The Italian Campaign in WWII

[Simon_Jester]

In any case a retreat to Singapore may mean certain defeat, but since this is with hindsight we know that Japan was doing everything on a shoe string. They only had the ammunition for one attempt at taking the island, and they needed those troops to conquer Burma afterwards. A generally more successful and protracted defense could allow Burma to be saved, placing the allies in a much stronger position for the rest of the war. Malay might be retaken in 1943 instead of wasting time in the hopeless Italian campaign for example. After that bombers flatten every oil port in South East Asia.

I know this is off topic, and that it is a popular position among historians to say so, but was the Italian campaign truly hopeless? As a route to Berlin it was never going to work, absolutely. As a way of destroying large amounts of enemy materiel at small cost in Allied materiel, not a good plan. But as a way of denying manpower that would otherwise have been used to shore up German defenses and occupation forces in other parts of Europe? Or to gain useful experience in some aspects of mechanized warfare and amphibious landings?

I do not know enough to claim to know, one way or the other.

[thejester]

I know this is off topic, and that it is a popular position among historians to say so, but was the Italian campaign truly hopeless? As a route to Berlin it was never going to work, absolutely. As a way of destroying large amounts of enemy materiel at small cost in Allied materiel, not a good plan. But as a way of denying manpower that would otherwise have been used to shore up German defenses and occupation forces in other parts of Europe?

As this OOB from July 1943 and this OOB for July 1944 show, ultimately the forces deployed by the Germans in Italy were a tiny part of their overall force. Let's say the Allies hypothetically don't invade Italy - the 7ish divisions the Germans have in Italy (and keep in mind they were there in part because the Germans were well aware that their erstwhile Allies were on the way out) are just going to get shunted to the Eastern Front, where in all likelihood they're going to be swallowed whole by the Red Army's 1943 counteroffensives.

That hints at the reason, though. It would have been politically unacceptable to have the US and Commonwealth armies not engaged for the nearly twelve months between the end of HUSKY and the start of OVERLORD, or for the Allies to be seen to be abandoning the Italians. About the only genuine strategic benefit the Allies got from the campaign after Italy formally asked for an armistice was that the build up of the 15th Air Force.

[Sea Skimmer]

Can someone split this and the above couple posts on Italy?

I know this is off topic, and that it is a popular position among historians to say so, but was the Italian campaign truly hopeless? As a route to Berlin it was never going to work, absolutely. As a way of destroying large amounts of enemy materiel at small cost in Allied materiel, not a good plan. But as a way of denying manpower that would otherwise have been used to shore up German defenses and occupation forces in other parts of Europe? Or to gain useful experience in some aspects of mechanized warfare and amphibious landings?

The Germans would have had to garrison Italy anyway, and the Germans mostly committed horse mobile infantry divisions to the defense rather then Panzer units because the terrain was so awful. Meanwhile the limitation on the allies operational choices was not troops or tanks, but landing craft and the invasion of Italy, and then the Anzio debacle used up landing craft in huge numbers. This directly delayed the invasion of France, and also historically forced an abandonment of a major British offensive aimed at retaking all of Burma in 1943. Meanwhile the Italian war economy was actually a major drain on German resources, because Italy had almost no domestic supplies of coal or iron ore, and couldn’t even feed itself. So leaving Italy in the war producing weapons inferior to those of German manufacture could actually be an allied gain. Instead Germany was able to just let the Italian population starve and freeze, the same fate it inflicted on all its other occupied territories. It’s not even certain Mussolini would be able to stay in power of the allies had halted at Sicily anyway.

Also the Italian campaign suffered in general from being a dumping ground for some of the worst leaders and units the allies had, which made our losses all the more excessive. Some of those units, like the black divisions the US field (given only the most inept washout white officers to be found and poor training at best) would have better been left out of combat completely. They could have done useful enough duty as garrisons

Some hindsight is involved in this assessment, but American military leaders argued heavily against the invasion historically, and had to threaten Churchill with an abandonment to the European first policy when he went on to insist on further invasions of the fictional ‘soft underbelly’ of Europe. Indeed as late as June 1944 Churchill tried to have the invasion of southern France canceled and redirected to Greece. Churchill just as or even more concerned with ensuring a strong British political position after the war as he was about beating Hitler in the first place (he rightly assumed we’d win one way or another). American wanted to just stab the Nazi scum in the neck, invade France, and be done with the damn war.

[Simon_Jester]

Can someone split this and the above couple posts on Italy?

I'll start a new thread; hopefully Thanas will see fit to split the earlier posts in "Defending Malaya" off into it.

I know this is off topic, and that it is a popular position among historians to say so, but was the Italian campaign truly hopeless? As a route to Berlin it was never going to work, absolutely. As a way of destroying large amounts of enemy materiel at small cost in Allied materiel, not a good plan. But as a way of denying manpower that would otherwise have been used to shore up German defenses and occupation forces in other parts of Europe?

As this OOB from July 1943 and this OOB for July 1944 show, ultimately the forces deployed by the Germans in Italy were a tiny part of their overall force. Let's say the Allies hypothetically don't invade Italy - the 7ish divisions the Germans have in Italy (and keep in mind they were there in part because the Germans were well aware that their erstwhile Allies were on the way out) are just going to get shunted to the Eastern Front, where in all likelihood they're going to be swallowed whole by the Red Army's 1943 counteroffensives.

That hints at the reason, though. It would have been politically unacceptable to have the US and Commonwealth armies not engaged for the nearly twelve months between the end of HUSKY and the start of OVERLORD, or for the Allies to be seen to be abandoning the Italians. About the only genuine strategic benefit the Allies got from the campaign after Italy formally asked for an armistice was that the build up of the 15th Air Force.

The manpower I was referring to was Italian, not German- for instance, the availability of Italian troops to garrison the Balkans.

I can easily understand how the Italian campaign easily could have been a waste of resources, and I certainly admit that it probably was. I just... don't know enough to know, as I said earlier. So I appreciate it when people actually try to answer my questions on the subject, as you and Sea Skimmer have started to do.

Some hindsight is involved in this assessment, but American military leaders argued heavily against the invasion historically, and had to threaten Churchill with an abandonment to the European first policy when he went on to insist on further invasions of the fictional ‘soft underbelly’ of Europe. Indeed as late as June 1944 Churchill tried to have the invasion of southern France canceled and redirected to Greece. Churchill just as or even more concerned with ensuring a strong British political position after the war as he was about beating Hitler in the first place (he rightly assumed we’d win one way or another). American wanted to just stab the Nazi scum in the neck, invade France, and be done with the damn war.

I wonder how much, if any, of the hindsight is affected by the question of whether the story of the Western Allies is being told from an American, British, or Russian perspective. Does the campaign seem as stupid to British historians as American ones tend to claim it was, for instance?

[thejester]

]The manpower I was referring to was Italian, not German- for instance, the availability of Italian troops to garrison the Balkans.

I don't think it really matters who garrisons the Balkans, TBH. Again, looking at the OOB for '44 the stuff the Germans had there were dribs and drabs - SS formations, refitting regular units and various allied formations. Either way the manpower freed up wouldn't have been significant and not much of it would have been mobile, as Skimmer said. If not invading Italy means another few thousand Germans get captured in the Ukraine because they couldn't outrun Red Army tanks, so much the better.

And that's assuming Italy stays in the war, which is far from guaranteed.

[Thanas]

Posts merged.

[Marcus Aurelius]

If not invading Italy means another few thousand Germans get captured in the Ukraine because they couldn't outrun Red Army tanks, so much the better.

And that's assuming Italy stays in the war, which is far from guaranteed.

Well, if Germans still control the whole mainland of Italy, an attempt for a separate peace by a new non-fascist Italian government would probably just make whole mainland Italy part of the puppet Social Republic under Mussolini's nominal rule rather than just Northern Italy. There is little chance that the weak Italian army could have effectively opposed the Germans in the confusing situation, especially since some officers still supported the fascists, although they could perhaps give the Germans some trouble as partisans, which historically happened in Northern Italy.

I also believe that the main justification for the Italian campaign was political. Stalin was not exactly happy with things as they were and although the Western Allies certainly did not have to pander to Stalin's every wish, a year-long hiatus in Western Allied land operations would have been politically difficult.

A possible alternative to the Italian campaign would have been invasion of Norway. It would have carried a much greater risk due to longer distances and potential weather problems, but the potential strategic gains were also much greater. Control of Southern Norway puts you just one landing away from a to a direct route to the bowels of Germany without a huge mountain range in between and airfields in Norway would also help the strategic bombing campaign much more than airfields in Italy. You could also put political pressure on Sweden to stop iron ore shipments to Germany and on Finland to make a separate peace earlier, which would put an end to nickel shipments from Pechenga (which historically fulfilled more than half of German nickel consumption by 1944) and relieve some Soviet troops.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Isn't Norway very defensible via sea? The Germans invaded overland after all, and not via a seaward invasion. You could have U-boats waiting to ambush invasion forces, and the end result would likely be a few sunken warships.

[Simon_Jester]

My impression was that the invasion of Norway would have been much less viable than the invasion of Italy was historically, for Fingolfin's reasons. Also that trying to invade Germany through the Baltic via Norway would be a losing proposition, since there were long-standing coast defenses and minefields in place there, and that any line of supply for the invasion force would have to steam for hundreds of miles through territory very close to German-held coastlines.

Posts merged.

Thank you.

[TabascoOne]

That could be interesting.

I'm not sure about the availability of good invasion beaches, and I'm sure any of the major port cities are going to be well defended, but invading from Norway would neatly avoid having to breach the Atlantic Wall as well if it worked.

I'm not sure the French would've gone for it, though. De Gaulle was a fairly potent political force by this point if I remember correctly, and I can't imagine him signing off on bypassing the chance to liberate France.

[Sea Skimmer]

Isn't Norway very defensible via sea? The Germans invaded overland after all, and not via a seaward invasion. You could have U-boats waiting to ambush invasion forces, and the end result would likely be a few sunken warships.

Its ports are very defensible, though the fjords did create a defensive problem because they give Norway so much extra coastline. However most of that coastline leads to absolutely nothing, not even a road. Indeed the Germans had to build many roads after they invaded.

The Germans simultaneously invaded Norway by sea at seven points, supported by two major airborne landings. All forces came by sea or air because the only way to go over land from Germany to Norway would be a 1,000 mile side trip through the Soviet Union and Finland! However Norway had few of its defenses manned at the time, and almost no army, and the army had no guns or ammo ready for use, so it was as easy a target as they could come. It was better defended in 1914.

After the Nazis invaded however they put all the Norwegian batteries back into service, and Norway because the number one priority for the Atlantic Wall ahead of even the Calais area, and had more artillery batteries then the rest of the wall put together. This included two different 40.6cm batteries defending Narvik alone. In contrast the heaviest guns on the entire Normandy invasion area was a single 21cm battery, everything else was 155mm or smaller. Combined this high scale of fortification with inland defensive terrain even better then Italy and any invasion could only have been incredibly torturous. Then you still have to invade Sweden to cut off the iron ore supply, and Sweden had an 800,000 man Army plus very extensive defenses of its own.

All and all, it’s a fairly useless axis of advance because it does not lead to allied troops marching into the Rhur and Berlin and making Hitler blow his brains out. Swedish iron ore became less important out of hand when France fell too and the extensive iron ore mines of Lorraine fell into German hands. The ore quality was not as good, but it will work.

[Sea Skimmer]

I wonder how much, if any, of the hindsight is affected by the question of whether the story of the Western Allies is being told from an American, British, or Russian perspective. Does the campaign seem as stupid to British historians as American ones tend to claim it was, for instance?

The British really like to blame the American General Clark for the fuckup at Salarno, and totally ignore Montgomery absurdly long delay in crossing at Messina against no opposition as he insisted on lining up over 800 pieces of artillery prior to crossing. These two events ensured that a dubious invasion was off to a very bad start from the onset. But Monty quickly left the campaign, replaced by Harold Alexander and this was only the start of British involvement steadily dropping off, because from 1943 onward the British army in Europe shrank in size for lack of manpower. So they ended up also using Italy as an dumping ground for oddball units too, like the New Zealand Division, a Canadian corps, the Polish Corps and a couple of Indian divisions. The US was only able to muster up a Brazilian division to go with its worthless (for reasons related to racism, not race) Negro units. Every commander sent to Italy had certain merits, but they all failed to a degree that would have gotten them shot in an earlier time, or the Soviet Army.

The fact is if the plan had been merely to take the toe and heel of the Italian boot, and thus gain some airfields to bomb southern Europe, the whole campaign might have gone very well and not wasted that many resources. But that wasn’t the plan, and everyone committed enough resources to make it a major drain through constant ineffective offensive action, and yet not enough to assure a victory.

[Marcus Aurelius]

Combined this high scale of fortification with inland defensive terrain even better then Italy and any invasion could only have been incredibly torturous. Then you still have to invade Sweden to cut off the iron ore supply, and Sweden had an 800,000 man Army plus very extensive defenses of its own.

All and all, it’s a fairly useless axis of advance because it does not lead to allied troops marching into the Rhur and Berlin and making Hitler blow his brains out. Swedish iron ore became less important out of hand when France fell too and the extensive iron ore mines of Lorraine fell into German hands. The ore quality was not as good, but it will work.

Well, you don't have to take all of Norway to render the German troops in northern Norway essentially impotent. Trying to supply that many troops through Finland would be almost impossible, since there were (and still are) no railways that go directly from Finland to Norway and the roads at the time were very few and in poor condition. With southern Norway in Allied hands Germans could not have utilized coastal shipping lanes.

Furthermore, with southern Norway in Allied hands political pressure would probably be enough for Sweden to cut or at least severely limit iron ore shipments to Germany. After Stalingrad and Kursk the Swedish government was already trying to distance itself from Germany, whose defeat seemed unavoidable, but historically the threat of German invasion was still real in 1943 and Sweden was at that point completely isolated, so the government had to play it safe.

I also don't know who said that the invasion of Norway would be an alternative to invasion of France. It wasn't me for sure. The whole idea was that it would be alternative to invasion of mainland Italy. It is fairly obvious that you could not invade Germany solely through Denmark, but as a supportive route it is a much better and more realistic prospect than the alpine passes. As for the difficulty of the task, I already noted that it would be more risky than Italy and significantly so, but also with substantially higher potential of strategic benefits.

[Sea Skimmer]

Well, you don't have to take all of Norway to render the German troops in northern Norway essentially impotent. Trying to supply that many troops through Finland would be almost impossible, since there were (and still are) no railways that go directly from Finland to Norway and the roads at the time were very few and in poor condition. With southern Norway in Allied hands Germans could not have utilized coastal shipping lanes.

Impotent? More impotent then troops sitting in a garrison waiting for an attack that will never come already are? If you don’t take the iron ore mines by force, nothing is accomplished. Southern Norway was absurdly heavily defended, and well garrisoned by troops capable of moving around. North Norway had heavy defenses and many troops, but they had little mobility compared to a force that controlled the sea. And actually Finland was supplied via Norway, not the other way around, though the Germans had built a new road through Finland by the end of 1942 for this purpose. A historical deception operation related to Overlord was aimed at Stavanger though.

Seriously now, the Germans poured resources into Norway without the allies attacking, far more then they ever should have. Why on earth attack the most heavily defend spot the allies possibly could in hope of an economic advantage that could take over a year to do anything? It doesn’t make sense and that’s why invading Norway was never a serious proposal at all after the allied withdrawal in 1940.

Furthermore, with southern Norway in Allied hands political pressure would probably be enough for Sweden to cut or at least severely limit iron ore shipments to Germany.

Political pressure does not triumph military pressure, Hitler can order bombers over Stockholm and nothing really existed to stop them because Sweden had no radar and relatively few fighter planes. This is especially true in 1943 when the Luftwaffe was still a significant bomber force. Furthermore even if the ore supply was cut off the situation is not as it was in 1940 as I already pointed out. The Germans had gained more iron ore in France, and several other countries. So even cutting off the supply entirely would take a long time to have any effect on the Germans.

After Stalingrad and Kursk the Swedish government was already trying to distance itself from Germany, whose defeat seemed unavoidable, but historically the threat of German invasion was still real in 1943 and Sweden was at that point completely isolated, so the government had to play it safe.

Yeah and the threat of invasion would probably turn into an actual invasion of Sweden tried to defy Hitler so openly. Especially if the allies had landed in southern Norway, and thus have no direct means of aiding the Swedes until months of absurdly hard fighting up narrow mountain valleys. An attack on Narvik would make more sense if the goal was to be cutting off German iron ore. Then you gain a direct route to supply the Sweds with weapons and reinforcements.

I also don't know who said that the invasion of Norway would be an alternative to invasion of France. It wasn't me for sure. The whole idea was that it would be alternative to invasion of mainland Italy. It is fairly obvious that you could not invade Germany solely through Denmark, but as a supportive route it is a much better and more realistic prospect than the alpine passes. As for the difficulty of the task, I already noted that it would be more risky than Italy and significantly so, but also with substantially higher potential of strategic benefits.

And its not a zero balance one or the other choice. The allies invaded Italy in part because they already had large forces in the Mediterranean. You want to invade Norway? Well then shifting those troops, retraining and reequipping them to make heavily opposed landings in a truly mountainous country that becomes artic like in winter will take months. It might not even be possible to mount the operation before the winter of 1943 sets in, meaning the western allies just do NOTHING for the rest of 1943. In addition such an operation will surely eat up more amphibious shipping. At least to invade Italy the British force could mostly just be ferried across from Sicily with minimal effort. Everything going to Norway takes an all out amphibious effort. In short, doing this will probably delay the invasion of France even longer then Italy already did and may not economically damage the Germans mid to late 1944 when allied troops were historically approaching the Siegfried line and the Rhur anyway.

Meanwhile France in 1943 was almost wide open. The Germans only had about 600 tanks, none better then a Panzer III in the whole place; and virtually no beach defenses outside the immediate area of major ports at all. It was very close to allied bases, had terrain that did not heavily favor the defenders nor require special equipment and it was the only direct path to certain victory over the Nazis. Allowing the Germans to survive into 1944 without a second front was an immense blow to the western allies. The forces they fielded in France latter were far strong as a result of the huge surge in German armaments production and the extra year of fortifications construction.

Picking around the peripheral edge of the Nazi Empire is what Churchill wanted and was pretty well based on British history as a sea power with little in the way of an army that was happy to take 20 years to defeat the enemy. It is not a way to win the war any faster or with any fewer losses. Frostbite in Norway might well claim more men then Nazi bullets. Substituting one peripheral operation for another is fairly pointless.

[Sea Skimmer]

Just as a sample of how heavily Norway was defended, here’s a chart of the fixed gun batteries on one stretch of southern Norwegian coastline.



Of the points shown in this strip roughly 120 miles across, only Kristiansand was actually a significant port in the first place.

[Simon_Jester]

The Germans simultaneously invaded Norway by sea at seven points, supported by two major airborne landings. All forces came by sea or air because the only way to go over land from Germany to Norway would be a 1,000 mile side trip through the Soviet Union and Finland!

Woo! Road trip! Seriously, though:

However Norway had few of its defenses manned at the time, and almost no army, and the army had no guns or ammo ready for use, so it was as easy a target as they could come. It was better defended in 1914.

In addition (this is directed at people not Sea Skimmer; he knows this already), the Germans had just about total strategic surprise, which meant that even the defenses in place often weren't used as efficiently as they could have been (see the Eidsvold for reference). An Allied invasion of Norway in 1944 could not achieve similar surprise.

...Every commander sent to Italy had certain merits, but they all failed to a degree that would have gotten them shot in an earlier time, or the Soviet Army.

Could you expand on this more?

The fact is if the plan had been merely to take the toe and heel of the Italian boot, and thus gain some airfields to bomb southern Europe, the whole campaign might have gone very well and not wasted that many resources. But that wasn’t the plan, and everyone committed enough resources to make it a major drain through constant ineffective offensive action, and yet not enough to assure a victory.

That makes sense. Part of me is wondering how much of that was necessary and how much of that was screw-up, though.

[Kingmaker]

Meanwhile France in 1943 was almost wide open. The Germans only had about 600 tanks, none better then a Panzer III in the whole place; and virtually no beach defenses outside the immediate area of major ports at all. It was very close to allied bases, had terrain that did not heavily favor the defenders nor require special equipment and it was the only direct path to certain victory over the Nazis.

You mentioned that the western allies had large forces in the Mediterranean already in 1943. Was an invasion of southern France ever considered? Or was it deemed impractical for some reason (insufficient troops, insufficient logistics, too many defenders, heavy fortification, unsuitable beaches, politics, etc...)?

[aieeegrunt]

Taking the resources used by Husky and then Salerno and using them on Southern France instead IS the big what if of WWII, it has the real potential to end WWII a year ahead of schedule, requires no deviations from history except command decisions at the top.

It's not a sexy as driving Panzers to the Pyramids or whatever, so of course you never hear about it.

France in 1943 was indeed wide open. The German garrison was largely made up of either burnt out units being rotated off the Ostfront for a rest, or units forming, or units too crappy to be of use doing anything other than static garrison duty. Nothing had really been done about fortifications or anything of that nature, the beaches were wide, wide open. The theatre commander on the German side, von Rundestedt had been sent there basically as a retirement posting after his open defeatism in the wake of Barbarossa's failure and had most certainly stop caring about the war's outcome.

It's beautiful economy of force too, the German forces historically comitted to Italy still have to be comitted even if the Allies don't invade, because they served the dual purpose of preventing an open Italian defection as well as fighting any Allied invasion.

The Allied forces historically comitted to the Italian theatre would have no problem carving out a lodgement in Southern France. The ports there would certainly have no trouble supporting them, especially Marseilles. Logistics for the Germans would be a nightmare, there are few good rail lines into the area, and they could easily be smithereened by the Allied air forces.

Then the Allies build up for a big push when good weather returns in 1944. The Germans are in a hopeless strategic position; they can't possibly defend both an Allied push up the Rhone vally AND cover the beaches of Northern France AND cover Northern Italy (which is an important industrial and agricultural centre for them). Defeat in detail no matter what they do; for once the Allies get to pull the Interior Lines shenanigans on the Germans.

[Sea Skimmer]

The thing about southern France is in 1943, the Luftwaffe still had serious bomber strength and the area is outside the range of allied land fighter cover without invading Sardinia and Corsica first (telegraphing the plans ahead) and then taking the time to establish major airfields. The historical Dragoon invasion in 1944 was covered by a large number of CVEs (not available in 1943), besides planes based on those two islands, and by then we knew the Luftwaffe was broken. The historical Salerno invasion suffered pretty heavily from air attacks, owing to the long range allied fighter cover had to operate at and poor planning.

Trouble also is most of the follow on forces are in England and would have to go all the way around Spain to arrive. It would be easier to invade from England and move the less numerous Mediterranean divisions back around to the British isles. But given the lack of any real defense in Southern France even more so then the north, it is still an option. The terrain certainly would impead a major Axis counterattack.

[aieeegrunt]

Occupying Sardinia and Corisca would not be all that tasking. The Luftwaffe would have more fight left in it for sure, but it's still going down. Hell, this will just start the pilot attrition death spiral that much sooner. Shipping troops to Marseilles isn't going to be any worse than shipping them to their historical destinations of Salerno or Naples or Taranto.

The air sea part of the invasion would certainly be a tougher fight, but that's a good trade off to ending the war a year sooner. Provided the Allies reach the shoreline the rest of the fight would be a lot easier than Normandy was.

Once Overlord actually happens in 1944 it'll be facing far far less resistance. There is also a real possibility of a super Falaise trapping a lot of German troops between the Allied troops coming up the Rhone, and the Overlord forces coming down from where ever it is decided to land them, most likely in the Calais area. Hitler's No Steps Back policy could really bite them in the ass here.