke out, would be hurriedly manned by the Naval Milita.

The War of 1812 changed all that. The Milita Groups that counted for so much in U.S. Military planning completely flopped.

At Bladensburg, Maryland; the U.S had only about 400~ regulars (Dragoons, US Infantry, Marines) to back up 1,500 militamen. The Militamen broke and ran nearly right away; and it was only the Regulars who steadily stood their ground, but they were overwhelmed by the British. End result: DC gets burned.

This could be applied to any real action between milita and the British troops in the Chesapeake region -- the British disembark a force of troops and marines from their ships, make a sally against some town; drive off the milita, and then loot/burn the place.

At sea; the Jeffersonian Milita Gunboats were next to worthless. They did NOTHING to break the British blockade of the US East coast which was strangling the US economy. It was only the large SIX FRIGATES that did anything worthwhile.

Plus, there was the whole disastrous Invasion of Canada business.

Postwar, it was realized that in order to survive against any credible, competent opponent who wasn't hamstrung (we were very lucky that the full force of British attention was diverted to Europe during that period); we would have to professionalize our military and build up forces of regulars.

This policy was carried out in two Primary ways:

1.) The US Military Academy at West Point was professionalized as the War of 1812 broke out -- the Cadet Corps was increased to 250, and the curriculum was finally formalized with a set length of study. But this occured too late to have any effect during the War of 1812. But post-war, USMA was further professionalized, with academic standards, a code of conduct -- and most importantly, oriented USMA as an Engineering School.

This ensued that there would always be a steady flow of people to fill whatever slots Congress authorized -- because even with the War of 1812; the US was still very leery of large permanent military establishments of officers and men sitting around with nothing to do. If the officers received an engineering education, this meant that they were not limited to just being U.S. Army Officers; they could resign from the Army and become engineers across the United States.

2.) The force of regulars was increased significantly. For the Navy, this meant more heavy frigates and a few battleships of 70+ guns. For the Army, this meant many more Regulars on the rolls.

These reforms culiminated in our excellent performance in the Mexican-American War; and later the Civil War (by both sides) because the mythos of the Minuteman performing all duties of the Military had been discredited in favor of that of heavily trained troops (whether regulars or federalized milita who had trained for several months).

Israel on the other hand, never had that kind of military catastrophe which required/drove reform. Post-War of Independence, they beat the Arabs handily in 1956 and 1967 (massively too).

1973 is a bit more problematic. While the Israelis were close to defeat IIRC during the early parts of the war; they managed to turn it around by the end of the war and maintain their military mythos of superiority in the region.

Honestly, it would have been better for the IDF if they had only managed a draw in 1973 and lost the Sinai to Egypt. Maybe then they'd begin the required professionalization of the Israeli Military and move their ethos away from the paramilitary forces they grew out of.

EDIT: Phong has pointed out that this isn't just a problem limited to the US/IDF. It also affects any military force that grew out of a revolutionary/paramilitary force, like the Red Army between the Russian Civil War and the Russo-Finnish War -- where the RKKA tried out so many stupid revolutionary ideas -- like eliminating large amounts of ranks -- or trappings of rank.

[Coyote]

It is bizarre to note, though, that in Israel a lot of people treat the 1973 war as a traumatic defeat and talk about it almost like it was some sort of Vietnam-like debacle. More so than the Lebanon war of the 1980's... or at least that was the impression I had.

I suppose it was a "defeat" for the Intelligence community there; they got caught with their pants down and there was no reason for that to happen, and politically Golda Meir came off looking like a total tool.

[Illuminatus Primus]

I think the RKKA's social-cultural egalitarianism was more a residue of its revolutionary radical socialist origins, than a more general basis as an unprofessional, paramilitary force. Afterall, the Brownshirts loved ranks and trappings of pseudo-military, but certainly had no professionalism.

[Spoonist]

Back on topic, things may escalate.

It is hard to imagine how much worse the situation could get, but the confrontation in Gaza could see a dangerous escalation in the coming days as Iran threatens to break the Israeli blockade and deliver urgently needed medical supplies and other aid to the coastal strip.

From here

So Iran is jumping on the bandwagon and declaring that they will send armed transports to lift the blockade.

[MKSheppard]

Finally, an opponent worthy of the Israeli Navy!

[Sea Skimmer]

I forget what the law is on the matter, but somehow I don't think Egypt would allow Iranian naval vessels through the Suez canal if they could at all avoid it. IIRC it had to be put into the peace treaty that Israeli vessels were allowed to pass so I think Egypt has total control of passages. It would be really amusing if Iran tried to sail its speed boats all the way around Africa and had 75% of them sink.

[Spoonist]

I forget what the law is on the matter, but somehow I don't think Egypt would allow Iranian naval vessels through the Suez canal if they could at all avoid it. IIRC it had to be put into the peace treaty that Israeli vessels were allowed to pass so I think Egypt has total control of passages. It would be really amusing if Iran tried to sail its speed boats all the way around Africa and had 75% of them sink.

Uhm I don't think they are saying they will go there with their navy. Instead they will allocate troops and weapons to already existing ships. If that would be the case they would likely go through any of Isreals non-friendly neighbours.

Now mind you, to me it all sounds like BS trying to get attention and political points. Iran can't have Turkey getting points form the arab community, etc.

[Straha]

Back on topic, things may escalate.

It is hard to imagine how much worse the situation could get, but the confrontation in Gaza could see a dangerous escalation in the coming days as Iran threatens to break the Israeli blockade and deliver urgently needed medical supplies and other aid to the coastal strip.

From here

So Iran is jumping on the bandwagon and declaring that they will send armed transports to lift the blockade.

Iran probably wont do anything.

Well, I'd be surprised if they did. Much as they're looking for a short victorious war to boost morale at home and make them look credible abroad, I don't think they have the cajones to do it. The Iranian regime is too busy trying to work out internal squabbles to actually get all their ducks in a row for an external fight. Then again, when the Pasdaran decide they want to do something they tend to do it.

That said, they will definitely huff and puff over this, beat their chest and attack Israel over this for months to come.

[eyl]

The Arab armies are really more regime-support gendermeries with heavy military equipment. Their focus is to quell internal dissent and to fluff the regime leader. They disdain "boring" stuff like logistics and maintenance as scut-work and see training as a chore to be endured and very pre-scripted to make themsleves look tough. This is mostly extrapolated from Kenneth M. Pollack's book, "Arabs at War" in which he examines various Arab armies involved in different conflicts at different times, mostly against other Arabs or countries like Chad.

Against an actual, organized and competent military force such a model falls apart easily. The Israelis, because they have been invaded multiple times by forces that vastly outnumber them and frequently had higher technology than them, have been forced to assimilate some competency to make up for their lacks.

Now, from here on it is my opinion, but it seems to me that the Israeli forces overall are probably the words foremost experts at taking apart third-world level internal-suppression gendermeries. Would they stack up against a real army, like, say, the US or UK? Probably not. But I think after decades of routinely hammering invaders with long odds, the politicians have started believing their own press about IDF invincibility. Certainly the IDF could defeat a lot of militaries in, say, Africa or other third-world regimes. But the third-world country would have to come to Israel for it to really work; they have limited force-projection ability beyond isolated long-range air or commando strikes. The IDF is more similar to the Swiss home defense militia-- tenacious on home soil, defending their territory, but can't really support long-term, long-range, far-off operations.

A lot of IDF success relies on "soft" things, like giving more initiative to commanders on the ground, and being readily able to adapt more to situations as they unfold and also to adapting equipment to specific, regional needs. They train more and I believe it is less scripted and more open to dealing with the unexpected. Flexibility and initiative goes a long way in the types of wars being fought there.

I think there's another aspect - given that, as you mentioned, Israel's enemies tend to outnumber it, then the IDF needs to be at a certain minimum size, since edges in competence and technology will only get you so far - you can't use them to decrease the number of boots on the ground ad infinitum (especially with Israel's lack of strategic depth to fall back on). Given the population disparities, that means a military heavily dependent on conscripts and reserves - and since Israel doesn't want to keep them for too long in the IDF (due to social and economic reasons), those kinds of troops inherently have less competence than long-term professionals. As the situation is, I'm not sure to what degree that can be changed (or if it's even desirable - sure, it might be nce to have a military that can go to and defeat any other military on Earth, but we don't really need that).

I forget what the law is on the matter, but somehow I don't think Egypt would allow Iranian naval vessels through the Suez canal if they could at all avoid it. IIRC it had to be put into the peace treaty that Israeli vessels were allowed to pass so I think Egypt has total control of passages. It would be really amusing if Iran tried to sail its speed boats all the way around Africa and had 75% of them sink.

I can't find a source for the text I can access from work, but IIRC UNSCR 118 or 119 affirmed Israel's right to use the Suez Canal (after Egypt blocked it to Israeli traffic in 1956), so if that's so then apparently Egypt's control over the Canal isn't absolute.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Back on topic, things may escalate.

It is hard to imagine how much worse the situation could get, but the confrontation in Gaza could see a dangerous escalation in the coming days as Iran threatens to break the Israeli blockade and deliver urgently needed medical supplies and other aid to the coastal strip.

From here

So Iran is jumping on the bandwagon and declaring that they will send armed transports to lift the blockade.

That article is from January of 2009, Jesus, during the Israeli ground operations in Gaza that led up to this situation. Ergo the Iranians were clearly saying hollow words, and you clearly can't read a timestamp.

[Spoonist]

So Iran is jumping on the bandwagon and declaring that they will send armed transports to lift the blockade.

That article is from January of 2009, Jesus, during the Israeli ground operations in Gaza that led up to this situation. Ergo the Iranians were clearly saying hollow words, and you clearly can't read a timestamp.

Hmm that is embarrassing. The news was in a local language paper so I did a search for an english one, my bad that I didnt check the date.

Lets do a new search. This was the article I was failing to find last time. Now with correct date etc.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6550WZ20100606

"Iran's Revolutionary Guards naval forces are fully prepared to escort the peace and freedom convoys to Gaza with all their powers and capabilities," Ali Shirazi, Khamenei's representative inside the Revolutionary Guards, was quoted as saying by the semi-official Mehr news agency.

Any intervention by the Iranian military would be considered highly provocative by Israel which accuses Iran of supplying weapons to Hamas, the Islamist movement which rules Gaza.

Again I think its just bluster.

[MKSheppard]

Hey nice

Link

Iran Red Crescent to send two aid ships to Gaza
By Farhad Pouladi (AFP) – 1 day ago

TEHRAN — The Iranian Red Crescent has decided to send two aid ships to Gaza this week in the latest bid to break the blockade imposed on the Palestinian territory by Iran's regional archfoe Israel.

Red Crescent director for international affairs Abdolrauf Adibzadeh told the state IRNA news agency late on Sunday that the decision to send the ships was taken after a meeting with the foreign ministry.

"One ship will carry donations made by the people and the other will carry relief workers. The ships will be sent to Gaza by end of this week," Adibzadeh said.

He said the Red Crescent has called for Iranian volunteers to act as relief workers and accompany the vessels.

"Volunteers who want to go to Gaza and help the oppressed people of occupied Palestine can refer to the Red Crescent website and register," Adibzadeh said.

He said the initial plan was to send the ships through an intermediary country, but "based on a decision by the society, they will be sent directly." He added that the aid would consist of foodstuffs and medicines.

The Iranian Red Crescent had previously sent an aid ship carrying food and medicines to Gaza in December 2008 but it was prevented from reaching the territory by the Israeli navy.

The decision to send the two ships comes hot on the heels of a report that Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards had expressed readiness to escort aid flotillas to Gaza.

"If the respected leader of the revolution (supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) gives an order in this regard, the Revolutionary Guards' naval forces will take a practical step using their capability and equipment to escort flotillas to Gaza," Khamenei's aide in the Guards' naval wing, Ali Shirazi, told the Mehr news agency on Sunday.

It was unclear, however, how the Guards would escort the flotillas as their naval wing is largely made up of speed boats and light vessels.

Blaming the United States, Britain and France for the deadly raid, Khamenei called for the prosecution of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Ehud Barak.

In a message issued on Tuesday, Iran's supreme leader called on the international community to end the Israeli blocakde.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad too lashed out at Israel, demanding that it face "political sanctions" for the raid.

The animosity between Iran and its regional archfoe has only worsened under Ahmadinejad, with top Guards commanders repeatedly boasting that the elite force has missiles capable of reaching any target in Israel.

In turn, Israel, which has the Middle East's sole if undeclared nuclear arsenal, has refused to rule out a resort to military action against Iran to prevent it aquiring a nuclear weapons capability.

Iran denies any such ambition.

[Simon_Jester]

I think there's another aspect - given that, as you mentioned, Israel's enemies tend to outnumber it, then the IDF needs to be at a certain minimum size, since edges in competence and technology will only get you so far - you can't use them to decrease the number of boots on the ground ad infinitum (especially with Israel's lack of strategic depth to fall back on). Given the population disparities, that means a military heavily dependent on conscripts and reserves - and since Israel doesn't want to keep them for too long in the IDF (due to social and economic reasons), those kinds of troops inherently have less competence than long-term professionals. As the situation is, I'm not sure to what degree that can be changed (or if it's even desirable - sure, it might be nce to have a military that can go to and defeat any other military on Earth, but we don't really need that).

Encourage NCOs to go careerist, or at least stay in service for longer terms? If one of your biggest weaknesses is that the sergeants and petty officers are just whichever conscripts happen to be brightest, and they get booted out in two or three years like everybody else... try to retain the ones who do a good job as sergeants.

I mean, from what I know of the historical record, an army with conscript lieutenants and long-service noncoms might actually work better than an army with long-service lieutenants and conscript sergeants.

[eyl]

Encourage NCOs to go careerist, or at least stay in service for longer terms? If one of your biggest weaknesses is that the sergeants and petty officers are just whichever conscripts happen to be brightest, and they get booted out in two or three years like everybody else... try to retain the ones who do a good job as sergeants.

I mean, from what I know of the historical record, an army with conscript lieutenants and long-service noncoms might actually work better than an army with long-service lieutenants and conscript sergeants.

I'd like to see that happen, there's occasionally been moves to do that* - the main problem is money (since a career soldier's pay & benefits are considerably higher than those of someone still in his/her mandatory term).

Of course, another hurdle is that we have a number of moronic politicians and generals who believe their own hype and use that to reach absurd conclusions about what the IDf needs to do. And they aren't necessarily on the right, either.

An example which I find particularly rankling - around 2004-2005 (IIRC) it was decided (and approved by Knesset members, including some from the left-wing Meretz party, as well as the then IDF CoS) to reduce the maximum amount of training days reservists could be called up for - they wanted to restrict call-ups for enlisted commanders to twice in a three year period and for other enlisted to once in that time - the rationale being that "the IDF is the strongest military in the area and doesn't face a threat"**. That maintaining that strength required soldiers to at least get basic refreshers every once in a while seems to have escaped them. As a result, units went for years without comprehensive excersises - it took the Second Lebanon War to change that particular idiocy.

So getting a large increase in NCOs approved may encounter similiar idiocy.

*In the regular combat arms, that is. There are a lot of career NCOs in technical fields - I was one of them, for that matter - and certain combat (and some noncombat) specialties require you to agree to a career term in advance (pilots are the most famous example, but the Naval Commandos - including enlisted - are another; for that matter, all officers are required to take a minimum extension of one year).

**I may be misremembering the details, but that was the gist of it

snip

Yeah, like Israel would let those ships pass without inspection (given that Israel has intercepted a number of ships carrying weapons originally sent by Iran, the Karine A being the most famous example).

[Chris OFarrell]

Its Anecdotal, but a friend of my Father was a VERY senior NCO in the Australian Army. He once had some kind of 'joint operational' tour or something with the IDF in the 90s.

Apparently he came back wondering how in the hell the IDF had mananged to win its wars. And in turn, just how bad the Arab armies around them had to be to loose to them.

[MKSheppard]

I like THIS idea....

Ideas for ‘reverse flotillas’ gain steam
By ABE SELIG
08/06/2010

Although most of the recent talk regarding flotillas has revolved around ships sailing toward Gaza, at least two plans have emerged for “reverse flotillas” – from Israel toward Turkey – to highlight what organizers have labeled the Turks’ “shameless hypocrisy” in their criticisms of the Jewish state.

The most ambitious of the two plans has been devised by members of Israel’s National Student Union, who this week announced their intention to set sail toward Turkey, in an effort to bring humanitarian aid to the “oppressed people of Turkish Kurdistan” and to members of the “Turkish Armenian minority.”

Student Union chairman Boaz Torporovsky, who has been leading the reverse flotilla charge, told The Jerusalem Post on Monday, “Hundreds of people have volunteered for the flotilla, and many more are contacting us all the time for ways they can help.

“Our plan is to deliver much-needed humanitarian assistance to the Kurds of Turkey, who by the way outnumber Israelis and Palestinians combined,” he said.

“And to show that Turkey has its own issues when it comes to the treatment of its minorities, which they should consider before criticizing us.”

Torporovsky added that the National Student Union members had two separate flotilla ideas, both of which they hoped to embark on soon. The first was a flotilla of private yachts that would head out to sea if additional Gaza-bound flotillas entered Israeli waters.

“We would like to greet them at sea,” he said. “And explain to them, peacefully – we don’t want any violence – what it is that’s really going on here.

We’d like to show them the truth and help them understand that the reality here is not what they’ve been told.”

Torporovsky said that many yacht owners had already volunteered for that phase of the plan, and that he and his colleagues were preparing for the arrival of a number of Gaza-bound ships, of European or even Iranian origin.

The second phase of the National Student Union members’ flotilla plan would be the more ambitious journey to Turkey, though Torporovsky admitted they were hard-pressed when it came to funding it.

“We need three things to pull this part off,” he said.

“Money, logistical support and balls – and we’ve got the last two things covered.

“But it’s here that we really get into the shameless hypocrisy of the Turks, because while they criticize us day and night, they are oppressing the Kurds and silencing the world when it comes to recognition of the Armenian Genocide.”

Torporovsky said his group had already found a captain for the vessel, a retired Israel Navy sailor, but the ship itself was proving harder to acquire.

“It’s not easy to find a large, sea-bound vessel,” he said.

“But we’re looking, and we’re raising funds, and as soon as we’re able to do it, we will.”

But the reverse-flotilla talk hasn’t stopped there.

Another sea-bound venture is being organized in an effort to draw attention to Turkey’s own controversial policies – this time to Cyprus, to “call for an end to the Turkish occupation” of the island’s northern half – and is being organized by Meretz activist Pinchas Har-Zahav, and his son Haim, who has also signed on for the voyage.

The group is also set to include Alex Goldfarb, who was an MK with the Tzomet and Yiud parties from 1992 to 1996, and is being subsidized by an unnamed wealthy Israeli.

Speaking to the Post on Monday, Haim Har-Zahav said the goal of the voyage was to “remind the world that Turkey is not innocent.

“If Uruguay or Iceland were the ones criticizing us so harshly, it might be a different story,” he said. “But we’re talking about a country that only seven years after [the Six Day War and the beginning of Israeli control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank] began occupying Cyprus.

“We’re talking about a country that has systematically killed the Kurds and refuses to acknowledge their role in the Armenian Genocide,” he said.

“And so no, we will not accept this. The hypocrisy has to stop here.”

Har-Zahav added that the ship’s passengers were not looking for a violent confrontation and if told to turn back, they would.

“But we feel that it’s important for us to show and remind the world that Turkey is not a righteous country, but a near-rogue state, and that we, the Israeli people, are not suckers.”

Gil Hoffman contributed to this report.

[Serafina]

Ah, the good, old tu-quoque fallacy
Yes, yes, Turkey is not perfect. That doesn't remove any of the problems in/with Israel.