What implications did the Spanish Civil War have, if any?

[thejester]

In fact, nothing at all before 1939 suggested that France and Britain would act against Hitler, in a turn of their previous complete ignorance of his expansion and fascist expansion in general.

Isn't that the point? After 1933 Hitler spat in the face of Versailles - open rearmament, militarization of the Rhineland, the union with Austria etc. The French and British reaction was weak and in pretty sharp contrast to the occupation of the Rhineland in the '20s. In that context I fail to see how the fascists winning in Spain would have been important in the foreign policy thinking of Germany, Britain or France. You or Elfdart are welcome to prove otherwise but all the literature I've read doesn't see Spain as being terribly important.

Wait, wait, wait."Spitting in the face of Versailles" and fascist expansion by military means are diffrerent things. Spain and Czechoslovakia would be the main points where Hitler utilized military force, with success, and without consequences from Britain and France. Certainly, both Czechoslovakia and Spain and the behaviour of Western powers impacted Hitler's thinking.

I wouldn't just reject Spain as "unimportant" - it's one of the cases of fascist expansion with openly military means (the annexation of Austria was not a military operation).

Shirer's (I know it's old but it's all of I've got immediately to hand) view of Spain's importance in the march to war:

It gave France a third unfriendly fascist power on its borders, It exacerbated the internal strife in France between Right and Left and thus weakened Germany's principal rival in the West. Above all it rendered impossible a rapprochement of Britain and France with Italy, which the Paris and London governments had hoped for after the termination of the Abyssinian War, and thus drove Mussolini into the arms of Hitler. (p. 325)

At best Shirer suggests that Britain and France's fumbling over 'nonintervention' in Spain confirmed Hitler's feelings that the democratic leaders were weak and ineffectual. As an example of 'fascist' (rather than Nazi) violence Spain seems to have been less of a flash point than Abyssinia, and as an example of direct German military action less of a potential crisis than the reoccupation of the Rhineland. The overall point being that, as German aims in Spain suggest, the civil war was merely one step in a process and not the decisive event as Elfdart seemed to be suggesting.

[Illuminatus Primus]

I find that assertion by Shirer kind of curious. It was my understanding by the end Britain was actually supportive of a Nationalist victory in Spain, though I'm unsure of France. If that's the case, why would it render rapprochement with Italy impossible?

[Murazor]

I find that assertion by Shirer kind of curious. It was my understanding by the end Britain was actually supportive of a Nationalist victory in Spain, though I'm unsure of France. If that's the case, why would it render rapprochement with Italy impossible?

The United Kingdom did indeed favour (from the very beginning) a Nationalist victory in Spain and even pressured France (then with a government of the left parties) to stop selling supplies to the Spanish government.

As a rule of thumb, the foreign policy of the Spanish Republic sucked big donkey balls, so the British government was rather worried about the possibility of a leftist revolutionary movement creating a Soviet style government in Spain should the Republican forces win, whereas Iberian generalotes like Primo de Rivera (who ruled Spain until just before the proclamation of the Second Republic six-seven years before the start of the civil war) were mostly a known quantity.

The crisis with Italy comes from the creation of the Non Intervention Committee, an organization that both Germany and Italy joined and then merrily ignored. Despite claiming to patrol the Spanish coasts to keep foreigners outside of the Spanish mess, Italy sent tons of war material and troops through Portugal (over four divisions at one point) which caused a crisis when the Italians got their asses kicked during the battle of Guadalajara and let lots of equipment be captured.

The Republic government presented this equipment in the League of Nations as evidence of Fascist Italy being neck deep in helping the Nationalists. They hoped to get the British to act, but only managed to thoroughly humiliate Italy in the international level (beyond the whole thing about a large Italian force being soundly beaten by the low quality Republican militieas).

[Akkleptos]

As a rule of thumb, the foreign policy of the Spanish Republic sucked big donkey balls, so the British government was rather worried about the possibility of a leftist revolutionary movement creating a Soviet style government in Spain should the Republican forces win, whereas Iberian generalotes like Primo de Rivera (who ruled Spain until just before the proclamation of the Second Republic six-seven years before the start of the civil war) were mostly a known quantity.

So, would you say that the Spanish Civil War was as innefectual to world History as, say, the Zimmermann Telegram?

[Murazor]

So, would you say that the Spanish Civil War was as innefectual to world History as, say, the Zimmermann Telegram?

Although I am well read in the subject, I am no historian so take my opinion with several grains of salt: Though it was a complete disaster for Spain (just about any other scenario would have been better for us) with effects that haunt the country even nowadays, our war was a relatively local affair with relatively minor effects abroad (much smaller than the Spanish War of Independence during the Napoleonic Wars).

Though it would have been nice if Great Britain had been willing to strongarm (or let France do it for them) Hitler into being a good boy, Spain wouldn't have been a good casus belli. At all. In this sense, I'd say that the Spanish Civil War was globally less important than the Zimmermann telegraph. At least, that fiasco made it easier for the United States to enter the first world war.

[Oskuro]

What about those who committed war crimes/post war crimes - the so called Red and White Terror? Was there ever a tribunal set up to prosecute those? The only thing I could find was an investigation started in 2008, which I find surprisingly late.

Newsflash, the prosecutor (Judge Garzon) of said case is actually being prosecuted and facing inprisonment due to charges of abuse of power in said investigation. Unsurprisingly, the ones supporting this are groups with ties to Franco's regime.

I'm really not following the case much, and my sources are in Spanish, maybe Murazor can enlighten us about this?

[Murazor]

Not a lot of time now, so I'll just give the short version.

Garzon (who some here might remember as the Spanish Judge who tried to try Pinochet a few years back) has a ton of enemies in both sides of the political spectrum, because he is something of a media celebrity who has made a career full of high profile cases.

Right now, these enemies have managed to put him in a seriously tight spot with three different issues and it seems likely that they are going to nail him with at least one of them. However, the only one of these three that is somewhat relevant to this thread would be the one related to his allowing the opening of mass graves of victims of the Franco regime.

In short, the amnesty law of 1977 was one of the turning points of the Spanish transition to democracy, because its first article reads:

1- Are amnestied

a) All acts of political intentionality, whatever might be their result, categorized as felonies or misdemeanors commited prior to the 15th of December of 1976.

This allowed the members of the democratic opposition to go free, while granting the supporters of the dictatorship blanket immunity for their crimes. Garzon allowed the relatives/descendants of people executed in situations of dubious legality either during the war or its aftermath to open several mass graves and try to identify the corpses of their victims. This... wasn't particularly well liked in certain circles of political life for obvious reasons.

[Akkleptos]

So, nothing more relevant that a butterfly effect?

Could we say that the Spanish Civil War was, outside the Spanish borders, largely innefectual, pretty much as my previous example of the Zimmerman Telegram, considering effects on world history?

We're talking about serious effects on world history, here. As in "The Second World War wouldn't have happened if it weren't for the Spanish Civil War" or as in "The outcome of the Second World War would have been very different hadn't it been for the Spanish Civil War"; or as in "The Spanish Civil War had ramifications that forever made history different for many other countries, outside Spain itself"...?

[Iosef Cross]

Okay, I mean really significant implications, but the system wouldn't let me post that long a title. When I once mentioned that I found the current Spanish "obsession" with their Civil War history (as you see it included in plots for movies, novels, TV series, etc) a tad excessive, someone replied in kind of a "are you kidding?" tone. When asked about the historical trascendence of the Spanish Civil War, all I got was something in the style of "You must be stupid, the Civil War had tons of very important implications in world history", but nothing more specific than that. As I perceived this to be a rather sensitive topic for the person (who had spent a semester studying in Spain and thus might have acquired a certain sympathy for the Spanish and their history), I decided to drop it, but I was left still curious.

If you think about it, civil wars have only limited importance for the global history, at least compared to traditional wars: They don't involve multiple countries directly and their main relevance lies to the people of the country itself.

The American civil war had a rather small importance as well. If the separatists formed a new country, the Union would still become a superpower in the future: they had 3/4 of the population of the US and were more developed than the South. They could do everything that they did in the international sphere, while the Confederacy would become a country like Canada and Mexico. Hence, the outcome of the American civil war had little relevance for anybody that lived outside of the South.

[Samuel]

Unless it is used as a proxy by foreign powers against mainland United States. That would have caused major changes- at the least the US would have had to maintain a large army which would have drastically changed our government and foreign policy.

[Thanas]

If you think about it, civil wars have only limited importance for the global history, at least compared to traditional wars: They don't involve multiple countries directly and their main relevance lies to the people of the country itself.

You are completely wrong about that. The war of Spanish succession alone should teach you the complete opposite. I would actually love for you to support this argument with more than just proclaiming it be so.

[Iosef Cross]

Tanas, of course, I meant that generally, most civil wars have smaller impact in the international scene as compared to international wars between great powers. I didn't mean that it was impossible for a civil war to have a great impact in the world history. The Roman civil wars for example, had enormous impact over world history. Perhaps greater than any war after it.

[Kane Starkiller]

The American civil war had a rather small importance as well. If the separatists formed a new country, the Union would still become a superpower in the future: they had 3/4 of the population of the US and were more developed than the South. They could do everything that they did in the international sphere, while the Confederacy would become a country like Canada and Mexico. Hence, the outcome of the American civil war had little relevance for anybody that lived outside of the South.

The 11 states that formed the Confederacy today comprise 29% of US GDP, 31% of population and 21% of total area which includes such locales as New Orleans (the confluence of Mississippi-Missouri river system with the ocean), large part of Chesapeake Bay, Mexican Gulf coastline etc.
I don't see how you can claim that the rump US dealing with likely hostile Confederacy would manage to emerge as a superpower the same way it did in reality.

[Samuel]

Some of our members have pointed out that the Confederacy was extremely economically weak (one of the reasons it lost) and that many of its states would soon be returned to the union rather than face complete and utter ruin.

[Ziggy Stardust]

. None of those were really affected by the war in Spain - as Shirer pointed out in the '60s, this broad change of events was outlined by Hitler in Mein Kampf and he basically stuck to it, suggesting Spain didn't really embolden or radicalise his foreign policy in any way; and I would think the evidence points to Munich and the annexation of Czechoslovakia as being the impetus for Britain and France's turn toward war.

Yeah, Hitler really stuck to Mein Kampf, what with forging an alliance with Britain to avoid a war in the West as well as the East. Yup, that's exactly what happened.

The 11 states that formed the Confederacy today comprise 29% of US GDP, 31% of population and 21% of total area which includes such locales as New Orleans (the confluence of Mississippi-Missouri river system with the ocean), large part of Chesapeake Bay, Mexican Gulf coastline etc.

To be fair, most of the growth in the former Confederacy has been in the last 50 years, under socio-economic conditions that would be impossible had they been a different country. As of 1860, the Confederacy was around 29% of the population of the Union (though 39% of that was slaves, and only 6% of the total population were slaveholders - which does not make for a long term, stable society). Furthermore, unlike now, the South was then overwhelmingly rural. New Orleans was the only large city (only 13 Confederate cities ranked in the top 100 American cities in terms of population), though during the war Richmond grew fairly big. The economy was weak, based on agriculture (and the relative lack of railroads in the South made distribution of products to market a difficulty). It is tough to find numbers, but the GDP of the South likely made up no more than 16% of U.S. GDP (though it did account for 70% of exports). And, well, I could go on this rant forever, heh.

[thejester]

. None of those were really affected by the war in Spain - as Shirer pointed out in the '60s, this broad change of events was outlined by Hitler in Mein Kampf and he basically stuck to it, suggesting Spain didn't really embolden or radicalise his foreign policy in any way; and I would think the evidence points to Munich and the annexation of Czechoslovakia as being the impetus for Britain and France's turn toward war.

Yeah, Hitler really stuck to Mein Kampf, what with forging an alliance with Britain to avoid a war in the West as well as the East. Yup, that's exactly what happened.

My argument was that Hitler had outlined a version of German foreign policy that basically eventuated in the late 30s and 40s - a move East for lebensraum that would see an inevitable war with the Soviet Union and could well force a war with France should the Third Republic object. That's...what happened, ergo the Spanish Civil War did not radicalise Nazi foreign policy, given Hitler outlined said vision in the '20s. If you're speaking of Hitler's intentions - his ambivalence toward war with Britain was well known and his repeated olive branches are well documented.

I never said that what was outlined in Mein Kampf is exactly what happened, and I would have thought there were enough riders ('broad change of events...basically stuck to it') to make that clear. Apparently not.

[Simon_Jester]

Yeah, Hitler really stuck to Mein Kampf, what with forging an alliance with Britain to avoid a war in the West as well as the East. Yup, that's exactly what happened.

It's pretty clear that Hitler wanted that or something like it, even as late as 1939-40. It's just that he failed. After Hitler reneged on the Munich deal and occupied the remnant of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, there was effectively no way for him to avoid war with Britain without giving up all his ambitions in the East... because the Chamberlain government decided that it was now willing to fight Germany to block those ambitions.

That defeated Hitler's goal of staying on friendly or neutral terms with Britain, so he had to drop that element of his strategy whether he wanted to or not. The fact that he did not accomplish every step of his original plan does not mean that he wasn't following the plan; sometimes you just fail because of outside forces.

I mean, losing the war wasn't part of the plan in Mein Kampf either, and he did that too...

[Ziggy Stardust]

My argument was that Hitler had outlined a version of German foreign policy that basically eventuated in the late 30s and 40s - a move East for lebensraum that would see an inevitable war with the Soviet Union and could well force a war with France should the Third Republic object. That's...what happened,the Spanish Civil War did not radicalise Nazi foreign policy, given Hitler outlined said vision in the '20s. If you're speaking of Hitler's intentions - his ambivalence toward war with Britain was well known and his repeated olive branches are well documented.

You complete and utterly missed my point, which was that you can't use Mein Kampf as evidence when talking about Nazi foreign policy. The document wasn't official, it was literally just Hitler's ramblings when he was in prison, almost 10 years before he was in power. Nazi foreign policy between 1936 and 1945 does not parallel what Hitler originally imagined; therefore, it is worthless as evidence.

That defeated Hitler's goal of staying on friendly or neutral terms with Britain, so he had to drop that element of his strategy whether he wanted to or not. The fact that he did not accomplish every step of his original plan does not mean that he wasn't following the plan; sometimes you just fail because of outside forces.

I mean, losing the war wasn't part of the plan in Mein Kampf either, and he did that too...

You, too, completely missed the point. Why should we accept Mein Kampf as a definitive source of German foreign policy, when it was written 10 years before Hitler was even in a position to affect such policy? Considering the vast differences between what he wrote about and what he actually did when in power, why should we assume that the deviations are all just due to random chance? Hitler in, say, 1941, was not Hitler in 1925.

[Simon_Jester]

My argument was that Hitler had outlined a version of German foreign policy that basically eventuated in the late 30s and 40s - a move East for lebensraum that would see an inevitable war with the Soviet Union and could well force a war with France should the Third Republic object. That's...what happened,the Spanish Civil War did not radicalise Nazi foreign policy, given Hitler outlined said vision in the '20s. If you're speaking of Hitler's intentions - his ambivalence toward war with Britain was well known and his repeated olive branches are well documented.

You complete and utterly missed my point, which was that you can't use Mein Kampf as evidence when talking about Nazi foreign policy. The document wasn't official, it was literally just Hitler's ramblings when he was in prison, almost 10 years before he was in power. Nazi foreign policy between 1936 and 1945 does not parallel what Hitler originally imagined; therefore, it is worthless as evidence.

What Mein Kampf provides is a map of Hitler's strategic goals prior to taking power. Unless you're aware of evidence that he radically rethought his goals (not his actions, his intentions) between 1925 and the 1940s, it stands on that basis.

You, too, completely missed the point. Why should we accept Mein Kampf as a definitive source of German foreign policy, when it was written 10 years before Hitler was even in a position to affect such policy? Considering the vast differences between what he wrote about and what he actually did when in power, why should we assume that the deviations are all just due to random chance? Hitler in, say, 1941, was not Hitler in 1925.

If we find evidence that he reconsidered something, fine.

If not, Mein Kampf remains relevant as one of the few primary sources on what the Nazis were thinking before the war.

[Iosef Cross]

The 11 states that formed the Confederacy today comprise 29% of US GDP, 31% of population and 21% of total area which includes such locales as New Orleans (the confluence of Mississippi-Missouri river system with the ocean), large part of Chesapeake Bay, Mexican Gulf coastline etc.
I don't see how you can claim that the rump US dealing with likely hostile Confederacy would manage to emerge as a superpower the same way it did in reality.

Today they comprise 29% of the US GDP. But during WW2, when the US became the superpower, they comprised a smaller proportion of it. And those days, these states where mostly agriculture, while what's matter is industry to make weapons.

Also, 71% of the US GDP is still 10 trillion dollars, larger than Japan or China today. Enough to sustain a superpower military.

[xt828]

One of the more important implications of the SCW was the previously-mentioned end to any possibility of a rapproachment between Italy and France or Britain. Italy had, during the early 30s, been a strong opponent to Hitler and had formed with France and Britain the Stresa Front, aimed at containing German expansionism. Italy was in fact the most bellicose of the three, as its reaction to the attempted Nazi takeover of Austria in 1934 demonstrates - in reaction to the Austrian Nazis assassinating Austrian Chancellor Dolfuß, Mussolini ordered the general mobilisation of the Italian Army to prevent an Anschluß from occurring. He felt betrayed when his two partners offered only words of support. This alignment was primarily one of government figures and national interest rather than populism, and so it started to come undone in the face of popular opposition to Italy's adventurism in Ethiopia, particularly once word started leaking out of Italian use of gas and other nastiness. The Hoare-Laval treaty was aimed at concluding the Ethiopian war in a manner which would allow the three nations to be seen as cooperating and broadly aligned, and when it blew up official relations soured somewhat.

This left Italy in 1936 essentially without Great Power allies - cordial relations existed with all the major powers, but Italy's WW1 allies were backing away. Additionally, the Ethiopian invasion turned Italy into a laughingstock, and Mussolini was looking for a quick and easy way to restore Italian prestige. The outbreak of Civil War in Spain, especially given that it was cast as a war between Communism and the Right, was just what he was looking for - Italy could go to the aid of its ideological allies, the Falange, and fight its ideological enemy, Communism, while demonstrating to the world the effectiveness of the new Italian war machine. As it turned out, the only major power to agree with Italy's perspective was Germany, and even more to the point, they were the only major nation not adhering to the League's embargos of Italy, which left its economy struggling. The result of the SCW on the European stage was the welding together of Italy and Germany into the Axis. If Italy had remained uninvolved, Europe would have been substantially altered. As a couple of examples off the top of my head: Italy remaining strongly opposed to the prospect of Germany on their northern border may lead to a significant strengthening of the Danube Pact of Italy, Austria and Hungary; Mussolini put forth the proposal of cession of the Sudetenland at Munich; Italy's premature and almost unplanned war against Greece may not occur, and even if it did, it would not result in the German invasion of Yugoslavia; and of course the lack of an African front in WW2, with all the implications that has for Commonwealth and British manpower and deployment.

On that basis, I'd argue that the SCW did have a relevant impact on history.