From CNN, with additional links and video on the article sidebar:
A couple of things that stood out at me:Washington (CNN) -- The pilot of an Asiana Airlines jet that crashed in San Francisco this year told investigators after the accident that he had been "very concerned" about landing without help from an airport navigation system that was out of order.
Capt. Lee Kang Kuk, who was highly experienced in a Boeing 747 but was transitioning to flying a 777, told the National Transportation Safety Board that he found it "very stressful, very difficult" to land without the glideslope indicator that helps pilots determine whether the plane is too high or too low during approach.
"Asked whether he was concerned about his ability to perform the visual approach while piloting Asiana Flight 214, he said 'very concerned, yea,'" the safety board revealed at a hearing on Wednesday on its investigation into the July 6 crash that killed three people and injured more than 180 others.
The jet struck a sea wall and broke apart on the runway following a missed approach.
The navigation aid that syncs up with aircraft instruments was out of service while the Federal Aviation Administration made runway safety improvements. But a second, visual lighting system was operable at the time of the daytime crash and the weather was clear.
The safety board investigation is focusing on whether pilots have become overly reliant on automation to fly commercial planes, and whether basic manual flying skills have eroded.
Investigators have also focused on the pilot understanding -- or misunderstanding -- of the plane's auto-thrust system, which controls aircraft power.
Automated cockpit systems key to Asiana probe
Some of the crew of the Asiana flight from Seoul told investigators the auto thrust was always engaged.
But the safety board has said that system was not engaged, and the jet descended in altitude faster than it should have, and had a slower forward speed than intended.
The combination put the plane into a perilous situation in the final minute of flight.
The relief first officer, Bong Dongwon, who was sitting behind Lee and instructor pilot Lee Jungmin, said he observed the fast descent -- or sink rate -- and called out the excessive sink rate "more than four times."
Bong told investigators the pilot appeared to be correcting the "sink rate" and did not advise further changes.
But its speed was declining at about the same time. The plane was flying at 170 knots 73 seconds before impact, dropped below the target speed for landing of 137 knots at roughly 38 seconds before impact, and plummeted as low as 103 knots just seconds before the plane's front landing gear and tail hit the sea wall at the end of the runway.
The crew made its first reference to the plane's speed problem just seven seconds before the crash.
The pilot called out a "go around" -- a command to abort the landing -- three seconds before impact.
Boeing's former chief pilot for the B777 program said automated systems are intended to help pilots, but that they still need to exercise diligence.
"We accept the fact that pilots, as all humans, make errors," he said. Automation is intended "as a tool to aid the pilot, not replace the pilot," he said.
Information released at Wednesday's hearing also showed investigators are concerned about the role Korean and airline culture played in the crash.
Bong said the crew practiced "cockpit resource management," training that encourages subordinates to speak up about safety concerns to other crew members, despite their senior rank, experience or seniority.
But when Lee -- who was considered a student pilot in the 777 -- was asked whether he had contemplated an aborted landing as the plane descended, he said it was a "very hard" decision to make, given the deference shown to superiors in Korean culture.
By the time Lee pushed the throttle forward just seconds before impact, he discovered his instructor had already done so.
Three passengers died in the accident -- two in the crash and a third on the ground when hit by a rescue truck responding to the scene.
The accident was the first fatal commercial airline crash in the United States since February 2009.
Crash survivor Ben Levy told CNN he was forfeiting an opportunity to watch the proceedings.
"I think something that I've done quickly after this plane crash has been to focus on work and family and things that matter to me," Levy said. "I'm extremely happy that something is being done to get to the bottom of what happened that day because it should not have happened."
- A pilot SHOULD be able to land an airplane using the Mark 1 eyeball in clear daytime weather. Yes, the various landing aids are extremely useful and even a small scale pilot such as myself will happily use them, even in the best weather, but a properly trained bald ape is entirely capable of landing an airplane without such aids. Granted, a big B7x7 is more difficult to handle than what I have been known to fly but, again, those guys are supposed to have more training and experience, it's a scenario that is supposed to be practiced in simulation, and since power failures happen and instrument landing systems need periodic maintenance/rebuilding it's a skill that should be in every pilot's toolkit. I mean, WTF? The pilot is there to deal with unusual situations no matter how trivial. When the pretty lights in front of/alongside the runway are not functioning it's the pilot's job to land safely anyway. If the pilot couldn't do this he wasn't, in my opinion, qualified to fly the airplane no matter how many others flying he has in his log book.
- Yes, I think some pilots are becoming over-reliant on automation. Automation is great, even on a small scale - I could give you an earful about the the joys of computer controlled fuel injected engines over classical hand controlled carburetors in single engine piston aircraft but that's way too much a diversion - and it's one of the major reasons that modern aviation is, on average, safer than ever. Computers and machines do routine stuff better and more reliably than human beings, and they can significantly reduce the mental workload at crucial times. These are all good things, but the human being is there to deal with stuff the computer isn't good at, which still covers a good slice of the pie. The pilot is there to recognize anomalous situations and emergencies. The pilot is there to deal with situations where machinery isn't working (including navigation and landing aids). The pilot is there to deal with anything outside the routine. Mechanical glideslope isn't working? Then it's the pilot's job to use the old eyeballs to do it the old fashioned way. Holy crap, people have safely landed airliners with complete engine failure, mechanical failures, and all sorts of problems, this landing should have been trivial. Not to mention a buttload of other airplanes managed it that very same day. This was a human failure, not weather or machine failure. It's scary to think this "captain" was flying B747's - was he doing so with the same attitude and lack of attention?
- A second landing approach system was active. I'm assuming that they mean a PAPI (precision approach path indicator). It's not as refined as an ILS or some of the other landing aids but it's still extremely useful AND it's easy to use! Even rural grass strips out in the middle of nowhere have them sometimes, particularly in mountainous areas where certain approach angles are used to avoid obstacles. This is another WTF moment because pilots are exposed to these and use them from primary flight school onward. It's a little like finding a mentally normal, physically capable adult who can't remember how to tie his shoes.
- Another pilot in the cockpit noted the sink rate and said something - but the guys actually flying didn't respond. Uh, hello? Bong Dongwon should have been the one flying because apparently he was the only one with his brain actually working. As soon as he noted something amiss and said something the other two should have responded by at least checking the situation, then taking any needed action. Dongwon did what he was supposed to, the other two were asleep at the switch. Another big WTF here.
OK, this is not a problem limited to Koreans - the March 27, 1977 Tenerife airport disaster involving two 747's colliding on a runway involved similar issues regarding hierarchy among pilots of European origins - but the very term CRM was coined during the efforts to prevent this from causing future crashes. Even among maverick cultures like the US training to speak up even when a subordinate requires nurturing. One of a pilot's responsibilities is to say "no" or "Hey, this needs attention" even in the face of frowning Authority. Unfortunately, pilots can be punished for doing so because airlines these days are not usually run by pilots. (Actually, even in the past that was the exception).Bong said the crew practiced "cockpit resource management," training that encourages subordinates to speak up about safety concerns to other crew members, despite their senior rank, experience or seniority.
But when Lee -- who was considered a student pilot in the 777 -- was asked whether he had contemplated an aborted landing as the plane descended, he said it was a "very hard" decision to make, given the deference shown to superiors in Korean culture
Go-arounds, or aborted landings, do cost money because they burn more fuel, take time, and may disturb traffic patterns thus requiring other airplanes to delay landing. They shouldn't be routine. However, it should be expected that they will occur from time to time. One problem is that doing a go-around is an admission of a less than perfect approach, and pilots are expected to approach perfectly every time, regardless. So rather than be praised for avoiding an accident a pilot might be punished for being less than perfect, or a pilot perceives that he will be punished in such circumstances even if that will not happen.
Bottom line: this was caused by people problems more than anything else. The weather was excellent. The machine did what it was told to do, it's not the mechanism's fault that something was accidentally turned off. This was a failure of the pilot(s) to properly monitor and fly the airplane.
Now, there probably are better ways to automate airplanes and train pilots. We shouldn't just say "bad pilot!" and ignore the rest. As always, we should try to learn something from this. What we've been learning lately is that the machines and humans aren't interacting as well as they should sometimes. Machines have to be made/programmed with human limitations in mind, so that we can better take advantage of human strengths at crucial times.
