Designing a test to determine continuity of consciousness

[petesampras]

To sum up my point of view, if I was asked what would I lose by being copied 100% mentally and physically (while my original self is destroyed in process), I would assert I'm losing my specific subjective frame of reference of self. My copy wouldn't lose that, but would actually just be obtaining it since his subjective frame of reference of self is just beginning after completion of his creation.

Obviously a subjective frame of reference of self is utterly impossible to transfer with the destruction method (copying would be easy), by virtue of two of me capable of existing at once and both possessing such.

The only way such a frame of reference isn't lost is if the process is not a method of duplication, but a method of alteration. Hence, why things like learning to play ping pong or growing up doesn't make me a seperate entity because the frame of reference for self is unchanged. Destruction of an entity would clearly destroy that subjective frame of reference, even if another subjective frame of reference is created.

What is this subjective frame of reference? What empirical tests could exist which demonstrate its existance in you but not a copy of you?

If it's just the history which lead up to your current state, then let me ask you a question. If it turned out that all your memories up to this point were a fabrication, would that cause your mind to suddenly pop out of existance?

In fact, you cannot be 100% certain your memories are no fake, yet you can be 100% certain of the existance of your mind. That fact alone is sufficient evidence that the mind is not dependant, in principle, on its history.

[petesampras]

As has been stated repeatedly. Alive and dead are biological phenomena. If I got into a car accident and lost all higher brain functions I could still be alive, but I would have no mind. Equally, there is no reason a non living machine could not, in theory, have a mind.

And I or others have argued that AIs couldn't?

If you accept that AIs can have a mind, then you also accept that something does not need to be alive to have a mind. In which case your original makes no sense for the reasons I stated. To quote..

However that doesn't mean that 10-years-younger you is equivalent to dead.

We weren't, and never have, been discussing the biological phenomena of being alive or dead. We are discussing mental identity. I could, with sufficiently advanced technology, rewire you brain so that you were mental another person. That would not kill you. You would not be dead. For these are biological terms.

[Singular Intellect]

To sum up my point of view, if I was asked what would I lose by being copied 100% mentally and physically (while my original self is destroyed in process), I would assert I'm losing my specific subjective frame of reference of self. My copy wouldn't lose that, but would actually just be obtaining it since his subjective frame of reference of self is just beginning after completion of his creation.

Obviously a subjective frame of reference of self is utterly impossible to transfer with the destruction method (copying would be easy), by virtue of two of me capable of existing at once and both possessing such.

The only way such a frame of reference isn't lost is if the process is not a method of duplication, but a method of alteration. Hence, why things like learning to play ping pong or growing up doesn't make me a seperate entity because the frame of reference for self is unchanged. Destruction of an entity would clearly destroy that subjective frame of reference, even if another subjective frame of reference is created.

What is this subjective frame of reference?

You don't understand what a frame of reference is? You're standing at point A, I'm standing at point B. We have two different frames of reference for where we are, what we see, what we hear, etc, etc. In case of my clone, there might be similarites such as thought process and dealing with the situation, but our positions are clearly different frames of reference.

What empirical tests could exist which demonstrate its existance in you but not a copy of you?

I specifically stated that my copy would clearly have a frame of reference. Ergo it proves irrefuteably that the two frames of reference are unique, otherwise my clone's physical makeup down to the last existing piece of matter would be occupying the exact same space/time position I am, which is impossible.

If it's just the history which lead up to your current state, then let me ask you a question. If it turned out that all your memories up to this point were a fabrication, would that cause your mind to suddenly pop out of existance?

No.

In fact, you cannot be 100% certain your memories are no fake, yet you can be 100% certain of the existance of your mind. That fact alone is sufficient evidence that the mind is not dependant, in principle, on its history.

Your example would do nothing more than prove my subjective frame of reference began at a time far later than I currently think it did, since any previous memories of frame of reference are a frabrication.

This of course presumes frame of reference can exist as a memory at all.

[petesampras]

To sum up my point of view, if I was asked what would I lose by being copied 100% mentally and physically (while my original self is destroyed in process), I would assert I'm losing my specific subjective frame of reference of self. My copy wouldn't lose that, but would actually just be obtaining it since his subjective frame of reference of self is just beginning after completion of his creation.

Obviously a subjective frame of reference of self is utterly impossible to transfer with the destruction method (copying would be easy), by virtue of two of me capable of existing at once and both possessing such.

The only way such a frame of reference isn't lost is if the process is not a method of duplication, but a method of alteration. Hence, why things like learning to play ping pong or growing up doesn't make me a seperate entity because the frame of reference for self is unchanged. Destruction of an entity would clearly destroy that subjective frame of reference, even if another subjective frame of reference is created.

What is this subjective frame of reference?

You don't understand what a frame of reference is? You're standing at point A, I'm standing at point B. We have two different frames of reference for where we are, what we see, what we hear, etc, etc. In case of my clone, there might be similarites such as thought process and dealing with the situation, but our positions are clearly different frames of reference.

I understand the concept of a frame of reference in terms of physical position, which is what you are describing here. However, walking across a room changes your frame of reference, but you still have the same mental identity. You don't become a completely difference person because of where you are currently standing, so you mind cannot be defined by its frame of reference.

What empirical tests could exist which demonstrate its existance in you but not a copy of you?

I specifically stated that my copy would clearly have a frame of reference. Ergo it proves irrefuteably that the two frames of reference are unique, otherwise my clone's physical makeup down to the last existing piece of matter would be occupying the exact same space/time position I am, which is impossible.

..and so we come full circle again. In saying this you are requiring that physical properties of the matter that make up your body are fundamental in defining your mind. There are many problems with thus, not least of which is that the physical matter that makes up your body is constantly changing.

If it's just the history which lead up to your current state, then let me ask you a question. If it turned out that all your memories up to this point were a fabrication, would that cause your mind to suddenly pop out of existance?

No.

In fact, you cannot be 100% certain your memories are no fake, yet you can be 100% certain of the existance of your mind. That fact alone is sufficient evidence that the mind is not dependant, in principle, on its history.

Your example would do nothing more than prove my subjective frame of reference began at a time far later than I currently think it did, since any previous memories of frame of reference are a frabrication.

This of course presumes frame of reference can exist as a memory at all.

Again, you need to define exactly what you mean by subjective frame of reference. The term is extremely vague and has many possible meanings.

[Singular Intellect]

I understand the concept of a frame of reference in terms of physical position, which is what you are describing here. However, walking across a room changes your frame of reference, but you still have the same mental identity. You don't become a completely difference person because of where you are currently standing, so you mind cannot be defined by its frame of reference.

I would define subjective frame of reference in mental terms as self awareness at any one point in space/time.

For example, you can circle a tree and look at it from almost any angle you wish, but you cannot look at it from all angles at the same time. That's impossible (we're discounting obvious shit like having a 360 degree image of said tree using technology, because you can still only look at that photo from a single frame of reference at any point in space time).

..and so we come full circle again. In saying this you are requiring that physical properties of the matter that make up your body are fundamental in defining your mind. There are many problems with thus, not least of which is that the physical matter that makes up your body is constantly changing.

That's why there's a difference between moving a specific frame of reference and destroying a specific frame of reference. Walking around constantly changes my mind's frame of reference, both physically and mentally (since my thought obviously change too). Killing my brain terminates my mental ability to comprehend a frame of reference entirely.

Again, you need to define exactly what you mean by subjective frame of reference. The term is extremely vague and has many possible meanings.

To try and word it another way, it's the assertion that a mind possesses a point of view (which encompasses thoughts, energy and matter), and can only possess one at any given point in space time. That's why I can circle a tree and look at it from all angles, but it's impossible for me to look at it from all angles at exactly the same time.

[petesampras]

Okay. So its the history of the experiences gained from a mind attached to a body following a path in space/time? I'm assuming that it's not the exact positions that are important, but the experiences those positions offer?

Say there were two identical fields with a tree in them. If I were to drug you and transport you to one of the fields containing a tree for you to wake up and look at. Then drug you again and take you back to your house. Would it make any difference to this subjective frame of reference which field I took you to? And, if so, why?

[Singular Intellect]

Okay. So its the history of the experiences gained from a mind attached to a body following a path in space/time? I'm assuming that it's not the exact positions that are important, but the experiences those positions offer?

Say there were two identical fields with a tree in them. If I were to drug you and transport you to one of the fields containing a tree for you to wake up and look at. Then drug you again and take you back to your house. Would it make any difference to this subjective frame of reference which field I took you to? And, if so, why?

I don't see what your point is there...

You're not destroying my frame of reference, your drugging efforts merely compromise my comprehension of it (as would sleeping, dreaming, drugged, near death experience, etc). You can argueably move this subjective frame of reference, hinder the ability of a mind to comprehend the concept in the first place, but once you destroy it, all you can ever do is create a new one.

What makes the subjective frame of reference of self unique is that it can never occupy two or more places in space time at once.

That's the only distinction I can logically argue against the whole sum of a mind being replicable to every degree as proposed. The only difference would be frame of reference, and by definition, those can never be the same because they cannot occupy a single point in space/time.

[petesampras]

Okay. So its the history of the experiences gained from a mind attached to a body following a path in space/time? I'm assuming that it's not the exact positions that are important, but the experiences those positions offer?

Say there were two identical fields with a tree in them. If I were to drug you and transport you to one of the fields containing a tree for you to wake up and look at. Then drug you again and take you back to your house. Would it make any difference to this subjective frame of reference which field I took you to? And, if so, why?

I don't see what your point is there...

You're not destroying my frame of reference, your drugging efforts merely compromise my comprehension of it (as would sleeping, dreaming, drugged, near death experience, etc). You can argueably move this subjective frame of reference, hinder the ability of a mind to comprehend the concept in the first place, but once you destroy it, all you can ever do is create a new one.

What makes the subjective frame of reference of self unique is that it can never occupy two or more places in space time at once.

That's the only distinction I can logically argue against the whole sum of a mind being replicable to every degree as proposed. The only difference would be frame of reference, and by definition, those can never be the same because they cannot occupy a single point in space/time.

Put it another way, if you had two super powerful computers each running a simulation of the world. In each is also a simulation of you. Each simulation has the exact same experiences and takes the exact same actions. Now, do they have the same subjective frame of reference? If their subjective frames of reference are different, what is it that makes them different. The physical locations and matter comprising the two different computers cannot be the cause, since that is not subjectively part of the experience of either simulated you. In fact their lives and experiences and actions are utterly independant of the physical situations of the two computers.

[Singular Intellect]

Put it another way, if you had two super powerful computers each running a simulation of the world.

So in our objective world you've established three; the two identical virtual worlds and the one world in which those two are being simulated.

In each is also a simulation of you. Each simulation has the exact same experiences and takes the exact same actions. Now, do they have the same subjective frame of reference?

Obviously not, you just said they are two seperate worlds running identically.

If their subjective frames of reference are different, what is it that makes them different.

The fact you just asserted there are two of these worlds and therefore cannot occupy the same space/time, virtual or otherwise.

The physical locations and matter comprising the two different computers cannot be the cause, since that is not subjectively part of the experience of either simulated you. In fact their lives and experiences and actions are utterly independant of the physical situations of the two computers.

You asserted they are two different frames of reference by asserting these are two identical, yet seperate worlds.

You're now playing childish word games by insisting I point out some difference but yet also insist I'm not allowed to point out the one and only difference you stipulated exists in the first place!

[petesampras]

Put it another way, if you had two super powerful computers each running a simulation of the world.

So in our objective world you've established three; the two identical virtual worlds and the one world in which those two are being simulated.

In each is also a simulation of you. Each simulation has the exact same experiences and takes the exact same actions. Now, do they have the same subjective frame of reference?

Obviously not, you just said they are two seperate worlds running identically.

If their subjective frames of reference are different, what is it that makes them different.

The fact you just asserted there are two of these worlds and therefore cannot occupy the same space/time, virtual or otherwise.

The physical locations and matter comprising the two different computers cannot be the cause, since that is not subjectively part of the experience of either simulated you. In fact their lives and experiences and actions are utterly independant of the physical situations of the two computers.

You asserted they are two different frames of reference by asserting these are two identical, yet seperate worlds.

You're now playing childish word games by insisting I point out some difference but yet also insist I'm not allowed to point out the one and only difference you stipulated exists in the first place! [/quote]

A computer simulation is not effected by the computer used to run it. The subjective frame of reference must be identical for an entity in the same simulation. You cannot have different subjective frames of reference if there is no possible difference in subjective experience.

There could be 2 identical simulations running on the same computer. That computer will be constantly shifting data in and out of memory, cache and registers. There will be no difference of physical location, anymore than you would claim your mind has different location as different neurons and regions are activated. What would be your difference of the subjective frame of reference in that case?

[Ohma]

If you accept that AIs can have a mind, then you also accept that something does not need to be alive to have a mind. In which case your original makes no sense for the reasons I stated. To quote..

However that doesn't mean that 10-years-younger you is equivalent to dead.

We weren't, and never have, been discussing the biological phenomena of being alive or dead. We are discussing mental identity. I could, with sufficiently advanced technology, rewire you brain so that you were mental another person. That would not kill you. You would not be dead. For these are biological terms.

So you refuse to believe that other people in the thread have been arguing about whether or not copying a person's conscious thought patterns and short/long-term memories into a robot brain, then killing the original biological (or alternately destroying the robot brain) involves that person dieing, therefore people who are arguing about that are wrong?

(where is that pac-man looking smiley anyway?)

[petesampras]

So you refuse to believe that other people in the thread have been arguing about whether or not copying a person's conscious thought patterns and short/long-term memories into a robot brain, then killing the original biological (or alternately destroying the robot brain) involves that person dieing, therefore people who are arguing about that are wrong?

(where is that pac-man looking smiley anyway?)

I'm really not sure what point you are trying to make. My position on this has been consistantly clear..

If you kill a human being, then that human being is dead. The presense of identical copies has no bearing on this.

If you, using advanced technology, you rewire someones brain to be a completely different person, you have not killed them.

Life and death are biologically terms. They have nothing to do with mental identity.

[Singular Intellect]

A computer simulation is not effected by the computer used to run it.

Then explain how a simulation is unaffected when I kill the power to the computer simulating it. While you're at it, explain to everyone why all their computer component upgrades were a waste of money because any game simulation they play is unaffected by the computer system running it.

The subjective frame of reference must be identical for an entity in the same simulation. You cannot have different subjective frames of reference if there is no possible difference in subjective experience.

There could be 2 identical simulations running on the same computer. That computer will be constantly shifting data in and out of memory, cache and registers.

Yes, a process that happens over a dimension we call time. Hence my specific mention of frame of reference not happening in the same space time, not just space.

There will be no difference of physical location, anymore than you would claim your mind has different location as different neurons and regions are activated. What would be your difference of the subjective frame of reference in that case?

Time. That's why I specified space time and not just space. Kindly pay attention.

[petesampras]

Then explain how a simulation is unaffected when I kill the power to the computer simulating it. While you're at it, explain to everyone why all their computer component upgrades were a waste of money because any game simulation they play is unaffected by the computer system running it.

Don't be pedantic. Clearly we are refering to a theoretical computer of sufficient power. Not a practical experiment! That a simulation does not depend, in theory, on the details of the implementation is the Church-Turing thesis, which forms the basis of all computer science.

The subjective frame of reference must be identical for an entity in the same simulation. You cannot have different subjective frames of reference if there is no possible difference in subjective experience.

There could be 2 identical simulations running on the same computer. That computer will be constantly shifting data in and out of memory, cache and registers.

Yes, a process that happens over a dimension we call time. Hence my specific mention of frame of reference not happening in the same space time, not just space.

I'm talking about two simulations being run at the same time on the same machine. It could even be the same process with different threads representing the different simulations. In the physical time and space of the computers operation the two simulations would be hopelessly interleaved.

If you say they occupy sufficiently different time and space to be considered separate 'frames of reference', then each and every thought that enters your mind is a different frame of reference from every other thought, and there is no mental entity that is you.

There will be no difference of physical location, anymore than you would claim your mind has different location as different neurons and regions are activated. What would be your difference of the subjective frame of reference in that case?

Time. That's why I specified space time and not just space. Kindly pay attention.

As already stated, two simulations running simultaneously on the same computer will be interleaved in time as well as space.

[Singular Intellect]

Then explain how a simulation is unaffected when I kill the power to the computer simulating it. While you're at it, explain to everyone why all their computer component upgrades were a waste of money because any game simulation they play is unaffected by the computer system running it.

Don't be pedantic. Clearly we are refering to a theoretical computer of sufficient power. Not a practical experiment! That a simulation does not depend, in theory, on the details of the implementation is the Church-Turing thesis, which forms the basis of all computer science.

The subjective frame of reference must be identical for an entity in the same simulation. You cannot have different subjective frames of reference if there is no possible difference in subjective experience.

There could be 2 identical simulations running on the same computer. That computer will be constantly shifting data in and out of memory, cache and registers.

Yes, a process that happens over a dimension we call time. Hence my specific mention of frame of reference not happening in the same space time, not just space.

I'm talking about two simulations being run at the same time on the same machine. It could even be the same process with different threads representing the different simulations. In the physical time and space of the computers operation the two simulations would be hopelessly interleaved.

If you say they occupy sufficiently different time and space to be considered separate 'frames of reference', then each and every thought that enters your mind is a different frame of reference from every other thought, and there is no mental entity that is you.

There will be no difference of physical location, anymore than you would claim your mind has different location as different neurons and regions are activated. What would be your difference of the subjective frame of reference in that case?

Time. That's why I specified space time and not just space. Kindly pay attention.

As already stated, two simulations running simultaneously on the same computer will be interleaved in time as well as space.

Here's a question for your little simulation 'theory' then. If I upload a virus to kill only one simulation person, what happens to the other simulation person? If nothing, then they clearly have seperate subjective frames of reference because one exists and the other no longer does. If my virus designed to kill only simulation one person and both die, then they aren't seperate as you asserted previously.

Which is it? Make up your fucking mind already.

[Ohma]

I'm really not sure what point you are trying to make. My position on this has been consistantly clear..

If you kill a human being, then that human being is dead. The presense of identical copies has no bearing on this.

If you, using advanced technology, you rewire someones brain to be a completely different person, you have not killed them.

Life and death are biologically terms. They have nothing to do with mental identity.

So again, while most people in the thread are arguing about whether or not it matters if a theoretical procedure to copy their thought patterns into a computer simulation of them kills biological them in the process, you argue that super-duper-awesome computers can simulate a human mind...and somehow that refutes the arguments of people who say that the aforementioned "upload" process is problematic because they will die (as in physically and mentally, full cessation of subjective existence etc.) in the process.

[petesampras]

Here's a question for your little simulation 'theory' then. If I upload a virus to kill only one simulation person, what happens to the other simulation person? If nothing, then they clearly have seperate subjective frames of reference because one exists and the other no longer does. If my virus designed to kill only simulation one person and both die, then they aren't seperate as you asserted previously.

Which is it? Make up your fucking mind already.

That would make the two simulations different from an information point of view, I clearly stated that the simulations were identical. If you change the information in one simulation, i.e. uploading your 'virus', then you can distinguish between them in terms of the 'subjective frames of reference' of the inhabitants. But that is not a problem for my position. If you look back, it is your position that the identity of mental processes are a product of more than just information.

[petesampras]

So again, while most people in the thread are arguing about whether or not it matters if a theoretical procedure to copy their thought patterns into a computer simulation of them kills biological them in the process, you argue that super-duper-awesome computers can simulate a human mind...and somehow that refutes the arguments of people who say that the aforementioned "upload" process is problematic because they will die (as in physically and mentally, full cessation of subjective existence etc.) in the process.

No, that is not what I have claimed. How many times do I have to repeat this? Killing someone is killing them, regardless of whether you have a copy of their mind. Now go away, you really are boring me with this.

[Ohma]

No, that is not what I have claimed. How many times do I have to repeat this? Killing someone is killing them, regardless of whether you have a copy of their mind. Now go away, you really are boring me with this.

Then what are you fucking claiming?! Because you supposedly aren't claiming that the hippotheticle upload process doesnt kill people, however you aren't apparently claiming that it does either.

To bring up another fucking hippotheticle senario:
I buy an apple.
Another apple spontaneously appears in my hand.
I now have two apples which are exactly the same right down to their molecular structure.
The first apple dissapeares.
Has anything changed changed?

[Gigaliel]

No, that is not what I have claimed. How many times do I have to repeat this? Killing someone is killing them, regardless of whether you have a copy of their mind. Now go away, you really are boring me with this.

Then what are you fucking claiming?! Because you supposedly aren't claiming that the hippotheticle upload process doesnt kill people, however you aren't apparently claiming that it does either.

To bring up another fucking hippotheticle senario:
I buy an apple.
Another apple spontaneously appears in my hand.
I now have two apples which are exactly the same right down to their molecular structure.
The first apple dissapeares.
Has anything changed changed?

..no? The apple could have traveled through a wormhole and ended up where it started and there would be no difference between the apples. This scenario has the apple maintaining its special perspective while a duplication would not. Yet there is no difference empirically. How would you test for the special perspective?

Anyway, back to the patterns analogy. Before and after the upload there is a self in the brain and then in the computer. There's your continuity. There's no experimental difference that can tell at all. Think of the mind as a highly complex function. You don't destroy it by burning the paper it's on.

Special perspective is the opposite, it seems. The spacetime definition assumes that events do not just change the mind's information, spacetime is a part of it. Thus, when one copy dies and another does not, if you assign personal perspectives then some universal spectator could say 'yes, he died'. This is why simulations do not affect this position, you can always say one copy is separate in odd ways despite no observable difference between the copies, because if view from outside the universe, there would be.

To emphasize: Who observes special perspective end? No one. Not even the dying see it coming, because it is nothing. You just see a body destroyed beyond repair. Perhaps it was merely fluttered away with some hyper drive jump and replaced with a duplicate. Then they gave it amnesia, or pretended it lived a little longer. This speculation is typical fruitless and Ockham's razor can be invoked. But what if the brain/copy was still available?

But with uploading this speculation is not fruitless. You can have a new, if amnesiac you, created when you died. Your self is preserved.

To conclude, why would special perspective exist? Everyone agrees that there is no empirical difference between copies. Special perspective seems arbitrary and is definitional. Empirically, if you have a back-up, being shot in the head 'merely' results in U(X+new) reverting to U(X) somewhere else. Since they're identical empirically, then 'you' still exist.

That reads like it should explain it.

[Steel]

But with uploading this speculation is not fruitless. You can have a new, if amnesiac you, created when you died. Your self is preserved.

Explain (with the following assumption) to me why i should pay to have this clone of me created then. What is my gain?

Given that the clone could be continuously recorded and could be popped over to me whenever i want and in any state recorded up to the time i order it.

Assumption: I would not regard the investment as worthwhile if i have my limbs chopped off and can then bring in the clone to take over from exactly where i was before my dismemberment and have the clone live out the rest of my life as if that happened, while i go and sit in some hosptial somewhere.

[petesampras]

But with uploading this speculation is not fruitless. You can have a new, if amnesiac you, created when you died. Your self is preserved.

Explain (with the following assumption) to me why i should pay to have this clone of me created then. What is my gain?

Given that the clone could be continuously recorded and could be popped over to me whenever i want and in any state recorded up to the time i order it.

Assumption: I would not regard the investment as worthwhile if i have my limbs chopped off and can then bring in the clone to take over from exactly where i was before my dismemberment and have the clone live out the rest of my life as if that happened, while i go and sit in some hosptial somewhere.

Remember, that the purpose of your mind is not to preserve its own identity, your self if you like, it is to preserve your physical body. Thus any situation which envolves the destruction, or damage, to that body will be avoided by your mind. This is true of any normal human. Where your mind is in a different body, it will seek to protect that one at all costs. This is what human minds are for. Imagine a program designed to monitor some piece of equipment. The purpose of this program is to regulate various parameters of this equipment to prevent it blowing up (which would also take this copy of the program with it). Now, imagine another piece of equipment with the exact same program in it. Does that mean the program doesn't need to do its job to continue to exist? Well yes it could just let the equipment blow up and it would still exist. However, the program protects the equipment, not to protect its own existance, but becauing protecting the physical equipment it is residing in is its function.

[Steel]

... your own identity, your self if you like...

... its own existance...

So you agree that these things exist, and that the creation of a clone does not carry them over, and thus the cloning process would be useless for someone who wants immortality. (Which in every sane persons mind means that you yourself survive, not some bollocks like immortality through your children or survival of your genes or the survival of an exact replica who can take over when you die.)

[petesampras]

... your own identity, your self if you like...

... its own existance...

So you agree that these things exist, and that the creation of a clone does not carry them over, and thus the cloning process would be useless for someone who wants immortality. (Which in every sane persons mind means that you yourself survive, not some bollocks like immortality through your children or survival of your genes or the survival of an exact replica who can take over when you die.)

They exist only as information. There is no evidence what-so-ever to attribute any existance to mental properties beyond this. If there is a perfect copy of someone and that person dies, then their mental identity survives, by virtue of the information surviving. There is no need to copy anything over if the information is already in the clone. If I have two copies of the book Moby Dick and I destroy one, the story Moby Dick survives. Any phenomena which can be described in terms of information and that does not depend directly on the nature of its medium has this property.

Now survival instincts are a completely different issue. You may think that survival of your genes is 'some bollocks', but it is the very force which drives our deepest instincts. We all desire to protect our physical bodies because evolution has given us an overwhelming instinct to do so. There is no need to envoke any protecting of the mental self or mental identity. In can be explained perfectly without that. Occams razor again.

[Resinence]

Um, except most people don't give a fuck if their identity lives on if they are dead. I fail to see how it's perfectly ok to be in oblivion just because no one else can tell the difference.