"Fuck the poor"

[K. A. Pital]

Human life under "this system", as stated by Surlethe in the opening, is in fact just another good to be traded. Human is a commodity. Thus there can be expensive and worthless humans.

[Bakustra]

Human life under "this system", as stated by Surlethe in the opening, is in fact just another good to be traded. Human is a commodity. Thus there can be expensive and worthless humans.

I am well aware of that, but I wish to bring this out into the open and see whether people are willing to follow this to its logical conclusions.

[K. A. Pital]

They already have. This whole system is nothing but a formalized apology of social-darwinism.

Problem is, not even the pre-requisites stated in the opening (voluntary contract) are fulfilled - humans are never fully informed (and more often than not misinformed), and unequal bargaining power means the agent (a human) becomes a part of the process to leave other humans without access to a certain resource. This is a form of coercion, plain and simple.

Surlethe said:

Note that this process only accurately measures utility when people are not coerced, i.e., not threatened with direct harm by other humans should a particular outcome occur.

That's a weak spot. Harm is negative utility. Are people coerced into working or not? The correct answer is - they are. They need subsistence to live, else they will experience negative utility - privation, hunger and finally death. Ergo, the decision not to work entails harm. Are they threatened with this outcome? Yes; that is a threat-in-being which is always there.

A decision not made under the threat of a bad outcome is the one which would leave the human in the same position as he was even if he never made that decision. For example, if a human were fed and supplied by an automated facility, then he could truly voluntarily choose between working and not working. Otherwise the choice is not free and the threat of negativt utility renders the whole system of "voluntary" decisions useless.

[Master of Ossus]

Can you show that it is an ultimate result, though? Because you seem to be saying that the only value is that of market value, and then generalizing that to material success equaling moral worth. Just as an example, diamonds are valuable. This is agreed upon generally. Is the life of the children who die in the process of mining blood diamonds valued at the price of the diamonds?

Presumably (I don't know about this--it's the subject of discussion on which I'm unclear of) a libertarian would accept that their system is only meant to govern internalized markets with few or no externalities associated with them.

What is the value of a human life under this system? How do you determine the value? By life insurance, by wrongful-death suits, by the cost of hiring an assassin? For that matter, before the existence of life insurance or wrongful-death suits, did life have no value?

I typically measure human life by what people themselves declare their lives to be worth through their actions. This is pretty easily measurable (in the US it's been estimated at around $2.7-$3mm). For instance, you can find subsets of construction workers and high-rise construction workers who have essentially equal skillsets, and can set up a matched-pair sample with many hundreds or thousands of pairs. High-rise construction workers are paid a premium over other construction workers with similar skills and experience because of the danger associated with their jobs, and so you can extrapolate from that what the marginal worker believes their life to be worth.

This also suggests that some people are worth more than others, which would tend to stratify along national boundaries.

Ummm... yes, that's possible.

A hypothetical. Take two nations, A and B. The market value of human life in A is four times that of B, by way of greater economic development and the presence of more worker's rights. Should a criminal receive one-quarter of the sentence for murdering a citizen of B as opposed to A? Remember, we have no value but market value here, and so the crime is therefore less for B than A. It seems to me that you would have to abandon in such a situation either market values as moral values or the concept of basic human equality.

Yes, I believe that criminal penalties should be set with reference to the amount of damage that they have done to society and with respect to the cost to that society of inflicting that punishment upon the criminal. I imagine that a libertarian (to the extent that they believe that there should be a government to dole out such punishments) would agree.

[K. A. Pital]

I believe that criminal penalties should be set with reference to the amount of damage that they have done to society

If I kill a First World engineer (high number of engineers per capita, less damage to society at large because easily compensated) and an Indian engineer (few engineers per capita, greater damage to society), I get unequal punishment. Killing the Indian engineer deals greater damage, although he is the cheaper person. Killing the First World engineer deals less damage, although he is the more expensive person. The market value of a human and the damage dealt to society are thus different.

If I kill Einstein (Kurchatov, Korolev, etc...), I massively set back science and technical development. If I kill Paris Hilton (a more expensive human), the damage to society is zero.

Let's call this the Hilton-Einstein paradox

[Master of Ossus]

They already have. This whole system is nothing but a formalized apology of social-darwinism.

Problem is, not even the pre-requisites stated in the opening (voluntary contract) are fulfilled - humans are never fully informed (and more often than not misinformed), and unequal bargaining power means the agent (a human) becomes a part of the process to leave other humans without access to a certain resource. This is a form of coercion, plain and simple.

Surlethe said:

Note that this process only accurately measures utility when people are not coerced, i.e., not threatened with direct harm by other humans should a particular outcome occur.

That's a weak spot. Harm is negative utility. Are people coerced into working or not? The correct answer is - they are. They need subsistence to live, else they will experience negative utility - privation, hunger and finally death. Ergo, the decision not to work entails harm. Are they threatened with this outcome? Yes; that is a threat-in-being which is always there.

A decision not made under the threat of a bad outcome is the one which would leave the human in the same position as he was even if he never made that decision. For example, if a human were fed and supplied by an automated facility, then he could truly voluntarily choose between working and not working. Otherwise the choice is not free and the threat of negativt utility renders the whole system of "voluntary" decisions useless.

I fail to see the nature of the criticism at all. Utilitarianism is based around the concept of maximized good, or avoidance of suffering, or what have you. There is no reason why avoiding pain should be viewed differently from promoting the antithesis of pain, for example, when attempting to maximize. It's not a system that is meant to make people free of any sort of "coercion" in the sense that they have to work to get paid (as if anyone would actually view that as a form of coercion), but rather one that involves making the people in society as happy as possible. That may well involve getting them to work if, by working, they are happier than they would be if they were not to work. Right?

[Master of Ossus]

If I kill a First World engineer (high number of engineers per capita, less damage to society at large because easily compensated) and an Indian engineer (few engineers per capita, greater damage to society), I get unequal punishment. Killing the Indian engineer deals greater damage, although he is the cheaper person. Killing the First World engineer deals less damage, although he is the more expensive person. The market value of a human and the damage dealt to society are thus different.

If I kill Einstein (Kurchatov, Korolev, etc...), I massively set back science and technical development. If I kill Paris Hilton (a more expensive human), the damage to society is zero.

Ummm... okay. We don't live in a world in which criminal penalties are evaluated according to a libertarian model. Your observations [sic] don't explain why the libertarian system is objectively worse. Indeed, they seem to support it (fewer Paris Hiltons).

[K. A. Pital]

Utilitarianism is based around the concept of maximized good, or avoidance of suffering, or what have you. There is no reason why avoiding pain should be viewed differently from promoting the antithesis of pain

I would beg to differ here. Suffering is more easily measurable, biologically, physically and materially more objective than "happiness". Biological suffering has objective criteria, variation between humans is small. On the other hand, maximization of happiness is more subjective and thus a lot harder to measure. It is natural that a desire to be free of suffering would be universal for most humans (except sadomasochists), but the desire for maximizing happiness would lead to massive deviations between humans. I prefer, to the greatest extent possible, to use objective criteria when measuring utility.

Ummm... okay. We don't live in a world in which criminal penalties are evaluated according to a libertarian model. Your observations [sic] don't explain why the libertarian system is objectively worse. Indeed, they seem to support it (fewer Paris Hiltons).

How? Paris Hilton is very rich and thus (in Surlethe's model) is worth more than Einstein to society. You seem to support that by declaring the market value of humans to be the only true value. This means killing Paris is dealing more damage to society. But it is obviously not so.

Hilton is worth billions of dollars; Einstein could be worth zero.

[Master of Ossus]

I would beg to differ here. Suffering is more easily measurable, biologically, physically and materially more objective than "happiness". Biological suffering has objective criteria, variation between humans is small.

I don't think that's true. I've had injuries very similar to ones that others have found horrendously painful, for example, without seeming to suffer anywhere near the same level of discomfort. The reverse has also been true. But even if it were true, that doesn't mean that people would be unable to estimate their utility from avoiding the discomfort and clearly expressing that through their actions--just as the construction workers in my example, supra did.

On the other hand, maximization of happiness is more subjective and thus a lot harder to measure. It is natural that a desire to be free of suffering would be universal for most humans (except sadomasochists), but the desire for maximizing happiness would lead to massive deviations between humans. I prefer, to the greatest extent possible, to use objective criteria when measuring utility.

Utilitarians do this, though: they call them utils (or dollars, if you would prefer). The same unit can be applied to either disutility or utility: you can create an indifference curve to see how much of a "bad" people are willing to accept in order to receive some positive quantity of a "good." I don't understand how this makes it a substantively different problem.

How? Paris Hilton is very rich and thus (in Surlethe's model) is worth more than Einstein to society. You seem to support that by declaring the market value of humans to be the only true value. This means killing Paris is dealing more damage to society. But it is obviously not so.

Hilton is worth billions of dollars; Einstein could be worth zero.

Well, first of all, the model struggles with externalities. I have repeatedly pointed this out. I don't know how a libertarian would respond to this criticism.

But even if that were not true, someone's life is not valued at their net worth under Surlethe's argument. I'm not sure how you arrived at the belief that these are the same. Hilton's behavior may indicate that she values her life far less than Einstein does, if she is willing to risk it for vastly lower rewards (in fact, some of her actions seem positively risk-seeking with respect to her life, from what I understand of her character, which is not a normal view for people to take). That peoples' lives can be valued in the market doesn't imply that their net worth is that measure: the two are separate and distinct, and measured in different ways.

[K. A. Pital]

But even if it were true, that doesn't mean that people would be unable to estimate their utility from avoiding the discomfort and clearly expressing that through their actions--just as the construction workers in my example, supra did.

The problem with this whole model is a reliance on individualism. Individual decision is treated as being solely responsible for the outcome. But that is not so. The individual decision is only a small part of the process leading to the final result. People are often unable to estimate their utility from certain things because they are either misinformed or simply poorly informed; or misinformed on purpose. The risk of gross negative utility can seem smaller than it really is (NINJA lending, a good recent example).

I don't understand how this makes it a substantively different problem.

See above. The process is a multi-factor model and decisions are a flawed representation of the actual end result. I prefer to judge by the end result in any case. I'm not sure different degrees of physical pain from similar injuries is a large variation - the biological damage to humans will tend to be rather similar, and the problems 99% of humans experience when, say, losing a liver are rather similar regardless of the finer aspects of their feelings. On the other hand, the happiness is most certainly a subjective matter. This is well signified by absolutely pathetic things like Nigerians being high on happiness surveys while Japanese being low. Subjective impression of utility is often too flawed.

Well, first of all, the model struggles with externalities. I have repeatedly pointed this out. I don't know how a libertarian would respond to this criticism.

What are they? If everything is valued at the margin, free things are simply those that are abundant and have a price of zero. Even if the Earth itself was a libertarian anarchy and the atmosphere itself privatized, there would be an Einstein and a Hilton. The former can be destitute and the latter extremely rich. Everything is private and there are no externalities; everything is priced in inside a huge market. Hilton is really worth more than Einstein, and yet her loss deals almost zero damage to society compared to losing Einstein. What is the externality here? And if there is such a gigantic externality so that Einstein is not adequately "priced in" the society, perhaps prices are a piss poor method of finding out human worth.

That peoples' lives can be valued in the market doesn't imply that their net worth is that measure: the two are separate and distinct, and measured in different ways.

What of income inequality? Simple: the person with more income is a person more valuable to society. Therefore, goods and services are allocated not just to those people who derive great utility from them but also to those whom society, i.e., the aggregate of all other human beings, values most, as measured by the voluntary transfer of resources from all other human beings to that individual.

So people give more to Hilton than to Einstein, even though the latter is clearly more important and, I'd say, even more scarce than Hilton. Collective misdecision, maybe, or the model is a pile of useless shit.

[Simon_Jester]

Collective misdecision makes the model a useless pile of shit; I've been going on about that literally since page one.

This model is fundamentally invalid if we do not assume that the market is accurate, rational, objective-about-reality in the sense of "has objectivity." If it's just a random number generator for sticking numbers onto things and calling them prices, or even if there are significant erratic effects in it, that puts a huge hole in the model. MoO has yet to adequately acknowledge this, in spite of his ritual genuflection in the direction of "market errors."

Because the entire argument relies on using prices to measure preferences, and this you cannot do, because money is not reliably distributed through the economy at levels that accurately match people's preferences. Huge piles of money wind up in Paris Hilton's hands; was that something anyone wanted to happen? How is it a utilitarian good for her to end up rich? And you can't reverse the argument and say "but she is rich, therefore society must prefer that she have the money." It doesn't work that way, because that's assuming what you very much need to prove (that society allocated money in accordance with some reasonable weighted average of the preferences of its members) if you want to argue that we should use the allocation of money to measure preferences.

Otherwise we might as well read tea leaves to measure preferences.

[Bakustra]

Can you show that it is an ultimate result, though? Because you seem to be saying that the only value is that of market value, and then generalizing that to material success equaling moral worth. Just as an example, diamonds are valuable. This is agreed upon generally. Is the life of the children who die in the process of mining blood diamonds valued at the price of the diamonds?

Presumably (I don't know about this--it's the subject of discussion on which I'm unclear of) a libertarian would accept that their system is only meant to govern internalized markets with few or no externalities associated with them.

So then, the system is far less practical than communism, seeing as they can only govern highly idealized systems, and at least communists attempt to make their systems workable generally.

What is the value of a human life under this system? How do you determine the value? By life insurance, by wrongful-death suits, by the cost of hiring an assassin? For that matter, before the existence of life insurance or wrongful-death suits, did life have no value?

I typically measure human life by what people themselves declare their lives to be worth through their actions. This is pretty easily measurable (in the US it's been estimated at around $2.7-$3mm). For instance, you can find subsets of construction workers and high-rise construction workers who have essentially equal skillsets, and can set up a matched-pair sample with many hundreds or thousands of pairs. High-rise construction workers are paid a premium over other construction workers with similar skills and experience because of the danger associated with their jobs, and so you can extrapolate from that what the marginal worker believes their life to be worth.

So does this mean that American CEOs are inherently valuable and morally superior to European and Japanese CEOs, as they earn far more?

This also suggests that some people are worth more than others, which would tend to stratify along national boundaries.

Ummm... yes, that's possible.

More inevitable, since any conceivable measure of worth under your system will vary from nation to nation, and vary sharply between the developed and developing worlds. Apart from the problems of declaring Africans to be morally inferior to Americans and Europeans, this secular prosperity doctrine excuses the actions of First World countries and distorts historical actions. Under this, we would have to conclude that the excesses of feudalism were quite justified, as peasants were morally inferior to their overlords. Do you really think that codifying this into society is really worth it?

A hypothetical. Take two nations, A and B. The market value of human life in A is four times that of B, by way of greater economic development and the presence of more worker's rights. Should a criminal receive one-quarter of the sentence for murdering a citizen of B as opposed to A? Remember, we have no value but market value here, and so the crime is therefore less for B than A. It seems to me that you would have to abandon in such a situation either market values as moral values or the concept of basic human equality.

Yes, I believe that criminal penalties should be set with reference to the amount of damage that they have done to society and with respect to the cost to that society of inflicting that punishment upon the criminal. I imagine that a libertarian (to the extent that they believe that there should be a government to dole out such punishments) would agree.

So you are a-OK with one law for the rich, and another for the poor? This is what this amounts to.

[Andrew J.]

Ultimately, a libertarian would point out that I am a better arbiter of what I like and what my tastes and preferences are than anyone else, and I imagine that you can more accurately determine what will be of benefit to you than anyone else.

Haha, nope. Like most people, I am terrible at self-evaluation. I buy shit I don't need and don't particularly enjoy later all the time! An outside observer who studies how I use the things I buy could make better purchasing decisions for me than I ever could.

[Rye]

Hilton's behavior may indicate that she values her life far less than Einstein does, if she is willing to risk it for vastly lower rewards (in fact, some of her actions seem positively risk-seeking with respect to her life, from what I understand of her character, which is not a normal view for people to take). That peoples' lives can be valued in the market doesn't imply that their net worth is that measure: the two are separate and distinct, and measured in different ways.

Well, aside from the fact Surly said that a person's worth to society corresponds to the money "voluntarily" paid to them by the public, the problem with even appealing to self-described notions of personal value. A happy death camp supervisor will value his life far more than a doctor that can potentially cure cancer but who frequently has suicidal thoughts.