Kursk/Operation Citadel question

[wautd]

I always tought that the Germans lost the battle of Kursk even before it begun. However, recently I heared that it was Hitler who cancelled the operation, arguably at the worst timing possible, while Manstein (afaik one of Germany's most competent strategists) urged to continue the attack.
I'd take the advice from Manstein over Hitler any time, but was Manstein right or were they both wrong? Or in other words, regardless the choice, was it already disastrous for the Germans anyway?

[Thanas]

Yes. With the soviet reserves pouring in there was no hope for success. But IMO the most important mistake Hitler made here was to delay the attack as well as transfer two elite divisions out of the theater.

Not that it would have made such a difference in the face of overwhelming soviet odds. At that time in the war, the soviets could take pretty much all the losses the Wehrmacht inflicted on them.

[K. A. Pital]

Exactly. When mid-1943 hit, the Soviet Army was past the danger threshold of mobilizational reserve/losses whereas the Germans were slowly but steadily nearing it until in 1944 finally they started losing water faster than Titanic.

As for continuing the attack, with such heavy attrition on the mechanized units as the Germans experienced IRL in 1943, the odds were clearly not stacked in favour of the germans as attackers. A mechanized attack is only so far successful when it's attrition is low; else, it will fail very soon due to equipment being knocked out and basically losing capability to fight in it's original role as a mech. unit.

[Sea Skimmer]

The mistake was in not attacking as soon as the winter of 1942/43 had passed, or else making a planned strategic withdrawal. The Germans waited mainly for more Panther and Tiger tanks to arrive, the former of which all broke down after a couple miles travel and the latter while reliable were simply far too few in number to matter. This let the Soviets build an epic level of anti tank defense that would give pause to a modern army. Everything was made worse by poor German counter intelligence, which allowed the Soviets to learn the precise date and time of the attack.

An earlier attack might have worked, at a heavy cost. A much better option would have been to simply abandon the Orel and Kharkov salient’s even though the latter had only just been recaptured. This would have accomplished the same strategic objective of shortening the frontline and allowing more German divisions to go into reserve. The Germans would have then been in a fairly good position to counter a major Russian summer offensive with mobile battles. They’d still lose some ground, but nothing like the massive collapse they suffered in the aftermath of Kursk. They could also hope to emerge from such defensive battles while still retaining some level of strategic reserve.

The fact that Hitler did not approve construction of any kind of rearward defense line until after Kursk, even though such a line had been proposed as early as November 1941 and Hitler loved bunkers, made the situation all the more damning. All the concrete and mines were going to the Atlantic wall, but even log bunkers and anti tank ditches built by forced labor along the Dnieper river crossings would have made a lot of different. As it was the historical Wotan Line the Germans fell back on in October-December 1943 essentially did not exist, and the ‘Panther Line’ in the north was such a joke that the commander of Army Group North issued orders not to call it a defensive line, least the troops gain a false sense of security. With a prepared line to fall back on, and a shortened frontline ahead of it the mobile Panzers would have done very well, and could risk themselves without exposing the mostly horse drawn infantry units to destruction.

I mean hell, even 10% of the Russian civilians the Nazis outright murdered put to work building anti tank ditches instead for two years would have been enough to build several continuous barriers across the entire front.

To give an example of what Russia built at Kursk in a few months here are some pictures. The first one shows an army sized position with I think five divisions present. The second is a close up of a single regiments position

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/ ... 743art.gif
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/ ... e29_43.jpg

[Thanas]

Would it really have mattered, though? I mean, was Stalin willing to squander as many men in attacks as he did in 1941/2?

[Sea Skimmer]

Sure was, I don’t think that ever changed. The thing was in late 1941 and early 1942 Stalin made the mistake of ordering four separate offensives at virtually the same time. Every single one thus failed except the initial push back from Moscow.

In 1942 however at Stalingrad and then again in the 1943 Right Bank Ukraine-Dnieper offensive the Soviets concentrated one just making one big push on a single very wide front at a time, and thus obtained strategic successes, but the cost was not much lighter day to day. Russia also just had much more to throw into battle and by the end of 1943 its strength (and just as importantly the experience of mid level leadership) had grown enough that once again it could attack across the entire frontline. Once that happened German forces were completely screwed.

If the Germans meanwhile retain strategic reserves and met a single big Soviet push with counter attacks on its flanks and the initial rush blunted by a strong reward position they might well prevent such massive Russian gains as historically occurred August-December 1943. As it was the historical German Panzer troops did score a major victory driving the Russians back towards Kiev in November. Its not hard to see that if the Germans remained purely defensive and straightened the line the result could be that by the end of 1943 the Russians would not have any bridgeheads over the Dnieper (historically they got across the river along nearly its entire length) and would not have isolated the Crimean.

This would in turn vastly improve the German situation in early 1944 as the Russians would not be one big tank rush away from Romania and its oilfields. Its hardly war winning, but it just might be enough to keep Russian troops from storming Berlin ahead of the Americans.

[PainRack]

I always tought that the Germans lost the battle of Kursk even before it begun. However, recently I heared that it was Hitler who cancelled the operation, arguably at the worst timing possible, while Manstein (afaik one of Germany's most competent strategists) urged to continue the attack.
I'd take the advice from Manstein over Hitler any time, but was Manstein right or were they both wrong? Or in other words, regardless the choice, was it already disastrous for the Germans anyway?

Wasn't the cancellation also due to the fact that the Soviets had opened up a new offensive elsewhere with other reserves?

[Sea Skimmer]

Not quite. Here’s the rundown of what happened.

August 4th Citadel commences with the Soviets, who had learned the exact time of the attack firing a counter preparatory barrage with 900 guns. The Nazi onslaught proceeds to make slow painful progress over the next five says.

Late in the night of July 9th the western allies launched Operation Huskey, the invasion of Sicily. Hitler considered calling off Citadel at that point but was convinced to allow it to continue, this led to the massive tank battle at Prokhorovka on July 12th during which each side commits five mechanized or armored corps (the German units are bigger, but weakened, the Soviets smaller but at 100% authorized strength or even higher). Each side loses at least 400 tanks and assault guns, though a portion are recovered during the night. The armored units on both sides are unable to continue the battle the next day.

At this point further Nazi progress was highly unlikely, but a more infantry oriented attack was kept up until July 17th when it was clear no breakthrough would occur. Almost no changes in the frontline occur. Manstein was unusually foolish in calling for the attack to continue at this point, but he probably did not know just how many forces the Soviets still had in reserve even after the 5th Guards Tank Army was decimated, along with the Nazis, at Prokhorovka.

On the 17th July Hitler ordered a withdrawal from the break-in forced into the Soviet trench spam, and ordered several Panzer units including the bulk of the surviving Tigers, Panthers and Elephants transferred to Italy. Citadel is formally canceled. Allied troops on Sicily have meanwhile linked up all beachheads, and begun massively expanding them. German and Italian forces are already peeling back towards the north eastern corner of the island. Evacuation will occur over the first two weeks of August.

On the 19th of July meanwhile the Soviets commenced a full scale counter offensive on the northern side of the Kursk salient, aimed at capturing the German salient around Orel. The northern arm of the German attack had failed to make any ground after July 7th just two days into the attack. After hard defensive fighting Orel fell on August 6th and the Germans were forced from the salient over the next two weeks.

In the south, the site of Prokhorovka and the main bulk of Nazi Panzer strength the Soviets were more hesitant and did not commit to a full scale counter offensive until August 3rd when it was clear the German position in the north would not hold. In fact in the south the Germans were already pulling back beaten and weakened by Hitler’s troop transfers, the salient around Kharkov was liquidated within just a few days, though after Aug 7th German counter attacks temporarily halt progress.

On August 13th however, the Soviet attack front enormously expanded when armies in the Donbas begin attacking. By the end of August Soviet forces around the former Kursk salient and even further north resume the offensive, pushing the Nazis back 200-300 miles over a front more then 500 miles across. With the Dnieper river unfortified and already crossed along much of its length by November, and the Crimea isolated by December the Nazi hoard cannot recover, and from then on it will collapse and cede territory in enormous increments under every Soviet offensive until the swastika falls from the reichstag. Kursk was nothing but an utter disaster for the Panzer hoard and Nazi fortunes in general.