Moral realism

[Bugsby]

I started up on a bit of a metaethics rant on the Logical Proof that God exists thread, and Kuroneko responded. Because I didn't want to hijcak the thread, I figured I'd move the discussion elsewhere. So here it is.

...The most famous alternative, implicitly found in almost every description of "the scientific method" (questions on the applicability of this label notwithstanding) is Popperian falsificationism: simply take the best best-performing model not known to be false. It's important to distinguish induction in the sense of abstracting patterns from data and induction in the sense of assigning truth-value to those abstractions. Science doesn't strictly speaking require the latter, although there may be substantial disagreement on to what extent science actually follows this "minimalist" approach.

Step 4: ABSOLUTE MORAL LAWS DO NOT EXIST! This is still a big debate in philosophy, in the field of metaethics.

It depends on just what is meant on "absolute"; if one interprets it as you have in the case of absolute truth, in the sense that the validity of a moral statement may be independent of beliefs about it (what's commonly called 'objective' in metaethics), then absolute moral laws can indeed exist. Note that absolute in this sense does not mean independent of culture and/or society, only that that law itself may to some extent depend on cultural factors other than beliefs about it. This may even be explicit in hypothetical (as opposed to categorical) systems of ethics.

I am writing a thesis on this very subject. Absolute moral laws do not exist. If I wanted, I could write for hours on this, but I'm not going to bore you.

Either you're using a sense of 'absolute' different from the one you gave above, or you've managed to disprove an enormous class of ethical systems, such as utilitarianism, which posits an absolute moral imperative. This particular example has the bonus in that it can be interpreted as a hypothetical system (which was one of Kant's objections to it), so it can be made immune to certain well-known Humean concerns.

Uh, first off, thanks for that Philosophy of Science tidbit. That's another area where I've wanted to study, but havent had time.

Now. As to moral objectivism, I am firmly opposed to it. The definition that I have of objectivism is "a given moral statement can be true or false, and that truth or falsity would hold independently of our thoughts or feelings about it." For example, if we believe that rape is wrong, then "wrongness" is just a property of rape, and would be even if no one thought that rape was wrong.

It's important to distinguish this metaethical claim from other normative ethical claims. For example, you suggest that disproving objectivism would disprove utilitarianism, but this is not the case. It is consistent to believe both that the right thing to do is to maximize happiness (or whatever principle you might endorse) while believing that that particular moral belief is a function of one's psychology, not representative of any greater moral truth. I hold beliefs along roughly utilitarian lines. I just believe that my moral beliefs are not grounded in some universal truth about moral laws.

Of course, all normative ethical principles feel objectivist. That can be conceded easily. No groundwork on any ethical principle has ever concluded with "but that's just how I feel about it." A linguistic analysis of our use of moral terms will come down pretty conclusively on the side of ethical realism. But to quote J.L. Mackie, just because we use moral terms as if they are objectively true, that does not mean that they are.

My own problem with objectivist ethics is that there is no way to justify your moral beliefs without begging the question. Take the example that the author of our proof-of-God website offers: child molestation. Most people believe that child molestation is wrong. But let's say that I think it's right. How would you go about proving me wrong?

A few possibilities:
Appeal to some theory
If you are a utilitarian, and utilitarianism forbids child molestation, then child molestation is wrong. Thus, I am wrong. Here's the problem with this approach. Theories are usually supported by appeals to our intuitions about particular cases. So if we try to support our theory that molestation is wrong by appealing to the utilitarian theory, while at the same time supporting utilitarianism by appeals to our intuitions about cases, we have an infinite explanatory regress. Theories justifying intuitions justifying theories justifying intuitions justifying theories.... that doesn't work. We need explanatory priority somewhere. Theories must either be prior to our intuitions or vice versa.

1. Intuitions are prior to theories: You can't prove me wrong by appeals to a theory.

2. Theories are prior to intuitions: You are now in the situation where you need to justify your theory to me. Keep two things in mind. First, you cannot use non-normative premises. As Hume proved, no amount of descriptive premises can yield a normative conclusion. Second, you cannot use normative premises. This would almost certainly qualify as an appeal to moral intuition, and thus violates our basic "theories are prior to intuitions" method. I admit there MIGHT be a way here to justify a theory here, but I sure don't see it.

Appeals to some form of perfect observer
We could try to justify our intuitions by saying that they are similar to the intuitions of some perfect moral judge. Like Kant, we could be talking about a perfectly rational agent. Or a perfectly informed judge, or a perfectly sympathetic judge, or any number of other criteria. The problem is, none of us are perfect judges. So we can't ask anyone. We'd have to guess at what a perfect judge would think. So in effect, we would have to know what we would believe if we were smarter than we really are, or more "rational" than we really are, or what have you. These guesses are likely to be wrong. How do I know what I would know if I knew what I don't know? I don't.

Appeals to self-evidence.
"If you just understand all the facts of the case, you will just SEE that it is wrong to molest children. If you do not, there is no help for you; you are fundamentally misguided." That argument is very persuasive if you do believe that it is wrong to molest children. But if you don't it's not persuasive at all. Rather, it's a bit insulting. I could just as easily claim that YOU are the one who is fundamentally misguided. So we are back where we started.



These are a few of the objections I've explored and hopefully refuted. If anyone has any other methods of trying to justify moral beliefs, or if they find any flaws with the arguments I've presented against the methods of justification above, then post them here. I need criticism to get my arguments working as tightly as they can.

Note: This is a compression of a 15-page draft that I am expanding into a thesis. As such, 1) my ideas here are a lot less fully developed than I have them elsewhere, and 2) This is a work in progress, and will actually be the key part of my graduate school application to some highly selective programs. Keep that in mind. Ask me if you want to use these ideas outside the forum; seeing as how things can get pretty competitive in philosophy, I am a bit paranoid about protecting my ideas.

[Darth Wong]

I think you're asking whether moral systems themselves are "right" or "wrong", when a more scientific approach is to ask how well they perform when measured against some kind of metric. The selection of this metric would then depend on what you think a system of morality is supposed to accomplish. If it is supposed to serve the needs and collective goals of the society which creates it, then we can measure how well it accomplishes this objective.

The problem with typical religious morality schemes (especially those of Judeo-Christo-Islamo-Fascism) is that they cannot reference any performance metric or objective that is external to themselves. While a system such as utilitarianism or humanism or even confucianism can measure its performance based on the contentment and prosperity of the society that it is supposed to serve, a religious system simply declares its tenets to be truths and then declares that "right" and "wrong" are defined by adherence to those tenets. At no point is there any way of evaluating this system's performance; it is assumed to be perfect by virtue of obeying itself.

These external performance metrics, regardless of whether you agree with their selection, are "absolute" for the purposes of evaluating moral claims simply by virtue of the fact that they are external to any particular ethical belief system and therefore allow comparisons of those belief systems.

[Bugsby]

I think you're asking whether moral systems themselves are "right" or "wrong", when a more scientific approach is to ask how well they perform when measured against some kind of metric. The selection of this metric would then depend on what you think a system of morality is supposed to accomplish. If it is supposed to serve the needs and collective goals of the society which creates it, then we can measure how well it accomplishes this objective.

The problem with typical religious morality schemes (especially those of Judeo-Christo-Islamo-Fascism) is that they cannot reference any performance metric or objective that is external to themselves. While a system such as utilitarianism or humanism or even confucianism can measure its performance based on the contentment and prosperity of the society that it is supposed to serve, a religious system simply declares its tenets to be truths and then declares that "right" and "wrong" are defined by adherence to those tenets. At no point is there any way of evaluating this system's performance; it is assumed to be perfect by virtue of obeying itself.

These external performance metrics, regardless of whether you agree with their selection, are "absolute" for the purposes of evaluating moral claims simply by virtue of the fact that they are external to any particular ethical belief system and therefore allow comparisons of those belief systems.

I agree with most of that, but your response is slightly off base. The objectivist metaethic that I am attacking does not make any reference to the goals of morality. The goal of morality, as it were, is to derive a solution that is always morally right, i.e. the thing that one ought to do in any situation. When one figures in the goals of morality, the picture looks a little different. It is true that one can dub a certain end or goal as what is good, and then we will have a metric to measure whether our moral judgments are right or wrong, and that will hold absolutely, in the scientific sense you mention. The problem is dubbing one goal or another to be right or wrong. If you say that any goal is legitimate, well, that is a relativist stance, of the type that I am advocating. But it needs to be explicitly stated that your ethic depends critically on the assumption is that "the good just is what aims at X," where X is the CONTINGENTLY stated goal of morality.

Objectivist metaethics can take formulations similar to "the good just is what aims at X," and they often do. Utilitarianism is an example of this. The critical difference is that "the good just is what aims at X" is taken to be an absolutely true claim. It is not true in virtue of your stated goal to pursue X, rather, it is a true fact about the universe, to be placed next to the law of gravity or the pythagorean theorem. This is the proposal that I disagree with, and my argument above is intended to show that it is impossible to justify any absolute identification of any X with moral goodness.

[Kuroneko]

Unfortunately, you seem to conflate moral objectivism with moral realism, as well as other things besides.

Now. As to moral objectivism, I am firmly opposed to it. The definition that I have of objectivism is "a given moral statement can be true or false, and that truth or falsity would hold independently of our thoughts or feelings about it." For example, if we believe that rape is wrong, then "wrongness" is just a property of rape, and would be even if no one thought that rape was wrong.

Somewhere along the line, you misinterpret moral objectivism to be much stronger than it claims to be. What you're really opposed to, if the last sentence is taken to be indicative, are systems of ethics in which the moral imperatives categorical. That includes all deontological system, such as that of Kant, who explicitly formulates his "categorical imperative" and denies all hypothetical systems. All categorical systems are objectivist, but the converse is not the case.

It's important to distinguish this metaethical claim from other normative ethical claims. For example, you suggest that disproving objectivism would disprove utilitarianism, but this is not the case.

In the way you interpret objectivism, yes, since utilitarianism is not objectivist under your interpretation. That's not the usual definition of moral objectivism. If you wish to introduce a version of utilitarianism is in itself non-objectivist, that's fine, but be aware that it runs contrary to the "standard version(s)".

It is consistent to believe both that the right thing to do is to maximize happiness (or whatever principle you might endorse) while believing that that particular moral belief is a function of one's psychology, not representative of any greater moral truth.

True. Consistency alone, however, is not an overwhelming virtue.

My own problem with objectivist ethics is that there is no way to justify your moral beliefs without begging the question. Take the example that the author of our proof-of-God website offers: child molestation. Most people believe that child molestation is wrong. But let's say that I think it's right. How would you go about proving me wrong?

It is very important to differentiate between comparing the validity of ethical systems and specific actions. Your error lies in erasing this distinction. It is possible, at least in principle, to compare the performance of many systems if a given goal is given. Such an approach has been discussed on this board many times, Mr. Wong being among its more vocal proponets (as above). One would not be begging the question about specific claims such as that one if that approach is undertaken. I would think that might better appeal to you, since categorical ethical systems are automatically ruled out.

[Darth Wong]

I agree with most of that, but your response is slightly off base. The objectivist metaethic that I am attacking does not make any reference to the goals of morality. The goal of morality, as it were, is to derive a solution that is always morally right, i.e. the thing that one ought to do in any situation.

"Right" and "wrong" are correct and incorrect answers to questions. If you don't know what the question is, the terms "right" and "wrong" have no real meaning.

When one figures in the goals of morality, the picture looks a little different. It is true that one can dub a certain end or goal as what is good, and then we will have a metric to measure whether our moral judgments are right or wrong, and that will hold absolutely, in the scientific sense you mention. The problem is dubbing one goal or another to be right or wrong.

That may not be as intractable a problem as you surmise, simply because we have some idea as to how moral systems originated. We began our existence as primitive tribal people, for whom the survival of the tribe was the highest priority and certain rules had to be created to ensure that survival. That's why there are certain rules which are universal to all moral systems, such as "don't stab your neighbour in the back", because that kind of behaviour would have swiftly led to the extinction of the tribe.

If you say that any goal is legitimate, well, that is a relativist stance, of the type that I am advocating. But it needs to be explicitly stated that your ethic depends critically on the assumption is that "the good just is what aims at X," where X is the CONTINGENTLY stated goal of morality.

Looking at our anthropological background, it is quite clear that the origins of morality systems lay in ensuring the prosperity and survival of the tribe (these two concepts being somewhat synonymous at that time). Ergo, we can be fairly certain that they were created in order to serve the material needs of their originating societies. This hypothesis is consistent with the fact that all moral systems do share some universally accepted tenets, all of which happen to be compatible with the simple goal of tribal survival.

Objectivist metaethics can take formulations similar to "the good just is what aims at X," and they often do. Utilitarianism is an example of this. The critical difference is that "the good just is what aims at X" is taken to be an absolutely true claim. It is not true in virtue of your stated goal to pursue X, rather, it is a true fact about the universe, to be placed next to the law of gravity or the pythagorean theorem.

And yet we can state with a fair degree of certainty that the original tribal codes of conduct must have had something to do with survival imperatives and other social material needs, hence morality is intended to serve the survival imperatives and social material needs of societies.

This is the proposal that I disagree with, and my argument above is intended to show that it is impossible to justify any absolute identification of any X with moral goodness.

"Moral goodness" is a silly term, and it is not at all unreasonable to declare that social codes of conduct (which are all that a moral system is, after all) are supposed to serve the objective interests of the societies they serve.

[Kuroneko]

Objectivist metaethics can take formulations similar to "the good just is what aims at X," and they often do. Utilitarianism is an example of this. The critical difference is that "the good just is what aims at X" is taken to be an absolutely true claim. It is not true in virtue of your stated goal to pursue X, rather, it is a true fact about the universe, to be placed next to the law of gravity or the pythagorean theorem.

You're attacking moral realism. That is not moral objectivism, nor is it necessary for moral realism to hold for moral statements to be 'absolutely true' in the sense you've defined in the previous thread. Morality need not be some over-arching property of the universe; the moral objectivist position is much weaker than that.

[Darth Wong]

Ah, I hadn't noticed that. Yes, Bugsby seems to be assuming that morality exists independently of society and must therefore be justified by citing some kind of universal truth that also exists independently of society.

[Bugsby]

Objectivist metaethics can take formulations similar to "the good just is what aims at X," and they often do. Utilitarianism is an example of this. The critical difference is that "the good just is what aims at X" is taken to be an absolutely true claim. It is not true in virtue of your stated goal to pursue X, rather, it is a true fact about the universe, to be placed next to the law of gravity or the pythagorean theorem.

You're attacking moral realism. That is not moral objectivism, nor is it necessary for moral realism to hold for moral statements to be 'absolutely true' in the sense you've defined in the previous thread. Morality need not be some over-arching property of the universe; the moral objectivist position is much weaker than that.

This isn't a distinction that I've seen explained before, so let me see if I have this right:
Moral objectivism - there is a metric on which we can evaluate moral statements.
Moral realism - there is a metric on which we can evaluate moral statements that is also an over-arching property of the universe.

I think that objectivism (as I have stated it - inferred from both the posts of you and the redoubtable Mr. Wong) is much too weak a claim to be called "objective," as in "independent of subject." Because we can then question on what metric we evaluate moral systems. System A will be the "best" towards attaining given goal X, System B will be the best at attaining given goal Y. So what should we, morally, do? If following either A or B is acceptable, we have really adopted a subjectivist metaethic, since the right thing to do is critically dependent upon the metric adopted, and anyone can adopt whatever metric they way. But if only A or B is acceptable, not both, there needs to be some way of saying which system is objectively better. And that's exactly what we don't have.

If I misinterpreted your realist/objectivist distinction, please straighten me out.

[Darth Wong]

Why is it "subjectivist" to measure systems by different metrics? If I decide to evaluate a car by looking at its acceleration, and someone else decides to evaluate a car by looking at its fuel economy, are these "subjectivist" methods? They are both empirical and quite objective, are they not?

Are you suggesting that there should be some way of determining that there is only one acceptable performance metric? I don't see why you can't have multiple performance metrics, but even if we assume that you must select one, and that you must provide some objective justification for that selection, I already pointed out earlier that we do in fact have a pretty good idea how the entire concept of morality came about. Hence, we have a good idea what its original purpose was. This certainly lends weight to continued performance evaluation against that purpose. We can also determine that evaluating performance by measuring a belief system's conformance to its own edicts (aka- common practice among the religious) is obviously circular, so certain performance metrics are clearly useless.

[Kuroneko]

This isn't a distinction that I've seen explained before, so let me see if I have this right:
Moral objectivism - there is a metric on which we can evaluate moral statements.
Moral realism - there is a metric on which we can evaluate moral statements that is also an over-arching property of the universe.

Moral objectivism is the position that some moral principles are true or false independently of beliefs about them. (One definition of) moral realism is that moral statement can not only be true but are part of reality, in a sense independent of moral agents, e.g., Kantian ethics. The key concept to the general form of moral objectivism is that the system of ethics can cater to human needs and be responsive to human circumstances without being completely dependent on human beliefs (as moral relativism is).

I think that objectivism (as I have stated it - inferred from both the posts of you and the redoubtable Mr. Wong) is much too weak a claim to be called "objective," as in "independent of subject."

Perhaps, but I do not think so. It's independent of moral agents' beliefs about the morality of the action, so it is objective in the most relevant sense. For example, consider someone on trial for murder. The question as to whether or not the accused has done the deed has an objective answer, independently of what anyone believes, even if there is no certain way of getting that answer. But it's not objective your sense of "independent of subject", since it does has everything to do with the accused.

Because we can then question on what metric we evaluate moral systems. System A will be the "best" towards attaining given goal X, System B will be the best at attaining given goal Y.

If you wish to base your thesis on the problems of agreeing on a common goal, by all means do so. But the typical formulation of the problem in terms of specific actions disappears.

If following either A or B is acceptable, we have really adopted a subjectivist metaethic, since the right thing to do is critically dependent upon the metric adopted, and anyone can adopt whatever metric they way.

Consider the question "are all bachelors unmarried?" It surely has an objective answer, by virtue of the definitions of its constituent terms, one that is absolutely correct in the sense that it does not matter if anyone believed otherwise, since propositions (questions) carry the meaning with them. There is always some tinge of subjectivity in that language itself is a human construct, not existing independently in some sort of Platonic realm--if someone decides to define the word "bachelor" in some other way, then the correct answer to that re-interpreted question may be different. But the question remains objective.

What you describe above is not unlike that situation in its nature. The fact that we can get overwhelming agreement as to what "bachelor" means but not what the what standards to apply for evaluation of ethical systems is a different sort of problem than whether morality is subjectivist or objectivist, which is the issue discussed here. I would remind you, that some versions (though not all) of ethical egoism fall under moral objectivism, specifically those for which it is possible for one to be wrong about what is in one's interests.

[Bugsby]

Why is it "subjectivist" to measure systems by different metrics? If I decide to evaluate a car by looking at its acceleration, and someone else decides to evaluate a car by looking at its fuel economy, are these "subjectivist" methods? They are both empirical and quite objective, are they not?

Perhaps, but I do not think so. It's independent of moral agents' beliefs about the morality of the action, so it is objective in the most relevant sense. For example, consider someone on trial for murder. The question as to whether or not the accused has done the deed has an objective answer, independently of what anyone believes, even if there is no certain way of getting that answer. But it's not objective your sense of "independent of subject", since it does has everything to do with the accused.

The mistake that both of you are making with these lines of thought is where to draw the subjectivist/objectivist distinction. In this debate, that distinction belongs squarely between the descriptive and the normative. To Darth Wong: Yes, one car can have better fuel economy than another, while that other has better acceleration. To Kuroneko: Whether the accused has done the deed is certainly an objective matter. I would not wish to argue with either of these claims, nor would anyone else, either an ethical objectivist or an ethical subjectivist. Where the distinction must be draw is when you move from the descriptive to the normative. One car accelerates at a greater rate, the other has better MPG rating, but which is the BETTER car? Surely the accused did the deed in question, but was that deed morally wrong? (NOTE: The matter is whether the deed is wrong, which is a normative claim, not whether it was illegal - that's descriptive.)

There are objective truths, of that there can be no doubt. But whether statements of the kind "X is wrong" fall under that category is what is at hand. If you believe that valuing a car either on the basis of its fuel efficiency or its acceleration is a valid mode of valuation, then our stance on value must be subjective. That's not exactly the best example, though, because it deals with non-moral value. To abstract a bit and place us in the moral realm: To do action A aims at goal X. To fail to do action A aims at goal Y. (X and Y are both goals that have been appealed to in moral discourse before - let's have X be utility and Y be rationality.) If you believe that the only measure of what you should do in this instance is your personal preference for X or Y, that is subjectivism. But if you believe if there is some sense in which X just is better than Y, that is objectivism. But now you need to justify placing X over Y, which I don't think you can do.

Consider the question "are all bachelors unmarried?" It surely has an objective answer, by virtue of the definitions of its constituent terms, one that is absolutely correct in the sense that it does not matter if anyone believed otherwise, since propositions (questions) carry the meaning with them. There is always some tinge of subjectivity in that language itself is a human construct, not existing independently in some sort of Platonic realm--if someone decides to define the word "bachelor" in some other way, then the correct answer to that re-interpreted question may be different. But the question remains objective.

What you describe above is not unlike that situation in its nature. The fact that we can get overwhelming agreement as to what "bachelor" means but not what the what standards to apply for evaluation of ethical systems is a different sort of problem than whether morality is subjectivist or objectivist, which is the issue discussed here.

This is a perfect example to demonstrate the point I am trying to make. "Bachelors are married men" carries the definition as a part of its terms. The relationship between "bachelor" and "married man" is explicit in our language. The relation is definitional (ie. all bachelors just are married men). To make the above statement false, we must change either our definition of "bachelor" or our definition of "married man."

However, this is not the case when we look at the possibility of descriptive claims being tied to normative judgments. There are two ways of approaching this problem. One is through Hume's Law, which states that no normative conclusion can validly be derived from descriptive premises. It follows from that that no amount of describing a case, no amount of description of the pain (let's say) that a certain action will cause will imply that the action is wrong. It's not logically valid, and it's certainly not definitionally true in the way "all bachelors are married men" is. Another way is through G.E. Moore's famous Open Question argument. The concept of moral goodness is not contained in any naturalistic description. Suppose we want to say that X is good in virtue of the fact that X causes something naturalisticly describable, that is supposed to be good. Happiness, for example. The sense in which X will cause happiness is objective. But it is always legitimate to ask, when someone tells you that X causes happiness, "Yes, but is X GOOD?" You might reply that it is good, but the question "is X good?" has an open feel to it, an open feel that "are bachelors married?" does not. Unlike "bachelors are married men," we can say both "happiness is good" and "happiness is not good" without changing our definitions of either happiness or goodness. This applies for any potential goal for morality, not just happiness. To prove moral goodness, we have another step to go through. In the above example, it's supporting the claim that "happiness is good." Again - how would one go about proving that?

I would remind you, that some versions (though not all) of ethical egoism fall under moral objectivism, specifically those for which it is possible for one to be wrong about what is in one's interests.

Again, you mix the normative ethical and metaethical considerations. Egoism is a normative ethical stance, and objectivism is a metaethical stance. I am not arguing for egoism as a normative ethical position. I am arguing for subjectivism as a metaethical position.

Are you suggesting that there should be some way of determining that there is only one acceptable performance metric? I don't see why you can't have multiple performance metrics, but even if we assume that you must select one, and that you must provide some objective justification for that selection, I already pointed out earlier that we do in fact have a pretty good idea how the entire concept of morality came about. Hence, we have a good idea what its original purpose was. This certainly lends weight to continued performance evaluation against that purpose.

If you want to call your position moral objectivism, as opposed to some form of natural/scientific objectivism, that's exactly what I'm suggesting. As I've said above, for an ethical theory to be objective, there must be some sense in which one goal is better than another. You present an interesting possible goal here - the "orginal purpose" of morality. Unfortunately, that won't work.

Again, the problem is Hume's Law. You can't get at a normative conclusion by using descriptive premises. The premise you rely on here seems to be something along the lines of "morality has developed to promote certain goals, like social interaction." There are two ways to take this premise. One is normative and the other is descriptive. The descriptive premise is just a statement about the course that human social/psychological/anthropological development has taken over the course of our evolution.The normative premise is some kind of strange statement about the evolution of our social norms being guided toward some desirable goal. That sounds a whole lot like a theist moral creationism, and that's a big problem. However, appealing to some intelligent moral design is the only way to make your premise validly support an objectivist moral conclusion.

I'll assume that you intended to use the descriptive premise about social evolution. Our evolution has guided us down this path, but that does not mean that it is the right path, in any sense. Claiming that we ought to go in the direction our social evolution has taken us is a lot like being thrown in a river, and pointing downstream as the direction we "ought" to go. While it certainly is the direction that we ARE going, there is no moral justification in that.

Suppose we are debating an anarchist. We want to claim that good actions just are those actions that work to promote a society. The anarchist disagrees. He says that the society has led to the development of corrupt governments and the easy expoitation of men by other men. In the end, having a society is a WORSE state of affairs than if we did not have a society. Therefore, "morality" as a social construct has created an immoral system. So good actions are those actions that defy the move toward society.

I believe the underlying confusion here is the different senses in which we can use the term "moral." One is a descriptive usage, where the name of the river that we have fallen into is "The Moral River," so calling actions pointed in that direction certainly does qualify as moral in a purely descriptive sense. It tells us where we are going, not if we should go that way. But suppose I now ask if we SHOULD go that way. If you consider this to be an irrelevent concern, or perhaps even a meaningless question, you deny the existence of a normative truth that underlies our moral thought. If evolution had gone differently, and our metaphorical river had taken a different course, that would be fine. Also, because there is no inherent rightness to following the river, there is nothing wrong with swimming against the current. Allowing these alternative possible systems of moral goodness is subjectivism.

But should we take the term moral as normative, we have work left to do. A naturalist, descriptive analysis of human evolution in society can tell us what we believe to be morally true and why we believe it. But it does not justify the claim that our beliefs are representative of objective moral goodness.

[Darth Wong]

I think you're missing the entire point here. The purpose of morality is not some ethereal absolute truth. Morality is a system, devised by mankind for our purposes. It is therefore completely reasonable to evaluate it based that purpose, rather than asking how we know that purpose to be the correct one in some sort of universal aether where systems such as morality have intrinsic value to the universe and our job is to somehow divine that value.

It's no different than any other tool that we have created. Does the shovel have some innate purpose ascribed to it by the universe? Is it more right or wrong to hit someone on the head with it than to dig a hole with it? It was created for a particular purpose, so it should be evaluated for that purpose. It does not and cannot exist without human purpose assigned to it, because it is nothing more than an idea that we cooked up for our uses.

[Superman]

I think 'morality' could have what amounts to a biological purpose as well. Primitive Homo sapiens would have been intelligent enough to basically knock out the concept of any type of hierarchical system of leadership. An alpha male may be bigger and stronger, but a smaller male could stab him with a spear. Some functions of morality may exist to ensure order, and subsequently help the species survive.

[Kuroneko]

The mistake that both of you are making with these lines of thought is where to draw the subjectivist/objectivist distinction. In this debate, that distinction belongs squarely between the descriptive and the normative.

I've only used the definition of 'absolute' that you yourself have provided in the previous thread--if you intended something different for this context, you have had plenty of opportunity to correct me. I've even explicitly asked you to. As for the difference between descriptive and normative, I gathered you thought so, which is why I've repeatedly reminded you of the distinction between the categorical and hypothetical. Something like utilitarianism works perfectly well as a purely hypothetical system.

This is a perfect example to demonstrate the point I am trying to make. "Bachelors are married men" carries the definition as a part of its terms. The relationship between "bachelor" and "married man" is explicit in our language. The relation is definitional (ie. all bachelors just are married men). To make the above statement false, we must change either our definition of "bachelor" or our definition of "married man."

Indeed. But subjectivity does not follow in the sense that you defined previously, any more that the truth of "1+1=2" is subjective, merely because it is dependent on the interpretation of the given symbols. You're suggesting we expand the notions of objectivity to the point where every statement made by any agent whatever is subjective merely because it is laden with some interpretation that could have been otherwise. That approach, while strictly speaking consistent, is also wholly useless.

However, this is not the case when we look at the possibility of descriptive claims being tied to normative judgments. There are two ways of approaching this problem. One is through Hume's Law, which states that no normative conclusion can validly be derived from descriptive premises.

Through the process suggested by Mr. Wong, non-categorical systems of ethics are open to the same immunizations against Hume's law that scientific systems are--at the worst, the minimalist approach of using the best-performing system until such a time as it is known to be false is still adequate.

Moore's famous Open Question argument. The concept of moral goodness is not contained in any naturalistic description. Suppose we want to say that X is good in virtue of the fact that X causes something naturalisticly describable, that is supposed to be good. Happiness, for example. The sense in which X will cause happiness is objective. But it is always legitimate to ask, when someone tells you that X causes happiness, "Yes, but is X GOOD?" You might reply that it is good, but the question "is X good?" has an open feel to it, an open feel that "are bachelors married?" does not.

Again, that has already been covered. The "openness" of the question is due to the fact that you did not commit to any definition of the term--but if there is no definition, the question itself is meaningless.

[Bugsby]

I think you're missing the entire point here. The purpose of morality is not some ethereal absolute truth. Morality is a system, devised by mankind for our purposes. It is therefore completely reasonable to evaluate it based that purpose, rather than asking how we know that purpose to be the correct one in some sort of universal aether where systems such as morality have intrinsic value to the universe and our job is to somehow divine that value.

It's no different than any other tool that we have created. Does the shovel have some innate purpose ascribed to it by the universe? Is it more right or wrong to hit someone on the head with it than to dig a hole with it? It was created for a particular purpose, so it should be evaluated for that purpose. It does not and cannot exist without human purpose assigned to it, because it is nothing more than an idea that we cooked up for our uses.

Evidence has shown that we haven't really CREATED morality, as we would a shovel. A more accurate description would be to say that morality is an emergent phenomenon in human social interaction. If we had created morality in the way that we created the shovel, then your argument would have a lot of force behind it. If there had ever been, at morality's "creation", a purpose assigned to morality, then it would be legitimate to appeal to that purpose in our moral discourse. Since there wasn't, your talk about the goal of morality isn't as solid as talking about the goal of the shovel. This disanalogy has two consquences. First, any talk of a goal of morality must be inferred. We can take a look at the kind of things we believe are right or wrong, and from that try to find some end point that morality is pointing at. There are a fair number of apparent contradictions in morality, especially once we consider the wide variation of ethical views over time, so pinning down this point will not be easy. Second, pinning down this point will not be all that useful, since morality was not created with some purpose. What we would be doing is simply pointing in the direction of the flow. Morality is not a process directed at some goal. The emergence of moral thought is a process that developed as individual ideas of valuation survived within a society. In true Darwininan fashion, the purpose of these thoughts was not anything apart from the survival and continued belief in these thoughts - the survival of moral memes.

My river analogy comes to mind again. The purpose of the river is not to deliver water to the sea. The river's structure is just a function of how water flows over surfaces. Similarly, there is no greater purpose to moral thought. That's just how our ideas fit together.

This is a problem for any objective morality. Morality is action-guiding. As such, if something is morally right, that should give us a reason to do it. But it is difficult to see how any objective system of morality that came about in this way would give us reason to act. If I wanted to do something that was forbidden by this objective morality, you would have a hard time convincing me that I shouldn't do it, since "shouldn't" is just your expression of a surviving valuative meme. So this objectivist non-realist morality could exist in conception, but the end result just wouldn't look like morality.

The only way that we can preserve both the story about the evolution and existence of valuative memes and the inherent action-guiding-ness of moral thought is to embrace those memes. These emergent valuative thoughts can only guide our actions if we believe in them. Thus, it is embracing these moral concepts that causes morality, not the fact of their survival though human evolution.

Embracing and internalizing concepts is a subjective, not an objective process.

[Darth Wong]

Evidence has shown that we haven't really CREATED morality, as we would a shovel.

And what is this evidence?

A more accurate description would be to say that morality is an emergent phenomenon in human social interaction.

How does that disprove the idea that humans created it? If you wish to view it as a self-generating phenomenon, then the mechanism of evolution will explain its development quite nicely, as we shall see below.

If we had created morality in the way that we created the shovel, then your argument would have a lot of force behind it.

But we did create morality. We created rules which were necessary in order to ensure the survival of the tribe. Those tribes who had different ideas of how to do things died out. That is evolution in action; moral codes literally evolved; if a tribe had a moral code which was not conducive to its survival, that moral code was eliminated along with the tribe.

If there had ever been, at morality's "creation", a purpose assigned to morality, then it would be legitimate to appeal to that purpose in our moral discourse.

Even if you disregard anthropology and evolution, that purpose is evident in the nature of the few rules which are universal to all major moral codes.

Since there wasn't, your talk about the goal of morality isn't as solid as talking about the goal of the shovel. This disanalogy has two consquences. First, any talk of a goal of morality must be inferred.

So? Virtually everything we know about how things work is inferred.

We can take a look at the kind of things we believe are right or wrong, and from that try to find some end point that morality is pointing at.

You keep using those terms "right" and "wrong". What do they mean in the context of morality? Can you explain what it means to be morally "right" or "wrong"?

There are a fair number of apparent contradictions in morality, especially once we consider the wide variation of ethical views over time, so pinning down this point will not be easy. Second, pinning down this point will not be all that useful, since morality was not created with some purpose.

You do not need someone to consciously decide the purpose of a system in order for that system to have certain imperatives. Evolution is a good example of this; it has no conscious purpose or plan, but it does have a clear survival imperative, and therefore, one can say that evolution intrinsically favours certain actions or characteristics. Similarly, if one chooses to view social morality as an evolved system rather than a consciously designed one (even though many of these rules were in fact consciously designed), then one can still say that human social morality intrinsically favours certain actions or characteristics.

What we would be doing is simply pointing in the direction of the flow. Morality is not a process directed at some goal. The emergence of moral thought is a process that developed as individual ideas of valuation survived within a society. In true Darwininan fashion, the purpose of these thoughts was not anything apart from the survival and continued belief in these thoughts - the survival of moral memes.

Moral memes do not survive well if the societies which favour them fall into disrepair. Even if one accepts the evolutionary model of morality, one must acknowledge that it will intrinsically favour traits which are conducive to the prosperity of the species or tribe, just as Darwinian evolution does.

My river analogy comes to mind again. The purpose of the river is not to deliver water to the sea. The river's structure is just a function of how water flows over surfaces. Similarly, there is no greater purpose to moral thought. That's just how our ideas fit together.

I think you are using the word "purpose" in a religious manner. When I say "purpose", it is completely acceptable for that purpose to be entirely materialistic. As an analogy, your heart has a purpose: to pump blood. No one ever consciously decided this purpose, yet it has a purpose anyway. So the fact that I cannot show any "greater purpose" doesn't refute my position.

This is a problem for any objective morality. Morality is action-guiding. As such, if something is morally right, that should give us a reason to do it. But it is difficult to see how any objective system of morality that came about in this way would give us reason to act. If I wanted to do something that was forbidden by this objective morality, you would have a hard time convincing me that I shouldn't do it, since "shouldn't" is just your expression of a surviving valuative meme. So this objectivist non-realist morality could exist in conception, but the end result just wouldn't look like morality.

"Just wouldn't look like morality"? Please define your test for determining that something is a legitimate form of morality.

The only way that we can preserve both the story about the evolution and existence of valuative memes and the inherent action-guiding-ness of moral thought is to embrace those memes. These emergent valuative thoughts can only guide our actions if we believe in them. Thus, it is embracing these moral concepts that causes morality, not the fact of their survival though human evolution.

This paragraph doesn't make any sense. How is "embracing" moral concepts any different than simply employing them, which is all that is required of the evolutionary survival model?

Embracing and internalizing concepts is a subjective, not an objective process.

Obedience to rules is an objective process.

[Kuroneko]

This is a problem for any objective morality. Morality is action-guiding. As such, if something is morally right, that should give us a reason to do it. But it is difficult to see how any objective system of morality that came about in this way would give us reason to act. If I wanted to do something that was forbidden by this objective morality, you would have a hard time convincing me that I shouldn't do it, since "shouldn't" is just your expression of a surviving valuative meme. So this objectivist non-realist morality could exist in conception, but the end result just wouldn't look like morality.

This is very puzzling. All hypothetical/non-categorical systems of ethics by their nature provide a reason for action. Utilitarianism is even explicit in this. Your perceived problem here seems to be that one cannot provide a reason that compels action "universally" in the sense that everyone will accept it. But that's not only nearly a truism, but a not-so-subtle shifting of what it means to be "absolute", which you have defined as validity independent of opinion of it (objectivist in metaethical jargon). According to you, utilitarianism (any particular version) doesn't "look like morality", since its principle of utility is objectivist in the metaethical sense and yet does not claim realism to the point of complete independence from moral agents as some others do.

Now, it may be pointed out that validity in reference to some system is different from validity in some higher ethereal sense, but one of the arguments repeated in this thread has been that the latter is meaningless, so that only the former interpretation is applicable. To generalize the argument, any tenable system of metaphysics must have some way of determining what is "real" for the term to have meaning, in which case any such system of "higher" morality becomes systemitized.