Dealing with ultra-libertarian idiocy?

[Ender]

By the way fucker, I hope you are not going to a state school, or making use of any tuition assistance or scholarships. That would be contrary to your little creed.

So long as I pay taxes, I don't see any problem with using the services they pay for. If I didn't I might as well have flushed all that money down the toilet.

It makes you a fucking hypocrite. "I'm getting mine, but fuck you all!"

It's not like I'm forcing you to pay for the government services I use.

Again "I got mine, now fuck you guys!"

How far should I take your logic? Should I stop driving on public roads? Should I stop buying utilities from government protected monopolies? Should I stop going to restaurants that are inspected by government health inspectors? The government does all sorts of things. Barring a complete disengagement with society, I can't simply cut off all dealings with them.

It's not my logic you god damned moron. It is yours. It is the end result of your position.

You are obviously too stupid to even understand the meaning of simple concepts like property. As it happens, I am paying my own way. However, your point is utterly retarded. Who but a shrill, brain-dead asshole like you would suggest that a voluntary gift from one person to another is an "infringement" of anyone's property?

Stas covered this pretty well, but I just want to make an additional point:

Your parents provide for you as part of a survival strategy. Aside from the fact that you carry on their genes and memes, the idea is that when they are too old, you will provide and care for them in return. Now this is fine and dandy with you, and me as well. But for some reason you think it is good when the individual invests in their future by providing for fullgrown offspring to help ensure a good standard of living in the future, but object to the state doing the same via social security, when they are the exact same fucking thing.

Furthermore, all this foolishness about libertarians letting diabetics die in elevators is nothing more than gross and sensational misrepresentation.

How is it a misrepresentation when you confirmed that the essential point was correct?

The fact that libertarians value property rights in no way suggests that a libertarian would be opposed to one person giving property to another. Nor does it prove anything about whether or not a libertarian would render aid to another, should the need arise.

This from someone who thinks cold-blooded murder of tax collectors is fine. Have you ever even examined your position for conflicting statements?

Like I said before. Between work and school, I have precious little time to waste on (admittedly pointless) internet debate. However I am trying to put together some further responses (including something about Katrina) that I'll hopefully be able to post tomorrow.

Yeah, keep stalling. I'm really interested to hear how a communal distribution of goods, services, and labor is an example reinforcing the idea of the anarchistic free-market.

Economics is a science that seeks to explain observable human behavior. It is not a normative doctrine that claims people ought to act one way or another.

You are one dumb son of a bitch.

Economics is the scientific study of the distribution of resources.
Psychology is the scientific study of observable human behavior.

EDIT: In the interest of clarity, Psychology is the subset of behavioral science that studies observable human behavior as it relates to neurological and physiological processes. Your vague definition of "the science that seeks to explain human behavior" fits any of the behavioral sciences. Anthropology, with it's broad definition, may have been a better counter, but I felt like nailing it down to a more specific science. And as our understanding of psychology is more complete then that of molecular biology (the other likely cause of human behavior) I chose to cite that one. END OF EDIT


How about you stop using terms you don't understand, ok? I know mommy and daddy got you that word-a-day calander to help you, but all it is doing is making you look like a fool.


"stop misrepresenting the science of economics"... kid you don't even know what economics is. So far you have confused it with biology and psychology. What is next, history?

Some of the criticisms raised by various posters in this thread are non-trivial, some are quite fundamental. Trivial answers, the kind that I can fire off when I have a few spare moments, are not going to satisfy anyone. I'm simply explaining why non-trivial answers, the kind that take a few hours to research and compose, haven't yet been forthcoming from me and re-affirming my intention to provide some when I have the time to do so.

Fuck you kid, you knew when you came here that this was not a place that you could fire off soundbites. You said as much in your first post. The average levle of education here is (or was as of a few years ago, we've picked up a fair share of morons since then) graduate student level. We are here to debate positions, not bear witness in blind faith. Come to play, or shut the fuck up.

[bilateralrope]

I'd like to know what happens to the people who can't afford these private security companies?

But you're not being taxed, so you have more money! What do you mean there are people with income so low they don't get taxed?! Er.... charity police?

Does this leave open a way for other countries (or foreign corporations) from taking over the country ?
Lets call them country x

First the send in their guys to replace the other private security companies in a couple of areas. Because they are being funded from an outside source they will be able to offer better quality at a lower price. At some point they start enforcing their countries laws, as well as charging people about the same as they would be taxed in country x.

Then once they have a complete monopoly they run a vote on if the citizens of those cities want to become part of country x. This will be a completely fair vote but two facts will be made clear in the leadup to the vote:

1 - The security company will leave overnight if the vote fails. They will also remind people of how bad the previous security companies were.

2 - Because they are already enforcing the laws for country x, there won't actually be much that changes for the average citizen.

The then repeat this for the next batch of cities until the libertarian country is no more.

So under a libertarian government, how would this scenario be prevented ?

[Ender]

So under a libertarian government, how would this scenario be prevented ?

Actually, there is a very simple answer to that one. Your scenario won't happen because it is far faster to simply go in and conquer them the old fashioned way. Katrina serves a useful example again for when the Navy showed up bearing supplies and marines.

For simplicity I've debated under the assumption that this scenario is either in a vacuum, or world wide. But once you try mixing an anarchist group with a statist group (or any kind of organized collectivism) in a competitive scenario, the anarchists are fucked. I've seen it referred to as the squared rule of interaction in a few publications (no idea if that is the real term for it or not). A group of disciplined and focused people working in concert towards a goal will be as effective as the same number of people squarred working independently. Primates organized into troops originally for a reason - it is fundamentally more effective to work in an organized heirarchy.


About the best you could hope for in a real world scenario is for the invasion to not be cost effective e.g. what we are seeing in Iraq. If the war, occupation, and reconstruction costs more then the profit you make from the conquered country's GNP and resources, then economically it makes no sense to go in and steal it. This is why the standard empire of the last century died and was replaced with the more modern economic/cultural empire. Nowadays it simply costs to much to go in and take it, just buy it at cut rate prices and fuck them in the market. That said, country X may still invade simply out of ideaology or because the executive power in it is a damn moron. Again e.g. Iraq.

[Ritterin Sophia]

I had great grandparents who relayed to me what happened when whole towns were literally owned by the company, this doesn't sound much different, so I'd expect the wealth distribution to be extremely uneven. So I don't think the term conquer is very appropriate for the situation, it's going to be the extremely disgustingly wealthy and their private contractors versus the forces sent to annex the former US of A whilst the peasents rejoice at their arrival. The annexation is all but assured since even the largest of private contractors in the US simply uses armoured SUVs.

[MartianHoplite]

This is the first in a series of posts I'm making in an attempt to address the fundamental points raised so far in this thread. This is how I summarized them in an earlier post.

1) Without a state, the situation would necessarily degenerate to a Hobbesian struggle that would favor the strong and rich. The poor and weak would have no recourse against aggression and exploitation.

2) Competition between security firms is insufficient to prevent corruption and abuse. Individuals have little or no control over corporations. Witness Blackwater.

3)Security firms would eventually, through natural market trends, open warfare or shady dealing, acquire extortionate, territorial monopolies and a patchwork of small, mafia-like states or feudal fiefdoms would arise. Worse still, a large territorial monopoly could result.

4)In contrast, elections and an independent judiciary guarantee government accountability and give even the lowliest citizen some protection against abuses by the state, businesses and other individuals.

To these I will go ahead and add

5)Libertarianism provides no guarantee of the positive rights to life, health care, food, shelter and education. Libertarians would be content to let somebody languish in abject poverty or even die simply because of inability to afford access to these services.

OK, now, on to the responses.

First, the Hobbesian thesis that peaceful cooperation without the state is impossible and that such a "state of nature" necessarily results in a general "warre of all against all" (Hobbes, Leviathan)

This thesis, as stated by Hobbes, has two parts. First, that it is good for all to have peace. Second, that is better still for each to invade the property of the others and that, therefore, all will be at war.

Game theorists have refined this thesis further with the creation of a number of dilemmas showing that there are circumstances under which collectively rational results will not be achieved by individual, rational actors.

Thus, we have the prisoner's dilemma. Two prisoners, A and B, are given the opportunity to rat each other out. If both stay silent, each gets six month in prison. If both talk, each serves five years. If one talks and the other doesn't, the one who doesn't gets ten years while the one who does gets off scott free. The collectively rational approach is to not talk. Individually, however, the rational thing to do is to rat out the other, since it offers the possibility of getting off completely, while remaining silent carries with it the risk of serving ten years. Each, therefore will serve 5 years by behaving rationally instead of being able to reduce that to 6 months through cooperation.

We have the dilemma of tort. Life, limb and property are vulnerable. If the players respect each other's bodily integrity and property then all are well off. If one trespasses while the others respect, the trespasser is better off still, while the others are worse off. If all take expensive precautions against being trespassed against, then all will be worse off than if all respected, however, this is the best that can be hoped for from rational, individual actors.

We have the dilemma of teamwork. Members of a team can choose between working and shirking. If all work, then all are well off. However, as long as enough work, each member is better off individually shirking. Choosing to work, on the other hand, necessarily leads to exploitation by the shirkers. The equilibrium solution is that all shirk.

These dilemmas and other can be solved by explicit or implicit contract. Therefore, they all hinge on the conclusions we can draw from the dilemma of contract. The dilemma of contract is the master dilemma from which these others derive.

The dilemma of contract goes as follows. An exchange of promises is made. If the first performer fulfills his end of the bargain, a rational second performer will default, since he has already received the benefit and has nothing to gain from faithfully performing his end of the bargain. This, however, is common knowledge, and the first party would know that his performance would not be requited. Therefore, the first party would default as well. The result, therefore, of any contract, made in a state of nature, is no contract at all.

Peaceful cooperation between individuals and the fulfillment of their contracts can only be secured, according to Hobbes, by the existence of an external power by which all parties are "overawed" and which can compel harmonious and honest dealings by overwhelming force. For this reason, states are formed among men.

There are, however, a number of paradoxes inherent in this point of view. How can a social contract arise within a stateless society if the contract dilemma prevents the creation of binding contracts in the absence of a state? How can the state arise from anarchy if it is thus its own necessary antecedent? (De Jasay - against politics)

Furthermore. If it is true that the enforcement of a contract requires compulsion from some agency not party to it, how can individuals, having entered into a "social-contract" with some agents charged with enforcing peace and harmony, hold the agents to their end of the social contract without resorting to a "meta-state", superior to both the state and its citizens, for enforcement. This would seem to lead to an infinite regress towards higher and higher levels of necessary meta-enforcement. In other words, who governs the government?

Isn't it likely, then, that these agents to which we entrust the final say in the settlement of our social dilemmas are themselves rational entities, with their own interests that can sway them from the impartiality that their responsibility requires? What evidence is there, a priori or empirical, to indicate that their self-interest leads them to seek fair and objective solutions to our dilemmas? Might their own self-interest lead them, rather, to use their discretionary power to exploit their subjects for the achievement of some holistic end, or to exploit one group for the benefit of another? The equilibrium strategy of the subject population would be, in this case, not to resist but to obey, adjust and profit from the opportunities for coalition building with the rulers at the expense of the rest of society.

We can get another perspective on this paradox by looking at the public goods dilemma. Stated simply, this boils down to the following: If a good is too costly or difficult to reserve exclusively to those who pay for it, and restrict from those who do not, then it will be rational to try not to pay for it, whilst still deriving as much benefit from it as possible. The idea, then, is that authority is required to force everyone to pay for the public good, so that everyone can derive the benefit. An example would be the television tax in Britain, where the government charges a license fee on each television to fund public broadcasting that is then pumped out on the airwaves for everyone to watch. If this funding model operated without the authority of government to compel payment, it would not be in anyone's best interest to pay, but simply to enjoy the free television broadcasts paid for by others.

Leslie Green argues in The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon 1990) that this authority to provide public goods is itself a public good, and that it is more difficult to organize such authority than it is simply to provide lower order public goods outright (for example, as in the specific case of television broadcasts, how they're provided in America through advertising revenue.)

For the sake of argument, let's discard the assumption that a state is necessary to enforce contracts, and look at the situation where a contract is to be enforced by the opposing wills of those party to it.

If A and B enter into an agreement, and the contract dilemma, as already stated, is valid, then it is obvious that, if A performs his obligations under the contract, B, if rational, will default. However, there are a number of measures that A can undertake to force performance on B's part and make sure B doesn't default. For free contract to be a stable equilibrium, the marginal cost of enforcement, incurred by A, must be lower than the marginal benefit of B's performance to A. Furthermore, the cost of enforcement threatened against B, must be greater than the marginal benefit to B of defaulting. Since the marginal benefit to A of B's performance is the net gain he expects from successful fulfilment of the contract, while the marginal benefit to B of default is the gross value of the whole contract, it would seem, at first glance, that default must still have the upper hand as opposed to successful performance.

However, if we factor in the possibility of future contracts into the picture, the situation changes markedly. A will now be willing to spend more than he expects to gain from the present contract in order to enforce it, if he thinks that by so doing he will be able to gain future benefit from the successful fulfilment of additional contracts with B. B, for his part, will be faced not only with a much greater threat of enforcement from A, but also higher opportunity costs for default; namely the loss of any benefits future contracts with A might bring.

Iteration of the contract dilemma produces a completely different equilibrium solution. To quote De Jasay...

Anyone who has a name, lives in a place, does something for a living - That is, anyone tied into the fabric of society - would think twice before treating mutual promises as the single-play prisoner's dilemma says he must. He would have to look very carefully at all his affairs and tie up all his lose ends before defaulting on a contract, as if it were the last one he will ever enter. Feeling tempted, he would have to consider Hobbes famous and unHobbesian answer to the rather Hobbesian Foole, who thinks that reason may dictate breach of promise and default.

He therefore that breaketh his Covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society, that unite themselves for Peace and Defense, but by the errour of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retayned in it, without seeing the danger of their errour.

Further discussion on the effects of iteration to the similar prisoners dilemma can be found in the eponymous Wikipedia entry.

Axelrod discovered that when these encounters were repeated over a long period of time with many players, each with different strategies, greedy strategies tended to do very poorly in the long run while more altruistic strategies did better, as judged purely by self-interest. He used this to show a possible mechanism for the evolution of altruistic behaviour from mechanisms that are initially purely selfish, by natural selection.

The best deterministic strategy was found to be "Tit for Tat", which Anatol Rapoport developed and entered into the tournament. It was the simplest of any program entered, containing only four lines of BASIC, and won the contest. The strategy is simply to cooperate on the first iteration of the game; after that, the player does what his opponent did on the previous move. Depending on the situation, a slightly better strategy can be "Tit for Tat with forgiveness". When the opponent defects, on the next move, the player sometimes cooperates anyway, with a small probability (around 1%-5%). This allows for occasional recovery from getting trapped in a cycle of defections. The exact probability depends on the line-up of opponents.

By analysing the top-scoring strategies, Axelrod stated several conditions necessary for a strategy to be successful.

Nice
The most important condition is that the strategy must be "nice", that is, it will not defect before its opponent does. Almost all of the top-scoring strategies were nice; therefore a purely selfish strategy will not "cheat" on its opponent, for purely utilitarian reasons first.
Retaliating

However, Axelrod contended, the successful strategy must not be a blind optimist. It must always retaliate. An example of a non-retaliating strategy is Always Cooperate. This is a very bad choice, as "nasty" strategies will ruthlessly exploit such softies.

Forgiving
Another quality of successful strategies is that they must be forgiving. Though they will retaliate, they will once again fall back to cooperating if the opponent does not continue to play defects. This stops long runs of revenge and counter-revenge, maximizing points.

Non-envious
The last quality is being non-envious, that is not striving to score more than the opponent (impossible for a ‘nice’ strategy, i.e., a 'nice' strategy can never score more than the opponent).

Therefore, Axelrod reached the Utopian-sounding conclusion that selfish individuals for their own selfish good will tend to be nice and forgiving and non-envious. One of the most important conclusions of Axelrod's study of IPDs[Iterated Prisoner Dilemmas] is that Nice guys can finish first.

[K. A. Pital]

There are, however, a number of paradoxes inherent in this point of view. How can a social contract arise within a stateless society if the contract dilemma prevents the creation of binding contracts in the absence of a state? How can the state arise from anarchy if it is thus its own necessary antecedent?

"Uh, how did social contract arise"? It did in practice, kiddo. You know why? Because people have chosen to opt for external order force so that they may live in the order that this external force creates.

Actually, it's not true that binding contracts are totally prevented by Hobbesian struggle theory. Small-level cooperation is viable, between individuals who know each other well. Then, this power structure expands and voila, the first government is created. Governments are scalable, so no problem here.

how can individuals, having entered into a "social-contract" with some agents charged with enforcing peace and harmony, hold the agents to their end of the social contract without resorting to a "meta-state", superior to both the state and its citizens, for enforcement

Simple. Threaten the other party with repercursions for not upholding their end of the contract. Since the government is dependent on the citizenry to exist, as it extract it's funds from economy, citizens can do that. In the more extreme cases, it's called "revolution".

That is, anyone tied into the fabric of society - would think twice before treating mutual promises as the single-play prisoner's dilemma says he must.

You're a moron, aren't you? On a smaller level, he would. If, however, the level is huge -for example, a magnate with millions of workers who are dirt-cheap - what is his reason to "think twice"? The opposing party cannot initiate effective counteraction against his fraud and default on contract. But, it's also forced to continue working, since it is their means of survival. It's thus impossible for the poor guy to default on contract, but pretty ratinal for the rich and powerful to default and fuck people up.

Oh, and you haven't even responded to the Five Points you raised in your post. Just another diatribe about Hobbesian state theory (which is a theory; a rough approximation of practice, but quite corroborated by evidence and correct in general).

[Ender]

Oh, and you haven't even responded to the Five Points you raised in your post. Just another diatribe about Hobbesian state theory (which is a theory; a rough approximation of practice, but quite corroborated by evidence and correct in general).

Indeed, he did not respond to anyone, just expanded from earlier. He started to debate, got his shit kicked in, and has now shifted to witnessing instead. If he follows the same path as the other idiots who try this tactic, I forsee that the rest of this thread is going to consist of him repeating soundbites as if they are actual counters, becomming condescending when we aren't swayed to his view (soundbites were enough to convince him, they should be enough to make us abandon rational thinking and evidence as well) and then either storming off or getting shown the door by the mods.


Still waiting to hear how the Katrina aftermath either does not represent anarchy/libertarianism or how that scenario was a good thing.

[Patrick Degan]

Furthermore. If it is true that the enforcement of a contract requires compulsion from some agency not party to it, how can individuals, having entered into a "social-contract" with some agents charged with enforcing peace and harmony, hold the agents to their end of the social contract without resorting to a "meta-state", superior to both the state and its citizens, for enforcement. This would seem to lead to an infinite regress towards higher and higher levels of necessary meta-enforcement. In other words, who governs the government?

Isn't it likely, then, that these agents to which we entrust the final say in the settlement of our social dilemmas are themselves rational entities, with their own interests that can sway them from the impartiality that their responsibility requires? What evidence is there, a priori or empirical, to indicate that their self-interest leads them to seek fair and objective solutions to our dilemmas? Might their own self-interest lead them, rather, to use their discretionary power to exploit their subjects for the achievement of some holistic end, or to exploit one group for the benefit of another? The equilibrium strategy of the subject population would be, in this case, not to resist but to obey, adjust and profit from the opportunities for coalition building with the rulers at the expense of the rest of society.

So... I suppose that's what the American colonial population did during the misrule of King George III —oh, that's right, they overthrew the monarchy, didn't they? Since it was in the popular interest to claim their ultimate revolutionary right to abolish the old government and institute a new one.

I suppose the French populace simply submitted during the misrule of King Louis XVI —oh, that's right, they overthrew the monarchy, didn't they? Since it was in the popular interest, if not their actual survival, to claim their ultimate revolutionary right to abolish the old government and institute a new one.

Well then, perhaps it was the Russian populace who simply submitted during the misrule of Tsar Nicholas II —oh, that's right, they overthrew the monarchy, didn't they? Since it was in the popular interest, if not their actual survival, to claim their ultimate revolutionary right to abolish the old government and institute a new one.

And how do you explain the capacity for a democratic republic (such as the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Japan, Sweeden, Norway, Denmark, etc...) to operate under law and constitutional restraint without resort to a "meta-state" to enforce the government's adherence to the popular interest, which your "theory" declares must result in an infinite regress? Is the basic fact that in a democracy the people are the ultimate governors of the government (which stops that infinite regress), or, as has been pointed out, that the people always have the ultimate resort to revolution, that lost to you?

[Covenant]

I’m no economist, but I think you’re making a few statements here based on nothing but the stuff you’ve read, which may or may not be sensible, but that you’re not really evaluating this properly—especially in the context of calling it a paradox.

I really think you should answer, or concede for now, the existing complaints we have so that you can move on or actually debate them.

However, I'm going to respond to this the best I can, since if this makes sense to me the way it does, then I think it's got some lack-of-thought involved. Stas is much more well-informed than I am, but it seems like one of the only criticisms you responded to was mine, where I said the contractual obligations would not be strong enough to insure that non-manufactured goods and services would be protected.

Rand's view of Art is pretty fucking distorted anyway, but whatever.

There are, however, a number of paradoxes inherent in this point of view. How can a social contract arise within a stateless society if the contract dilemma prevents the creation of binding contracts in the absence of a state? How can the state arise from anarchy if it is thus its own necessary antecedent?

You’re assuming that a stateless society is inherently an anarchy, which I think is a false premise, as even communal groups practice government, regulation, and a degree of social welfare.

Most societies without a state devolve not into anarchy, but into a form of rule with a loose organization. For example, when a flood hits a neighborhood, people organize. It’s not anarchy; it’s a form of communal self government that would, given time, probably tend towards the structures we see now—with an Elder for dealing with legal issues, a rough court for the hearing of grievances, and so on. Inherent to this though is the idea that there’s the ability to compel one group to yield to another via an outside force. At the very least there is a social threat of becoming outcast from the group, which is a psychological threat as well as a very potent socioeconomic one.

I would say that true stateless societies, where there is no compelled social organization, are nearly a myth. It assumes people are free to leave—and freedom of movement was never feasible before relatively modern times where you became less dependant on groups for your own personal survival. If you’re not free to leave a group, you’re beholden to obey its systems. And thus a state is merely just a greater degree of organization among those who have already formed rule-based social groupings, with an agreed upon set of rules.

Libertarian anarchy, if it is possible, would only be possible in a relatively recent timeframe.

Furthermore. If it is true that the enforcement of a contract requires compulsion from some agency not party to it, how can individuals, having entered into a "social-contract" with some agents charged with enforcing peace and harmony, hold the agents to their end of the social contract without resorting to a "meta-state", superior to both the state and its citizens, for enforcement. This would seem to lead to an infinite regress towards higher and higher levels of necessary meta-enforcement. In other words, who governs the government?

This again has a false premise. B can default on A, but if A has threatened to knock B’s teeth in, that can be an adequate degree of compulsion. However, I wouldn’t really consider than an answer to the question, but it is important to note that a threat of violence has often been a good ‘mitigating circumstance’ for defaulting onto a contract. And in collaborative industries, which you could view traditional agrarian type industries as, getting on the blacklist as a lousy worker is something that requires no more than B and one or two other sources to just talk amongst themselves. There’s a greater degree of complexity for the ability of one to compel another than the premise gives us credit for.

As for “Who watches the Watchmen,” that’s why government with checks and balances are so popular. If you assume that people will act in their own self interest, as most people do—Libertarian or not—then you structure the governing system in such a way that there are not only several levels of government (such as county, state, circuit… etc levels of Courts that allow you to appeal to a higher—and presumably more fairly disinterested authority) but that there are always going to be other people capable of weighing in on your favor if there is some breach of justice. It isn’t infinite regress. You just install enough capacity for regress that due process is observed, and assume that you do the best job you can in representing the law.

Clearly, if you think that hiring some nebulous ‘protection’ against a breach of contract is sufficient, you’ve never tried to take a company to court. If I work contractually for Microsoft, and they default on a contract in whole or in part, I’m basically fucked. I may want to fight back, but it’s like fighting the R.I.A.A. and you just don’t have enough money to do battle with a much more well-funded agency, especially when bringing an issue to court at all is going to cost me money, even outside of my additional retained legal fees. I’ve had a larger organization bone me and leave me high-and-dry, and unless I wanted to attempt to bring them to court on my meager savings, there’s not a damn thing I can do about it.

Isn't it likely, then, that these agents to which we entrust the final say in the settlement of our social dilemmas are themselves rational entities, with their own interests that can sway them from the impartiality that their responsibility requires?

What evidence is there, a priori or empirical, to indicate that their self-interest leads them to seek fair and objective solutions to our dilemmas?

No. Unless the Judge was appointed by a corporate entity and gets his paychecks from the people you’re trying to bring to court, or you have insufficient oversight of the judicial proceedings (say, for example, no government) then by strict interpretation the Judge would be best served to do the best legal interpretation that he can. A governmental Judge, whose promotions and appointments are dependant on him properly doing his job as an impartial arbiter of the law, would be a far greater advocate than a company Judge.

It is only when you make his self-interest somehow come unfastened from his legal qualifications that this is problematic. And if you’re speaking less of judges and more of politicians, then the same applies. If someone’s well-being is attached to their quality of work then their efforts will work in your best interest as well.

Now, if the Judge is swayed somehow via a bribe, that would distort the process. But there’s no assumption of decreased corruption in a Libertarian system, and without sufficient oversight, I find it hard to escape the conclusion that there would be inherently more corruption—and that it would benefit directly those who have the most money to spend, or the largest organizational framework with which to launder their bribes.

Might their own self-interest lead them, rather, to use their discretionary power to exploit their subjects for the achievement of some holistic end, or to exploit one group for the benefit of another?

Outside of corruption, which afflicts both systems but would have less inherent likelihood of occurrence in a climate of increased oversight and regulation, it would not only be difficult for someone to exceed the powers given to them or go outside their level of authority without compromising their position, but it would also not be technically very useful. Getting yourself fired just to do some biased rules-making, which would then be overturned, doesn’t seem logical or very self-interested.

The equilibrium strategy of the subject population would be, in this case, not to resist but to obey, adjust and profit from the opportunities for coalition building with the rulers at the expense of the rest of society.

I’m not sure how a Libertarian system argues for anything else, except for the assumption that they have the ideal society envisioned and thus any obedience would be in their own best interest.

As wealth and power accumulates in the hands of a few who are able to employ others, right there the idea of a coalition sneaks back in, without the option of allying yourself to a more independent force. The government doesn’t pay me, and I also do have a voice in the government. When I work at a place, not only do I not get a vote in what is done, but they have complete control of me, down to the level of what I can discuss with my family, what I can wear, where I can live, and what to do on my own time.

Furthermore, without an independent population—a population independent from their source of need-fulfillment—you end up having extreme amounts of control that leads to greater degrees of control than you would have under a standard government. As someone already said, I’m reminded of the Company Towns of yesteryear, where people were paid in Company Script and it was only redeemable at the Company Store. If I work for ConGlommo, and I get CGBux that I can redeem for food and services at CGMart, my ability to exercise the kinds of freedom I would have under a standard government evaporate. Furthermore, I lose the ability to leave the situation for something superior unless there’s an exchange-rate for CGBux, which I would doubt, since CGCorp doesn’t export their goods for their own currency. You’re basically fucked again.

Yes, it’s certainly possible for market forces to encourage people to work for a more beneficial company, rather than the oppressive one that sucks, but this is assuming that you’re one of Galt’s Chosen, and not one of the poor Proles whose job it is to wash the floor. The fact is, we rarely see large companies move towards these trends on their own, nor do we see people openly attempting to oppose a stronger company outside of the presence of a larger authority.

This is a major issue. As with Coalitions between individuals, there’s no real reason for a company to not merge with another company if it would be beneficial to do so. How long can we assume for market forces to keep the rights of the individual at the forefront when anyone with money can make more money and live more safely by selling their company to ConGlommo (rather than be crushed by competition forces), especially when we see companies in this day and age already attempting to exercise monopolizing force, even with the existence of an ‘oppressive’ Government regulatory force? Why would they become MORE benevolent when freed of that oversight?

Leslie Green argues in The Authority of the State (Oxford: Clarendon 1990) that this authority to provide public goods is itself a public good, and that it is more difficult to organize such authority than it is simply to provide lower order public goods outright (for example, as in the specific case of television broadcasts, how they're provided in America through advertising revenue.)

This makes no accounting for content. Part of the reason the UK has a greater degree of public discourse than the Americans do is because of these paid-for programs being far more available, and for doing their part to educate a populace. If you don’t believe me on that, ask Miss USA to look for America on the map again. If FOX news is any indication, market forces tend towards what is popular or desirable, not what is best or true. There are certain things which are not open to subjective interpretation, and which should not be subject to death from market pressure. There should always be pressure to make something profitable, but Public Broadcasting would cease to be a valuable service if it was forced to compete with daytime TV. If you want to debate the value of Public Broadcasting, open a new thread, as I’m sure that’s a slightly more controversial subject and you might not be the only person on your side.

For the sake of argument, let's discard the assumption that a state is necessary to enforce contracts, and look at the situation where a contract is to be enforced by the opposing wills of those party to it.

Why should we discard that assumption? Do you have evidence that opposing wills is more fair, or more reasonable? In the case of an individual versus a corporation, how is a test of wills and assets a more fair system? In the case of a majority against a minority, how is there no requirement of a larger body to compel the minority? You can call it what you will, but even in a Libertarian society with laws and rules, it is not merely a contest of wills. Both parties need to submit to the authority of the other, otherwise no law is possible, and you’ve already stated that Libertarians do believe in law and justice. W contest of wills is not a decider of justice.

However, if we factor in the possibility of future contracts into the picture, the situation changes markedly. A will now be willing to spend more than he expects to gain from the present contract in order to enforce it, if he thinks that by so doing he will be able to gain future benefit from the successful fulfilment of additional contracts with B. B, for his part, will be faced not only with a much greater threat of enforcement from A, but also higher opportunity costs for default; namely the loss of any benefits future contracts with A might bring.

I don’t think you’ve ever been in this situation yourself. If I write a book or compose a song or make an animation, and I want to sell it to someone, and I need to retain an Enforcement group to insure that, I’m still completely in their hands. If I refuse to submit to their demands, such as full contractual ownership of my stuff, a payment scheme on the receipt of 2 other works of similar quality, etc… then they can just tell me to walk away and call back if I change my mind.

This is the situation as-is, it wouldn’t change in Libertopia, except that I’m already paying for the protection of a service I hope to provide that I haven’t yet got an expectation of payment for. How am I supposed to pay for the protection of some legal authority if I don’t have any capital right now? Take my situation for example—out of college, fighting to get a job in artsy fields, and without copyright I’d be unable to show my work to an employer and be sure they wouldn’t just steal it. If I was trying to pay for an Enforcement package, I could quickly go bankrupt and be unable to barter anymore, thus forced into taking an incredibly shitty job offer and forced to sign a contract which works against me. Now the greater assets of B work against A, as if A wants to re-negotiate, they can’t and they’re stuck.

All you’ve done are remove a ‘free’ protection for standard business and added an unfair ‘tax’ onto the system due to your negligent oversight of potential abuse, which is further enflamed by the lack of certain other protections, such as intellectual property. By forcing me to pay extra just for the chance to actually develop some income, you’re abusing me directly. A lot of the stuff you see on TV, like advertisements for major brands, are done in extremely small houses staffed by no more than 20 or so people. They run on extremely tight budgets and work is usually not plentiful. Even the best ones can’t afford to take on further burdens, such as extra personal enforcement troupes, to compel other people to pay them. It’s a buyer’s market, not a seller’s.

Your situation works fine for Mercenary Companies and Huge Advertising Agencies, but it works poorly at the individual or small business level, where the most need of these essential protections is.

Therefore, Axelrod reached the Utopian-sounding conclusion that selfish individuals for their own selfish good will tend to be nice and forgiving and non-envious. One of the most important conclusions of Axelrod's study of IPDs[Iterated Prisoner Dilemmas] is that Nice guys can finish first.

If only we were robots. This is clearly not the state in the real world. Given that his conclusion has no basis in the actual reality we all live and breathe in, I’m not sure how this is useful outside of a thought experiment or philosophical level. While it is absolutely true that nice, generous, forgiving people work better and perform better in a large-scale system than the converse, there’s no need for this to be done in a Libertarian context. Regardless of the system, niceness is useful, but there’s no incentive to be nice in a Libertarian Anarchy that does not exist in a State system, and there are several conclusions that Libertarian Anarchists make (such as the idea that needs are subjective) that decrease a social imperative to be nice, even those who are self-interested. Sadly, this is because people are stupid, and far more bound by Drama Theory than Game Theory.

Once you successfully edit envy, and therefore the idea of Capitalism, out of the human genome, this will have pertinence. Until then, the manufacture of needs and wants—which is envy at its most basic—will continue to drive people, and is the foundation of your Libertopia anyway? This is more a support of a strong Federal Republic, where everyone works together to achieve the most they can, or a Altruist Communism, where they act nice and seek their self interest through the interest of the whole, than it is of a system where competitive Self-Interest makes no assumption of cooperative social obligations towards your fellow man.

[MartianHoplite]

Uh, how did social contract arise"? It did in practice, kiddo. You know why? Because people have chosen to opt for external order force so that they may live in the order that this external force creates.

I'm not disputing that it did arise. I'm saying that by perhaps the most commonly advanced theory justifying its rise, it should not have happened. The fact that people were able to organize and establish a state, to me suggests that they would have been able to organize and provide the services it renders without having to create the state itself.

Simple. Threaten the other party with repercursions for not upholding their end of the contract. Since the government is dependent on the citizenry to exist, as it extract it's funds from economy, citizens can do that. In the more extreme cases, it's called "revolution".

I don't dispute that there are recourses available to individuals against an abusive government, up to and including revolution. I'm simply saying that if even an abusive and tyrannical government can be successfully opposed than it makes little sense to be scared of a much less powerful organization, like a corporation. A corporation, even one that had attained a monopoly over its line of business in a given area, is still much less powerful than a nation state.

If its true, as some claim, that an individual can't protect themselves against abuse by other individuals or businesses, then how can an indiidual protect themselves against a state?

Oh, and you haven't even responded to the Five Points you raised in your post.

First, I didn't raise them, I'm just restating what I perceive to be the most important points others have raised in various posts. With so many of you, and only one of me, some of you are not going to get individual responses. I may overlook some points, even some valid ones. If I do, and enough of you keep harping on them, then I'll add them to the list.

Second, this is a response to point number one on my list. If it is not a particularly good one, I'm sure you'll point that out. That's why I'm here, to clarify my own thinking on the matter.

If he follows the same path as the other idiots who try this tactic, I forsee that the rest of this thread is going to consist of him repeating soundbites as if they are actual counters, becomming condescending when we aren't swayed to his view (soundbites were enough to convince him, they should be enough to make us abandon rational thinking and evidence as well) and then either storming off or getting shown the door by the mods.

Frankly I don't care if you come around to my point of view or not. I'm here more for my own benefit than for yours.

I really think you should answer, or concede for now, the existing complaints we have so that you can move on or actually debate them.

I'll try my best.

You’re assuming that a stateless society is inherently an anarchy which I think is a false premise, as even communal groups practice government, regulation, and a degree of social welfare.

When I use the term "anarchy" I mean by it an orderly society without a state. Some people use "anarchy" as a synonym for "chaos." For that meaning, I simply use "chaos". So yes I do assume a stateless society is an anarchy, but I don't mean exactly the same thing by it as you do.

I have nothing against government, regulation or social welfare, so long as they are arranged on a voluntary basis.

At the very least there is a social threat of becoming outcast from the group, which is a psychological threat as well as a very potent socioeconomic one.

You've more or less hit on the entire basis for libertarian law, enforcement of which would rest on the threat of ostracism rather than the threat of force. The evolution of efficient institutions for performing ostracism in societies too large for its members to be personally known to each other is already quite advanced. The debt collection system today works in exactly this way. If you default on a small debt, the state will do nothing or very nearly nothing about it. Creditors, however, will share information about you through credit bureaus, and your access to further credit, no matter how far away you try and run, will be cut off until you settle the debt. You will also suffer additional consequences, such as difficulties seeking employment or renting housing. Similar systems could be used to share information about past performance on contracts and whether or not you submit to arbitration and the resulting rulings when you're involved in a dispute.

As for “Who watches the Watchmen,” that’s why government with checks and balances are so popular.

There are, however, a number of flaws with the way these are integrated into existing states, and some questions about whether or not they even can be made to work reliably. It's taken little more than two centuries for the US Constitution to essentially be redefined into irrelevance. The only amendment of the Bill of Rights which isn't routines violated is the third amendment, prohibiting the quartering of soldiers in private homes. The commerce clause is interpreted so widely that growing wheat on your own land, for your own consumption, is considered "interstate commerce."

This is a subject I'm going to try an elaborate on further in one of my next posts.

Clearly, if you think that hiring some nebulous ‘protection’ against a breach of contract is sufficient, you’ve never tried to take a company to court.

Government court? There are powerful lobbies that seek to keep the government's courts as overcrowded and inefficient as they are. The entire legal profession, for one, derive their livelihoods from an adversarial court system where rulings are made not on the basis of commonly accepted standards of justice, or even necessarily, written statute, but often merely on how much money someone has to spend on representation. Many businesses - insurance companies are notorious - know that they can screw people and that the expense and time of taking the matter to court will prevent them from seeking redress. Do you think you're going to go up against the entire legal profession and the insurance industry and that the government is going to take your side? If you do, you're fooling yourself. You're never going to be able to put more pressure on the government for meaningful reform than those who benefit from the status quo can bring to bear on resisting it.

The rise of private arbitration can be directly attributed to the inefficiency and expense of the public courts. The [url]http://www.adr.org]American Arbitration Association[/url] settles commercial disputes worth billions of dollars annually and has the authority to award legally binding settlements. Even before the AAA was backed up by government statutes, it was able to secure compliance by refusing to do business with parties that refused to abide by its rulings. The threat of being cut off from the AAA and having to use the public courts was enough to secure compliance in almost all cases. The fact that it's cheaper to lose your case before a private arbitrator than win before a public judge speak volumes.

When I work at a place, not only do I not get a vote in what is done, but they have complete control of me, down to the level of what I can discuss with my family, what I can wear, where I can live, and what to do on my own time.

All of which is spelled out in the contract. However, they only have this control until you tell them to go fuck themselves and get yourself another job. I've personally done this enough times to be pretty comfortable with the process. So what? Well, it might not seem like a big deal for a business, they can just get a new peon like me with the snap of a finger. However, turnover hurts the bottom line, and causes firms to have to constantly evaluate whether they're offering their employees enough and giving them favorable enough working conditions.

Supply and demand govern the availability of jobs. No one employer, or even cartel, is going to be able to have enough market power to push down wages and working conditions substantially.

Again, this is a point I intend to expand upon further.

This makes no accounting for content. Part of the reason the UK has a greater degree of public discourse than the Americans do is because of these paid-for programs being far more available, and for doing their part to educate a populace.

I like the BBC and the content they produce. However, while American media is mostly rubbish, we have our own nuggets of brilliance. The Daily Show is some of the best shit ever. Of course, that's on subscription-based cable TV, not a public good at all, which just goes to show that almost any service can be provided in a number of different ways, and usually they aren't all subject to the "public goods" problem.

Why should we discard that assumption? Do you have evidence that opposing wills is more fair, or more reasonable?

No, we're just looking at the two different cases. The intent is to demonstrate that it is at least possible for mutual agreements to be honored without an external, coercive authority. If we can establish that, then we can move on to the task of looking at specific arrangements and institutions that can be built up on a voluntary, contractual basis, to secure the fulfillment of contracts.

[kinnison]

Have you asked for a single factual example of anarchy providing anything but brutality and might makes right?

Of course. That was pretty much the first argument I tried. Unfortunately, they completely refuse any real-world examples since:

1) There has never been "true" anarchy/libertarianism. If you look hard enough, you'll find some involvement by a state making things worse.

2) They argue that "social pressure" will deal with this problem. If someone has a bigger private security company (they never honestly call them mercenaries) than you do and tries to use it to initiate force, the rest of society will refuse to deal with them.

The first one is the big problem... to any observer, it's a blindingly obvious fallacy. But that still doesn't get them to shut up about it.

Point out the positive good that can come from a responsible government. If it wasn't for government grants I probably couldn't afford to go to college (or I'd have a much harder time of it anyway). They may think welfare is evil now, but if they ever lost their jobs and fell on serious financial difficulties I bet most of them would be singing a different tune. Point out that it's thanks to the evil government that they get to enjoy nice things like highways or a free education up to 12th grade. Ask them if they really want to see all these things done away with.

You don't realize just how much they worship the idea of private charity... in libertarian fantasy world, all of these things will be provided by charity or voluntary groups.

The real-world examples of the failures of private charity are of course rejected. Since people are no longer poor after having all their money stolen by a government, they'll be much more willing to donate in the True Libertarian Paradise.

Fine. But if there is no government, then what is money? It's small pieces of paper, good for nothing but starting fires - it isn't even good toilet tissue, and is useless for writing on because it's got printing all over it. Use precious metals? Fine. And what's stopping you using debased currency (e.g. gold that's maybe 9-karat instead of pure?)

I've heard it said that there are only two essential tasks of government - defense against external threats and defense of the value of money. No money that's worth anything, and you go back to barter.

[MartianHoplite]

I've heard it said that there are only two essential tasks of government - defense against external threats and defense of the value of money.

If you're really interested.

[url=http://www.mises.org/money.asp]What Has Goverment Done to Our Money? - Murray Rothbard

[url=http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/14_1/14_1_2.pdf]The Private Production of Defense - Han-Herman Hoppe

[K. A. Pital]

A corporation, even one that had attained a monopoly over its line of business in a given area, is still much less powerful than a nation state.

A corporation is not in social contract with citizenry, mister obvious. Also, corporations are much more powerful than some smaller governments. Both of your points are false. In fact, you seem to be spouting false nonsense all the way from your arrival here.

If its true, as some claim, that an individual can't protect themselves against abuse by other individuals or businesses, then how can an indiidual protect themselves against a state?

The legal system created in the process of social contract defines the way states act. Without a legal system, nothing defines how individuals or businesses act, or how they could be held responsible for anything.

When I use the term "anarchy" I mean by it an orderly society without a state.

There are little such examples. Very little. Almost to nonexistent. Anarchy is not "orderly society".

It's taken little more than two centuries for the US Constitution to essentially be redefined into irrelevance.

No anarchic, but "orderly" societies have existed even for a century. Governments have existed for thousands of years. It must be that social evolution does not favour your bullshit way of organizing things, sadly.

Government court? There are powerful lobbies that seek to keep the government's courts as overcrowded and inefficient as they are.

Monetary influence and corruption are the root of problem; not the concept of the government itself, moron. There are little-corruption governments, as well as socially conscious governments where financial lobbies power is reduced, lobbying is outlawed.

The rise of private arbitration can be directly attributed to the inefficiency and expense of the public courts.

How is that any more secure from lobbying, moron? It's not. How does it adress the problem of a poor and disenfranchised worker suing a corporate giant? It doesn't. So why choose it? No reason.

However, turnover hurts the bottom line, and causes firms to have to constantly evaluate whether they're offering their employees enough and giving them favorable enough working conditions.

Yeah, like using cheap slave labour overseas to ensure said workers can have "favourable conditions" in the form of cheap goods and resources, since the profit margin in the West is constatly falling due to worker's rights increasing.

Supply and demand govern the availability of jobs. No one employer, or even cartel, is going to be able to have enough market power to push down wages and working conditions substantially.

Practice disproves you, moron. Producers can shift the supply curve itself, cutting millions from jobs through automatization, then letting them starve. That's not wrong under libertarianism - no one is forced to find new occupations for them, since property is absolute. In socialism or welfare, re-distribution mechanism would share part of the produce to support those people and, technically, somehow involve them in labour by reducing the labour strain of the labourers still involved.

And that's not the only problem, idiot. If it's profitable to produce B which is luxurious foods, that are bought by the wealthy 10% of the population, instead of A which is needed to support the poor 90% of the population, production and competition will be aimed at the highest bidders, not the lowest ones. Thus, artificial scarcity will be created, where peons starve but wealthy thrive - with productive capabilities that can support all. We see that now with the food crisis, and similar situations have happened before, where demand from a higher bidder surpassed the importance of supporting human life and welfare.

The intent is to demonstrate that it is at least possible for mutual agreements to be honored without an external, coercive authority.

It's possible, but not necessary. A law, unless it's enforcement fails, makes honoring it 100% guaranteed. A failure of the law is lawbreaking, which causes punishment. A failure of "wills opposition" in libertarianism leads to zero consequences, since that's not breaking anything.

[PeZook]

[url=http://www.mises.org/money.asp]What Has Goverment Done to Our Money? - Murray Rothbard

This guy is an idiot.

1) He assumes the free market is perfect, works instantly and recognizes change in the money supply without a hitch.

2) He doesn't realize that virtual currency is a necessity in the modern economy - because, unlike his basic claim, there has to be enough money in the economy so that everyone has acces to an exchange medium adequate to what he needs to translate his work into goods.

For example, if we remained at a gold standard, the buying power of a single ounce of gold would increase (because there's less and less gold, and they're not making any more) to the point where the amounts of gold used in everyday business would be small enough to be impossible to handle.

Furthermore, increasing size of financial transactions made the gold standard impractical even as far as 1000 years ago, when virtual currency started to first appear. Simply put, moving 20 tonnes of gold is far less practical than moving a bill of exchange for the same amount.

There are literally hundreds of problems with a gold standard, or any other currency based on scarce a material good, for that matter. Suggesting "the market" would magically handle problems with the money supply is naive at best, when it wasn't adequate to stave off the cascade failure of the Spanish economy due to inflation four hundred years ago!

It's just wishful thinking, really.

[PeZook]

I'll throw this little bit in:

Even the simplest societies spontaneously form governments. What is a village elder, if not a form of governance? A primitive one, but a government nonetheless.

This is an indisputable fact, an inevitability even in groups of a few dozen individuals! How does the libertarian model posit we get over this tendency, which is so immensely practical (for conflict solving, for example)? Which is, you know, why it happens in the first place.

[K. A. Pital]

Linking to mises.org is bad. It's the place of habitat for Gary North. The fact that Gary North is allowed to publish anything on economics, in that place (Gary is a theocrat, libertarian and theonomic, who thinks gays, witches, etc. should be executed and science is a waste of resources since the Bible is 100% correct...), signifies total loss of credentials. When people allow theonomists publish anything in their "economic" magazine, that looses any credibility in an instant.

[K. A. Pital]

Furthermore, increasing size of financial transactions made the gold standard impractical even as far as 1000 years ago, when virtual currency started to first appear. Simply put, moving 20 tonnes of gold is far less practical than moving a bill of exchange for the same amount.

A Soviet Economics Nobel Prize laureate, Leonid Kantarovich, posed that any economic problem in re-distribution is solved most efficiently when the least amount of mass is moved, thus using up the least amount of energy for that. Kantarovich developed linear programming to that end, which is now a standard methodology of optimization in capitalist and socialist economies alike.

But, apparently we must re-introduce gold even though it grossly violates obective mathematical laws of resource use optimization

[PeZook]

But, apparently we must re-introduce gold even though it grossly violates obective mathematical laws of resource use optimization

The fact that an ideal exchange medium does not require any energy to move whatsoever should be obvious, since it's just an exchange medium.

Really, gold is pretty far from an ideal exchange medium. It's heavy, it's scarce, difficult to easily verify. Using uranium coins makes about as much sense.

For people who claim to use common sense so much, libertarians lack quite a lot of it

[K. A. Pital]

Libertarians are a pathetic example of a XIX century ideology which utterly failed to get prominence and create any viable example of a society. They whine that their ideas are so good, but the fact that no libertarian society project ever took off the ground is pretty damning it to the same kind of historical dustbin that utopian socialism went to after Campanella, Proudhon and More.

So all they have left is whining from their political fringe, still living in the XIX century concepts of property, economy and exchange. What a wonder they'll never get anywhere at all... which is quietly satisfying.

The fact that an ideal exchange medium does not require any energy to move whatsoever should be obvious, since it's just an exchange medium.

Elaborating on this further, a cashless "exchange internet" might be the closest to becoming the most efficient exchange medium, especially in a 100% informatized society. I would assume waste of electrical energy to propel signals is much less than the combined waste of many forms of energy to propel physical objects, no natural scarcity and effctive algorithms of transaction and verification will make that a de-facto standard. It's allready used to make large-scale transactions and even in daily life, so it's only natural to expand that universally over time as technology becomes abundant and ubiqutous.

[eyl]

A corporation, even one that had attained a monopoly over its line of business in a given area, is still much less powerful than a nation state.

Depending on the strength of the government and the service the corporation provides, athe corporation may well be more powerful than the government, at least as far as citizens' daily lives are concerned. And you're proposing to remove practically all restraint on the corporation's behavior.

If its true, as some claim, that an individual can't protect themselves against abuse by other individuals or businesses, then how can an indiidual protect themselves against a state?

States include mechanisms allowing their subjects to redress wrongs. When those mechanisms are inadequate, that's when you get resolutions. In contrast, absent state oversight, the only ways you can affect a corporation's behavior is by public pressure (which is useless in the case of a monopoly) or becoming a significant shareholder (which assumes you have sufficient resources to do so)

You've more or less hit on the entire basis for libertarian law, enforcement of which would rest on the threat of ostracism rather than the threat of force. The evolution of efficient institutions for performing ostracism in societies too large for its members to be personally known to each other is already quite advanced.

The problem (well, one of them) is that you have no mechanism for enforcing ostracism. Say a corporation screws you over, and you're even fortunate enough to get a ruling against it in court. In your scheme, if the corporation refuses to pay, the public will ostracize it. However, if the rest of the populace isn't willing to do so - because it's more profitable for them to continue dealings with it, because the corporation controls a vital servie and threatens to stop providing it to anyone who does so, because they just don't like you, etc. - you have no recourse.

Government court? There are powerful lobbies that seek to keep the government's courts as overcrowded and inefficient as they are. The entire legal profession, for one, derive their livelihoods from an adversarial court system where rulings are made not on the basis of commonly accepted standards of justice, or even necessarily, written statute, but often merely on how much money someone has to spend on representation. Many businesses - insurance companies are notorious - know that they can screw people and that the expense and time of taking the matter to court will prevent them from seeking redress. Do you think you're going to go up against the entire legal profession and the insurance industry and that the government is going to take your side? If you do, you're fooling yourself. You're never going to be able to put more pressure on the government for meaningful reform than those who benefit from the status quo can bring to bear on resisting it.

Eevn assuming for the sake of argument that's true, it's a problem with the current legal system, not with government per se.

All of which is spelled out in the contract. However, they only have this control until you tell them to go fuck themselves and get yourself another job. I've personally done this enough times to be pretty comfortable with the process. So what? Well, it might not seem like a big deal for a business, they can just get a new peon like me with the snap of a finger. However, turnover hurts the bottom line, and causes firms to have to constantly evaluate whether they're offering their employees enough and giving them favorable enough working conditions.

Of course, that assumes you have both the skill set and resources to easily find and relocate to another job. That's not universally true.

[PeZook]

Of course, that assumes you have both the skill set and resources to easily find and relocate to another job. That's not universally true.

...and that the corporation doesn't happen to pay for your security company, your health care and your fire insurance. And, also, that you own your home, rather than still paying it off. And that you can move elsewhere easily without getting robbed and gangraped on the way.

At a certain point, the companies providing employment and benefits effectivelly become the government for some of their employees at least. It's just a matter of definitions at that point.

[MartianHoplite]

Linking to mises.org is bad. It's the place of habitat for Gary North.

Major ad hominem fallacy. Neither Rothbard nor Hoppe are Gary North. Even if I linked to something by Gary North, it would not be wrong because it was by Gary North.

A corporation is not in social contract with citizenry, mister obvious.

Without a legal system, nothing defines how individuals or businesses act, or how they could be held responsible for anything.

Like a government, A corporation could not get away with behavior generally regarded as criminal for long because people have the ability to enforce their own justice.

Fielding has argued this case before.

A major reason why Locke believes that
living under a government is preferable to living
in a state of nature is because of the nature of a
pre-government judiciary. In a state of nature,
aggressors are punished directly by injured
parties. Each injured party sets himself up as a
judge in his own case and punishes according to
his own estimate of the damages. With injured
parties judging their own cases, however, there
would be a tendency for these judges to exact
more than enough compensation for their
damages. The former aggressors, perceiving
that an injustice has been done to them, judge
their own case and punish the punishers. If the
injury is more than compensated for, then the
aggression-overcompensation cycle could con-
tinue indefinitely. To rid themselves of this
cycle, men establish independent and impartial
arbitration institutions to decide cases.
What Locke refers to as setting up one's self
as a judge in one's own case is what I call a
"personal judiciary".
In what respect is the concept of a personal
judiciary relevant to the operation of an
anarcho-capitalist court system? Let us con-
sider an example. Suppose that Smith has
injured Jones. Jones then hires the fairest
free-market judge he can find and institutes
proceedings against Smith. The court finds
Smith guilty and orders him to pay Jones for
actual damages and court costs. Smith, on the
other hand, hears of the verdict and rushes to
"hire" his brother to decide the case as a
free-market judge. His brother, meanwhile, has
had no experience in arbitration and, in
addition, has plainly stated that he intends to
find his brother not guilty regardless of the
facts. So, Smith's brother pronounces a verdict
of not guilty. The courts are at a deadlock. (I
assume, for convenience, that there are no
free-market appeals courts.) What happens
now?
It is evident that Smith has set up his own
agent as a judge in his case. This, in essence, is
the same as setting himself up as his own judge.
The particular incidentals differ, but the
essential principle remains the same: a judge,
biased in favor of Smith, judges the case.
Smith's actions demonstrate that he consents to
that principle.
But, since Smith consents to that principle,
he can hardly expect to exclude Jones from
acting in accordance with that principle. Smith
has stated a preference by means of his actions;
Jones's acting in accordance with Smith's legal
principle fulfills Smith's preferences. Indeed
it would take very little persuasion to convince
Jones that he is entitled to respond in kind.
Smith, by virtue of his actions, tacitly consents
to Jones's response.
Of course, Jones does not have to go through
the motions involved in "hiring" his own
brother in response to Smith's actions -Jones
may hire himself as a judge. Jones may revert
to acting in accordance with Smith's legal
principle in a more overt manner. Jones could
grab his shotgun and seize part of Smith's
property in compensation for Jones's injuries.
Jones has a moral advantage. He had shown
his good faith by hiring initially the most
impartial jurist he could find. He may be able
to gain the support of a large segment of that
society in any personal action he takes against
Smith. In addition, other members of the
society may take advantage of Smith's legal
rule to inflict injuries on him without having to
pay compensation. Hiring his brother may be
tantamount to Smith's declaring himself an
outlaw - an unenviable position indeed.
But it really does not matter that I am able t o
outline the motives which may prompt Jones t o
seek compensation or that 1 am able to suggest
how society may act with regard to Smith and
Jones. What matters is that in a free market,
personal judiciary actions are always a viable
alternative open to an injured party when an
aggressor has initiated such actions to stymie
the operation of justice. But, one must
remember that there are disadvantages associa-
ted with the initiation of personal judicial
actions - to wit, Locke's infinite aggression-
overcompensation cycle. This disadvantage
provides an incentive for all parties to show
good faith in having their disputes decided
impartially. This incentive is especially strong
for an alleged injurer who wishes to establish
his innocence.

The rise of private arbitration can be directly attributed to the inefficiency and expense of the public courts.

Private arbitrators sell one thing primarily, their reputation for impartiality, if they tarnish this, they cut off their source of livelihood.

Yeah, like using cheap slave labour overseas to ensure said workers can have "favourable conditions" in the form of cheap goods and resources, since the profit margin in the West is constatly falling due to worker's rights increasing.

The fact that labor is cheap does not make it "slave labor." When a first world company hires third world workers it still has to pay good wages, by third world standards, or it won't be able to convince workers to give up what they're currently doing to work for it. Even if we're talking about an unemployed third-world beggar, the corporation's offer has to represent an improvement from his perspective or it will be rejected.

Furthermore, there is still plenty of profit to be made in the first world because the availability of advanced infrastructure makes possible work that simply can't be done in the third world, or the availability of capital makes first world labor, expensive as it is, productive enough to compete with third world labor.

Practice disproves you, moron. Producers can shift the supply curve itself, cutting millions from jobs through automatization, then letting them starve.

With respect to labor, workers are the suppliers, firms that hire them are the consumers.

Furthermore, automation doesn't cause unemployment. It's not like there's a finite amount of work to do, and once it is all done, there's nothing else for anyone to do. We can always find new and additional productive enterprise to engage in.

In fact, by increasing the productivity of labor, automation will dramatically increase the compensation workers receive for their time. Why is it that the most automated economies pay their employees the most?

And that's not the only problem, idiot. If it's profitable to produce B which is luxurious foods, that are bought by the wealthy 10% of the population, instead of A which is needed to support the poor 90% of the population, production and competition will be aimed at the highest bidders, not the lowest ones.

The wealthy don't spend most of their resources on luxury consumer goods, they spend most of their resource on productive investments that produce more wealth, usually by selling some product or service to the masses. Who got richer, Karl Benz or Henry Ford? Mass market consumer goods are more profitable than luxury items because of the sheer volume involved.

A law, unless it's enforcement fails, makes honoring it 100% guaranteed.

That's a huge fucking caveat. Have you seen how frequently law enforcement fails?

This guy is an idiot.

1) He assumes the free market is perfect, works instantly and recognizes change in the money supply without a hitch.

2) He doesn't realize that virtual currency is a necessity in the modern economy - because, unlike his basic claim, there has to be enough money in the economy so that everyone has acces to an exchange medium adequate to what he needs to translate his work into goods.

You obviously didn't even skim the link I posted.

Here's an extract for your benefit.

Even in the convenient shape of coins, gold is often cumbersome and awkward to carry and use directly in exchange. For larger transactions, it is awkward and expensive to transport several hundred pounds of gold. But the free market, ever ready to satisfy social needs, comes to the rescue. Gold, in the first place, must be stored somewhere, and just as specialization is most efficient in other lines of business, so it will be most efficient in the warehousing business. Certain firms, then, will be successful on the market in providing warehousing services. Some will be gold warehouses, and will store gold for its myriad owners. As in the case of all warehouses, the owner's right to the stored goods is established by a warehouse receipt which he receives in exchange for storing the goods. The receipt entitles the owner to claim his goods at any time he desires. this warehouse will earn profit no differently from any other?i.e., by charging a price for its storage services.

There is every reason to believe that gold warehouses, or money warehouses, will flourish on the free market in the same way that other warehouses will prosper. In fact, warehousing plays an even more important role in the case of money. For all other goods pass into consumption, and so must leave the warehouse after a while to be used up in production or consumption. But money, as we have seen, is mainly not "used" in 3&3 the physical sense; instead, it is used to exchange for other goods, and to lie in wait for such exchanges in the future. In short, money is not so much "used up" as simply transferred from one person to another.

In such a situation, convenience inevitably leads to transfer of the warehouse receipt instead of the physical gold itself.

As for the issue of the value of gold rising to where quantities would be impractically small for daily transactions, we can now, by electronic means, trade very precise claims on stored gold, even down to the milligram.

There are literally hundreds of problems with a gold standard, or any other currency based on scarce a material good

There are certainly not any fewer problems with a fiat currency back by nothing more substantial than the full faith and credit of some government. These sort of currencies have melted down completely on a number of occasions. Even a supposedly stable one, like the US dollar, has lost 95% of its purchasing power since 1913, when the Federal Reserve was established with the specific mandate to preserve the value of the currency.

This is an indisputable fact, an inevitability even in groups of a few dozen individuals! How does the libertarian model posit we get over this tendency

It doesn't. It simply posits that we replace coercive government with voluntary government.

and that the corporation doesn't happen to pay for your security company, your health care and your fire insurance.

Why should I want it to pay me anything but cash? Almost all people value an equivalent amount of exchangeable money more than a specific benefit that an employer provides. If it weren't for laws mandating that employers provide benefits to full-time employees, why should companies want to spend more to provide benefits when they can just pay their employees directly in the common medium of exchange? Why should employees not prefer to simply get money, which can be exchanged for anything, and make their own bargains for other products and services?

I’m reminded of the Company Towns of yesteryear, where people were paid in Company Script and it was only redeemable at the Company Store.

The modern equivalent of company scrip is the ubiquitous gift card, even the most obscure of which can usually be exchanged on eBay for at least 60% of its face value in the commonly accepted medium of exchange. This seems to be a fair approximation for how people value such money substitutes. Companies wanting to pay employees in such a way would have to pay correspondingly more if they wanted to bid their labor away from companies paying in cold, hard cash.

[Edi]

I'm going to take a few swings at the libertopian moron just to keep in practice.

Without a legal system, nothing defines how individuals or businesses act, or how they could be held responsible for anything.

Like a government, A corporation could not get away with behavior generally regarded as criminal for long because people have the ability to enforce their own justice.

What the fuck would prevent the corporation from hiring enough muscle to make it impossible for anything other than a well-organized force to retaliate? And since they generally have more resources and deeper pockets than their customers, that's what would happen. In fact, such things were fucking routine once upon a time before government intervention put paid to it, or at least the worst of it.

All of this fucking idiocy of yours rests upon the completely unfounded assumption that you can treat people as individuals (your default assumption in order for your retarded libertopian idea to work) but when confronted with an abusive corporation, they suddenly, magically all at once turn to a cohesive, monolithic, unstoppable block. IT DOES NOT WORK THAT WAY.

Fielding has argued this case before.

<snip>

If that's the level of his arguments, he's full of shit. The mere act of hiring anyone with your money automatically removes their impartiality in judging a case involving your interests.

Yeah, like using cheap slave labour overseas to ensure said workers can have "favourable conditions" in the form of cheap goods and resources, since the profit margin in the West is constatly falling due to worker's rights increasing.

The fact that labor is cheap does not make it "slave labor." When a first world company hires third world workers it still has to pay good wages, by third world standards, or it won't be able to convince workers to give up what they're currently doing to work for it. Even if we're talking about an unemployed third-world beggar, the corporation's offer has to represent an improvement from his perspective or it will be rejected.

You assume that the third world person has standing as an equal in negotiating the wages. Also, improvement compared to having absolutely nothing does not necessarily equate just or fair compensation.

Practice disproves you, moron. Producers can shift the supply curve itself, cutting millions from jobs through automatization, then letting them starve.

With respect to labor, workers are the suppliers, firms that hire them are the consumers.

And when there's a supply glut, the consumer gets to pick and choose and dictate terms, which renders this point moot. The corporation is still in control.

Furthermore, automation doesn't cause unemployment. It's not like there's a finite amount of work to do, and once it is all done, there's nothing else for anyone to do. We can always find new and additional productive enterprise to engage in.

Unsupported claim. Provide evidence for it, since there is plenty of evidence that switching to automation directly leads to the same amount of work being done by fewer people than before, leaving others jobless. Provide evidence that it is as easy to find new productive things for people to do as you claim.

In fact, by increasing the productivity of labor, automation will dramatically increase the compensation workers receive for their time. Why is it that the most automated economies pay their employees the most?

Complete non sequitur.

And that's not the only problem, idiot. If it's profitable to produce B which is luxurious foods, that are bought by the wealthy 10% of the population, instead of A which is needed to support the poor 90% of the population, production and competition will be aimed at the highest bidders, not the lowest ones.

The wealthy don't spend most of their resources on luxury consumer goods, they spend most of their resource on productive investments that produce more wealth, usually by selling some product or service to the masses. Who got richer, Karl Benz or Henry Ford? Mass market consumer goods are more profitable than luxury items because of the sheer volume involved.

Whose pockets does all that additional wealth go? The same wealthy people, who will then have even more resources, more than they can possibly use, while less fortunate people are left to do without.

A law, unless it's enforcement fails, makes honoring it 100% guaranteed.

That's a huge fucking caveat. Have you seen how frequently law enforcement fails?

Provide evidence that a society without law enforcement would do better, as you claim.

This guy is an idiot.

1) He assumes the free market is perfect, works instantly and recognizes change in the money supply without a hitch.

2) He doesn't realize that virtual currency is a necessity in the modern economy - because, unlike his basic claim, there has to be enough money in the economy so that everyone has acces to an exchange medium adequate to what he needs to translate his work into goods.

You obviously didn't even skim the link I posted.

Your link is irrelevant. It does not add anything to the discussion.

This is an indisputable fact, an inevitability even in groups of a few dozen individuals! How does the libertarian model posit we get over this tendency

It doesn't. It simply posits that we replace coercive government with voluntary government.

Then it is upon you to provide evidence for a mechanism by which that proposition can be made to work, isntead of ignoring inconvenient real world facts.

and that the corporation doesn't happen to pay for your security company, your health care and your fire insurance.

Why should I want it to pay me anything but cash? Almost all people value an equivalent amount of exchangeable money more than a specific benefit that an employer provides. If it weren't for laws mandating that employers provide benefits to full-time employees, why should companies want to spend more to provide benefits when they can just pay their employees directly in the common medium of exchange? Why should employees not prefer to simply get money, which can be exchanged for anything, and make their own bargains for other products and services?

Because emplotyers, especially big ones, can negotiate with fr more leverage than an individual, and thus obtain the same services at a sometimes significant discount, thus it is more advantageous for the employer to get part of his pay as benefits than money, since the end rsult favors him. This is obvious to anyone but a blithering moron like yourself who apparently has no real life experience from the work environment.

[K. A. Pital]

Major ad hominem fallacy.

It wasn't a reply to you. We were discussing the libertarian wanktank with PeZook. Yes, I know it's a fallacy. I also do not use it as an argument replying to your points.

Though being a theonomist is pretty damning anyway - that's like a creationist offering scientific commentary, since theonomics is not science, but religious faith. If it were Gary North as you imply, him being a theonomist would seriously impact his credibility. Not necessarily make him wrong, of course, since just as creationists can sometimes offer commentary on things not regarding evolution which is correct.

Like a government, A corporation could not get away with behavior generally regarded as criminal for long because people have the ability to enforce their own justice.

What is "regarded as criminal" if there is no criminal code? You idiot. Besides, there's nothing criminal about cutting wages, ignoring the starving poor since they are unviable as clients, and other practices of the same nature in libertarianism.

And "their own sense of justice" is a nice euphemism for "if the corporation fucks people up, they can use measures up to violence against it". But the problem is that a corporation is of the same nature as a government - it's a centralized resource and power agent, and due to that centralization, it is more potent at both inducing violence or protecting itself than the citizen which it fucks up. The key difference between a government and a corporation? The corporation exists to profit and increase the wealth of shareholders. Other people can be fucked in the process. A government exists not to profit, but to serve the people which is enshrined in most constitutions. The government can operate with zero fiscal profit, and for a government which was brought by popular demand, it's "shareholders", i.e. people to whom it answers and is accountable, are all citizens.

Private arbitrators sell one thing primarily, their reputation for impartiality

Heh. I doubt a private arbitrator would last long with his "impartiality", being offered a villa in Hawaii and a hefty retirement bonus by a business. After all, if everything is a good and impartiality is also a good which can be bought, the higher bidder wins. A business wins by default due to it's concentration of resource which makes it easier for it to buy the arbitrator entirely.

The fact that labor is cheap does not make it "slave labor."

It does, you fucking idiot. Labour is enslaved by the externality circumstances which you do not want to acknowledge. Such as the need for transactional costs - movement, re-education - and often a direct barrier, such as visa. In classic economic theory, capital and labour are both perfectly mobile. I.e. a businessman moving capitals from Country A to Country B induces a chain reaction, where labour also moves to Country B. In reality, capital is highly mobile, while labour is not and often it's immobile - in fact, for the most workers that is so. Immigration borders between nation-states render the theory totally invalid. Capital concentrates in Country B. Workers may want to move to that capital concentration place. But they cannot - either because of the inability to lever the expense, or because of national borders. Thus a disparity is created, where in one country capital is scarce and labour abundant. This labour competes for capital, driving it's own price down. On the other hand, another place is the concentration of capital. A few enfranchised enjoy enormously higher wages due to that fact alone.

Were China workers, in a close-to-theory model, allowed to freely immigrate into the States with no barriers, how long before they drive wages down? Of course, the ideal model dictates that they shoudl also be able to instantly switch their language and skills, which is impossible, but technically, allowing labour to be 100% free in mobility in the world would bring down those "riches" in the First World to nilch in an instance.

Furthermore, there is still plenty of profit to be made in the first world because the availability of advanced infrastructure makes possible work that simply can't be done in the third world

Will you adress the falling profit margins and the solution capitalists have devised for that, or will you hide behind the "well, there's still some profit abilities"? I'm talking about a trend; you're talking about something completely irrelevant for the point.

In fact, by increasing the productivity of labor, automation will dramatically increase the compensation workers receive for their time.

Not really. Driving automation to the the logical extreme, if one man needs ten men to produce all that he, and them, need with an automated factory which they themselves can also maintain with little labour, they do not need the remaining humans. He may sponsor a limited number of services that are technically yet unavailable to machines, like unique sectors of fashion, art, music, et cetera. The rest of humanity is dead since it's price for the capital owner has dropped to zero. He has zero incentive to provide his capital for those people.

The wealthy don't spend most of their resources on luxury consumer goods, they spend most of their resource on productive investments that produce more wealth

"Productive"? You mean, like a wealthy guy deciding to move his capitals out of a country, thereby increasing his wealth and also forcing thousands to poverty and starvation? Well, certainly the investment is productive for him. Hell, probably it will also increase First World workers wages. But "more wealth" does not mean "for everyone", sucker.

Have you seen how frequently law enforcement fails?

Yes, usually it's connected to rich powerful fuckers abusing the system by monetary corruption. Buying the impartiality of judges, you know.

Even a supposedly stable one, like the US dollar

In what way US dollar is more stable than other currencies? And praytell, how the fuck is gold any more stable or any more secure from default than any other medium of exchange, idiot? You clearly comprehend NOTHING of economics. A medium of exchange can become worthless in an economic crisis, where people resort to bartering things that have actual value to them. You can't eat gold, or wear gold as medium of exchange, so in case of a gold default, people would resort to barter of needs commodities, just as with a currency default. A natural scarcity of gold also does not help - in fact, it's universal rejection as medium of exchange was exactly due to that reason, not counting many others.

Why should I want it to pay me anything but cash?

Because cash can default, moron?

Why should employees not prefer to simply get money, which can be exchanged for anything, and make their own bargains for other products and services?

Because it would drive up speculative private healthcare prices, fucking employees. Are you a moron again, or just pretending? Another issue is that people's ability to plan is offset by biological reasons. For example, cash saving for any prolonged period is extremely hard. Especially for an employee. That's an observable fact. Not to mention inflation which will inevitably arise if corporations start compensating workers with more money due to inevitably rising healthcare prices. YOU are fucked.

[eyl]

Like a government, A corporation could not get away with behavior generally regarded as criminal for long because people have the ability to enforce their own justice.

Fielding has argued this case before.

There's a real ugly name for citizen-enforced justice.

One major assumption in the example you gave here is that you assume people will always seek monetary compensation. In fact, they're just as likely to want to take it out of whoever offended them's hide - which, absent an overarching enforcement agency, is the beginning of the path to multigenerational blood fueds.

Second, impartiality is in the eyes of the beholder. In your example, Jones' judge is obviously impartial, while Smith's is obviously partial. In practice, assuming Smith isn't the moron he's portrayed here, it will be left up to the individual to decide whether one, both, or neither of the judges are impartial - in which case, people may well gang up on Jones

There's also the problem of enforcement against a powerful corporation which has a monopoly on a vital service. If I control the only electrical company in the vicinity - just how are you going to enforce judgements against me if I threaten to cut off your power, or that of anyone else who sides with you? The average citizen or group won't have the money to build a competing service, so your only recourse is to move - which assumes you have enough money to do so.

Also, it seems to me that what you're proposing is essentially a shame-based system, where citizens comply with the law for fear of losing face. Most of the societies I can think of which even approximate such a system are clan-based (and the shame-culture results in some pretty nasty side-effects). Try using that system in a society which enshrines self-interest, and I doubt it woud even begin to work.

Private arbitrators sell one thing primarily, their reputation for impartiality, if they tarnish this, they cut off their source of livelihood.

That depends on how dearly they sell their impartiality, doesn't it?

Or can litigants refuse to appear before an arbiter? In that case, what prevents me from stalling the trial indefinitely (using excuses which are, on the face, sufficiently valid to avoid public disapproval.)

The modern equivalent of company scrip is the ubiquitous gift card, even the most obscure of which can usually be exchanged on eBay for at least 60% of its face value in the commonly accepted medium of exchange. This seems to be a fair approximation for how people value such money substitutes. Companies wanting to pay employees in such a way would have to pay correspondingly more if they wanted to bid their labor away from companies paying in cold, hard cash.

You keep ignoring the fact that not all workers are equally mobile.

Say I'm a senior telephone technician for the only phone company in a region. I get fed up, and decide to leave.

However, all my experience and training is working on phones, and there is no other employer in the area. I probably have basic skills which can be used elsewhere, but as I have little non-phone experience, and they're fairly basic - equalled or exceeded by other technicians with different specialties, at best I'll have to take a significant pay cut. My other options are retraining (paid for by whom? and what do I do for support in the meantime?) or moving away and hoping I can find a job elsewhere. Of course, given that unemployment benefits don't exist, I'd better have sufficient funds saved to tide me over the transition period, and that I find a job before they run out. If I've been paid in company scrip, I effectively have no money at all once I leave the area.

Mind you, this assumes I'm young and fairly mobile. If I have a family, or a mortage, or other reasons tying me to my lcoation, moving just got much harder (or at least much more expensive).

You could argue, I suppose, that no-one would sign up in the first place with such an abusive company. But for one thing, that assumes there's a choice - if the company is sufficiently influential in the area, and I don't have the resources to move, it's take a company job or starve.