Question for atheists: What happens when we die?

[Admiral Valdemar]

Mimicking what millions of mammals already do naturally is all we need. If you can freeze a person to -20 degrees and bring them back with no lysing of cells via ice damage, then you can freeze them to a couple of Kelvin above absolute zero and keep them in pristine condition indefinitely. All you have to worry about is radiation damage from local sources in the body and around it, but any suitable nanotechnological society will have something to repair such damage come the thawing process.

[Sikon]

Good point.

Part of typical present-day concern about suspended animation or cryonics techniques is much uncertainty about whether or not the organization providing the preservation would continue maintaining it far enough into future, i.e. if the refrigeration system might sometime go out. Though backup systems and redundancy help, the ideal might be to avoid depending on an active system at all.

Once transport to space no longer costs so many orders of magnitude above energy costs, long-term storage might be in space. Put people in a space structure with the right design and albedo (reflectivity) of its surface, like modifying an asteroid, and they can stay cold indefinitely with no refrigeration system. There is no operating equipment needed, so there is no equipment existing to ever fail. No maintenance is needed.

The rate of radiation damage can be reduced by orders of magnitude below regular space cosmic radiation dosage if there is thick shielding, like being 10-meters or more below the surface of an asteroid. There would still be a slight bit of radiation, such as from natural radioisotopes in the body itself: typically around 17 milligrams of potassium-40, 90 micrograms of uranium, etc. However, such could be as little as a fraction of a single millisievert per year. A cumulative radiation dose on the order of 10,000 times greater (~ 10 Sv) is what it takes to cause a regular living person to have a large elevated chance of eventual death, such as from cancer. For perspective, bacterial spores millions of years old have been revived. Besides, as Admiral Valdemar suggested, the future should be able to better deal with any radiation damage.

[Arthur_Tuxedo]

I would argue that calling a person really dead if they made a digital backup that was exactly like them complete with memories and personality to be semantics. You could say "Well, it's not really him", but really, it would be close enough to continued existance that no one could tell the practical difference.

Though let me ask you a question. What are you? Are you the net sum of all your biological processes or are you the conscious product of said biological processes? At the present time, there is no practical difference between the two, because they are inseperable. But with Darth Raptors "Convincing Simulation", the are seperable. If a digital copy of a person's mind, hopes, desires, memories, all that stuff could be created. All that which is the person minus the flesh and bone is perserved. So is the person dead is all that made the person himself is still active and communicating? Or has the format of their existance just changed?

For everyone else, there's no difference. But for the individual in question, consciousness ends when the brain dies regardless of whether there's a digital copy. So you're still dead, you just have a clone. And to answer a previous point, I don't see how gradually replacing your brain with an electronic one would be any different. I'm not sure at what point of the robotization of the brain the individual's consciousness would cease, but a 100% robotic brain would most definitely have a different consciousness than the original. Other people may not perceive any change at all, but you would be quite dead. It's like the clone / disintegrate theory of how transporters work in Star Trek. You step in a transporter, and you die. The fact that there is someone who looks and acts exactly like you and who, to everyone else, is you doesn't mean that your consciousness hasn't ended.

The only way to live past the normal human lifespan is to keep the brain alive and healthy. I don't see any way around these conclusions unless you believe that consciousness is separate from the biochemical processes of the brain, and that means believing in a soul.

[Kuroneko]

I'm not sure at what point of the robotization of the brain the individual's consciousness would cease, but a 100% robotic brain would most definitely have a different consciousness than the original.

Different? In what sense? This hypothetical can be narrowed until the only difference is the material composition of the actual brain. If mental content is determined by the biological brain's operation, then it's quite plausible that a brain made of different materials may have structure and operation isomorphic to the biological one. It may or may not be in fact the case, but there is no apparent problem within hypothetical scenarios, which is sufficient here. A clock's function is to keep track of time. If it does this within some specified parameters, it makes no difference what its material actually consists of. If materialism is the case, as you seem to propose, then the only differences between a clock and brain are function and complexity.

I don't see any way around these conclusions unless you believe that consciousness is separate from the biochemical processes of the brain, and that means believing in a soul.

Quite the opposite--your interpretation ascribes some sort of metaphysical significance to biological neurons that's simply not substantiated by any physical considerations. Your view has to do this, for if, hypothetically, there is a technology that replaces the brain one neuron at a time with physically identical neuron, then the original person would be 'killed' by the same considerations as the above 'robotization', unless there is something metaphysically special about biological neurons.

[Arthur_Tuxedo]

I agree that if you replaced a brain one neuron at a time with isomorphic synthetic ones, there's no reason to believe that it would cause the cessation of consciousness. I thought the original poster was talking about slowly removing pieces of the brain and replacing them with digital equivalents, but that might have been a reading comprehension error on my part.

You do agree that creating a digital copy of the brain and letting the original die, rather than replacing its neurons with synthetic ones, would cause consciousness to stop from the perspective of the individual?

[Kuroneko]

You do agree that creating a digital copy of the brain and letting the original die, rather than replacing its neurons with synthetic ones, would cause consciousness to stop from the perspective of the individual?

Yes, I agree. But then this happens to me every time I sleep, and can be induced in others via blunt force, so clearly the mere fact that the subjective experience of consciousness was interrupted is insufficient. You seem to be using the word in a rather peculiar way, however--if you mean something more specific, please elaborate.

[Sikon]

A person's brain can shrink by up to 10% or more over the decades in aging, with continuous consciousness, and definitely no point of death during that process. Likewise, a person's brain grows during childhood, also with continuous consciousness. Out of billions of neurons, some die and some new ones form throughout life. (There used to be a common belief that adult neurogenesis never occurs, but that was found wrong).

Suppose a person had one in a million neurons die and get replaced by new ones through stimulated neurogenesis. I would say the person is the same person. After all, such is like a continuation of natural changes and natural neurogenesis.

Even if the new neurons were instead artificially modified, the person still hasn't died. Gradually, over the decades, the person might go to 1%, eventually 10%, someday 50%, and eventually 99% new neurons. Long-term memories are a concern, but possibly redundancy in the brain might help, particularly with them being stored in more than one location and potentially re-copied. The idea is like each 0.1% new artificially modified neurons become fully incorporated with a person's memories, etc. before the next 0.1% is added. It is an even more gradual process.

There is no fundamental absolute difference between biological cells and what sufficiently advanced technology would allow, except for that the artificial ones would be different in whatever manner was desirable. They could be metal and silicon like the classic "robotic" idea, or they could be mainly regular carbon-based biochemistry, whatever would be preferred.

Remembering that a person in childhood and old age naturally has gain or loss in the brain, consider a hypothetical person who at age 60 started having his brain changed at the rate of 1% annually, as part of life extension allowing life for many centuries. Would he have discontinuity of consciousness and death at age 61? No. Would he at age 70? No. Would he at age 80 or at age 150? No.

With such, there is no particular time at which someone thinks he is dying or dies. Rather, every single day he would see that he continued thinking and having consciousness just as much as he did when his brain gradually changed during his teenage years.

There would be no nasty surprise in which the person loses consciousness. It is not just a matter of seeming the same to outside observers. Instead, he personally could see he was okay even during the first year. Anyway, it would sure beat dying.

[Tolya]

Back to the original point:

As much as I dislike the prospect of turning into wormfood, deep in my heart I hope that after "death" I will get up from the chair, unplug the VR equipment, have a coke and then play another round of "Life on Earth". Only this time I would choose "military pilot" as my character class.

[Covenant]

I don't think I'm alone here in the complete acceptance that eventually I'll die, cease to be, and be remembered. I understand that for many the thought of death is a greatly terrifying thing, but I think the sooner we accept the fact that this is all there is and also accept all the ramifications of that fact... that you'll get over a fear of dying a lot faster. I much more fear the debilitating effects of old age than death, and plan to choose when I go rather than hang on until the bitter, grim, alzheimery end.

[Tolya]

I don't think I'm alone here in the complete acceptance that eventually I'll die, cease to be, and be remembered. I understand that for many the thought of death is a greatly terrifying thing, but I think the sooner we accept the fact that this is all there is and also accept all the ramifications of that fact... that you'll get over a fear of dying a lot faster. I much more fear the debilitating effects of old age than death, and plan to choose when I go rather than hang on until the bitter, grim, alzheimery end.

Plus, the prospect of existence ceased is much more appealing than spending an eternity being tortured in 'hell'. According to christian religion, its the place we are headed straight for anyway.

[Covenant]

Eh, I don't think I'd go to Hell. I don't believe the crap those people say any more than I believe the Heavens Gate bunch. I'm a nice guy to people, treat folks with dignity, and have respect for those who also try to treat people well even if it's not in the manner I think is best. By any reasonable criteria, I shouldn't be headed to some kind of eternal punishment.

It's seriously never really come up to me. It's too obviously a human contrivance to punish the jackasses who are mean to people forever. It's the ultimate 'get back' against someone who you hate. "Yeah, you may steal my lunch money today, but you're going to BURN FOREVER."

I just don't buy it. I'm not athiestic because I've disproved God or because I don't want to think that God is so petty. I don't want to think that either, but I'm athiestic because you can look at religions rise and fall along with civilizations that birthed them as social manifestations rather than something divine. It's just not something I'm worried about. :p

[Molyneux]

I don't think I'm alone here in the complete acceptance that eventually I'll die, cease to be, and be remembered. I understand that for many the thought of death is a greatly terrifying thing, but I think the sooner we accept the fact that this is all there is and also accept all the ramifications of that fact... that you'll get over a fear of dying a lot faster. I much more fear the debilitating effects of old age than death, and plan to choose when I go rather than hang on until the bitter, grim, alzheimery end.

Plus, the prospect of existence ceased is much more appealing than spending an eternity being tortured in 'hell'. According to christian religion, its the place we are headed straight for anyway.

...why?

This may be just the masochist in me talking, but pain seems better than nonexistence, to me.

Then again, if Hell is a physical place as in Dante, it seems unlikely that all the military folk down there haven't taken the place over by now...

[Ghost Rider]

I don't think I'm alone here in the complete acceptance that eventually I'll die, cease to be, and be remembered. I understand that for many the thought of death is a greatly terrifying thing, but I think the sooner we accept the fact that this is all there is and also accept all the ramifications of that fact... that you'll get over a fear of dying a lot faster. I much more fear the debilitating effects of old age than death, and plan to choose when I go rather than hang on until the bitter, grim, alzheimery end.

Plus, the prospect of existence ceased is much more appealing than spending an eternity being tortured in 'hell'. According to christian religion, its the place we are headed straight for anyway.

...why?

This may be just the masochist in me talking, but pain seems better than nonexistence, to me.

Then again, if Hell is a physical place as in Dante, it seems unlikely that all the military folk down there haven't taken the place over by now...

You equate eternal unending pain better then non existence?

Remember that particular. Pain may be preferable then not existing, because you exist and the human ego is strong enough to want some attachment to the physical world, but eternally? You can say you are feeling but it is unrelenting, it is some sick cruel unending torture. The equivilant of whatever is supposedly the worst you could feel in life but no reprieve.......ever. You won't die from it, you won't go into shock, you won't pass out and it won't end. This is what the general dogma of hell after mutliple retroactive changes.

And given the sheer twisted sickness behind that, I can easily see why people kissed ass. The mere thought of never ending torture, and being literally denied rest is beyond any mere horror man can inflict upon another man. If you die under the battlefield, torture, suicide, whatever...it ends. But then they tell you, nuh-uh...you're going to feel worse then you've ever felt before, but this time there is no exit?

On the other hand is ending one's existence, to which is just simply the end. You won't care, because there is no more you.

[Admiral Valdemar]

...why?

This may be just the masochist in me talking, but pain seems better than nonexistence, to me.

Then again, if Hell is a physical place as in Dante, it seems unlikely that all the military folk down there haven't taken the place over by now...

I don't think you've thought this through. I kick you in the balls. Now let's continue this for infinity. Enjoying existing yet?

Yes, I agree. But then this happens to me every time I sleep, and can be induced in others via blunt force, so clearly the mere fact that the subjective experience of consciousness was interrupted is insufficient. You seem to be using the word in a rather peculiar way, however--if you mean something more specific, please elaborate.

Annoyingly, this reminds me of the Sir Penrose/Tegmark debates over the quantum nature of biological neural nets. I'm of the view that there is no such unique factor that dictates that decoherence in the human neurone is slower than neural firings. It seems to appeal to the idea that you can't replicate the human mind synthetically, which in my mind, is like saying you can't forge a fingerprint synthetically. The debate Penrose had with a BBC Hard Talk presenter over this concept was amusing, with the former backpedaling and moving the goal posts with respect to making A.I. robots sapient enough to be like humans.

[Falkenhayn]

I got into a debate over this once. Apparently I am "just as ignorant" as a religious fundamentalist because I can't accept that there is no proof that there isn't any form of afterlife.

[NecronLord]

WRT Cryonics, I'm skeptical about the methods currently in use leaving very much to work with in the future without significant loss of memory, rather than the concept itself. In theory it's perfectly sound; if a lungfish can do it, then so can we, eventually; but I'm not going to be paying money I can leave to charity or relatives to such people until the technology improves greatly - which of course, it may well do in my lifetime. It'll really be a solid idea everyone should go for when it reaches the point of it being possible to store living people safely while waiting for transplant organs to be found/grown, and so on. However, at present; while I don't presume to say what future humans will be capable of, I'm not optimistic enough to do it - far better to get a donor card and shuffle off.

As for afterlives, I've rarely seen a description of one I'd like to go to - it'd get boring as hell in the end; Tolya's, above, is pretty damn cool looking though. Ian Watson's The Book of the River has something that's kind of similar, but more supernatural that looks alright. But singing the praises of some god over and over forever... It'd be mind-numbing, which is pretty much the only mercy to be had from it.

[Admiral Valdemar]

I got into a debate over this once. Apparently I am "just as ignorant" as a religious fundamentalist because I can't accept that there is no proof that there isn't any form of afterlife.

Next time, introduce them to the "cannot prove a negative" fallacy. Be sure to punctuate it with a slap to the face.

[General Zod]

For everyone else, there's no difference. But for the individual in question, consciousness ends when the brain dies regardless of whether there's a digital copy. So you're still dead, you just have a clone. And to answer a previous point, I don't see how gradually replacing your brain with an electronic one would be any different. I'm not sure at what point of the robotization of the brain the individual's consciousness would cease, but a 100% robotic brain would most definitely have a different consciousness than the original. Other people may not perceive any change at all, but you would be quite dead. It's like the clone / disintegrate theory of how transporters work in Star Trek. You step in a transporter, and you die. The fact that there is someone who looks and acts exactly like you and who, to everyone else, is you doesn't mean that your consciousness hasn't ended.

What about modern cases of people being declared clinically dead and then being revived shortly after? By the same logic, does that mean they're longer alive even after they've been brought back to a living state? The only difference between this and copying their brain that I can see, if I'm reading your post right is that nothing has changed its location.

[CaptJodan]

What about modern cases of people being declared clinically dead and then being revived shortly after? By the same logic, does that mean they're longer alive even after they've been brought back to a living state? The only difference between this and copying their brain that I can see, if I'm reading your post right is that nothing has changed its location.

I think that difference of different location is the point. A copy isn't the original, no matter what way you slice it, and thus you won't be seeing through this "copy's" eyes. Your consciousness will still remain in your own body.

[General Zod]

What about modern cases of people being declared clinically dead and then being revived shortly after? By the same logic, does that mean they're longer alive even after they've been brought back to a living state? The only difference between this and copying their brain that I can see, if I'm reading your post right is that nothing has changed its location.

I think that difference of different location is the point. A copy isn't the original, no matter what way you slice it, and thus you won't be seeing through this "copy's" eyes. Your consciousness will still remain in your own body.

Except when you die the consciousness is shut off. If it gets moved over atom by atom, the only thing that changes is the location. You must have glossed over my scenario because there is no copying, even though for all intents and purposes it's the exact same thing. One stream of consciousness stops and then it starts up a few minutes later. By Arthur's logic someone who was brain dead for a minute or two and then revived is no longer the original, even though people who have had such happen will claim that they are.

Though there's always the argument that you're not the same person now as you were ten years ago, the only difference is one change is gradual and the other is abrupt.

[CaptJodan]

snip.

Perhaps I just misunderstood. You're advocating the replacing of parts within one's brain, not the digital copy Gil suggested, right?

[General Zod]

snip.

Perhaps I just misunderstood. You're advocating the replacing of parts within one's brain, not the digital copy Gil suggested, right?

No. My argument is similar to Gil's. Individually, but suddenly creating a perfect digital copy is not noticeably different from someone suffering physical brain death and then being recuscitated. Unless you care to argue that the person who has been revived from temporary brain death is no longer the same person but merely a copy. Because from my understanding of how digitally copying something works, there is no noticeable difference beyond the change of bodies, especially if the copy is identical in every respectable fashion. One stream of consciousness stops, another one starts, with the only difference in the copy being it moves location.

[Gil Hamilton]

For everyone else, there's no difference. But for the individual in question, consciousness ends when the brain dies regardless of whether there's a digital copy. So you're still dead, you just have a clone.

I don't see it that way. The digital version, the new edition (to borrow a phrase from Geoffery Landis), contains everything that is you except that it is on a digital medium instead of a biological medium. Right now, there is no difference between the net sum of biological processes and the result of those biological processes (i.e. a mind, rather than a brain), but in a hypothetical future where digital copying and emulation of a human mind exists, they could be. Presumably, this digital edition contains an ego, since you have one, and therefore a sense of self. Your self in fact. If the body no longer exists, then you could argue that you are dead and there is a copy, but you could argue the other way convincingly as well that your mind continued on living on a different medium.

And to answer a previous point, I don't see how gradually replacing your brain with an electronic one would be any different. I'm not sure at what point of the robotization of the brain the individual's consciousness would cease, but a 100% robotic brain would most definitely have a different consciousness than the original. Other people may not perceive any change at all, but you would be quite dead. It's like the clone / disintegrate theory of how transporters work in Star Trek. You step in a transporter, and you die. The fact that there is someone who looks and acts exactly like you and who, to everyone else, is you doesn't mean that your consciousness hasn't ended.

That doesn't quite answer my question. "What are you?" is the question. Are you just the running activity of neurons, hormones, et cetera? Or are you their products, i.e. a mind that is generated by those things? If you are the latter, what is so special about neurons?

The only way to live past the normal human lifespan is to keep the brain alive and healthy. I don't see any way around these conclusions unless you believe that consciousness is separate from the biochemical processes of the brain, and that means believing in a soul.

Absolutely not. You are trying to make a false dilemma here. Either you think that consciousness is completely inseperable from biology or you believe in an immaterial soul. Given that were are talking about digital copying of human consciousness, it is pretty obvious that in our scenario that human consciousness is seperable from biochemical processes without resorting to an immaterial soul. If it wasn't, then you couldn't make the copy that we are debating is the continuation a person or not and the point would be moot. As you have said, from anyone's perspective including that of the digital edition, the digital edition of the person is identical to the person, sans the body. Clearly, it is then conscious, or indistinguishable from being conscious, and therefore consciousness is seperate from our own biological process. There question we are arguing and the Big Question is "Is that edition a continuation of a person or a copy of the person?"

Kuroneko hits the nail on the head. You are assigning special qualities to the biochemical process that we have. That's why the above question of what you actual are is so important. If we are our minds, then so long as our mind continues, the medium it continues on is irrelevant.

[Arthur_Tuxedo]

For everyone else, there's no difference. But for the individual in question, consciousness ends when the brain dies regardless of whether there's a digital copy. So you're still dead, you just have a clone.

I don't see it that way. The digital version, the new edition (to borrow a phrase from Geoffery Landis), contains everything that is you except that it is on a digital medium instead of a biological medium. Right now, there is no difference between the net sum of biological processes and the result of those biological processes (i.e. a mind, rather than a brain), but in a hypothetical future where digital copying and emulation of a human mind exists, they could be. Presumably, this digital edition contains an ego, since you have one, and therefore a sense of self. Your self in fact. If the body no longer exists, then you could argue that you are dead and there is a copy, but you could argue the other way convincingly as well that your mind continued on living on a different medium.

I don't dispute any of that. Where we differ is that I don't want to "fade to black" so that a perfect copy can continue my legacy.

And to answer a previous point, I don't see how gradually replacing your brain with an electronic one would be any different. I'm not sure at what point of the robotization of the brain the individual's consciousness would cease, but a 100% robotic brain would most definitely have a different consciousness than the original. Other people may not perceive any change at all, but you would be quite dead. It's like the clone / disintegrate theory of how transporters work in Star Trek. You step in a transporter, and you die. The fact that there is someone who looks and acts exactly like you and who, to everyone else, is you doesn't mean that your consciousness hasn't ended.

That doesn't quite answer my question. "What are you?" is the question. Are you just the running activity of neurons, hormones, et cetera? Or are you their products, i.e. a mind that is generated by those things? If you are the latter, what is so special about neurons?

There's no evidence that there's such thing as a mind that's separate from the physical processes, so there's no reason to believe that this hypothetical mind would transfer to a separate but otherwise identical brain.

The only way to live past the normal human lifespan is to keep the brain alive and healthy. I don't see any way around these conclusions unless you believe that consciousness is separate from the biochemical processes of the brain, and that means believing in a soul.

Absolutely not. You are trying to make a false dilemma here. Either you think that consciousness is completely inseperable from biology or you believe in an immaterial soul. Given that were are talking about digital copying of human consciousness, it is pretty obvious that in our scenario that human consciousness is seperable from biochemical processes without resorting to an immaterial soul. If it wasn't, then you couldn't make the copy that we are debating is the continuation a person or not and the point would be moot. As you have said, from anyone's perspective including that of the digital edition, the digital edition of the person is identical to the person, sans the body. Clearly, it is then conscious, or indistinguishable from being conscious, and therefore consciousness is seperate from our own biological process. There question we are arguing and the Big Question is "Is that edition a continuation of a person or a copy of the person?"

Kuroneko hits the nail on the head. You are assigning special qualities to the biochemical process that we have. That's why the above question of what you actual are is so important. If we are our minds, then so long as our mind continues, the medium it continues on is irrelevant.

It's not irrelevant if you're not around to see it. But I do see where you're coming from. From the perspective of everyone including the copy, the person is the same, and there's no original to offer an objection, so parsimony does seem to support your view. On the other hand, if you made an identical but physically separate copy of someone and they didn't subsequently die, they wouldn't both the same person, they would be different but indistinguishable people. So why would the situation change if one is zapped out of existance at the moment of cloning?

snip.

Perhaps I just misunderstood. You're advocating the replacing of parts within one's brain, not the digital copy Gil suggested, right?

No. My argument is similar to Gil's. Individually, but suddenly creating a perfect digital copy is not noticeably different from someone suffering physical brain death and then being recuscitated. Unless you care to argue that the person who has been revived from temporary brain death is no longer the same person but merely a copy. Because from my understanding of how digitally copying something works, there is no noticeable difference beyond the change of bodies, especially if the copy is identical in every respectable fashion. One stream of consciousness stops, another one starts, with the only difference in the copy being it moves location.

Someone who suffers temporary brain death still has the same brain. It's just been declared dead and then revived. Not so for a copy, even a perfect one.

Yes, I agree. But then this happens to me every time I sleep, and can be induced in others via blunt force, so clearly the mere fact that the subjective experience of consciousness was interrupted is insufficient. You seem to be using the word in a rather peculiar way, however--if you mean something more specific, please elaborate.

Right. But when you are KO'd or go to sleep, you later wake up and consciousness comes back. If you are killed and perfectly cloned, it doesn't.

[General Zod]

Someone who suffers temporary brain death still has the same brain. It's just been declared dead and then revived. Not so for a copy, even a perfect one.

The problem with that though, is that the difference is semantics for the person who died and/or was cloned. One moment their consciousness is in the 'off' position. The next moment, it's back on. Regardless of the methods used to do it. Since they're dead regardless, it shouldn't matter whether they stay in the same body or not, right?