That's fair. It took more of my time than I was expecting to write that last reply, so I wholly understand the sentiment.Kuroneko wrote:Please let me know if I've missed something important. This is getting a rather huge, and I'm a bit rushed.
Hmmm... maybe...'Casuistry'?
Well, I would include the truth value in all judgments, except that a) its not practical as we're already collapsing two dimensions (number of people effected and by how much) into one (how much is the effect of an action) b) the most fundamental things that make people happy or sad are biologically hardwired, not a matter of belief (like copulation).Completely disagreed with in regards to the first part. But let's proceed anyway.
On the other hand, lets look at this statement: "That lampshade told me such horrible things about you! He said you were one of... them." Clearly this person (lets say for a moment its a woman) is suffering from some sort of delusion or schizophrenia, and its a source of much distress for her. We can understand from a clinical standpoint what is going through her head, and even empathize from our own experiences... but we clearly have a duty to get her psychiatric help before she does something rash.
Keep in mind that this is the first time I've had to write down this system of ethics in detail, save for a few vague statements about how we humans have more complex desires than animals (and thus attach more value to our experiences) and that morality comes from our common wants. Its mostly been confined to my head, so my intuitions may be influencing my judgments here.You're evaluating it with respect to very specific circumstances: nostalgia and attachment to that particular place (which not many have), rather than a more general nostalgia and attachment to their home (which many would have). Thus, I gather that your test is based on persons hypothetically transplanted into this situation without changing who they are or their prior experiences in any way--after all, if they grew up there, they'd likely have the same attachments. In other words, you don't construct any sort of 'analogous' situation (of being forced from their home or whatnot), but use the exact same one.
I guess you could say that the general nostalgia that all people have for their homes is what makes it understandable... but people willingly change homes all the time. Drought and violence are much more relevant events that few people experience by choice.
In similar fashion, if a riot broke out after a sporting event, my reaction would be "its just a game! Is really worth fighting over?" I can understand that some people are really passionate for sports, but there is always next year. The difference here is that the community is distanced from the effects of their presence, so its not as obvious to them why they should be grateful to have been allowed to live there at all.
Exactly! We agree. When I read about situations like these (real and hypothetical), what I'm thinking is "wow, something must have gone really wrong to make a mess this bad. How can I fix it?" I see it as an argument for why we shouldn't ever allow the sociopathic to take over the world-- the results would be miserable even for them.Yes.
More precisely, I think a kind of fusion of ethics would be ideal, or at least better: a utilitarian judgment of states of affairs, but a deontological assignment of moral responsibility for them (a pure utilitarian would say that causal responsibility is sufficient for moral responsibility), and areatic restrictions on which preferences are relevant. I already see a need for the last part in your system--when pressed with an extreme hypothetical, you attacked its likelihood rather than simply applying your stated procedure, and all of your prescriptions were toward some idealized set of preferences rather than the actual set of preferences in the hypothetical. The sadists' world is somehow illegitimate. It's "incompatible with the ideal world we seek to create." And so, you substitute the preferences of that other world when prescribing what one should do if, against all odds, one finds oneself in that nightmare.
Come to think of it, I don't have any problem with that. In fact, I agree with it, because that idealization is a good way of defining those virtues in the first place! There are some dispositions, such as a desire to torture, that are fundamentally disharmonious with a respect toward the preferences of others. Let's call them vices. There are others, such as goodwill towards others, that reinforce it. Let's call them virtues. So if you make use this "ideal world" when you judge the scenario to be too far from reality, why not also let it inform the importance of preferences in all cases?
Have I ever mentioned that I'm a fan of Transformative Justice?
Anyway, that's why I listed education as one of the solutions: the long term consequence should be that there will be fewer people with desires that are abhorrent (in other words, highly personal desires that cause others to suffer), and more people capable of cooperating with each other. Its a slow process, but I think it works.
But yeah, in an ideal world we wouldn't need morality-- everyone would be free to enjoy the pursuits of their choice without having to worry about whether or not the guy next door wants to rape children. Pleasure gained at the expense of another is still pleasure... but that does not give you a right to do it.
(maybe I should call my ethics "utopian utilitarianism"...)
The only difference between you and I is that I think of virtue ethics and utilitarianism as two sides of the same coin, and you think of utilitarianism as being subservient to virtue ethics. Correct me if I'm wrong.
Well, I would be suspicious, but that's my default state anyway. If I were to learn why Bob did what he did, the good he hoped to cause and that he did cause, then yes. It would indicate that he has good intentions (the mother of virtue) and that he has courage to do what is right even when, intuitively, it seems like a horrid thing to do.That's a lot for avoiding answering the question. Since you're obviously concentrating too hard on the "you" part, suppose that it was Bob in that position, and he already did it. Was his action correct and is it indicative of good character (I don't think those are always compatible, particularly in cases like this)?
And I'd be the first to blame him if he made things worse.
I see. I thought it would have something to do with holistic medicine or something like, but I guess not.An act-utilitarianism with utility computed over the entire world.
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Before you go on, let me summarize my position on deontology: there isn't anything it gives you that you can't get using a combination of virtue ethics and utilitarianism.
It wouldn't-- I've just never seen a logical or empirical justification for doing so presented by deontologists.Since you were quite willing to introduce stratification of preferences/desires/whatnot for your system, why would it be illegitimate for the deontologist to do something similar in regards to duties?
Its the latter. On null results, that's actually one of the reasons I like the stratification I proposed. Whether I like Coke or Pepsi is my business, and there is room for me to make choices that haven't got a thing to do with morality. It should only come into play if it effects other people.If your criticism is that most deontological ethics wouldn't say anything about the situation, I don't see what that fact in itself is a problem. On the contrary, it is quite compatible with the ordinary intuition that some choices have no moral component, and it seems rather perverse to me that utilitarianism judges any action anyone ever takes or can take. For according to (act) utilitarianism, there is a morally right answer to whether I should order a chai latte or cappuccino.
If you just mean that there should be a moral prescription in the particular situation above, then I agree with you. But the general characteristic of a moral system sometimes providing a null result seems to me a positive feature. Some actions being just plain neutral is exactly what I would want in a moral system.
Surprisingly, I agree. Actually, moreover I think that holding people responsible for things that happened in the past has only limited utility even when they are the cause of something. Its primarily useful in determining what to do with the guilty, how likely they are to do something similar, and figuring out what to do from there. But the key constraint is that you can't change the past, and neither is it practical to hold someone responsible indefinitely.And I see it as a benefit of deontology. Most flavors of deontology are characterized through duties, and that can (and should) include a duty of due diligence. If the person exercised due diligence but the bad outcome happened anyway, then he or she is not at fault. If the person was capable of fulfilling that duty but did not, then of course he or she is culpable. On the other hand, if the person's incompetence is such that he or she was incapable of fulfilling it, then we label them with things like 'criminally insane' and don't hold them morally responsible.
In this case, refraining from trying to see every possibility in moral terms leads to a superior classification. Frankly, I find the implicit attempt to pin every accident on someone much more perverse.
We can observe the point about "due diligence" in the real world. I've made the argument in the past that if a person (insane or not, but the original context was a debate about insanity) has no more control over events then they have over the weather, logically they are no more responsible then they are for the rain. Responsibility is not just a function of cause and effect, its also a function of whether or not you could reliably control your behavior in light of the consequences *.
A drunk on the other hand can predict the consequences of getting drunk while still sober, so even though he has no control over his actions while drunk, he's clearly at fault if he gets into the passenger seat of a car. Similarly, I'm not supposed to drive until I've been seizure free for six months. (
)* Yes, that includes both deontological AND utilitarian qualifications for assigning responsibility. I suspect that most people use both rather than one or just the other.
