CmdrWilkens wrote:You remember the battle I was talking to you about the other night? Battle of Messines before 3rd Ypres/Passchendaele? That was 12 Divisions with 9 on line and 3 in close reserve (that is they advanced but were not the first wave) on a front of less than 6 miles. This works out to 1.333333etc Div/mile on the front and 2Div/mile overall. The front of advance on the first day of primary attacks (D+11) involved 6 Corps/18 Div on a Front of 10 Miles or 1.8 Div/mile (1.2/mile if I employed the same tactic of 2 up 1 back). The second day of attacks (D+12) Involved 4 Corps and 2 Division sized formations for a total of 14 Divisions on a front of about 6 miles or just slightly over the density at Messines.
In other words NO this is not overly dense troops concentrations
To further reiterate what I put to you last night those troops were supported by roughly 2,200 arty pieces and likely opposed by 600-700 pieces, a fire density on either part which is nowhere near (by an order of magnitude) what is occurring here. In other words once again I am pressing with the rule of thumb 3-1 advantage while your counter-battery density is an order of magnitude under what was seen on the Western Front. Moreover by D+11 you would be in secondary positions and likely beginning to experience your first shortage of shells due to chronic underestimation and the fact that half of your available supply line has been cut.
I've mentioned on AIM but I'll put it here, I expect that my arty (expect for units so far un-engaged) will no longer have sufficient stocks on hand for supporting D+13 attacks and that is with an uninterrupted supply line on my part.
Messines ridge actually offers a pretty good example of why a successfull Mexican assault is a pretty much problematic proposition. So lets start first with a look at Messines itself. A British empire force of three corps with 9 divisions on the first line and 3 divisions as a follow up echelon supported by 2266 artillery pieces (756 heavy, 356 4.5in howitzer, 1158 18pdr) and a considerable number of tanks attack along a 17,000 yard front. The assault is preceded by the British firing 3,561,530 shells on the salient. Then on the start of the assault the British detonate 19 mines with several hundred of explosives which were being prepared for the past 18 months. The mines alone destroy the forward German trench lines killing 10000. The end result? The British take the ridge at a cost of 23,749 casualties for total German casualties of 25,000 including the 10,000 lost to the mines. The artillery used on the British side amounts to about 75% what they used for the 3rd Ypres offensive.
Now apply the same on the Panama battles. First 12 British divisions on a 17,000 yard front make 1 per 1417 yards and this counts the reserves in. Your attacks consist on D+11 of 18 divisions on a 17600 yard front or about 50% the density at Messines ridge. On D+12 you attack on a 10560 yards front with 14 divisions a density near twice that of Messines (1.88 times more to be exact)
So for starters your troop densities are too high. If someone wanted to be "kind" for various degrees of misusing the term he could say you packed your units as thick as Rawlinson in the first day of the Somme with each infantry battalion holding a 400 yard front. Which assuming each regiment held a battalion in reserve and each division a regiment in reserve and then each corps of 3 divisions a whole division in reserve that on a 6 mile front you would be able to pack 9.9 divisions reserves included. Call it 10 for a round number.
Now what is the density on the other side? Last checked the Gran Colombians had 24 divisions of theirs covering the whole 16 mile front. That is 16 normal 3 brigade divisions or 1 per mile. So what you postulate is 14 of your divisions attacking 6 Colombian division equivelants. Going for call it 50 gun artillery regiments Mexicans have 700 pieces supporting the attack and Colombians 750 generally heavier ones defending against it. Since you bring Lanchester's square law up lets put it to some use:
Messines after the mines have been blown
British German
Starting force 216000 106000 (from original 116000)
End Force 192250 91000
Square difference 9695937500 2955000000
Ratio between British and German casualties 9695937500/2955000000=3,2812
Lets go to the Panama battles with the same ratio as the British achieved at Messines, forget for the time being the massive advantages the British had between the 2266 gun barrage and the mines or for that matter the higher density of artillery support each Colombian regiment can receive. To break through the lines Colombians have to take at least least 25% casualties. At that minimum assuming the Mexican divisions start battle at 100% strength they'd still suffer 30,000 casualties in the process.
Now there are two "minor" problems with that. First as already shown prior you can't have more than 10 divisions attacking. With 10 divisions attacking and still using Messines as our base for calculation to inflict 25% casualties on the Colombians the attacking Mexicans would be losing slightly over a third of their force 46,000 men to be exact. At which point if someone has lost cohesion and is broken it is the Mexicans.
The second problem is that you don't have the British advantages and the other side has artillery superiority. Add to the count that on a 16 mile front the Colombians can pretty much form a massive artillery reserve out with 25 artillery brigades in place a 105mm piece centrally positioned would be able to direct fire at most of the front, and the ration will be rather higher in the Colombian favour.
As for supply, you have advanced 400km over hostile territory in 10 days. You can't seriously claim you are in better supply that the defender. If anything you arguably outrun your supply lines about 250-300km from your starting positions. At which point you'd normally would have to stop and regroup. That you chose to walk your troops forward at the maximum level of their endurance in these 10 days doesn't help any either.
Which come to think of it adds the little problem of exhaustion for your men as well when they attack the Colombian lines after having walked said 400km in 10 days and then thrown into all out assault.
*sigh* I'll try to get something out today if it is at all possible.
