US War Planning Documents Released

[MKSheppard]

Under FOIA

Link

Lots and lots of redacted stuff but interesting things about "Regional options", which has led FAS to breathlessly imagine things.

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and White House guidance issued in response to the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001 led to the creation of new nuclear strike options against regional states seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction, according to a military planning document obtained by the Federation of American Scientists.

Rumors about such options have existed for years, but the document is the first authoritative evidence that fear of weapons of mass destruction attacks from outside Russia and China caused the Bush administration to broaden U.S. nuclear targeting policy by ordering the military to prepare a series of new options for nuclear strikes against regional proliferators.

Responding to nuclear weapons planning guidance issued by the White House shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, U.S. Strategic Command created a series of scenario driven nuclear strike options against regional states. Illustrations in the document identify the states as North Korea and Libya as well as SCUD-equipped countries that appear to include Iran, Iraq (at the time), and Syria - the very countries mentioned in the NPR. The new strike options were incorporated into the strategic nuclear war plan that entered into effect on March 1, 2003.

The creation of the new strike options contradict statements by government officials who have insisted that the NPR did not change U.S. nuclear policy but decreased the role of nuclear weapons.

-----

I've wondered about this -- while I can see the need for keeping the exact number of devices, and HOW we deploy them a secret; do we gain anything from heavily redacting target plans?

It would be interesting to see the 'calming' effect that an 'accidental' release of a semi-comprehensive Iranian target set document would have on the region; in particular the parts where we show how we just killed about oh, 60% of the Iranian population with a few devices; and the nice fallout plumes from a comprehensive strategic, industrial and economic target plan.

[MKSheppard]

Hm, looking on FAS' Blog, I foudn this tidbit in a blog entry about ABM:

“To ensure the penetration of the ICBM force, the Soviet ABM system would be attacked first. Minuteman E and F and Polaris missiles would first hit the Hen House early warning radars, and their Tallin system defenses [SA-5 SAM, ed.]. Then the Dog House radar and the Triad system around Moscow would be attacked. More than 100 Minuteman would be involved in the ABM suppression.”

Source: U.S. Strategic Air Command, History of U.S. Strategic Air Command January-June 1968, February 1969, p. 300. Excerpts (pp. 300-306) available here (pdf, 0.8 MB).

----

Wow, that's a hell of a lot of ICBMs just to take out a minimal system around moscow.

Multiply that if the system is expanded to other areas.

[Stuart]

Wow, that's a hell of a lot of ICBMs just to take out a minimal system around moscow. Multiply that if the system is expanded to other areas.

About 10 percent of the total ICBM force. See what I mean about virtual attrition? That's 100 missiles that were effectively "shot down" by the defense without said defense firing a shot. That's 100 other targets that won't get hit.

[K. A. Pital]

Hmm... being curious, why exactly "100 targets"? The 80's SIOPs had ~40,000 targets IIRC, but clearly they didn't have 40,000 missiles. If it's a 1-warhead missile, then, you lose 1 extra target per missile. But if it's an MIRV ICBM, you lose more targets per missile if said missile is shot down in entierty, isn't that so?

[Vehrec]

Well for starters, the Minuteman II only had one warhead. The III only has three, but still, you're going to be firing into a Missile Intercept system in order to destroy it, so you've got to be able to absorb some losses. And if you target three nukes for a radar or a missile site that only winds up needing one, you still spend three nukes with the missiles. So if you build your missile defense sites well enough away from anything else of value, they can't cause collateral damage to any industrial or military sites besides your ABM system.

[Beowulf]

Hmm... being curious, why exactly "100 targets"? The 80's SIOPs had ~40,000 targets IIRC, but clearly they didn't have 40,000 missiles. If it's a 1-warhead missile, then, you lose 1 extra target per missile. But if it's an MIRV ICBM, you lose more targets per missile if said missile is shot down in entierty, isn't that so?

Not all targets got there own warhead either. Some targets were sufficiently close together for 1 warhead to take out 2 or more targets.

[thejester]

FFS, I did an essay on this topic a month ago, with only the leaked sections of the NPR to guide me...and then they go and declassify it. Fucking hell..

[Sea Skimmer]

Hmm... being curious, why exactly "100 targets"? The 80's SIOPs had ~40,000 targets IIRC, but clearly they didn't have 40,000 missiles. If it's a 1-warhead missile, then, you lose 1 extra target per missile. But if it's an MIRV ICBM, you lose more targets per missile if said missile is shot down in entierty, isn't that so?

Well I would expect that a target as important as an ABM site would be double or tripled targeted to ensure that a mere missile or warhead malfunction wont let it survive. Meanwhile, you might allocate only one warhead to take out several closely spaced industrial or communications targets, the utter destruction of any specific one being relatively unimportant.

40,000 targets sounds high for any specific SIOP though, I suspect a figure like that would only be true if you included every target in every one of those plans.

[Kane Starkiller]

This "declassified" document would be more interesting if all useful information wasn't covered with a big white square saying "b1" USSC.
How many peacekeepers does US have? Why "b1" USSC of course.

[K. A. Pital]

40,000 targets sounds high for any specific SIOP though, I suspect a figure like that would only be true if you included every target in every one of those plans.

According to Desmond Ball, the current plan, SIOP-5D, "includes some 40,000 potential target installations, as compared to some 25,000 in 1974 when NUWEP was promulgated and the development of SIOP-5 initiated."

[Androsphinx]

Responding to nuclear weapons planning guidance issued by the White House shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, U.S. Strategic Command created a series of scenario driven nuclear strike options against regional states. Illustrations in the document identify the states as North Korea and Libya as well as SCUD-equipped countries that appear to include Iran, Iraq (at the time), and Syria - the very countries mentioned in the NPR. The new strike options were incorporated into the strategic nuclear war plan that entered into effect on March 1, 2003.

The creation of the new strike options contradict statements by government officials who have insisted that the NPR did not change U.S. nuclear policy but decreased the role of nuclear weapons.

I'm rather suprised that there weren't already strike option plans against Iran, Syria and Iraq. And if there were, how is this a policy change rather than a semi-routine update?

[Sidewinder]

But while some conventional weapons are being incorporated into the national war plan and planning against Russia is not done in the same way it was during the Cold War, the NPR (building on the 1997 PDD-60) and White House guidance also resulted in an increased nuclear targeting of China and, as the declassified STRATCOM document illustrates, an geographic expansion of national-level nuclear targeting to regional proliferators. Prudent or not, this is not a development that is highlighted by U.S. diplomats at NPT conferences.

So the document is advocating more warmongering against China. I understand the need to promote democracy by defending Taiwan, but what's the point of nuking the factories where a lot of toys are made for a lot of American children? Is the issue with lead paint paint that serious?

Seriously, isn't the threat of al-Qaida, including the possibility that the US military may have to intervene to prevent al-Qaida from taking power in Pakistan and gain control over that nation's nukes, enough to keep the White House and the Pentagon busy for the next few decades? Why is Washington trying to make more enemies?

[Stark]

About 10 percent of the total ICBM force. See what I mean about virtual attrition? That's 100 missiles that were effectively "shot down" by the defense without said defense firing a shot. That's 100 other targets that won't get hit.

Shep's quote seems to be saying that they don't just decapitate the system or kill it's sensors, they totally obliterate it at every level. In 'virtual attrition', is that worth it? It seems that killing the primary sensors would give a larger benefit that the same number of missiles targeting the now-sensorless ABM missiles. Is the policy to assume no interference for the primary targets, thus the ABM system has to be reduced to zero effectiveness?

[Aaron]

Sidewinder, where you asleep during your time in the service? The military and the government by extension plan for every eventuality, how many operational and exercise plans have you seen get shelved only to watch as another got pulled out of a filing cabinet?

[Sidewinder]

Sidewinder, where you asleep during your time in the service?

No, but then again, I was never promoted to a leadership position-- I never got to read the OPLANs they have for waging war against specific nations, e.g., how to fight Russia and/or China.

[Knife]

Sidewinder, where you asleep during your time in the service?

No, but then again, I was never promoted to a leadership position-- I never got to read the OPLANs they have for waging war against specific nations, e.g., how to fight Russia and/or China.

You many have never read one, but how the fuck can you be ignorant to the fact that they exsist...for everything! Burried in a draw somewhere is probably a plan to resist the invasion of the USofA by the army of Nepal. Why then, should a strategic plan for China seem weird?

[Aaron]

No, but then again, I was never promoted to a leadership position-- I never got to read the OPLANs they have for waging war against specific nations, e.g., how to fight Russia and/or China.

Well the theory at higher levels is pretty much the same as it is at the lower levels. Multiple levels of planning for everything. I've seen the OPS WO go into the filing cabinet in his office and pull out a fresh plan because the CO rejected the proposed one. It's not much different at the national level. The fact that they have a plan with increased targeting in China is no big deal, they no doubt have a bunch of targeting packages for China. China knows this, though you may see increased bitching about it on the world stage for dramtics but in truth they probably have a bunch of targeting plans for the US and other countries as well.

[Aaron]

Hell the US had a plan to deal with Canada, War Plan Orange IIRC that included gassing major cities up until WWII. And that's a nation on pretty friendly terms.

[Sidewinder]

Why then, should a strategic plan for China seem weird?

I wasn't surprised by the fact that there's an OPLAN for fighting China-- I know there's one somewhere-- but by the fact that the 2001 NPR advocated "increased nuclear targeting of China." I know China's military is becoming stronger, but I don't see why dealing with this requires more nukes instead of conventional or spec ops forces.

[Knife]

I wasn't surprised by the fact that there's an OPLAN for fighting China-- I know there's one somewhere-- but by the fact that the 2001 NPR advocated "increased nuclear targeting of China." I know China's military is becoming stronger, but I don't see why dealing with this requires more nukes instead of conventional or spec ops forces.

Because apperently you have some sort of Risk (the game) like notion of how large strategic operations are made. Moving conventional forces across to China or beefing up the spec ops orders of magnitude to deal with a theoritical threat is easier than targeting a strategic asset like ICBM's?

[Sidewinder]

Moving conventional forces across to China or beefing up the spec ops orders of magnitude to deal with a theoritical threat is easier than targeting a strategic asset like ICBM's?

Conceded.

[phongn]

Hell the US had a plan to deal with Canada, War Plan Orange IIRC that included gassing major cities up until WWII. And that's a nation on pretty friendly terms.

War Plan Crimson was the one for Canada; Orange was the plan for Japan.

[Aaron]

War Plan Crimson was the one for Canada; Orange was the plan for Japan.

Seen. I'm forever getting that one mixed up.

[Spyder]

Hell the US had a plan to deal with Canada, War Plan Orange IIRC that included gassing major cities up until WWII. And that's a nation on pretty friendly terms.

War Plan Crimson was the one for Canada; Orange was the plan for Japan.

I thought we were crimson.

[Knife]

Hell the US had a plan to deal with Canada, War Plan Orange IIRC that included gassing major cities up until WWII. And that's a nation on pretty friendly terms.

War Plan Crimson was the one for Canada; Orange was the plan for Japan.

I thought we were crimson.

New Zealand? No, you're Operation Hobbit.