Trouble in South Ossetia escalates

[Darth Hoth]

It has always been the rule of the strong, just that Western Europe lost its Great Power status since they royally screwed themselves in the last World War such that they have never recovered that status. Which is why they banded together as the EU and NATO just so they still have some clout left.

Still, is not an international consensus better to work with than individual whimsy? Russia itself respects such rulings, or at least did so till recently, and did not agitate against recognised borders before. Not to mention that this protects the status quo, and thus defends weaker parties from stronger neighbours who would otherwise take what they could by force. Or, if one imagines some crackpot dictator trying to revise Africa's borders . . . it would not be pretty.

And it was much of the EU and the US who determined how Yugoslavia was broken up, so you were saying?

It is my personal belief that the NATO action against Kosovo was morally unjustified, in that it constituted an assault upon a recognised state over what should have been an internal problem. It certainly was not a matter of acting by the overall model of respecting recognised borders; one state cannot "unrecognise" another.

[Axis Kast]

No it doesn't. Russia claims that South Ossetia is not part of Georgia, regardless of what the European powers say. How dare they defy the great powers which have drawn the world's maps for the last 200 years, right?

The CIA World Factbook holds otherwise: “Russia and Georgia agree on delimiting all but small, strategic segments of the land boundary and the maritime boundary; OSCE observers monitor volatile areas such as the Pankisi Gorge in the Akhmeti region and the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia….”

What Russia seems to claim, piecing it all together, is that South Ossetia ought to be an exclusion zone insofar as Georgia proper is concerned, never mind their essentially open support for a militia that regularly clashed with the Georgian military.

This is like the legalistic argument on morality, where it is said that rules, even stupid ones that lead to absurd outcomes, are superior to a system which calls for any situational judgment whatsoever simply because they are predictable.

Structure helps leaders make decisions. We tend to look at erratic leaders without much sympathy, saying, “These are the men who make war more probable.”

It is also amusing to see you refuse to admit the fact that your own supposedly superior system, which emphasizes “least oppression,” spells the end of many sub-Saharan African states. The Third World has always been the most tenacious proponent of sovereignty – precisely because they have no other means than convention to safeguard the integrity of borders that adhere to no real logic.

Your attitude is a manifesto that grants approval to any rebellion that buys itself into possession of a military, forgetting even about the practice of good government. The “least oppression” route even invalidates civil war.

I'm curious why you believe that it does.

By the rules and norms of international relations, Georgia is a sovereign nation and cannot voluntarily repudiate its de jure ownership of the two provinces.

[Darth Wong]

The CIA World Factbook holds otherwise: “Russia and Georgia agree on delimiting all but small, strategic segments of the land boundary and the maritime boundary; OSCE observers monitor volatile areas such as the Pankisi Gorge in the Akhmeti region and the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia….”

What Russia seems to claim, piecing it all together, is that South Ossetia ought to be an exclusion zone insofar as Georgia proper is concerned, never mind their essentially open support for a militia that regularly clashed with the Georgian military.

How does that mean that Russia agrees South Ossetia is part of Georgia?

This is like the legalistic argument on morality, where it is said that rules, even stupid ones that lead to absurd outcomes, are superior to a system which calls for any situational judgment whatsoever simply because they are predictable.

Structure helps leaders make decisions. We tend to look at erratic leaders without much sympathy, saying, “These are the men who make war more probable.”

So? It is quite possible to have predictable systems by which actions can be judged without resorting to the legalistic method. Are you honestly so ignorant that you think the legalistic system is the only way to do things?

It is also amusing to see you refuse to admit the fact that your own supposedly superior system, which emphasizes “least oppression,” spells the end of many sub-Saharan African states. The Third World has always been the most tenacious proponent of sovereignty – precisely because they have no other means than convention to safeguard the integrity of borders that adhere to no real logic.

I'm getting tired of your strawman lies, asshole. I haven't said one word about African states, nor would I leap up in defense of the sovereignty of a place like, for example, Zimbabwe.

The last time you grossly misrepresented my position in this thread, I generously assumed that you were just incompetent. However, it is looking more and more deliberate. No such conversation ever occurred where I defended African state sovereignty despite human-rights violations, yet you are acting as though we have been having one right here.

Your attitude is a manifesto that grants approval to any rebellion that buys itself into possession of a military, forgetting even about the practice of good government. The “least oppression” route even invalidates civil war.

Your inability to read is not my problem. Your increasing use of lies to characterize my position, however, is starting to seriously irritate me. You will either cease and desist, or I will force you to.

[Axis Kast]

How does that mean that Russia agrees South Ossetia is part of Georgia?

It's so simple, even you can follow.

The Factbook keeps a rather exhaustive list of outstanding territorial ("transnational") disputes. Totalistic rejection of the Georgian claim to South Ossetia does not appear therein, last I checked. Indeed, the implication of the quotation is that it is the specific boundaries, not the overall ownership of the province, that the two sides dispute. Although, obviously, Russia now claims that, within Georgia, there was a genuine enclave of Russian citizens in need of urgent assistance, their rebellion notwithstanding. Personally, I always found Russia's outcry over their peacekeepers much more convincing.

So? It is quite possible to have predictable systems by which actions can be judged without resorting to the legalistic method. Are you honestly so ignorant that you think the legalistic system is the only way to do things?

My entire point, unfolding below, is that your system isn't predictable, and therefore, isn't even really very moral, despite your call for supporting what one might call "the least violent" outcome.

I'm getting tired of your strawman lies, asshole. I haven't said one word about African states, nor would I leap up in defense of the sovereignty of a place like, for example, Zimbabwe.

Ah, yes, because anybody who adduces examples, or tries to make sense of your logic by applying it to real-world examples, is lying.

Did you or did you not encourage the application of a system that favors solutions that don't involve heavy military action?

By giving the nod to South Ossetia, with its generally homogenous attitude toward secession, its functional government, its own military, and the fact that Georgia has no bloodless method of bringing it to hell, you would set a precedent whereby any breakaway entity would have the implicit right of independence simply because their action requires suppression. How can you not understand this very straightforward outcome from your original position? In your own words, "[T]he outcome that seems to require the least oppression is best." If this is only going to be your position if the breakaway area has "proven" itself with de facto independence after an initial clash of arms, then say so. (Of course, this still involves huge problems for many countries, since a bunch of them don't really govern at all. Like Sudan.) A kind of one-off rule for civil war -- either settle it when everything originally goes to pot, or you've lost the chance to get your province back.

If this is not your position, I welcome you, of course, to clarify. Which is the whole point I have invited you to establish a definition of your own time and time again. Not that I think I've read the wrong outcomes into what you're proposing.

Once again, you seem to share Marina's attitude that the relative moral accomplishment of a breakaway people or province is an important consideration in their appeal for independence. And I ask you for the third time: by who's scale will we weight offenses?

[Kanastrous]

and the fact that Georgia has no bloodless method of bringing it to hell,

The methods used for bringing places to hell, are rarely bloodless.

[Axis Kast]

I meant "to heel." And you're right. They rarely are.

[Darth Wong]

The Factbook keeps a rather exhaustive list of outstanding territorial ("transnational") disputes. Totalistic rejection of the Georgian claim to South Ossetia does not appear therein, last I checked.

I like the way you carefully add the "totalistic" qualifier, in order to justify your laughably incorrect statement by moving the goalposts to the next zipcode.

My entire point, unfolding below, is that your system isn't predictable, and therefore, isn't even really very moral, despite your call for supporting what one might call "the least violent" outcome.

It's outcome-based, just like any legitimate ethical system. The fact that outcome-based systems lack perfect prescience is not an indictment; other systems don't even try.

I'm getting tired of your strawman lies, asshole. I haven't said one word about African states, nor would I leap up in defense of the sovereignty of a place like, for example, Zimbabwe.

Ah, yes, because anybody who adduces examples, or tries to make sense of your logic by applying it to real-world examples, is lying.

More lies, asshole. You assumed that I defend the sovereignty of African states, and that since my logic might lead to the loss of that sovereignty, then I would "refuse to admit" it. The fact is that I don't think much of sub-saharan African state sovereignty in many cases, so I would hardly "refuse to admit" that my system would lead to the loss of sovereignty of those states. Once more, YOU ARE LYING. You're a lying jackass at the best of times, but your repeated and insistent lying in this case is abnormal even for you.

Did you or did you not encourage the application of a system that favors solutions that don't involve heavy military action?

Yes. Your problem is that you assume I would make an exception for sub-saharan African states, when I said no such thing.

By giving the nod to South Ossetia, with its generally homogenous attitude toward secession, its functional government, its own military, and the fact that Georgia has no bloodless method of bringing it to hell, you would set a precedent whereby any breakaway entity would have the implicit right of independence simply because their action requires suppression.

Correct, which is why Canada responded to Quebec's secessionist movement by asking them to vote on it. That's how civilized people deal with these things. According to you, we should have shelled Quebec City. It's not my fault you're so locked into your cro-magnon way of looking at the world that you can't deal with this.

[Axis Kast]

I like the way you carefully add the "totalistic" qualifier, in order to justify your laughably incorrect statement by moving the goalposts to the next zipcode.

It’s close to an open and shut case; either Russia essentially recognizes the legitimacy of the Georgian claim, or it does not. In this case, the notation is very clear: there are specific disputes on demarcation of the border, but the general writ of Tbilisi over the majority of that territory is not disputed. Russia went to war over the deaths of its peacekeepers and its “citizens.”

It's outcome-based, just like any legitimate ethical system. The fact that outcome-based systems lack perfect prescience is not an indictment; other systems don't even try.

And adopting it is an invitation to chaos.

More lies, asshole.

Actually, this is where you begin putting words in my mouth.

You assumed that I defend the sovereignty of African states, and that since my logic might lead to the loss of that sovereignty, then I would "refuse to admit" it.

Incorrect. I assumed that you wouldn’t recognize the sovereignty of African states. Which, of course, opens a whole can of worms when it comes to solving conflicts there. Which has been my point all along. As I see it, you’re advocating that we pass Russia’s action in South Ossetia through a new moral lens that reimagines the sources of sovereignty. My argument is that using the lens across multiple cases would be disastrous.

The fact is that I don't think much of sub-saharan African state sovereignty in many cases, so I would hardly "refuse to admit" that my system would lead to the loss of sovereignty of those states.

Then what benefit does your system offer?

Illuminatus Primus and I were recently discussing this, and he makes a cogent point. Sovereignty is what the big powers in the international system hand down. Whether or not you think it is simple bullying – and let’s dispense with your ridiculous idea that it is a Western monopoly; he correctly cited that Russia and China have considerable say, as in Georgia and Sudan – it’s the way things get done. And it isn’t going to change, because they (and we) write the rules in bloody ink.

Your attitude toward solving conflicts in favor of the most vulnerable is morally commendable. And practically inutile.

Yes. Your problem is that you assume I would make an exception for sub-saharan African states, when I said no such thing.

Not at all. I see disaster for African states in any imagined adoption of your position – their presumptive sovereignty would be gone overnight.

Correct, which is why Canada responded to Quebec's secessionist movement by asking them to vote on it. That's how civilized people deal with these things. According to you, we should have shelled Quebec City. It's not my fault you're so locked into your cro-magnon way of looking at the world that you can't deal with this.

Since when was Canada in open rebellion? The FLQ were a bunch of lunatics. Many Quebecois supported total independence; there was no broad-based shadow government or universal militia.

I rerefer you here to Illuminatus Primus’ reminder that what matters is what stronger neighbors permit. Biafra aspired to be free. It could not be free because Nigeria would not permit. You have a preference for certain outcomes. It doesn’t work. It isn’t applicable. It’s not something we can safely use.

And, for the fourth time, since it’s so essential to your entire position: I understand the part about protecting innocent lives. But you and Marina were both explicit: some peoples are not sufficiently mature for self-rule. The Confederate States of America is a good example. Yet who will decide whether a group has committed too much sin to govern itself? And, when a people decides it wants to rebel, does the original sovereign have the right to oppose this violently? If so, at what stage?

[Darth Wong]

It’s close to an open and shut case; either Russia essentially recognizes the legitimacy of the Georgian claim, or it does not.

It does not. I don't know why you could possibly think otherwise.

In this case, the notation is very clear: there are specific disputes on demarcation of the border, but the general writ of Tbilisi over the majority of that territory is not disputed. Russia went to war over the deaths of its peacekeepers and its “citizens.”

Russia claimed to be protecting the people of South Ossetia, not going to war with them as part of Georgia.

Incorrect. I assumed that you wouldn’t recognize the sovereignty of African states. Which, of course, opens a whole can of worms when it comes to solving conflicts there. Which has been my point all along. As I see it, you’re advocating that we pass Russia’s action in South Ossetia through a new moral lens that reimagines the sources of sovereignty. My argument is that using the lens across multiple cases would be disastrous.

This is what you said, asshole:

It is also amusing to see you refuse to admit the fact that your own supposedly superior system, which emphasizes “least oppression,” spells the end of many sub-Saharan African states. The Third World has always been the most tenacious proponent of sovereignty – precisely because they have no other means than convention to safeguard the integrity of borders that adhere to no real logic.

You claimed that I would "refuse to admit" that some of these states should lose their sovereignty according to my logic. For the third fucking time, I have said no such thing, and your own words are about to hang you. You're a lying sack of shit.

Then what benefit does your system offer?

Illuminatus Primus and I were recently discussing this, and he makes a cogent point. Sovereignty is what the big powers in the international system hand down. Whether or not you think it is simple bullying – and let’s dispense with your ridiculous idea that it is a Western monopoly; he correctly cited that Russia and China have considerable say, as in Georgia and Sudan – it’s the way things get done. And it isn’t going to change, because they (and we) write the rules in bloody ink.

So? How does that change the fact that we are having an argument about whether certain nations are engaging in wrongful actions? An argument that, by its very nature, hinges upon ethical concerns rather than is/ought fallacies?

Your attitude toward solving conflicts in favor of the most vulnerable is morally commendable. And practically inutile.

Yes. Your problem is that you assume I would make an exception for sub-saharan African states, when I said no such thing.

Not at all. I see disaster for African states in any imagined adoption of your position – their presumptive sovereignty would be gone overnight.

If the result was actually chaos and oppression, then I would not recommend loss of sovereignty in those cases. You really don't grasp the whole concept of outcome-based ethics, do you?

I see now that the entire concept is simply beyond your grasp.

[Axis Kast]

It does not. I don't know why you could possibly think otherwise.

Because the list represents a compendium of the border arrangements that Russia takes issue with?

Russia claimed to be protecting the people of South Ossetia, not going to war with them as part of Georgia.

And yet, when it comes down to paper, Russia's bone of contention is actually where the ultimate border lies. They are described as "small" issues; not whether there is, in fact, a relatively newly-independent nation between the two.

You claimed that I would "refuse to admit" that some of these states should lose their sovereignty according to my logic. For the third fucking time, I have said no such thing, and your own words are about to hang you. You're a lying sack of shit.

Oh! Now I see the problem! Yes. What I should have said was, "You are too ignorant...," not, "You refuse to admit the fact..." My apologies. I did not realize I'd given the wrong impression. What I did was assume that you had to have seen the dangers of universally applying your desired norm.

My point, Mike, is that you wave your hands and, in a stroke, abrogate the sovereignty of the only thing an entire continent has to keep border poachers and ethnic politics at bay. More on this below, account for your rebuttal.

So? How does that change the fact that we are having an argument about whether certain nations are engaging in wrongful actions? An argument that, by its very nature, hinges upon ethical concerns rather than is/ought fallacies?

"Wrongful action" is either action that is ethnically or legally wrong. The two can differ. Legally, Russia violated Georgian sovereignty. Why do I say this? Because the legal norm, right now, is decided by the strong. Russia recently happened to alter it. Ethically, both sides are at fault. Russia stoked a fire, hoping it would have an opportunity to put the hurt on a neighbor. Georgia, as you've described it, ran roughshod over the ideal of self-determination.

I wouldn't say, anyway, that this is what our argument is about. As I see it, you've advanced an alternative to consensus-based sovereignty; a post-Westphalian idea actually articulated by Mill and others that sovereignty goes as far as the popular toleration of it.

If the result was actually chaos and oppression, then I would not recommend loss of sovereignty in those cases. You really don't grasp the whole concept of outcome-based ethics, do you?

How can you be sure? I understand outcome-based ethics. I don't think it works. Certainly it will not work in the world we see today.

You keep dodging the rational requirement of establishing how one can be ascertained of who is moral enough to deserve self-government. And how we are to decide whether and how the original sovereign may respond to secession. Is it correct that you believe they can only respond when the breakaway faction is morally reprehensible?

[Darth Wong]

And yet, when it comes down to paper, Russia's bone of contention is actually where the ultimate border lies. They are described as "small" issues; not whether there is, in fact, a relatively newly-independent nation between the two.

Nice way to split hairs: so according to you, Russia has no problem with the idea of South Ossetia being part of Georgia; they just disagree about where the border should be. Guess what: that's what people do when they disagree about who owns a piece of territory.

Oh! Now I see the problem! Yes. What I should have said was, "You are too ignorant...," not, "You refuse to admit the fact..." My apologies. I did not realize I'd given the wrong impression. What I did was assume that you had to have seen the dangers of universally applying your desired norm.

Yet again, you are too fucking stupid to understand that a situationally dependent outcome-based standard DOES NOT INVOLVE A RULE YOU MINDLESSLY APPLY UNIVERSALLY, BY DEFINITION. It involves looking at likely outcomes and choosing the one which will cause the least damage, moron. You keep thinking that you can trap me in some situation where my rule will cause net harm and I will insist on the rule anyway, and you clearly do not understand that if the outcome is net harm, then my rule would necessarily involve not doing it.

Allow me to repeat, since it seems that you just can't wrap your head around this: all of your arguments are based upon this idiotic notion that you can trap me by showing me some unanticipated harmful outcome of my argument, when my argument is in fact about always looking for the least harmful outcome. As I said, you are clearly incapable of grasping the concept of an outcome-based system.

[Axis Kast]

Nice way to split hairs: so according to you, Russia has no problem with the idea of South Ossetia being part of Georgia; they just disagree about where the border should be. Guess what: that's what people do when they disagree about who owns a piece of territory.

Negative. Argentina contests, for example, the whole of the British claim on the Falkland Island group.

Allow me to repeat, since it seems that you just can't wrap your head around this: all of your arguments are based upon this idiotic notion that you can trap me by showing me some unanticipated harmful outcome of my argument, when my argument is in fact about always looking for the least harmful outcome. As I said, you are clearly incapable of grasping the concept of an outcome-based system.

Even without a universal norm, you still require the very thing you have wormed around this entire time, obviously blithely unaware: an arbiter capable of making those calls about what is at stake, how the players are likely to move, and who qualifies for independence. You're proposing a way of doing things. These outcome-based ethics are a new model. How will they be applied? How can they be?

At least one hang-up is in the morality. Where does on start digging for bad blood?

[Darth Wong]

Nice way to split hairs: so according to you, Russia has no problem with the idea of South Ossetia being part of Georgia; they just disagree about where the border should be. Guess what: that's what people do when they disagree about who owns a piece of territory.

Negative. Argentina contests, for example, the whole of the British claim on the Falkland Island group.

So? The fact that it's possible to make a more extreme land claim doesn't mean that they are not disputing Georgian claims of the territory in question.

Allow me to repeat, since it seems that you just can't wrap your head around this: all of your arguments are based upon this idiotic notion that you can trap me by showing me some unanticipated harmful outcome of my argument, when my argument is in fact about always looking for the least harmful outcome. As I said, you are clearly incapable of grasping the concept of an outcome-based system.

Even without a universal norm, you still require the very thing you have wormed around this entire time, obviously blithely unaware: an arbiter capable of making those calls about what is at stake, how the players are likely to move, and who qualifies for independence.

Sure you do. But this also provides a way for others to determine whether that arbiter was correct, and a mechanism for determining that the arbiter's judgment was clearly wrong and reversing course if necessary. Can you say the same? Under your system, the arbiter is the standard, rather than having to justify his claims of meeting that standard.

You're proposing a way of doing things. These outcome-based ethics are a new model. How will they be applied? How can they be?

See above, fool. You are still trying to jam a square peg into a round hole.

[Axis Kast]

So? The fact that it's possible to make a more extreme land claim doesn't mean that they are not disputing Georgian claims of the territory in question.

If they do, why is it not recorded in the study? Why, in fact, does the study report that there are only "small" disagreements?

Sure you do. But this also provides a way for others to determine whether that arbiter was correct, and a mechanism for determining that the arbiter's judgment was clearly wrong and reversing course if necessary. Can you say the same? Under your system, the arbiter is the standard, rather than having to justify his claims of meeting that standard.

What are the mechanisms of arbitration? You sing the praises of this system. One understands that it may have moral benefits. Less obvious are the means of implementation that make this viable.

... clearly wrong? Reversing course? Are you kidding me? How does one "reverse course" on independence? "Oops, sorry. The original arbiter, all those months or years ago was wrong. Back you go!"

[K. A. Pital]

De jure, those were Georgian citizens. Considered to be part and parcel of an unlawful revolt against the recognized national authority.

However, they renounced their Georgian citizenship (a) and got Russian citizenship (b). End of story. Both acts are legal, as far as the relevant party agrees to give citizenship to certain persons.

Kosovo is also a great example of “war on its own merits.” The West intervened on behalf of the Albanians, who were facing genocide.

As far as I know, Albanians were not facing outright genocide. Ethnic cleansing, yes. But so? Did America or NATO help just about in every case of ethnic cleansing? Why Russia had to have it's soldiers die in Georgia's civil wars and the Nagorno-Karabach conflict, to be later told that those conflicts are "out of it's scope of jurisdiction"?

Georgia’s staunch opposition to South Ossetian self-government was regrettable, but not evidence of repressive activities anymore harsh than those reportedly practiced throughout the world today.

In that case what Serbia did in Kosovo doesn't classify as "genocide" as well. Actually, didn't the Tribunal rule that way?

Would the War in Iraq be any more to your liking if the U.S. had gone in to topple Hussein explicitly?

At least it'd be easier to check motivations against an explicit goal, but I do feel this is tangential.

[K. A. Pital]

Why, in fact, does the study report that there are only "small" disagreements?

Why the fuck is the CIA WFB suddenly a matter of "fact"? Would you also use Wikipedia to prove a political position of a nation, Kast?

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Still, is not an international consensus better to work with than individual whimsy? Russia itself respects such rulings, or at least did so till recently, and did not agitate against recognised borders before. Not to mention that this protects the status quo, and thus defends weaker parties from stronger neighbours who would otherwise take what they could by force. Or, if one imagines some crackpot dictator trying to revise Africa's borders . . . it would not be pretty.

The trouble is that if international consensus mattered, Kosovo wouldn't have. What Kosovo signified in many ways was that the borders were determined by the elite few. Naturally, the precedent ruffled lots of feathers behind doors. You can be certain that many countries like Spain and Indonesia and countless others with separatist problems said no to the idea of Kosovo. Status quo didn't matter at all.

As for Africa, well, who really cares about Africa?

It is my personal belief that the NATO action against Kosovo was morally unjustified, in that it constituted an assault upon a recognised state over what should have been an internal problem. It certainly was not a matter of acting by the overall model of respecting recognised borders; one state cannot "unrecognise" another.

I'm certainly glad you think that way. The trouble right now, is that Russia are sick of having someone else's will imposed on them that what happened in S. Ossetia is a natural consequence of the trampling of status quo in Eastern Europe. I really doubt Georgia will be first and last clash over borders in that area; a consequence of the break up of the Soviet Union and the fragmentation of the Russian people.

[Illuminatus Primus]

I don't see how Mike's sovereignty proposal could ever get realistically implemented. It'd just be instated, then abused and end up just being part of that laundry-list of things that sovereign states ignore and tread over in their pursuit of power, with a new term developing to describe the consensus of powers on the legitimacy of lesser states. Sovereignty by definition is a legal concept, not an ethical one. Whether a nation deserves to be a state and be recognized and whether that would be better morally for the human beings at stake is a different issue. Its normative versus positive discussions.

[Guardsman Bass]

Yet again, you are too fucking stupid to understand that a situationally dependent outcome-based standard DOES NOT INVOLVE A RULE YOU MINDLESSLY APPLY UNIVERSALLY, BY DEFINITION. It involves looking at likely outcomes and choosing the one which will cause the least damage, moron. You keep thinking that you can trap me in some situation where my rule will cause net harm and I will insist on the rule anyway, and you clearly do not understand that if the outcome is net harm, then my rule would necessarily involve not doing it.

Allow me to repeat, since it seems that you just can't wrap your head around this: all of your arguments are based upon this idiotic notion that you can trap me by showing me some unanticipated harmful outcome of my argument, when my argument is in fact about always looking for the least harmful outcome. As I said, you are clearly incapable of grasping the concept of an outcome-based system.

One problem with that, though; isn't that a rather tough standard to hold to? From the perspective of the CSA, for example, seceding from the United States was the act that led to the least oppression, since they believed (probably erroneously, but since Lincoln was from the more active wing of a party that wanted to stop the spread of slavery) that Lincoln would try to abolish the foundation of their livelihood.

Before you bring up the slavery issue, keep in mind that the Southern population (and a lot of the Northern population, before the war) did not really consider blacks to be real human beings. That's obviously wrong and horribly unethical from our position in time, but if you were deciding at that point and time which action led to the least oppression, then in the Southerners' view seceding was the right idea.

[Guardsman Bass]

I don't see how Mike's sovereignty proposal could ever get realistically implemented. It'd just be instated, then abused and end up just being part of that laundry-list of things that sovereign states ignore and tread over in their pursuit of power, with a new term developing to describe the consensus of powers on the legitimacy of lesser states. Sovereignty by definition is a legal concept, not an ethical one. Whether a nation deserves to be a state and be recognized and whether that would be better morally for the human beings at stake is a different issue. Its normative versus positive discussions.

That's a good point. Keep in mind that (I think) we are talking about sovereignty, which is a legal concept that entails certain rights and privileges as part of a community of legally recognized states (and yes, it is biased in favor of the strong). It would follow that attaining such status inherently requires that you have the support from at least some other nations who recognize you as having this status (again, biased in favor of the strong).

[Darth Wong]

I don't see how Mike's sovereignty proposal could ever get realistically implemented. It'd just be instated, then abused and end up just being part of that laundry-list of things that sovereign states ignore and tread over in their pursuit of power, with a new term developing to describe the consensus of powers on the legitimacy of lesser states. Sovereignty by definition is a legal concept, not an ethical one. Whether a nation deserves to be a state and be recognized and whether that would be better morally for the human beings at stake is a different issue. Its normative versus positive discussions.

It's irrelevant whether it can be practically implemented in the real world; I am describing it as an ethics argument, not a legalistic one.

Kast is ignoring the fact that we are arguing about whether we should condemn either Russia or Georgia for their respective actions. That is an ethics argument, not a practicality-based argument. If this argument is about practicality, then it's over before it begins: Georgia is piss-weak and Russia is strong and everyone needs Russia's oil, so Russia wins. Practicality. And nobody will do anything about it. That's practicality too.

But that's not what people are talking about, is it? They're talking about who was "in the wrong" and how badly. This entire tangent about the practicality of international systems of determining sovereignty is nothing more than Kast's usual red-herring methodology of trying to subtly change the subject when he has no argument.

[Illuminatus Primus]

It's irrelevant whether it can be practically implemented in the real world; I am describing it as an ethics argument, not a legalistic one.

Which is valid on its own grounds, of course, and questions of who is in the "wrong."

Kast is ignoring the fact that we are arguing about whether we should condemn either Russia or Georgia for their respective actions. That is an ethics argument, not a practicality-based argument. If this argument is about practicality, then it's over before it begins: Georgia is piss-weak and Russia is strong and everyone needs Russia's oil, so Russia wins. Practicality. And nobody will do anything about it. That's practicality too.

Then I think you're arguing cross-wise. He's a realist, and approaches everything from the reality of what is. I think Georgia is at fault too, but if you argue Georgia didn't have a legitimate claim by our existing international conventions to sovereignty over South Ossetia, that is entering legalism. I can see why Georgia thought it still had a claim and a case for taking it back, especially if it had done it competently. Unfortunately it read the real consensus all wrong, and that Great Power consensus is going to come back and bite them in the ass because now they're probably going to lose any recognized claim to those regions eventually.

But that's not what people are talking about, is it? They're talking about who was "in the wrong" and how badly. This entire tangent about the practicality of international systems of determining sovereignty is nothing more than Kast's usual red-herring methodology of trying to subtly change the subject when he has no argument.

Fair enough.

[Axis Kast]

Kast is ignoring the fact that we are arguing about whether we should condemn either Russia or Georgia for their respective actions. That is an ethics argument, not a practicality-based argument. If this argument is about practicality, then it's over before it begins: Georgia is piss-weak and Russia is strong and everyone needs Russia's oil, so Russia wins. Practicality. And nobody will do anything about it. That's practicality too.

But that's not what people are talking about, is it? They're talking about who was "in the wrong" and how badly. This entire tangent about the practicality of international systems of determining sovereignty is nothing more than Kast's usual red-herring methodology of trying to subtly change the subject when he has no argument.

The two cannot be made distinct.

Read Primus' commentary about my realism. Then, remember that I have said that Georgia was acting by the accepted rules of sovereignty. It was, to all intents and purposes, "playing the game."

Georgia's sin was not in working to reclaim South Ossetia by force -- unless you want to claim that there is some moralistic definition of sovereignty out there. My whole point has been that Georgia is working off the contemporary and agreed-upon understandings of sovereignty, one of the parties to which is Russia, except that Moscow just flexed its muscle unilaterally, as the "big boys" sometimes do.

[K. A. Pital]

My whole point has been that Georgia is working off the contemporary and agreed-upon understandings of sovereignty, one of the parties to which is Russia, except that Moscow just flexed its muscle unilaterally, as the "big boys" sometimes do.

What?

First of all, the PC forces were let into S.O and Abkhazia by an international mandate to which Georgia was a signatory. That's a real document. Not even some abstract "rules".

Second, citizens of SO were Russian citizens. That is legal, since a state can grant citizenship to any person be he so willing (and if dual citizenship is prohibited by his home nation, usually if he gets a 2nd citizenship, his first one is auto-renounced).

So Russia had no right to retaliate for the killing of (a) Russian soldiers who were there under a mandate (b) Russian citizens who obtained that citizenship during the years, rejecting Georgian citizenship?

Do you know that killing a foreign soldier or citizen constitutes a casus belli, right?

[Block]

If they were Russian citizens then weren't they in Georgia illegaly? Wouldn't Georgia have been well within it's rights to remove what are essentially foreign invaders?