Ukraine War Thread

[Omega18]

The above assumes that Russia got a right to a sphere of influence, it does not. If they want to chose the EU, they are free to do so and should be able to do so without any concern for Russia. As to it being economically disadvantageous to Russia, tough cookies for Russia. None of that excuses armed intervention.

No, it merely acknowledges that sphere of influence as a fact, which it is. Whether it has a 'right' to that influence is irrelevant. Its economic and military power relative to its neighbors and the hold it has over them via the supply of energy - as well as ethnic and cultural ties - is what it is. A fact on the ground. Effective foreign policy is about acknowledging reality, not actively fucking shit up and excusing said fuck ups with complaining whether x or y country has a 'right' to do a or b. America and the EU by the same measure had no 'right' to actively meddle in Ukraine's internal politics and legitimise a coup either. It means little and less. And why are you couching this in terms of "none of that excuses armed intervention"? The article plainly has absolutely nothing to do with Russia's intervention, let alone excusing it. Its exclusively talking about American and European policies creating a situation that is disadvantageous for America, which need not have existed at all.

The idea that sphere of influence should be accepted as a fact or in any way be acceptable to the U.S. or EU to the degree you are suggesting is laughable.

In reality truly simply accepting such a thing in the Ukraine would incredibly dangerous. That would basically convey the idea that this would also potentially apply to in particular Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and could easily create a situation where either Putin or a future Russian leader misjudges things and ends up in a full fledged war with NATO after military intervention in those cases. (Such a "sphere of influence" would also likely apply to the Central Asian republics along with possibly countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, or even Poland. At a minimum there is a risk that if Putin gets away with things in the Ukraine some future Russian leader would go further and see what he can get away with.) Your point about "the hold it has over them via their supply of energy" is potentially even more troubling since it applies to a significant degree to a substantial portion of the E.U. at the moment.

Even beyond the implications of Russia itself, the message the situation would convey to a country such as China and what they could possibly get away with without an international reaction would also be quite dangerous, and this could easily eventually apply to other countries as well. There have been clear international principles out there that another nation's borders and not to be infringed either directly militarily or even by some of the ways Russia has been doing so, and Russia appears to be currently trying to create a different and dangerous set of round rules. Russia simply can't plausibly argue that any of the circumstances that could arguably make international intervention arguably acceptable apply in the case of the Ukraine. (Even if for the sake of argument you truly buy that Russia was concerned about the possible future safety of the Russian population prior to their intervention and stirring up of an insurgency, options of international observers to monitor things and deter such behavior was clearly on the table to address this.) The basic reality is Russian propaganda aside, the US and EU didn't even vaguely meddle in the Ukraine the way Russia has.

Even looking at elements of the demographic details, there are further reasons for the US and EU not to let things slide in this case. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts literally have two of the lowest fertility rates in the Ukraine (and this has actually been the case for many years) with it being 1.34 and 1.33 respectively in 2012 for example. By contrast, Rivne Oblast actually had a 2.08 fertility rate in 2012 and some of the other western oblasts either have at least close to comparable, or at least far higher fertility rates than Donetsk and Luhansk.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographi ... lity_rates

This means that the degree of ability for the populations of Donetsk and Luhansk to internally dictate general Ukrainian policy is clearly going to substantially drop with time. (And even from a perspective of the two oblasts attempting to simply become independent/part of Russia Ukraine will in key respects be able to more easily handle things in the future given the demographic shift.)

[K. A. Pital]

The idea that sphere of influence should be accepted as a fact or in any way be acceptable to the U.S. or EU to the degree you are suggesting is laughable.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monroe_Doctrine
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_missile_crisis

Even beyond the implications of Russia itself, the message the situation would convey to a country such as China and what they could possibly get away with without an international reaction would also be quite dangerous, and this could easily eventually apply to other countries as well.

"Only established powers should have spheres of influence" is a message that is bound to have the same effect. But with more resentment, of course.

[Omega18]

The idea that sphere of influence should be accepted as a fact or in any way be acceptable to the U.S. or EU to the degree you are suggesting is laughable.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monroe_Doctrine
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_missile_crisis

If you look at the original rules and principles of the Monroe doctrine, it was actually about simply not basically allowing European countries to militarily intervene in the Americas rather than anything broader.

Now obviously in the 20th century it grew into something more than this, but past cold war excesses by the U.S., which has led to long term consequences for the U.S.'s international reputation do not justify current Russian misconduct. (If you do want to bring up the case of Panama in 1990, it should be noted that the Panama population voted overwhelmingly for anti-Noreiga candidates in 1989 and Noreiga simply arbitrarily annulled the election, so whatever else you think of the intervention it was a clear case of overthrowing an outright dictator by that point.)

If the U.S. wanted (and took steps) to base actual nukes in the Ukraine right now, or even more glaringly nuclear missiles, I would certainly understand a Russian reaction. It should be noted that the move was much more strategically significant than the comparable hypothetical reaction would be today, given the limited number of Soviet ICBMs and the lack of anything like modern SSBN capabilities. (Which in the case of SSBN could hypothetically launch pretty close to Moscow if the US truly wanted to although there are clearly all sorts of reasons that would be a terrible idea.) The practical reality is such a move by the U.S. is not even remotely vaguely on the radar screen at the moment.

Now the better example to actually bring up might be the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961, but I would among other things note that this occurred in 1961 in the middle of the Cold War. It should be noted that this was a period where not only did each side have its own sphere of influence much more formally declared, (the US essentially let the USSR get away with far more direct interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia for example) but its not as if the USSR was making no effort to covertly move various Latin and South American governments to be in their favor. Its just that the Us was able to more effectively do so in the region. (And it was true that actually militarily the US had a clear advantage over the US in an actual direct military fight in the region, although it should be noted that even in 1961 the US did not engage in an outright direct military invasion of Cuba.)

A key basic point here is there have been plenty of South American and Latin American governments with various levels of anti-American oriented politicians in charge post 1990 and the US simply has not done anything that could reasonably be called intervention in response. It simply is not plausible that Chavez and now Maduro would have remained in charge of Venezuela if the US had maintained a position regarding intervening comparable to what was the case in the middle of the Cold War.

In other words, the US doesn't maintain the kind of sphere of influence today that Russia clearly wants to have.

[Vympel]

Fixed your double-post.

The idea that sphere of influence should be accepted as a fact or in any way be acceptable to the U.S. or EU to the degree you are suggesting is laughable.

As Stas said, this is classic "its ok for me, but not for thee". The reality is that there's many good reasons why it should be accepted, as many seasoned diplomats from the Cold War have attested in lamenting the deterioration of relations with Russia. That reason is simple - Russia is a great power whose cooperation is required on many pressing issues and antagonizing it for reasons that are not critical to the national interests of the United States and Europe is incredibly foolish and shortsighted.

In reality truly simply accepting such a thing in the Ukraine would incredibly dangerous. That would basically convey the idea that this would also potentially apply to in particular Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and could easily create a situation where either Putin or a future Russian leader misjudges things and ends up in a full fledged war with NATO after military intervention in those cases. (Such a "sphere of influence" would also likely apply to the Central Asian republics along with possibly countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, or even Poland. At a minimum there is a risk that if Putin gets away with things in the Ukraine some future Russian leader would go further and see what he can get away with.) Your point about "the hold it has over them via their supply of energy" is potentially even more troubling since it applies to a significant degree to a substantial portion of the E.U. at the moment.

That's just rubbish. Russia has no stated or even apparent interest to extract political compliance or exercise hegemony from the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Romania, or Poland. Russia's 'sphere of influence' as is commonly understood is its near-abroad - i.e. the former Soviet Republics excluding the Baltic States. This is hardly surprising, since the membership of the Baltic States in NATO is entirely non-threatening to Russia. In the event of a war it could overrun all three of them in inside of a week, even in its weakened state, and there's not a damn thing that NATO could do about it. If the Baltic states were a critical issue to Russia, they would've raised much more hell than they did when they joined NATO back in 2004.

Ukraine is an entirely different matter. Justified or not, Russia considers it in their sphere of influence. I have yet to hear a single cogent reason what the US and EU gain out of trying to force it into their own sphere, save pissing Russia off and risking war for no apparent reason other than high-minded and irrelevant "Ukraine's right to go its own way" puffery.

Even beyond the implications of Russia itself, the message the situation would convey to a country such as China and what they could possibly get away with without an international reaction would also be quite dangerous, and this could easily eventually apply to other countries as well. There have been clear international principles out there that another nation's borders and not to be infringed either directly militarily or even by some of the ways Russia has been doing so, and Russia appears to be currently trying to create a different and dangerous set of round rules. Russia simply can't plausibly argue that any of the circumstances that could arguably make international intervention arguably acceptable apply in the case of the Ukraine. (Even if for the sake of argument you truly buy that Russia was concerned about the possible future safety of the Russian population prior to their intervention and stirring up of an insurgency, options of international observers to monitor things and deter such behavior was clearly on the table to address this.) The basic reality is Russian propaganda aside, the US and EU didn't even vaguely meddle in the Ukraine the way Russia has.

"That would send a dangerous message" is just a load of big fat bullshit neocons peddle to justify military aggression and confrontation all over the world, in crises both big and so small as to be beneath notice. In this alarmist world view, its always 1938, and every single international spat is Munich, and the person acting against US interests (i.e. everything everywhere in the world, as defined by neocons) is always Hitler. There is no relevance or applicability of what has happened in Ukraine to any other country or region. Countries act according to their perceived interest and are simply not swayed, ever, by action or inaction by their opponent in other regions, because they are not relelvant to them.

Stated simply - if China wishes to wage aggression, it will wage aggression, according to its own political calculations, with no regard whatsoever to what happened in Ukraine.

As to the US and EU not meddling in Ukraine the way Russia has, that's absolutely true - Russia never aided, abetted and legitimised an anti-Western coup in Ukraine to its own benefit, nor do we have a Russian diplomat getting caught on the phone discussing who they're going to replace the democratically elected leader of the country with. You'll recall that the 2004 pro-Western "Orange Revolution" passed without Russia annexing Crimea. Probably because said revolution involved a far more legitimate exercise of the political process.

Even looking at elements of the demographic details, there are further reasons for the US and EU not to let things slide in this case. Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts literally have two of the lowest fertility rates in the Ukraine (and this has actually been the case for many years) with it being 1.34 and 1.33 respectively in 2012 for example. By contrast, Rivne Oblast actually had a 2.08 fertility rate in 2012 and some of the other western oblasts either have at least close to comparable, or at least far higher fertility rates than Donetsk and Luhansk.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographi ... lity_rates

This means that the degree of ability for the populations of Donetsk and Luhansk to internally dictate general Ukrainian policy is clearly going to substantially drop with time. (And even from a perspective of the two oblasts attempting to simply become independent/part of Russia Ukraine will in key respects be able to more easily handle things in the future given the demographic shift.)

I fail to see how the population of Donetsk and Luhansk is the business of the US or EU in any way, shape or form whatsoever. As the article linked above states, Ukraine is a country with whom neither share any cultural, historical, demographic, economic, religious, or national-security interests.

If you look at the original rules and principles of the Monroe doctrine, it was actually about simply not basically allowing European countries to militarily intervene in the Americas rather than anything broader.

Now obviously in the 20th century it grew into something more than this, but past cold war excesses by the U.S., which has led to long term consequences for the U.S.'s international reputation do not justify current Russian misconduct. (If you do want to bring up the case of Panama in 1990, it should be noted that the Panama population voted overwhelmingly for anti-Noreiga candidates in 1989 and Noreiga simply arbitrarily annulled the election, so whatever else you think of the intervention it was a clear case of overthrowing an outright dictator by that point.)

If the U.S. wanted (and took steps) to base actual nukes in the Ukraine right now, or even more glaringly nuclear missiles, I would certainly understand a Russian reaction. It should be noted that the move was much more strategically significant than the comparable hypothetical reaction would be today, given the limited number of Soviet ICBMs and the lack of anything like modern SSBN capabilities. (Which in the case of SSBN could hypothetically launch pretty close to Moscow if the US truly wanted to although there are clearly all sorts of reasons that would be a terrible idea.) The practical reality is such a move by the U.S. is not even remotely vaguely on the radar screen at the moment.

Now the better example to actually bring up might be the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961, but I would among other things note that this occurred in 1961 in the middle of the Cold War. It should be noted that this was a period where not only did each side have its own sphere of influence much more formally declared, (the US essentially let the USSR get away with far more direct interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia for example) but its not as if the USSR was making no effort to covertly move various Latin and South American governments to be in their favor. Its just that the Us was able to more effectively do so in the region. (And it was true that actually militarily the US had a clear advantage over the US in an actual direct military fight in the region, although it should be noted that even in 1961 the US did not engage in an outright direct military invasion of Cuba.)

A key basic point here is there have been plenty of South American and Latin American governments with various levels of anti-American oriented politicians in charge post 1990 and the US simply has not done anything that could reasonably be called intervention in response. It simply is not plausible that Chavez and now Maduro would have remained in charge of Venezuela if the US had maintained a position regarding intervening comparable to what was the case in the middle of the Cold War.

In other words, the US doesn't maintain the kind of sphere of influence today that Russia clearly wants to have.

Indeed, the US doesn't maintain the kind of sphere of influence Russia wants to have. America considers its sphere of influence as the entire goddamn Earth and has hundreds of military bases scattered everywhere, all over the globe. It has launched massive military interventions in multiple nations in the past half-decade alone to impose regime change on leaders who will not do its bidding, killing hundreds of thousands of innocents in the process, wrecking Libya and Iraq, possibly beyond repair. It continues to agitate against Syria's government, even though to do so would strengthen ISIS - or the Caliphate or whatever they fuck they are now - even more.

Oh, and lets not forget the way they continue to prop up odious Middle Eastern dictatorships who kowtow to them. Like the coup government in Egypt which overthrew a democratically elected government.

The notion that anyone should look with disapproval and worry at Russia's modest and by comparison downright benign desire to influence its near abroad to its benefit and pretend America is not somehow guilty of orders of magnitude more aggression and suffering beggars the imagination.

EDIT: the point here is not 'who's worse' - though the answer is unequivocally and objectively the West - but to point out how goddamn ridiculous it is to intone solemnly about how Russia should not be allowed to maintain its influence over its neighbours because its some sort of threat to world peace. That's just ... obscene.

[Omega18]

Fixed your double-post.
As Stas said, this is classic "its ok for me, but not for thee". The reality is that there's many good reasons why it should be accepted, as many seasoned diplomats from the Cold War have attested in lamenting the deterioration of relations with Russia. That reason is simple - Russia is a great power whose cooperation is required on many pressing issues and antagonizing it for reasons that are not critical to the national interests of the United States and Europe is incredibly foolish and shortsighted.

We don't live in a world where the degree of compromises Russia apparently wants is acceptable. (Even if Russia is truly willing to stop there which is plainly very questionable.)

"That would send a dangerous message" is just a load of big fat bullshit neocons peddle to justify military aggression and confrontation all over the world, in crises both big and so small as to be beneath notice. In this alarmist world view, its always 1938, and every single international spat is Munich, and the person acting against US interests (i.e. everything everywhere in the world, as defined by neocons) is always Hitler. There is no relevance or applicability of what has happened in Ukraine to any other country or region. Countries act according to their perceived interest and are simply not swayed, ever, by action or inaction by their opponent in other regions, because they are not relelvant to them.

Stated simply - if China wishes to wage aggression, it will wage aggression, according to its own political calculations, with no regard whatsoever to what happened in Ukraine.

The simply fact of the matter is other countries look at the risks, including international responses, when making their own calculations of what they can get away with. Given the degree Russia has emphasized "protecting ethnic Russians" with their intervention that creates a clear possibility of China giving the same justification for all sorts of actions in the the region around it. China is already asserting all sorts of historical claims to territory it does not control (or should not legally control in the case of certain stretches of ocean) and that's another element of Russia's current justification for its behavior.

[QUOT]As to the US and EU not meddling in Ukraine the way Russia has, that's absolutely true - Russia never aided, abetted and legitimized an anti-Western coup in Ukraine to its own benefit, nor do we have a Russian diplomat getting caught on the phone discussing who they're going to replace the democratically elected leader of the country with.[/QUOTE]
The fact of the matter is all the EU and US can arguably be actually guilty of is legitimizing it after the fact which is not the same thing. Russian propaganda aside, the western reaction about all about Yanukovych and his escalation of things by attacking at what at the time had been basically unarmed protesters along with new laws stifling dissent. (And which also brought into extreme question the ability of the people of the Ukraine to be able to remove him in a future election.) The statement about the diplomat is wildly misleading at best. You had a US diplomatic expressing his preference for a specific leader, which is not in any way vaguely surprising or actual a problem. (It merely was embarrassing to come out publicly like that. Even the US privately letting it be known that ideally they would happen to prefer to see a certain leader in charge would not really be a problem.) If Obama had come out publicly strongly for a specific leader to be elected, that would have been an issue, but nothing vaguely like that happened. (Of course Russia has expressed in preferences far more blatantly in past Ukrainian elections.)

I would note that Russia itself is not talking about Yanukovych anymore, which suggests to some degree they are guilty of "legitimizing the coup" as well.

The basic thing this argument completely ignores is that an true election happened quickly after the fact and (why partly due to Russian actions) and the current Ukrainian President won by an overwhelming margin. The reality is that Donetsk and Luhansk could not have plausibly altered the results given the margin of victory. (And its not like the #2 vote recipient Tymoshenko is a beloved candidate of most of the people in those two oblasts.) Basically a situation where a true election happens so quickly after the fact clearly removes one of the conceivable justifications for intervention, and means what happened in the Ukraine fits far more with the profile of a revolution. (Just one where the parliament actually basically stays in place for awhile and what happened is admittedly not popular in a portion of the country. Russia however had a heck of allot to do with the reaction in the East going further than this though.)

[Vympel]

We don't live in a world where the degree of compromises Russia apparently wants is acceptable.

We should.

(Even if Russia is truly willing to stop there which is plainly very questionable.)

Its plainly not very questionable at all. We've already seen the alarmist nonsense about Putin taking over all Ukraine was just that - nonsense.

The simply fact of the matter is other countries look at the risks, including international responses, when making their own calculations of what they can get away with.Given the degree Russia has emphasized "protecting ethnic Russians" with their intervention that creates a clear possibility of China giving the same justification for all sorts of actions in the the region around it. China is already asserting all sorts of historical claims to territory it does not control (or should not legally control in the case of certain stretches of ocean) and that's another element of Russia's current justification for its behavior.

What evidence have you got that this is a "simple fact"? What on Earth does Russia taking Crimea have to do with China's territorial claims and its assessment of the threats to itself if it presses the issue?

The argument that never dies

Here's a direct response to the utterly spurious "but China!" argument:

This is as wrong as can be. For one thing, U.S. security guarantees to its treaty allies are of a completely different kind than U.S. commitments to clients and proxies. More to the point, what the U.S. does in one place doesn’t usually affect “the rest of the board” in the way that Gobry means. Even if the U.S. is perceived as having let down its local clients in one place, this has no relevance for what it will do in other places, nor is it important in shaping what other states expect the U.S. to do. The fall of South Vietnam and the overthrow of the Shah were the most dramatic reversals for U.S. policies in their respective regions during the Cold War, but this didn’t tell other governments anything about U.S. commitments to its allies in East Asia and Europe. And why would it? Jonathan Mercer noted in an article last year that the Soviets were puzzled by the extent of America’s commitment to South Vietnam:

Similarly, Ted Hopf, a professor of political science at the National University of Singapore, has found that the Soviet Union did not think the United States was irresolute for abandoning Vietnam; instead, Soviet officials were surprised that Americans would sacrifice so much for something the Soviets viewed as tangential to U.S. interests [bold mine-DL].

If the Soviets viewed the end of the Vietnam War this way, is it at all likely that China–or any other state–is going to judge U.S. commitments to its real allies based on what it does or doesn’t do about internal conflicts in countries where the U.S. has little or nothing at stake? No, it isn’t. The problem with the “credibility” argument isn’t just that it’s false, but that it creates perverse incentives to embark on and to persist in stupid and unnecessary policies for fear of what “they” will think of us if we don’t.

Ukraine was not an ally of the US or EU. There were no treaty obligations between NATO and Ukraine. The notion that Russia's actions in Crimea would in any way effect Chinese calculus in the South China Sea - an area of far more obvious interest to the United States, its allies, and un-allied third parties, is simply bullshit of the highest order.

The fact of the matter is all the EU and US can arguably be actually guilty of is legitimizing it after the fact which is not the same thing. Russian propaganda aside, the western reaction about all about Yanukovych and his escalation of things by attacking at what at the time had been basically unarmed protesters along with new laws stifling dissent.

Oh good lord you can't possibly be that naive. You think the West ever gave two flying fucks about protesters being oppressed? That's just bad comedy. The US and EU cared because they wanted to pull Ukraine out of Russia's orbit and into their own. The protesters in the east didn't do anything different from what the protesters in the Maidan did, originally. Where they exhorted Yanukovych not to use violence against the Maidan protesters (many of whom were armed - go watch the umpteen videos of cops with riot shields getting burned alive by molotovs) while giving diplomatic and rhetorical cover to the coup-government and then Porhoshenko's obscenely named and plainly excessive "anti-terrorist" operation?

In a world where the US turns a blind eye to Sisi's open slaughter of his political opponents in Egypt, I'm supposed to believe the US cares deeply about Ukrainian protesters. Come on.

(And which also brought into extreme question the ability of the people of the Ukraine to be able to remove him in a future election.) The statement about the diplomat is wildly misleading at best. You had a US diplomatic expressing his preference for a specific leader, which is not in any way vaguely surprising or actual a problem. (It merely was embarrassing to come out publicly like that. Even the US privately letting it be known that ideally they would happen to prefer to see a certain leader in charge would not really be a problem.) If Obama had come out publicly strongly for a specific leader to be elected, that would have been an issue, but nothing vaguely like that happened. (Of course Russia has expressed in preferences far more blatantly in past Ukrainian elections.)

Wildly misleading my ass. The transcript is crystal clear - they're actively involved in plotting the makeup of the new government of Ukraine according to their preferences, not just having a random chat about who they like.

I would note that Russia itself is not talking about Yanukovych anymore, which suggests to some degree they are guilty of "legitimizing the coup" as well.

That's a completely ridiculous attempt to draw equivalence and you know it.

The basic thing this argument completely ignores is that an true election happened quickly after the fact and (why partly due to Russian actions) and the current Ukrainian President won by an overwhelming margin. The reality is that Donetsk and Luhansk could not have plausibly altered the results given the margin of victory. (And its not like the #2 vote recipient Tymoshenko is a beloved candidate of most of the people in those two oblasts.) Basically a situation where a true election happens so quickly after the fact clearly removes one of the conceivable justifications for intervention, and means what happened in the Ukraine fits far more with the profile of a revolution. (Just one where the parliament actually basically stays in place for awhile and what happened is admittedly not popular in a portion of the country. Russia however had a heck of allot to do with the reaction in the East going further than this though.)

The idea that Ukraine's quick "election" after the fact is something to be applauded is a joke. Wow, a corrupt oligarch with billions to burn comfortably won an election in circumstances where the political infrastructure of the political party that had just been in power was destroyed by a coup and the coup-appointed and flagrantly undemocratic and unelected cabinet remains in place. It continues to amaze me that people think the people in the East needed to be roused by Russian propaganda into action.

[K. A. Pital]

If the U.S. wanted (and took steps) to base actual nukes in the Ukraine right now, or even more glaringly nuclear missiles, I would certainly understand a Russian reaction.

So potentially turning an entire state into your military base is irrelevant? I mean, you should know that bombers are based on airfields, right, and those carry nukes? Oh no; if it were nuclear missiles, then we'd have CMC mark 2.0 with a reverse twist, a lot more intense and dangerous than the current crisis.

[Omega18]

So potentially turning an entire state into your military base is irrelevant? I mean, you should know that bombers are based on airfields, right, and those carry nukes? Oh no; if it were nuclear missiles, then we'd have CMC mark 2.0 with a reverse twist, a lot more intense and dangerous than the current crisis.

There is absolutely zero evidence of anything even vaguely resembling this right now.

In fact, notably there is STILL little interest in the Ukraine joining NATO right now from the perspective of NATO countries. If that was all Russia wanted, they certainly could have pressed for guarantees, or even a formal treaty for that matter and presumably gotten it before they started pulling all their stunts in the Ukraine.

Of course geographically Latvia in particular is basically as close as the Ukraine is to Moscow, so as far as a possible nuclear threat to Russia is concerned there is virtually no difference.

As I pretty much noted, the whole idea of even Russia basing nukes in Cuba as a new significant threat is mostly obsolete (it only applied during the earlier 1960s) with the reality being that ICBMs can easily hit the US today in large number for all sorts of locations in Russia and SSBNs in particular could conceivably be launched with limited warning at Washington D.C. The main issue with it today would be how it breached a prior agreement and implies a far more aggressive general nuclear posture from Russia.

However in the case of Russia for example, the realities are the its SSBN fleet and mobile ICBMs in particular make any sort of decapitation strike strategy non-viable, (the US would still be screwed by the Russian nuclear response) and this is especially true in any remotely realistic crisis leading to a scenario where nukes might be used. The idea the Ukraine represents a new nuclear threat to Russia right now is laughable. (With the only question being if in the future the Ukraine will conclude that given Russia's word and promises are worthless, they will need to re-arm with nukes to guarantee their territorial integrity.)

[K. A. Pital]

If that was all Russia wanted, they certainly could have pressed for guarantees, or even a formal treaty for that matter and presumably gotten it before they started pulling all their stunts in the Ukraine.

Well, the US for one doesn't care about treaties if it has other interests. See ABM Treaty. What 'guarantee'? Trusting a nation state to hold its word is more foolish than walking through a dark lane at 3:00 in the morning.

Of course geographically Latvia in particular is basically as close as the Ukraine is to Moscow, so as far as a possible nuclear threat to Russia is concerned there is virtually no difference.

Pretty much so; couple this with the loss of high-end industrial enterprises. Russia already lost them once when the Western part of the USSR collapsed. Ukraine's enterprises, the ones around Kharkov that makes most of the industrial GDP, are important parts of Russia's defense sector.

The idea the Ukraine represents a new nuclear threat to Russia right now is laughable. (With the only question being if in the future the Ukraine will conclude that given Russia's word and promises is worthless, they will need to re-arm with nukes to guarantee their territorial integrity.)

I never said that Ukraine is a nuclear threat. However, states chose to meddle in the affairs of other sovereign states guided by perceptions of security. The very same thing is happening with Ukraine; although Russia's reaction has been rather muted (securing Crimea, a naval base on the Black Sea which has limited utility save for the enterprises that service ships).

Ukraine and other Soviet republics should have kept the nuclear weapons. They are the only serious guarantee of non-interference.

[mr friendly guy]

The simply fact of the matter is other countries look at the risks, including international responses, when making their own calculations of what they can get away with. Given the degree Russia has emphasized "protecting ethnic Russians" with their intervention that creates a clear possibility of China giving the same justification for all sorts of actions in the the region around it. China is already asserting all sorts of historical claims to territory it does not control (or should not legally control in the case of certain stretches of ocean) and that's another element of Russia's current justification for its behavior.

Just for clarification purposes

1. How do you make the link that what China is doing is linked to what Russia has done given that China had made these historical claims waaaaay before Russia took Crimea.

2. Are you saying its ok for China to assert historical claims to disputed areas it DOES control?

3. The corollary is that is it not ok for another country, oh I don't know, lets say a Western country like Spain to assert historical claim to a region it doesn't control, like Gibraltar?

4. It sounds like you are afraid China might use military force to settle geopolitical disputes because it can "get away with it" given that Russia seems to have "gotten away with it". Do you also think its NOT ok for a Western country, say the US to use force to settle a geopolitical dispute. Especially give the US's action in the last decade which unlike the Chinese example doesn't involve protecting any of its territory or territorial claim whatsoever.

[Omega18]

Pretty much so; couple this with the loss of high-end industrial enterprises. Russia already lost them once when the Western part of the USSR collapsed. Ukraine's enterprises, the ones around Kharkov that makes most of the industrial GDP, are important parts of Russia's defense sector.

Uh, this clearly falls under the tough luck category. There actually is allot of evidence even now that the Ukraine would be perfectly willing to cooperate given the economic motives as far as continuing to sell defense equipment and parts if Russia would stop its behavior. You seem to be arguing for a standard where the U.S. would be justified in invading any country that is part of the F-35 program for example if the U.S. didn't like a recent change in its government.

I never said that Ukraine is a nuclear threat. However, states chose to meddle in the affairs of other sovereign states guided by perceptions of security. The very same thing is happening with Ukraine; although Russia's reaction has been rather muted (securing Crimea, a naval base on the Black Sea which has limited utility save for the enterprises that service ships).

You certainly seemed to convey that it was a nuclear threat with your earlier comment. The second comment it utterly preposterous nonsense with the reality among other things being that the Ukrainian government had absolutely left the base and its troops alone prior to the Russian invasion, and had not given any impression this was going to change. If they actually had taken steps, I suppose then Russia would at least have some sort of justification for their invasion, but that simply did not happen in reality. (I'm not saying I would approve of an invasion for that reason, and I am really not persuaded that Russia could not simply have ports and facilities on non-Crimea Russia instead, but this issue didn't even apply when Russia took its action.)

[K. A. Pital]

Uh, this clearly falls under the tough luck category.

Your state should be dismembered, I'll see you talk about 'tough luck'.

You seem to be arguing for a standard where the U.S. would be justified in invading any country that is part of the F-35 program for example if the U.S. didn't like a recent change in its government.

No, actually (Russia is selling to everyone; when is the last time Russia invaded Iraq? Syria? Egypt?). But if the Confederacy or, say, Texas became independent 20 years ago along with all its industrial enterprises, I don't think the US would be kind to a pro-Russian government was installed there. Maybe it would accept the losses and attempt to rebuild its crippled industrial base. Or maybe it wouldn't, and it would invade the territory saying it has to protect itself and the others from... uh... Cuban aggression or something. Who knows.

You certainly seemed to convey that it was a nuclear threat with your earlier comment.

No, I just gave an example of how one nationstate threw a hissy fit over the sovereign dealings of two other nationstates.

Ukrainian government had absolutely left the base and its troops alone prior to the Russian invasion, and had not given any impression this was going to change.

The acting prime minister Yatsenuk said that the Kharkov agreements (allowing the fleet to remain until 2042) should not have been signed, in fact. He called them 'anticonstitutional'. If they were rescinded, the fleet would have to leave 2017. No options.

I'm not saying I would approve of an invasion for that reason, and I am really not persuaded that Russia could not simply have ports and facilities on non-Crimea Russia instead, but this issue didn't even apply when Russia took its action

It certainly applied; much more so than any actual fighting or 'protection of Russian speakers' (the shelling and the killing in the East did not yet start at all).

[Omega18]

Just for clarification purposes

1. How do you make the link that what China is doing is linked to what Russia has done given that China had made these historical claims waaaaay before Russia took Crimea.

2. Are you saying its ok for China to assert historical claims to disputed areas it DOES control?

3. The corollary is that is it not ok for another country, oh I don't know, lets say a Western country like Spain to assert historical claim to a region it doesn't control, like Gibraltar?

4. It sounds like you are afraid China might use military force to settle geopolitical disputes because it can "get away with it" given that Russia seems to have "gotten away with it". Do you also think its NOT ok for a Western country, say the US to use force to settle a geopolitical dispute. Especially give the US's action in the last decade which unlike the Chinese example doesn't involve protecting any of its territory or territorial claim whatsoever.

The point regarding #1 is not that China was not making the claims before, but that if they see Russia get away with both Crimea and especially other behavior with the Ukraine (I recognize that Crimea is not realistically going to be anything other than defacto part of Russia anytime soon.)

2. For #2 it depends on what you're talking about. I basically feel China occupation of Tibet was wrong, but I'm not about to support fighting WW3 to try to resolve the issue, nor do I feel any other approach is likely to be effective. (The best the international community can try for is to try to persuade China to respect the rights of Tibetans at this point.) China creating artificial islands to support their claims in the South China sea is troubling, and if its accepted as a valid tactic brings up the possibility of a whole bunch of other countries trying similar stunts to basically steal oceanic EEZ from another country in the future to gain more oil and gas rights for example.

3. In general I feel those claims are a huge problem period if they go beyond "for the record we had historical ties to that part of land but we don't intend to do anything about that."The only exception would be a truly recent occupation situation where it becomes more about the other country altering the previous status quo. Basically in the post WW2 world barring generally extreme circumstances country boundaries should stay the same because any other rule gets messy in a hurry.

4. You are presumably talking about Iraq here (I would put Afghanistan in a different category we can talk about this if your unclear.) I view the invasion of Iraq as wrong, although it should be noted Saddam certainly did take actions that got him in that position such as invading Kuwait in the first place. (And it was not as if he was generally beloved by Iraqis in general before the US military came in and removed him.) However I would note that the US invasion of Iraq was never about annexation of any territory, and Iraq did not end up with a US puppet government either. (With the issue of how the government in power has behaved actually leading to some of the problems the country is having now.)

The troubling thing is the "sphere of influence" doctrine that seems to be espoused here would even with a conservative version suggest that if the people of Belarus become fed up with their government and overthrow it in a revolution, Russia is justified either directly or covertly militarily intervening if they don't like the new government's position with regards to Russia. (In other words even a basic version significantly restrict the independence of a bunch of countries whom are not part of Russia right now among other issues.)

[Omega18]

The acting prime minister Yatsenuk said that the Kharkov agreements (allowing the fleet to remain until 2042) should not have been signed, in fact. He called them 'anticonstitutional'. If they were rescinded, the fleet would have to leave 2017. No options...

It certainly applied; much more so than any actual fighting or 'protection of Russian speakers' (the shelling and the killing in the East did not yet start at all).

Given the prime minister was clearly not likely to be in power long and this still fell under rhetoric, this is still a very laughable argument. As a practical matter Russia certainly could have waited for the Ukraine to actually do something before taking action. They didn't even do some version of "promise within 72 hours to respect the 2042 treaty or face the consequences" type of warning. (A more moderate theoretical option would be to specifically demand more time for the navy to make such a move and threaten consequences if this didn't happen, which would at least be more understandable for the international community and mean the Ukraine government would be blamed to some degree if they said no and Russia occupied the Crimea.)

When Russia behaves in an outrageous manner other countries don't have to accept what they do as reasonable, and this sort of justification is simply not even remotely convincing.

[K. A. Pital]

The best the international community can try for is to try to persuade China to respect the rights of Tibetans at this point.

Well, one thing is certain: tibetans do have a higher life standard and a better life than the ones that were left nominally independent under an idiotic fundamentalist monarchy in Bhutan. There are many problems with political rights, et cetera, but as you can see China itself has problems with separatism. And you think that something was wrong and you apparently think the best case scenario is separation - it's simply not realistic, but otherwise good? It kind of makes me wonder just how different that is from Crimea or the East of Ukraine...

China creating artificial islands to support their claims in the South China sea is troubling, and if its accepted as a valid tactic brings up the possibility of a whole bunch of other countries trying similar stunts to basically steal oceanic EEZ from another country in the future to gain more oil and gas rights for example.

Uh... I think you've been missing the scramble for the Arctic by Russia, Norway and Canada that's like, totally ongoing. So this tactic is (1) old (2) already in widespread use.

In general I feel those claims are a huge problem period if they go beyond "for the record we had historical ties to that part of land but we don't intend to do anything about that."

Japan claims the Kuriles even though it has absolutely nothing to do with them for almost a century now.

Given the prime minister was clearly not likely to be in power long and this still fell under rhetoric, this is still a very laughable argument.

The experience of the previous Maidan, when the government decided to void agreements with Russia, shows otherwise.

As a practical matter Russia certainly could have waited for the Ukraine to actually do something before taking action. They didn't even do some version of "promise within 72 hours to respect the 2042 treaty or face the consequences" type of warning.

Certainly. In fact, they could've done a lot differently. Maybe even ignored Crimea. How does this change the situation? It doesn't. Actually, by saying 'respect the treaty or we invade' that wouldn't have been made better in my view. It would be admitting that you invade over a military base. Bad PR.

When Russia behaves in an outrageous manner other countries don't have to accept what they do as reasonable, and this sort of justification is simply not even remotely convincing.

Crimeans are crazily pro-Russian and had something to gain by separating; only this made the option a comfortable decision for the rulers. But otherwise, of course, other countries 'don't have to accept'.

But what are they going to do? Escalate? Nuke? Uh... Cry?

[Omega18]

Uh... I think you've been missing the scramble for the Arctic by Russia, Norway and Canada that's like, totally ongoing. So this tactic is (1) old (2) already in widespread use.

Unless you can link to an example, I an unaware of anything involving that situation involving artificial islands being created. (There are potential issues with some of the current claims, but this is also an issue currently being discussed internationally rather than a country simply arbitrarily asserting EEZ clearly contrary to intentional law like China is currently doing with part of its South China sea claims. The claims by the countries in the artic in question do to my knowledge avoid infringing on internationally recognized EEZs.)

Japan claims the Kuriles even though it has absolutely nothing to do with them for almost a century now.

Uh, that seems a pretty lose definition of a century for the record. Japan remained in control of the islands in question until 1945. More to the point, I think its safe to say there is zero evidence that Japan is about to take military action on this point anytime in the remotely plausible future, so the continued claim in ultimately not that problematic in the grand scheme of things. (I don't see Japan in a position to effectively coerce Russia on this issue without using military force either.) Having said this, the more recent nature of the claim versus say Spain and Gibraltar at least makes it a more understandable dispute from my view. (There also is a bit of a dispute about what Japan exactly agreed to give up claims to in prior international agreements on the subject, which is actually a fairly reasonable point of dispute to bring up.)

[Thanas]

Meanwhile, the nationalists in Slawjanks have been defeated and are now fleeing. A good first start for the Ukrainian Army, may they quickly reestablish control before the extremists on both sides capitalize on the chaos.

[K. A. Pital]

More to the point, I think its safe to say there is zero evidence that Japan is about to take military action on this point anytime in the remotely plausible future, so the continued claim in ultimately not that problematic in the grand scheme of things

Of course. But is it because of agreements? No. It's because Russia has nukes.

[Omega18]

Of course. But is it because of agreements? No. It's because Russia has nukes.

Actually simply having nukes in of itself is not necessarily an absolute deterrent for this kind of thing or Argentina would have never invaded the Falklands in 1982.

[K. A. Pital]

Of course. But is it because of agreements? No. It's because Russia has nukes.

Actually simply having nukes in of itself is not necessarily an absolute deterrent for this kind of thing or Argentina would have never invaded the Falklands in 1982.

Falklands are too far; they are parts of a relic, an oceanic Empire. None of these left right now, most attacks will be aimed at the country's immediate vicinity. Where the nuclear deterrent operates. So tipping off a nuclear response in the Falklands was judged to be impossible, since other wars against oceanic Empires were successful (Vietnam; Algeria), without nukes being used. It was a correct judgement.

And on the other hand, attacking the immediate borders of a nation can provoke such a war, even through mere accident. So it's different.

In any case, if you think that Russia's deterrent won't stop Japan from attacking, then nothing will.

[mr friendly guy]

The point regarding #1 is not that China was not making the claims before, but that if they see Russia get away with both Crimea and especially other behavior with the Ukraine (I recognize that Crimea is not realistically going to be anything other than defacto part of Russia anytime soon.)

But they were "getting away" with making historical claims. Notice how there are no sanctions on them for making these claims. They were getting away with it before Russia took Crimea. Fuck, they have made these historical claims before some of the other claimants (noticeably the Phillipines) have been claiming the disputed territories. Sure you can make the claim that what Russia did has embolden them, but its hard to differentiate that hypothesis from the hypothesis that China is just going on business as usual with its claims.

2. For #2 it depends on what you're talking about. I basically feel China occupation of Tibet was wrong, but I'm not about to support fighting WW3 to try to resolve the issue, nor do I feel any other approach is likely to be effective. (The best the international community can try for is to try to persuade China to respect the rights of Tibetans at this point.) China creating artificial islands to support their claims in the South China sea is troubling, and if its accepted as a valid tactic brings up the possibility of a whole bunch of other countries trying similar stunts to basically steal oceanic EEZ from another country in the future to gain more oil and gas rights for example.

Since I mentioned disputed territory which they do control it doesn't include Tibet, because no other nation nor the Dalai Lama these days dispute Beijing's sovereignty over Tibet. Oh you meant those Free Tibet whiners who assault disabled athletes. I don't think they count, since we usually talk about countries disputing territorial claims with each other, not a bunch of historically illiterate attention whores.

But what I was thinking of, is the Paracel islands which they have controlled for decades and is disputed with Vietnam, and the site of the oil rig tension. They control it, even Vietnam doesn't dispute that, although they obviously consider it occupied. Is China wrong for making historical claims here since they do control it and have done so for decades?

BTW - do you also object to the actions of other countries who have disputes with China in setting up buildings in those disputed islands to bolster their claim, or is it bad because China has the means to create bigger structures?

3. In general I feel those claims are a huge problem period if they go beyond "for the record we had historical ties to that part of land but we don't intend to do anything about that."The only exception would be a truly recent occupation situation where it becomes more about the other country altering the previous status quo. Basically in the post WW2 world barring generally extreme circumstances country boundaries should stay the same because any other rule gets messy in a hurry.

First point I can't help noticing is your post WW2 statement. Take a look at this American propaganda video published during WWII which I have time indexed. This shows Tibet part of China. Since you are talking about a post WW2 borders will you withdraw the claim about China occupying Tibet? And if you're going to make an argument that they couldn't control all their territory, well that's because there were several wars going on in China at that time until the CCP reasserted control.

Second point is, you will therefore condemn some of China's rivals then for their claims on the islands. For example the Phillipines only made claims in 1958 to parts of the Spratly's and started occupying them in the 1960s, ie post WW2 1. Meanwhile China even before the founding of its modern incarnation the PRC had made claims pre WW2 in 1935 and asserted control over some of them after Japan's surrender, but had to withdraw because of the Chinese civil war 2.
1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine ... ly_Islands
2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spratly_Islands

Three - are you going to say "but Western media never reported this."

4. You are presumably talking about Iraq here (I would put Afghanistan in a different category we can talk about this if your unclear.) I view the invasion of Iraq as wrong, although it should be noted Saddam certainly did take actions that got him in that position such as invading Kuwait in the first place. (And it was not as if he was generally beloved by Iraqis in general before the US military came in and removed him.) However I would note that the US invasion of Iraq was never about annexation of any territory, and Iraq did not end up with a US puppet government either. (With the issue of how the government in power has behaved actually leading to some of the problems the country is having now.)

Yes I am talking about Iraq, and secondly, we both know the second invasion was not about Saddam invading Kuwait. It was about imaginary weapons of mass destruction which quickly changed to spreading democracy as a justification. But at least you view it as wrong.

Thirdly, the lack of annexation is irrelevant to this point. The number of deaths from US fuck ups in Iraq is more than what Russia did in Crimea, and certainly more than what China has done on predominantly uninhabited islands. This targeting of Russia and China looks to be a variation of special pleading - that is its more wrong when THEY do it.

The troubling thing is the "sphere of influence" doctrine that seems to be espoused here would even with a conservative version suggest that if the people of Belarus become fed up with their government and overthrow it in a revolution, Russia is justified either directly or covertly militarily intervening if they don't like the new government's position with regards to Russia. (In other words even a basic version significantly restrict the independence of a bunch of countries whom are not part of Russia right now among other issues.)

I don't necessarily agree with a right to have a sphere of influence, but I recognise it exists. However saying its just used by Russia when the West does it as well is just rhetorical bullshit. Look at America's involvement in the Pacific and the EU involvement with Africa with paternalistic shit where African countries aren't supposed to do deals they themselves negotiated with China.

[Omega18]

But they were "getting away" with making historical claims. Notice how there are no sanctions on them for making these claims. They were getting away with it before Russia took Crimea. Fuck, they have made these historical claims before some of the other claimants (noticeably the Phillipines) have been claiming the disputed territories. Sure you can make the claim that what Russia did has embolden them, but its hard to differentiate that hypothesis from the hypothesis that China is just going on business as usual with its claims.

While it may come down more to specific actions by China rather than just the claim's, while there has not been anything like sanctions so far, there have been real international diplomatic consequences for China.

In a rather eye opening reaction given the Philippines history with Japan during WW2, its government had the following explicitly positive response to Japan revising its constitution to allow its military to be more aggressive in its posture in the future.
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/107485 ... t-military

Given the way the U.S. got basically kicked out of these Philippine bases, the fact they have recently been welcomed back to a degree is also notable.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/ ... GE20140314

There is even talk about US forces getting regular access to Vietnamese bases in the future, which in combination with recent Vietnamese links with Japan suggests China is well on its well to creating a general regional alliance against it.
http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/vietnam- ... ter-china/
http://news.usni.org/2014/06/02/japan-p ... -next-year

BTW - do you also object to the actions of other countries who have disputes with China in setting up buildings in those disputed islands to bolster their claim, or is it bad because China has the means to create bigger structures?

My objection was never with setting up buildings in the first place if you read my post again. It is specifically about creating NEW islands which is a completely different matter altogether.
http://news.usni.org/2014/06/02/japan-p ... -next-year

Its this specific action which is so troubling and suggests a dangerous future disruptive precedent if it gets to be an accepted method to determine sea boundaries.

3. In general I feel those claims are a huge problem period if they go beyond "for the record we had historical ties to that part of land but we don't intend to do anything about that."The only exception would be a truly recent occupation situation where it becomes more about the other country altering the previous status quo. Basically in the post WW2 world barring generally extreme circumstances country boundaries should stay the same because any other rule gets messy in a hurry.

First point I can't help noticing is your post WW2 statement. Take a look at this American propaganda video published during WWII which I have time indexed. This shows Tibet part of China. Since you are talking about a post WW2 borders will you withdraw the claim about China occupying Tibet? And if you're going to make an argument that they couldn't control all their territory, well that's because there were several wars going on in China at that time until the CCP reasserted control.

You're talking about a propaganda video whose focus was mostly elsewhere rather than China's true legal boundaries, and is certainly not the sort of source that would be considered reliable regarding this sort of thing. I am rather astonished that you would even bother bringing it up as a point of evidence to be blunt. It even proceeds to show "China proper" with more limited boundaries which further undermines the point you appear to have been trying to make. To be possibly truly relevant, it would need to be something like a formal US or map from an intentionally recognized authority, (possibly the League of Nations give the time frame) specifically showing country boundaries. (Admittedly this is getting somewhat off topic from the original thread subject.)

Second point is, you will therefore condemn some of China's rivals then for their claims on the islands. For example the Phillipines only made claims in 1958 to parts of the Spratly's and started occupying them in the 1960s, ie post WW2 1. Meanwhile China even before the founding of its modern incarnation the PRC had made claims pre WW2 in 1935 and asserted control over some of them after Japan's surrender, but had to withdraw because of the Chinese civil war 2.
1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine ... ly_Islands
2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spratly_Islands

You appear to have missed my specific objection was with China's EEZ claims and not their claims on the islands in question persay.

Basically in this case you're talking about islands that have basically been historically uninhabited and historically had disputed claims to them. Given the relatively recent permanent stationing of even troops on the island, I put them in a very different category than say the Falklands which has had a long term resident non-military population. (I also put uninhabited islands with long undisputed or clearly settled territorial claims in a different category.)

While I am not an expert on every detail on the historical claims, I basically view the situation as a pissing match which should get settled diplomatically. Its very clear in this case the real motives are (along with being a pure nationalistic pissing match) are about the fishing and oil and gas in the surrounding regions rather than the islands themselves. (I would note for the record that Vietnam for example can certainly point to longer term claims with regards to the islands.)

Now my actual specific strong problem with China's behavior is even if you wanted to take the most favorable interpretation of China's Parcel and Spratley island claims, their EEZ claims are out of bounds.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scarboroug ... claims.jpg

Basically China signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, which means they should solely be able to claim oceanic areas with 200 miles of what they own.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nat ... of_the_Sea

When two sides own islands which would infringe on the other's boundaries, the differences should basically get split half and half. China is simply disregarding this and also basically looking for anything no matter how scant with regards to what they can claim as islands to bolster their EEZ claims. China also is specifically relying on a claim about historical maritime times to the region, which legally speaking appears to be trying to make a new claim principle out of thin air, which is certainly not authorized by the 1982 agreement. If this last principle was acceptable, you would wonder if the UK might be able to claim half the world's oceans as its EEZ or something given its historical period of naval dominance.

In other words, my objections are not really about claims to the Spratleys or Parcels at all, although how aggressive China has been recently is a concern, but how much further Chinese claims actually go with its EEZ assertions.

[Omega18]

Unfortunately I ran out of time to fix the link. My link about China creating new islands should have gone to this link instead.
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/20 ... -china-sea

[Pelranius]

I think that article is talking about China building extensions onto islands, rather than magicking them out of the deep blue seas.

[Omega18]

I think that article is talking about China building extensions onto islands, rather than magicking them out of the deep blue seas.

Not really.

You're at best talking about cases that are extremely borderline islands at best which China is now making much larger affairs to magnify their claims as this NY Times article clarifies.
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/world ... .html?_r=0

The article also notes how this behavior also appears in violation of a 2002 agreement which China also signed.