Articles: "Nuclear Warfare 101".

[Big Orange]

(Along with Davy Crocketts)

I can see why this weapon would've been harder to anticipate than a larger, more cumberson artillery gun or missile launcher armed with similar yield tactical nuclear devices. According to Shep if the US Army/Air Force built a base camp on the moon they would've also been used to fire upon Soviet cosmonauts.

[Big Orange]

*Sorry Double Post*

[Simon_Jester]

No, I mean, what is the point of artillery in particular? I may be out-of-date regarding modern artillery, but doesn't artillery have shorter range and using nuclear artillery shells implies that there is no air superiority (that is, bombers can't do the job instead) and would need artillery.

Well, you may not have air superiority- you can't always rely on the bomber getting through. Even if you do have air superiority (or, hell, supremacy), the enemy still has AA weapons and can still shoot down nuclear bombers in theory.

What's even better is the Iowa Class BBs Mk-23s, each had a 15-20 Kt payload (Similar to Annie) and could be delievered in mind blistering salvos of 135-180 Kts, wiping out any target not at least 20 miles from the coast line off the face of the earth.

Not that the Iowas would have much of a life expectancy in the event of a nuclear war... normal air attacks would be bad enough, but if the enemy can go nuclear, one near miss will turn an Iowa into radioactive junk.

[Sea Skimmer]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eiM-RzPHyGs
Since its so often talked about today and yet only got a few real tests in the good old open air days, I figure people will enjoy this video showing Davy Crocket in action.

[Seggybop]

There was a grain of truth in it in that the USSR was short of warheads so some of their ICBMs were loaded with radioactive waste (later they carried bio heads instead).

What was the actual role of biological/chemical weapons going to be in a hypothetical WW3? Simply augmenting deterrence beyond immediate destruction and/or eliminating the ability of the enemy to regenerate after the war?

Releasing something like enhanced smallpox seems like it could be worse for humanity long-term than the actual nuclear war itself

[Lonestar]

No, I mean, what is the point of artillery in particular?

Cheaper. In a lot of cases there may be a quicker turn-around between some guy calling for artillery vice air support. Keeps the fire support mission "in house" for the Army/Marines.

[Zixinus]

Ah, so its a departmental thing as well as that I was thinking in terms of land artillery rather than naval artillery (where the targets convinently are close enough to the shore).

[Big Orange]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eiM-RzPHyGs
Since its so often talked about today and yet only got a few real tests in the good old open air days, I figure people will enjoy this video showing Davy Crocket in action.

Hmmmm, here's the full length video of that same US Army demonstration that I've seen last night. It seems quite barmy to set off mini-nukes and expect that to happen in conjunction with major troop movements, but when over 600 T-80s and BMPs are rushing towards you, you'd love tactical nuke explosions to bits.

And since that last posted image of a Davy Crockett is awkward about hotlinking, here's the image again from my more stable ImageShack account:

[Simon_Jester]

Ah, so its a departmental thing as well as that I was thinking in terms of land artillery rather than naval artillery (where the targets convinently are close enough to the shore).

Well, you should be thinking of naval artillery. The point is that nuclear artillery (and short range nuclear missiles) are only issued to ground forces that you expect to need them, because they might be attacked by a huge enemy force that they need nukes to break up without taking heavy casualties of their own.

In that case, the fact that your nuclear artillery can't reach more than 15 km or so from the position of your own forces isn't that serious a problem; you're planning to use it specifically to repel an attack on that force by nuking enemies who approach it.

[MKSheppard]

Source Docs at My Site Now

USAF Ballistic Missiles [Programs] 1958-1959
USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1962-1964
USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1964-1966
USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967-1968
USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1969-1970

----------------------------------------------------------------

So anyway; you know the whole concept of "pindown"; where you blind an ABM site by continously detonating nukes over it?

Turns out it's far more applicable to ICBM launch sites than to ABM sites.

The '67-68 document has some interesting information:

To counter the threat posed to inflight missiles by radiation, the Air Force had directed installation of zircalloy shielding to prevent hot X-rays from penetrating the LGM-30F's guidance and control mechanism and burning out its electronic components. By the summer of 1966, however, tests showed that tantalum shielding offered the "best compromise for effectiveness and weight. " Air Force officials estimated 170,000 pounds of tantalum sheet, roughly 0.025 inches thick, would be required to protect the guidance and control units of all F missiles, replacing zircalloy where necessary.31

Besides providing protection for the guidance and control package from X-rays, the Air Force approved the installation of radiation shielding elsewhere in the missile. Certain nozzle components, for example, were vulnerable to X-rays. Also, the angular accelerometer and related electronic guidance circuitry had to be kept secure from neutron bombardment.32

The second nuclear phenomenon that menaced missiles in flight was electromagnetic pulse. Tests conducted during summer and fall of 1966 disclosed that safeguards previously installed against this nuclear effect were inadequate. In the LGM-30F, for example, existing grounding and shielding did not protect antennas and inductive loops that were especially vulnerable to electrical overload. Modifications to provide additional protection were undertaken, while experiments continued to verify the adequacy of the changes and to determine if other alterations were needed.33

The effect of nuclear detonations on missiles during powered flight opened the way for a new tactic. As has been indicated, an attacker, by detonating warheads some 300,000 feet above the silo that protected the Minuteman force, could create a radiation barrier--X-rays, gamma rays, and neutrons—through which U. S. missiles could not safely pass. This tactic was called "pindown" because it would force SAC to delay launching the retaliatory force until after the radiation had dispersed.

It's taken a bit further in the '69-70 document:

The Air Force pursued other projects to complement its missile hardness modifications. One, a high altitude radiation detection system (HARDS), sensed and reported a nuclear-charged environment. In January 1968 HARDS had been installed in five airborne launch control center aircraft and at one launch control facility in each Minuteman wing. By the end. of 1968 all post attack command control system (PACCS) aircraft carried HARDS. Furthermore, in October 1968 OSD expanded the ground-based network--the electromagnetic pulse sensor system (EMPSS)--to 20 Minuteman and six Titan II launch control centers; installation was completed in early 1970. OSD also approved incorporation of cancel launch in process (CLIP) devices in all Minuteman II and Modernized Minuteman control centers.

[CLIP enabled launch crews to override a valid firing order once pindown was detected.]

So...how is this a threat?

Well, you know how you can't launch a ballistic missile until you are absolutely sure that NUDETS are going to be occuring on US soil, etc, because it can't be recalled or blown up in flight?

This means that if say, the Soviet Union decided on a first strike aimed at our bomber airfields and missile fields; while the bombers could disperse on warning of the missiles in the air -- our missiles would largely be caught in their silos.

Now; we would probably begin to issue definite salvo fire orders to our ICBM Wings several minutes before the first RV impacts on CONUS -- because by that point we would have multiple confirmations of enemy attack from multiple sources (OTH radar, satellites looking over soviet ICBM fields; radar confirmation from the big radars we have) and you would begin to see the first streaks of re-entry about 30-40 seconds before initation.

The thing is; the big Soviet Missile fields would have nearly an hour to launch their missiles at us (30 minutes to begin firing our own missiles; then a 35~ minute flight time to Soviet Russia); before targets in Russia begin to feel the wrath of US retaliation.

Now, you're asking me -- What about forward deployed missiles and fighter bombers in Europe/Japan/Etc?

It goes to that point earlier -- once you've ignited the blue touch paper and launched a nuclear weapon; there's no going back.

So our tactical forces would be dispersing into airborne alert, moving away from bases, and on carriers, the nuclear weapons would be in the process of being assembled in the special weapons magazines. But they can't nuke away until we're absolutely sure that CONUS is about to be hit with many many nuclear weapons.

So this means that we probably get at least a wing or two (150 to 300 Minutemen) off the ground before the nukes hit and scattered launches from the other Wings including maybe a couple Titan IIs.

In fact; it's almost likely to be Wing I and Wing II which fire mostly -- because as built, they only had enough supplies to last six hours on alert once cut off from commercial power; and the emergency generators on the silos were soft.

Yes, you heard me right. The missile silos on the first 300 Minuteman launchers we built were rated at 300 PSI, and the command centers 1,000 PSI; but the emergency generators for the launch control center and launchers weren't even hardened at all, and they only had enough diesel to last for six hours!!!

We eventually did do a modernization program for those two wings to bring them somewhat up to the standards of the other wings; but that was late-ish in the program; and those wings can never really be trusted to be as damage resistant as the newer ones. So those missiles fly first, because in any case they are going to be destroyed/rendered inoperable by virtually any attack.

It's also because of this that the majority of SAC HQ/Higher Command attention is going to be focused on those two wings to get their missiles off.

Why? Because SAC launch crews aren't automations -- a significant fraction are going to need convincing from higher ups that this is for real, yes, it's for real -- launch your missile!

It may ultimately take an override command from higher up HQs or the ALCCs to launch the missile - and that wastes time.

The remainder of the Minuteman Force -- Wings III, IV, V, and VI, have emergency facilities hardened to varying degrees (25 to 1,000 PSI), but all have enough diesel to last nine weeks on alert once cut off from commercial power; so there isn't as much pressure to use them.

So we've gotten off a couple hundred missiles before impact -- but the remainder of our force -- the other 700 to 850 Minutemen and 50~ Titan II are caught sitting on the ground and have to ride out the attack.

For the purposes of this calculation; we'll assume that we're attacking minuteman silos with 500 kiloton warheads with a CEP of 1,000m (0.53nm) We also won't consider warhead reliability, missile reliability; or the effect of bias on CEP.

Rough SWAGs for damage radiuses give 315m (0.17nm) for 300 PSI -- remember that while the launch control center of the latest Minutemen are hardened to 1,000 PSI -- the silo itself and the diesel generator complex are not as well hardened.

SSPKs with such a weapon would be about 6.9% -- and if we wanted a kill probability of about 50% on that silo (remember; we just need to damage it enough so it can't launch) it would take about seven warheads. Since each Wing has 150 launchers, that's a thousand groundbursts occuring over an area about 10,000 square miles -- the size of roughly Massachusetts....at minimum.

That's a lot of hard radiation and fallout that's going to be blanketing the launch fields -- and since the Soviet RVs will be arriving over a fairly longish period (for nuclear war) to avoid fratricide; it's entirely possible that our surviving missiles will be held down by a prolonged nuclear barriage that lasts for an hour or more; plus whatever time it takes for the radioactive clouds from the groundbursts nearby to dissipate enough to make launches feasible.

By the time we can once again launch reliably, the Soviets could have reduced our ICBM force to a level where it can't counterforce what Soviet silos are left unfired or counterindustry Soviet cities enough to attain Assured Destruction.

When you combine this with the increasing soviet air defense forces and the increasing age of our bomber fleet; it seems that really, the Soviets had checkmated virtually all of our triad except the SSBN force.

And even the survival/effectiveness of our SSBN force is a bit questionable.

Why?

Due to the range of Poiseidon (2,500 nm); our boats have to stay in the North Atlantic about 600-700 nautical miles west of Ireland in order to hit Western Russia; and for our Pacific Poiseidon/Polaris boats, they can pretty much blow away Siberia; but that's it.

If you wanted to hit the Urals region of Central Russia; then your SSBNs would have to brave the G-I-UK Gap or the Okhotsk Sea; and that's a fairly dangerous thing in an era where Soviet ASW forces, both Surface and Subsurface are substantially improving, making life very dangerous for SSBNs.

Why? To give you an example; the Soviet YANKEE SSBN has sixteen missile tubes; and they are fired in four salvos of four missiles.

To prepare for launch takes eight minutes; and a full salvo of four missiles takes 32 seconds. Then you have to spend three minutes after each salvo correcting your depth. After the second salvo; it seems that you then have to spend about a half an hour correcting your trim; because you've fired off a hundred plus tons of missiles; and taken on at least that much amount of water as the missile tubes fill post-launch.

Oh; did I mention the fact that firing an SLBM is very noisy? First you have the hatches opening, KA WUNK KA WUNK; then the huge gas bubble and noise from each launch.

Ideal conditions for a enemy SSN to detect you and then drop a SS-N-15 or SUBROC on your launch point. They won't be able to stop your first salvo; but they can prevent you from firing your full complement.

[SilverHawk]

Well, that's why we created the B-2 and the AGM-129. A simple solution to a complex problem. (Not forgetting the Peacekeepers and Trident IIs.)

[PeZook]

I...really wouldn't call the B-2 a simple solution

[MKSheppard]

Trident I really did solve a lot of our problems with the SSBN force.

With a 4,000 nm range; you can pretty much nuke Moscow from only 400 nm off Delaware; and if you go up north to 300 nm off Newfoundland, you can nuke most of the Urals region; while still remaining under the protection of US/Canadian ASW aircraft.

Likewise; in the Pacific; it means you can sit just off Pearl Harbor and nuke Vladviostock and eastern Siberia; while a firing point 800-900 nm off of Japan lets you hit the Urals region.

When Trident II with it's 6,100 nm range arrived in 1990 for the end of the Cold War; it meant that a East Coast SSBN could nuke 90% of the Soviet Union from their piers in South Carolina -- Western Russia (Moscow) Central Russia (Urals), and Eastern Russia (Siberia/Vladviostock).

This means that our SSBNs can now effectively sit in preselected "bastions" protected by ASW forces, in much the same way the Soviets achieved this with their later SSBNs; so the chances of them firing off their full missile load greatly improve.

[MKSheppard]

Some more fun things found in STUDY S-467: THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL AND WARNING, 1945-1972

It mentions the Deep Underground Command Center (DUCC); which was to be a hardened command post 3,000/3,500/4,000 ft below the Pentagon; capable of providing life support for about 200~ personnel for 30 days post-attack and hardened to 5,000-10,000 PSI; which would give it protection against a 100 megaton device with a CEP of 0.5 nm -- which is basically a direct hit.

SAC also proposed post Cuba; an Advanced Airborne Command Post (AABNCP), which would use...the C-5A Galaxy, since the C-135 was inadequate. A C-5A Based CP would have had 3,500 ft2 of space; compared to 900 ft2 for the EC-135, allowing a much bigger battle staff, satellite terminal, and larger on board computers.

Unfortunately, the program was delayed into the 1970s and eventually became the 747 based E-4A/E-4B.

Some other tidbits:

Until 1956, the Air Force was prevented by law from installing telephones at government expense in private residences. At that time, after several years of trying, the Air Force managed to have the law changed sufficiently to put telephones in the homes of the Joint Chiefs and top Headquarters USAF, ADC, SAC, and European Command officers. Eventually approval was granted to install telephones wherever they were needed.

As General LeMay was to put the problem later, in connection with SAC's need for "safe passage" routes through the US air defense system, the Army concept of "shoot 'em down, sort 'em out on the ground" was totally unacceptable to the Air Force.

The JCS issued this doctrine during planning for SAFEGUARD:

(1) Preplanning for the operational employment of the offensive and defensive forces to enable:

• The full Safeguard system to operate without restriction at any time the offensive missile force was not being launched.

• Flyout corridors to be established for the offensive missile force.

• Unrestricted use of Sprint missiles throughout all phases of the engagement without regard to offensive missile corridors or offensive missile launch.

• Restricting Spartan missiles from engagements in the flyout corridors during launch of the offensive missiles, except for self-defense and if directed otherwise by the NCA on a preplanned basis.

• Bomber flyout corridors to be established through preplanned coordination by the offense and defense to achieve the best defense siting and corridor locations.

(2) Communications between CINCSAC and CINCONAD to pass the necessary information, i.e., launch times and holds, so that preplanned actions could be carried out.

(3) Incorporating within the Safeguard firing doctrine elements that would permit the selective hold or release of Spartan to match the conditions set forth in the coordination plan.7

And this tidbit:

The JCS study projected that possibly 9 percent of the Minuteman launches would be lost to fratricide, but an IDA-WSEG study predicted a loss of 20 percent if the Spartan's lethal radius were set at 200 n.m. instead of 80 n.m.

[phongn]

Well, that's why we created the B-2 and the AGM-129. A simple solution to a complex problem. (Not forgetting the Peacekeepers and Trident IIs.)

I...really wouldn't call the B-2 a simple solution

The B-2 force was also a highly specialized platform for hunting down pesky mobile ICBM launchers.

This means that our SSBNs can now effectively sit in preselected "bastions" protected by ASW forces, in much the same way the Soviets achieved this with their later SSBNs; so the chances of them firing off their full missile load greatly improve.

Would we ever do a bastion strategy? It seems with Trident the boats could - as you mentioned - shoot in all sorts of random places in such an area as the USSR could not hope to patrol

[MKSheppard]

Would we ever do a bastion strategy? It seems with Trident the boats could - as you mentioned - shoot in all sorts of random places in such an area as the USSR could not hope to patrol

Well, you're limited by the fact that a deterrent patrol is about 77 days long, or eleven weeks long.

Figure a week and half is spent going to the patrol zone and then the same time going back; and at fifteen knots silent speed (SWAG), that's a distance of 3,800 nm from Home Base (South Carolina) a SSBN can go; limiting you to the North Atlantic -- the Caribbean's off limits due to the presence of Cuba as a possible hostile state.

[Stuart]

The B-2 force was also a highly specialized platform for hunting down pesky mobile ICBM launchers.

It was more than that but essentially you're right. The B-2 was never considered as a viable "standard" bomber. It's too slow and is restricted to night operations. In daylight, it's a sitting duck to anything from a MiG-19 upwards.

Would we ever do a bastion strategy? It seems with Trident the boats could - as you mentioned - shoot in all sorts of random places in such an area as the USSR could not hope to patrol

At the moment we don't; we're better off letting the submarines get lost in the ocean. They're essentially unfindable until they start shooting and by then it's too late. The bastion strategy was essentially a recognition that the U.S. Navy was so far in advance of the Soviet Navy where ASW was concerned that tracking and killing a SSBN was plausible. We demonstrated that often enough by harassing an SSBN just enough to let the crew know we knew where she was. There's a massive sound signature difference between an Ohio and even the best of the Russian SSBNs. So, the Soviet answer (a good one) was to adopt bastions and defend the perimeter. In effect this was the old convoy solution, solving the detection problem by forcing the attacker to come to the defenses. We don't need to do that; we can find and kill the attacker while our SSBNs lurk.

[SilverHawk]

It was more than that but essentially you're right. The B-2 was never considered as a viable "standard" bomber. It's too slow and is restricted to night operations. In daylight, it's a sitting duck to anything from a MiG-19 upwards.

The B-2 operates at the same speeds as the B-52 with the added benefit of being practically invisible to ground radar and anything lower then Irbis-E and the Zalson-M won't even get a clean lock on it.

Anyway, with the AGM-129, the B-2 could engage anything with-in 2000 nm with impunity.

[phongn]

The B-2 operates at the same speeds as the B-52 with the added benefit of being practically invisible to ground radar and anything lower then Irbis-E and the Zalson-M won't even get a clean lock on it.

The B-52 is not exactly fast and you know how its characteristics against threat radars how?

Anyway, with the AGM-129, the B-2 could engage anything with-in 2000 nm with impunity.

Why? Cruise missiles are not invincible, either (and plenty of passive countermeasures against them) and they are still not exactly optimal for various roles.

[Sea Skimmer]

The B-2 operates at the same speeds as the B-52 with the added benefit of being practically invisible to ground radar and anything lower then Irbis-E and the Zalson-M won't even get a clean lock on it.

Ignoring whether or not any of that is even true, it doesn't exactly change the fact that a MiG-19 could still shoot it down with cannon fire. Funny enough the B-52 kept its tail guns around until the very end of the cold war for exactly that reason. The B-52 had massive ECM gear instead of stealth, but nothing electronic could stop a commie fighter from following the jamming until it was in gun range.

Anyway, with the AGM-129, the B-2 could engage anything with-in 2000 nm with impunity.

Cruise missiles don't work that way, especially not ones based on TERCOM guidance. You need a set of terrain maps all the way to the target to feed into the missile guidance system. That means in practice the cruise missile can only attack preplanned fixed targets. SRAM and gravity bombs could be targeted on the fly, but the former only had around 100nm range, 250nm planned for SRAM-II, and gravity bomb could only be flung a few miles. If cruise missiles really could be fired from 2000nm with impunity against any target we wished then no rational reason would exist for a penetrating plane like the B-2.

[SilverHawk]

The B-52 is not exactly fast and you know how its characteristics against threat radars how?

Speed doesn't save your ass either. We learned that with the XB-70. A B-1B going 1.2 mach on the deck is still meat for Su-27s and MiG-31s in look-down/shoot-down mode. The best defense is not to be seen at all. As for it's characteristics against threat radar, you'd think I'd tell you? You know how well the Nighthawk performed in the Gulf War, it has an RCS of about .01/.001 meters allowing it to get 90% closer to ground radars and 98% closer to airborne radars then a F-4G Wild Weasel, which had an RCS of 6 meters.

The B-2A Spirit is an even better and more refined design despite being massively larger then a F-117A Nighthawk. You can't even HEAR the thing until it's flown past you, I would know, I've had one fly about angels 5 over my head. In combat, I would of been obliterated well before then.

Why? Cruise missiles are not invincible, either (and plenty of passive countermeasures against them) and they are still not exactly optimal for various roles.

The AGM-129 is Stealth, it's a B-2A, launching a nuclear tipped F-117A traveling at high sub-sonice speeds. What the B-2A would be firing at, a CEP of 650 on the AGM-129's IGS (If for some reason TERCOM failed) with a 150 KT warhead would be accurate enough.

Ignoring whether or not any of that is even true, it doesn't exactly change the fact that a MiG-19 could still shoot it down with cannon fire. Funny enough the B-52 kept its tail guns around until the very end of the cold war for exactly that reason. The B-52 had massive ECM gear instead of stealth, but nothing electronic could stop a commie fighter from following the jamming until it was in gun range.

You have to find it first. A B-2A flying at Angels 40 is invisible to the naked eye from the ground, you can't hear it and you can't see it on radar. Stating the obvious that aircraft fall down and go boom when hit by cannon fire does not add anything useful to the discussion.

Cruise missiles don't work that way, especially not ones based on TERCOM guidance. You need a set of terrain maps all the way to the target to feed into the missile guidance system. That means in practice the cruise missile can only attack preplanned fixed targets. SRAM and gravity bombs could be targeted on the fly, but the former only had around 100nm range, 250nm planned for SRAM-II, and gravity bomb could only be flung a few miles. If cruise missiles really could be fired from 2000nm with impunity against any target we wished then no rational reason would exist for a penetrating plane like the B-2.

The AGM-129, if need be, can use IGS, as I just mentioned. But if TERCOM data did exist for the AGM-129's launch point, it could be fired from 2000 nm without fail.

Edit : Just in case the light bulb didn't go off in your head or you think you're funny by playing stupid at what I'm addressing, the B-2A could strike fixed targets deep within soviet airspace without fail. (Naval Bases/Ports, Air Bases, Army Bases, Assembly Areas, Missile Silos, Train Yards, Storage Depots, Power Plants, Fuel Refineries, etc.)

[Sea Skimmer]

Speed doesn't save your ass either. We learned that with the XB-70.

Speed and height combined sure do because they make it physically impossible for the vast majority of enemy weapons to even try to shoot at you. The B-70 was killed off because of absurd predictions of mach 15 SAMs by the 1970s and its generally high cost. You have no fucking clue how much we've been over that before.

A B-1B going 1.2 mach on the deck is still meat for Su-27s and MiG-31s in look-down/shoot-down mode. The best defense is not to be seen at all.

B-1B is subsonic down low, it can barely hit mach 1.2 up high. That was the entire point of the B-1A to B-1B design change, sacrifice almost all supersonic capability to gain the highest possible subsonic speed down low. Those fighters have IRST systems which could track any aircraft anyway, but then only an idiot thinks stealth is invisibility.

As for it's characteristics against threat radar, you'd think I'd tell you? You know how well the Nighthawk performed in the Gulf War, it has an RCS of about .01/.001 meters allowing it to get 90% closer to ground radars and 98% closer to airborne radars then a F-4G Wild Weasel, which had an RCS of 6 meters.

Do you honestly think we've believe you, when you don't know the speed of a well known aircraft? Iraq is its own story, but one bit we do know is that in fact the defenses of Baghdad knew something was coming and opened fire well before the first Nighthawk released weapons.

The B-2A Spirit is an even better and more refined design despite being massively larger then a F-117A Nighthawk. You can't even HEAR the thing until it's flown past you, I would know, I've had one fly about angels 5 over my head. In combat, I would of been obliterated well before then.

Yeah sure buddy.

The AGM-129 is Stealth, it's a B-2A, launching a nuclear tipped F-117A traveling at high sub-sonice speeds. What the B-2A would be firing at, a CEP of 650 on the AGM-129's IGS (If for some reason TERCOM failed) with a 150 KT warhead would be accurate enough.

Without TERCOM the cruise missile has to fly high, its not going to survive very long like that stealthy or not because it has no ability to respond to a threat. Fighters flying patrols will find it with good old infrared, thus the need to fly down in the weeds.

You have to find it first. A B-2A flying at Angels 40 is invisible to the naked eye from the ground, you can't hear it and you can't see it on radar. Stating the obvious that aircraft fall down and go boom when hit by cannon fire does not add anything useful to the discussion.

As opposed to your vague claims of having access to highly classified information? Yeah sure. You have no idea how many times people have showed up claiming crap like that before so I suggest you stop.

The AGM-129, if need be, can use IGS, as I just mentioned. But if TERCOM data did exist for the AGM-129's launch point, it could be fired from 2000 nm without fail.

Today having TERCOM for the entire globe handy might be feasible given a couple rack servers in the plane, it sure wasn't when the B-2 and AGM-129 were built.

Edit : Just in case the light bulb didn't go off in your head or you think you're funny by playing stupid at what I'm addressing, the B-2A could strike fixed targets deep within soviet airspace without fail. (Naval Bases/Ports, Air Bases, Army Bases, Assembly Areas, Missile Silos, Train Yards, Storage Depots, Power Plants, Fuel Refineries, etc.)

A light bulb did go off, too bad its the noob attempted bullshit artist alarm we get so often. I see from your profile, assuming it has any basis in truth, that you served for at most six years in the USAF doing air traffic control no less. And now you wish us to believe that you've got access to all sorts of absurdly classified data, and then walked away to talk about it on web forums because that super classified career was too boring I guess?

[SilverHawk]

Speed and height combined sure do because they make it physically impossible for the vast majority of enemy weapons to even try to shoot at you. The B-70 was killed off because of absurd predictions of mach 15 SAMs by the 1970s and its generally high cost. You have no fucking clue how much we've been over that before.

The SA-2F was a pretty large threat to the B-70 unless it was operating at the very limit of it's flight ceiling. Not to mention the 2K11M "Krug-M", S-200V "Vega" were also huge threats in the early 70's to the B-70.

B-1B is subsonic down low, it can barely hit mach 1.2 up high. That was the entire point of the B-1A to B-1B design change, sacrifice almost all supersonic capability to gain the highest possible subsonic speed down low. Those fighters have IRST systems which could track any aircraft anyway, but then only an idiot thinks stealth is invisibility.

Only an idiot calls another person an idiot when that idiot assumes the person meant visual invisibility when the person obviously meant radar invisibility. (Excluding the fact that the F-117A and B-2A had design features to defeat IRST systems looking down from above.)

Do you honestly think we've believe you, when you don't know the speed of a well known aircraft? Iraq is its own story, but one bit we do know is that in fact the defenses of Baghdad knew something was coming and opened fire well before the first Nighthawk released weapons.

I honestly don't care if you believe me. You're free to look yourself, you will find the same answers. As for Baghdad, they went crazy after the first Nighthawks dropped their payload, giving you those spectacular light shows in the old videos in the harrowing stories of Nighthawk pilots worried about the Golden BB.

Yeah sure buddy.

You're free to experience it yourself, just go to an airshow that will have a B-2 Demostration. But you'll find I'm telling the truth.

Without TERCOM the cruise missile has to fly high, its not going to survive very long like that stealthy or not because it has no ability to respond to a threat. Fighters flying patrols will find it with good old infrared, thus the need to fly down in the weeds.

Actually, no, they won't find it with infra-red. The Williams F-112 that powers the AGM-129 has practically zero IR emissions.

As opposed to your vague claims of having access to highly classified information? Yeah sure. You have no idea how many times people have showed up claiming crap like that before so I suggest you stop.

I suggest you actually address the discussion instead of issuing vague threats. If you want to call my bluff, it is totally within your power to do so, but you will find no information that contradicts what I have stated.

A light bulb did go off, too bad its the noob attempted bullshit artist alarm we get so often. I see from your profile, assuming it has any basis in truth, that you served for at most six years in the USAF doing air traffic control no less. And now you wish us to believe that you've got access to all sorts of absurdly classified data, and then walked away to talk about it on web forums because that super classified career was too boring I guess?

Nothing really too classified involved here, you can find all of what I said on the internet/JANES or through personal experience. Here, I'll even help you out, Boy-O.

F-117A RCS/History : http://www.luminoxshop.com/f1tealsec.html
SA-2F : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-75_Dvina#Major_variants
SA-4B : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2K11_Krug#Vehicles
SA-5B : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-200_Anga ... a#Versions

F-117A IR Stealth : Exhaust deflection panels push heat up, away from ground based sensors, the split-v tail covers the deflected exhaust, blocking it from air based sensors looking down.

B-2A IR Stealth : Same thing as the F-117A, with the exception of no split-v tail, sunken engines allow air to cool before expelled across Platypus type nozzles. (Also seen on the YF-23.)

Air Battle of Baghdad : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War_air_campaign . Gunners were tipped off by Raven ECM corridor and eventual LGB strikes of first Nighthawks.

AGM-129 IR Stealth : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Williams_F112

B-2A Aural Stealth : http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PwnKPa5O ... re=related I think this video covers what I've been saying.

Anything else you want to try and dodge the discussion on?

[SilverHawk]

Addendum : If for some reason, you get scared by the F-117A RCS link, here's the same article on a site that should ease your worries. (IE : your ability to try and side step discussion.)

http://www.historynet.com/stealth-secre ... eature.htm

If you still don't like it, you're free to order a back issue of the March 1996 Aviation History Magazine.

[K. A. Pital]

*looks around* I'm going to massively enjoy this.