Designing a test to determine continuity of consciousness

[Wyrm]

I have seen nothing to justify why your "subjective frame of reference" is any different from a physically copyable brain state, to which the clone's is equally as valid as yours.

I see you still don't get that I'm not saying my clone's self awareness is any less than mine. It simply exists in another body (ie: different frame of reference of self), thus by definition is seperate. Frankly, as either a clone or the original, I'd consider my other self to be my perfect equal. Frankly I know we'd get along perfectly too.

That you are able to tell that there are two yous is a separate issue entirely to whether or not either of the two yous can lay claim to your mental identity. You are conflating two senses of "different". Yes, the frames of reference are initially different in the sense that they will have different coordinates in any coordinate system. Yet, they are not initially different in the sense that their physics is identical; there is no physical test I could devise to tell which one is the clone and which one is the original.

Yes, once you and your clone have different experiences, you will be different in the sense of your physics, but you share a common branch point and initially you are absolutely indistinguishable from each other. You therefore have equal claim to being "you" in every physically meaningful sense of the word.

Of course, your intuition rebels, screaming at you that common sense states that the clone was never you, even though its physics is provably identical to your own. Your intuition is also wrong — intuition being based only on prior experiences, and you've never experienced an absolutely physically and mentally identical copy of yourself. No one, not even identical twins, have this experience, so we should expect our intuition to fail concerning them.

[petesampras]

That you are able to tell that there are two yous is a separate issue entirely to whether or not either of the two yous can lay claim to your mental identity. You are conflating two senses of "different". Yes, the frames of reference are initially different in the sense that they will have different coordinates in any coordinate system. Yet, they are not initially different in the sense that their physics is identical; there is no physical test I could devise to tell which one is the clone and which one is the original.

If you except, as Bubbleboy seems to, the possibility of true AI, you don't even need perfect physical identity.

Two identical AIs stored on a harddrive can both be copied into memory and run. Call the stored copies fileAIone and fileAItwo. Obviously these will contain enourmous quantities of ones and zeros, but for the sake of argument imagine they are just the bitstrings - "0101". Call two contigious memory locations memoryA and memoryB.

Imagine copying fileAIone into memoryA, and fileAItwo into memoryB and letting them run. Call this taskone. Now imagine copying fileAItwo into memoryA, and fileAIone into memoryB. Call this tasktwo. After taskone the block of memory will look like "01010101". After tasktwo it will look like "01010101". Bubbleboy would assert that there is some meaningful difference between the two. Yet this difference is not contained anywhere in the state of the system and, infact, you could achieve taskone by running tasktwo instead.

[Singular Intellect]

That you are able to tell that there are two yous is a separate issue entirely to whether or not either of the two yous can lay claim to your mental identity.You are conflating two senses of "different". Yes, the frames of reference are initially different in the sense that they will have different coordinates in any coordinate system. Yet, they are not initially different in the sense that their physics is identical; there is no physical test I could devise to tell which one is the clone and which one is the original.

Yes, once you and your clone have different experiences, you will be different in the sense of your physics, but you share a common branch point and initially you are absolutely indistinguishable from each other. You therefore have equal claim to being "you" in every physically meaningful sense of the word.

Of course, your intuition rebels, screaming at you that common sense states that the clone was never you, even though its physics is provably identical to your own. Your intuition is also wrong — intuition being based only on prior experiences, and you've never experienced an absolutely physically and mentally identical copy of yourself. No one, not even identical twins, have this experience, so we should expect our intuition to fail concerning them.

To phrase it in your terms then, I wouldn't want my "information package" destroyed even if you copy all the information that constitutes 'me' into another package, because I associate my real time space time coordinates as part of me as well.

Furthermore, what if you're faced with an individual who's awareness as being a perfect clone dismisses the notion that they are 'really' the person they are cloned from?

Let's say I walk into our little lab, step into a cloning tube, and then from my perspective step out of another cloning tube that was explained to me very clearly as the tube from which the clone emerges. Unless the staff and the other me are delibrately lying (and I obviously already know with 100% certainty I won't lie to myself), I will immediately know I'm in fact the clone who was just assembled into an identical physical and mental package.

Therefore with this knowledge, I will immediately realize I cannot claim right to all what I think is mine because I know I was just created. I didn't earn anything my orginal has, because I wasn't physically there. If my original dies (speaking from the perspective of a clone), I could easily slide right into 'my' life and no one would be the wiser aside from those who cloned me in the first place. But as a clone, I will have no illusions about the fact that my current information package in merely a copy and not an information package that was accumulated over years of previous existence which makes up a person.

[petesampras]

To phrase it in your terms then, I wouldn't want my "information package" destroyed even if you copy all the information that constitutes 'me' into another package, because I associate my real time space time coordinates as part of me as well.

But your space/time coordinates are not part of your mind. This is easily verified by the fact that you would not claim that you have a different mind when you move to a new location. Remember that we are not asserting that the two clones are the same physical entity, we are asserting that their minds are the same.

Furthermore, what if you're faced with an individual who's awareness as being a perfect clone dismisses the notion that they are 'really' the person they are cloned from?

Let's say I walk into our little lab, step into a cloning tube, and then from my perspective step out of another cloning tube that was explained to me very clearly as the tube from which the clone emerges. Unless the staff and the other me are delibrately lying (and I obviously already know with 100% certainty I won't lie to myself), I will immediately know I'm in fact the clone who was just assembled into an identical physical and mental package.

This holds true for as long as the information as to which is the clone persists. If that information is lost, which is perfectly feasible, the question of which is the original ceases to have any meaning, since it is empiricaly untestable. And you know what value a property which is empirically untestable has? Zilch.

[Singular Intellect]

To phrase it in your terms then, I wouldn't want my "information package" destroyed even if you copy all the information that constitutes 'me' into another package, because I associate my real time space time coordinates as part of me as well.

But your space/time coordinates are not part of your mind. This is easily verified by the fact that you would not claim that you have a different mind when you move to a new location. Remember that we are not asserting that the two clones are the same physical entity, we are asserting that their minds are the same.

Furthermore, what if you're faced with an individual who's awareness as being a perfect clone dismisses the notion that they are 'really' the person they are cloned from?

Let's say I walk into our little lab, step into a cloning tube, and then from my perspective step out of another cloning tube that was explained to me very clearly as the tube from which the clone emerges. Unless the staff and the other me are delibrately lying (and I obviously already know with 100% certainty I won't lie to myself), I will immediately know I'm in fact the clone who was just assembled into an identical physical and mental package.

This holds true for as long as the information as to which is the clone persists. If that information is lost, which is perfectly feasible, the question of which is the original ceases to have any meaning, since it is empiricaly untestable. And you know what value a property which is empirically untestable has? Zilch.

So then you don't disagree that if you destroy the clone or the original, you've destroyed a mind, even if there's a copy sitting next door so to speak?

[petesampras]

So then you don't disagree that if you destroy the clone or the original, you've destroyed a mind, even if there's a copy sitting next door so to speak?

It really depends on what you mean by the phrase "destroyed a mind". You've certainly destroyed a human being. You've certainly destroyed a brain. Have you destroyed a mind? Depends how you define 'mind', really. To me it refers to the sum of behaviours, memories and thought patterns which define a persons mental identity. These things are all expressable in a manner which is independant of their physical medium. They will, thus, survive the destruction of that medium, provided the information persists. Just like the story Moby Dick will survive you destroying a copy of the book.

[Singular Intellect]

So then you don't disagree that if you destroy the clone or the original, you've destroyed a mind, even if there's a copy sitting next door so to speak?

It really depends on what you mean by the phrase "destroyed a mind". You've certainly destroyed a human being. You've certainly destroyed a brain. Have you destroyed a mind? Depends how you define 'mind', really. To me it refers to the sum of behaviours, memories and thought patterns which define a persons mental identity. These things are all expressable in a manner which is independant of their physical medium. They will, thus, survive the destruction of that medium, provided the information persists. Just like the story Moby Dick will survive you destroying a copy of the book.

I suppose we agree then if we say that a human being was destroyed but a virtually identical mind exists. Again, depends on how much divergene there is before said destruction occurs, whereas one could start arguing for a unique mind.

Honestly though, I don't see how anyone could morally justify the destruction of a human being in the process of copying the mind. That's would be equivalent of killing the original and it's pleading "Don't kill me" is argued as nothing more than a "information package not capable of understanding we have a copy right over here".

[petesampras]

So then you don't disagree that if you destroy the clone or the original, you've destroyed a mind, even if there's a copy sitting next door so to speak?

It really depends on what you mean by the phrase "destroyed a mind". You've certainly destroyed a human being. You've certainly destroyed a brain. Have you destroyed a mind? Depends how you define 'mind', really. To me it refers to the sum of behaviours, memories and thought patterns which define a persons mental identity. These things are all expressable in a manner which is independant of their physical medium. They will, thus, survive the destruction of that medium, provided the information persists. Just like the story Moby Dick will survive you destroying a copy of the book.

I suppose we agree then if we say that a human being was destroyed but a virtually identical mind exists. Again, depends on how much divergene there is before said destruction occurs, whereas one could start arguing for a unique mind.

Honestly though, I don't see how anyone could morally justify the destruction of a human being in the process of copying the mind. That's would be equivalent of killing the original and it's pleading "Don't kill me" is argued as nothing more than a "information package not capable of understanding we have a copy right over here".

I don't see how you could have read my prior posts and come to the conclusion that I would view it as morally justified to kill a human being because a perfect copy exists. Morality is not based on philisophical thought puzzles. It is morally wrong to kill someone, except under special circumstances. The definition of those special circumstances may vary from person to person. I don't think many people will view a perfect copy existing as such a special circumstance. I certainly don't. However, this has nothing to do with the question of whether the two identical copies have the same mind.

[Singular Intellect]

I don't see how you could have read my prior posts and come to the conclusion that I would view it as morally justified to kill a human being because a perfect copy exists.

You misunderstand, I wasn't suggesting you advocated such. I was merely introducing the morality of the concept.

Morality is not based on philisophical thought puzzles. It is morally wrong to kill someone, except under special circumstances. The definition of those special circumstances may vary from person to person. I don't think many people will view a perfect copy existing as such a special circumstance. I certainly don't. However, this has nothing to do with the question of whether the two identical copies have the same mind.

So I assume then that we can agree both entities have an identical mind, yet each would view the other as a completely seperate 'self' whereas neither would consider their personal self living in the other.

[Wyrm]

To phrase it in your terms then, I wouldn't want my "information package" destroyed even if you copy all the information that constitutes 'me' into another package, because I associate my real time space time coordinates as part of me as well.

Your proof that your physical coordinates are part of you is... [Bubble Boy: insert your proof here].

Good luck with that, given the absolute physical space/time translation symmetries of the universe.

Furthermore, what if you're faced with an individual who's awareness as being a perfect clone dismisses the notion that they are 'really' the person they are cloned from?

Then the clone has had a different experience from yourself, and should not be identical to you. But then, you are not identical to yourself a few seconds ago, either. Experience counts.

Now my question. What if neither instance of you is told who is the original and who is the copy? Or worse, what if the experimenters themselves could not determine which is which? Then what? Do you suddenly vanish?

Let's say I walk into our little lab, step into a cloning tube, and then from my perspective step out of another cloning tube that was explained to me very clearly as the tube from which the clone emerges. Unless the staff and the other me are delibrately lying (and I obviously already know with 100% certainty I won't lie to myself), I will immediately know I'm in fact the clone who was just assembled into an identical physical and mental package.

Therefore with this knowledge, I will immediately realize I cannot claim right to all what I think is mine because I know I was just created. I didn't earn anything my orginal has, because I wasn't physically there. If my original dies (speaking from the perspective of a clone), I could easily slide right into 'my' life and no one would be the wiser aside from those who cloned me in the first place. But as a clone, I will have no illusions about the fact that my current information package in merely a copy and not an information package that was accumulated over years of previous existence which makes up a person.

You realize you have just destroyed your own argument. The only way you know that the clone emerges from your tube is if the experimenters tell you such. Now, it could be a genuine assymetry in the apparatus, but suppose it is not; suppose that your "original" steps out of a tube phyiscally identical to yours. The only difference is that the experimenters tell him that he is the original. Then whenceforth does the assymetry come from for you to claim that you cannot lay claim to your "original"'s stuff?

It came from the experimenters — it came from an artificial fiat of labeling one tube "original" and the other tube "clone". The assymetry is born of external information provided after the fact. It did not come from the cloning process itself. Before the moment the experimenters told you that you were the clone, you could have been the original, could you not? You didn't feel "clone-y", did you? Otherwise, you would've told the experimenters: "D-UH!"

Let's have some more fun: Suppose both you and your "original" that you are both copies of the original Bubble Boy! Then the original "Bubble Boy" has vanished without a trace! Just kidding, one of you is the original Bubble Boy, but the experimenters don't know which one. Now you have to fight to the death for your stuff, but what if the "clone" kills the "original"? Are you sure the "original" isn't really the "clone" and vice versa? Your notion of identity and ownership seems quite fragile, subject to the whims of a mischevious experimental lab staff.

If I were put through the same situation, it's very different. I would ask, what makes them so sure that the entity known as Wyrm has not branched, and that both I, the one labeled the "clone", and the one labeled the "original" are legitimate continuations thereof? I would accept any reasonable physical basis for establishing myself as the "clone" as such, but arbitrary labeling is not a sound physical basis for a difference. If no physical basis for differentiation exists... well, me and my shadow will just have to deal with it, but at least it's not subject to the whims of the experimenters' games.