Was the Late Roman army better than the Augustan army?

[ray245]

While the late army seems comparable to the early Imperial army in regards to equipment and training, I could not help but to question whether the Late Roman army during the fourth and early fifth century was more or less effective than the Augustan army.

From what I understand, the late army would be easier to equip with the development of the fabricae system and at the same time, be easier to respond to the number of attacks that occurred during the Later Roman Empire due to the size of the army as compared to the Augustan army.

Besides these two factors, is there any other issues that I should consider if I want to compare the Late Roman army to the Augustan army in regards to their military effectiveness?

[lord Martiya]

Their enemies: the Augustan army was meant to fight Gauls and Parthians, the Late army was meant to fight Germans, Huns and Sassanid Persia, and all of them were very different enemies.

[Thanas]

Their enemies: the Augustan army was meant to fight Gauls and Parthians, the Late army was meant to fight Germans, Huns and Sassanid Persia, and all of them were very different enemies.

I've never heard a more idiotic statement about the Roman Army.

While the late army seems comparable to the early Imperial army in regards to equipment and training,

Not really true. The basic equipment was changed, as well as the weapons etc. To us they look alike, but when you actually go into specifics they are very much different.

I could not help but to question whether the Late Roman army during the fourth and early fifth century was more or less effective than the Augustan army.

During the fourth, certainly. During the early fifth the army declined in quality and numbers, especially after the death of Stilicho.

From what I understand, the late army would be easier to equip with the development of the fabricae system

Correct, but also note that it needed more and better equipment than the Augustean army. Furthermore, we know precious little of the fabricae system, so we do not really know whether it was more effective than earlier procurement methods. One would think so, though.

and at the same time, be easier to respond to the number of attacks that occurred during the Later Roman Empire due to the size of the army as compared to the Augustan army.

The size of an army does not really matter if a lot of that is tied up in frontier or garrison duty. No, what made it more effective was the development of central armies that allowed the formation and assembly of large numbers of troops without requiring them to be pulled of frontier duty, or at least in theory.

Besides these two factors, is there any other issues that I should consider if I want to compare the Late Roman army to the Augustan army in regards to their military effectiveness?

What do you mean by military effectiveness? Certainly the late Roman Army was more specialized and better at combined-arms combat. However, they do not enjoy that position of unchallenged supremacy Roman legions during the Early Empire had.

[ray245]

What do you mean by military effectiveness? Certainly the late Roman Army was more specialized and better at combined-arms combat. However, they do not enjoy that position of unchallenged supremacy Roman legions during the Early Empire had.

I was thinking in terms of the army ability of the army to replace their losses after wars without a decline in the overall quality of the army.

[lord Martiya]

I've never heard a more idiotic statement about the Roman Army.

Explain the idiocy. Wasn't the Roman army equipped to fight the different enemies of the Empire and differently equipped according to such enemies?

[Thanas]

I was thinking in terms of the army ability of the army to replace their losses after wars without a decline in the overall quality of the army.

That is pretty hard to say, given we have no knowledge of roman casualty figures for over 95% of the battles.

I've never heard a more idiotic statement about the Roman Army.

Explain the idiocy. Wasn't the Roman army equipped to fight the different enemies of the Empire and differently equipped according to such enemies?

And, pray tell, what differed in the equipment and tactics of the, say, eastern enemies and the Sassanids?

[lord Martiya]

And, pray tell, what differed in the equipment and tactics of the, say, eastern enemies and the Sassanids?

As far I know, the enemies of the Empire were such equipped:
Gauls: the boogeymen of the Empire and the other Celts are reported as mainly light infantry equipped with javelins, longswords and shields (and in some cases helmets), with some tribes employing cavalry or war chariots. There is also at least a documented case of naval warfare: the Veneti tribe from Armorica had a powerful fleet, one that nearly defeated Caesar's legate Brutus Albinus. Roman tactics with them was the very basic one: throwing javelins and then meelee combat until the Gauls were defeated;
Parthians: they employed combined arms in the form of mounted archers who softened the enemy and cataphracts employed to charge the enemy and finish it. According to the situation, a cunning general could altern their attacks to better crush the enemy (at Carrhae Surena actually used the cataphracts to prevent the Romans from effectively using their famed testudo formation and defend from the arrows: it was the mounted archers, adequately resupplied, to destroy Crassus' army), but the Romans found counters replacing the older chainmail with scale and plate armor to deflect the arrows and flanking the legions with their own cataphracts (note that Carrhae, Phraaspa and Cornelianus' defeat in 161 are the only Roman losses in pitched battles against the Parthians: Trajan easily steamrolled the Parthians and nearly destroyed their empire before a Judaic rebellion forced him to retreat, Lucius Verus did the same in 165-166 after Cornelianus' initial defeat, and Septimus Severus sacked the Parthian capital for the third time in 198, weakening the Parthians enough for the Sassanid to take over);
Germans: by the time of the migrations, the 'barbarians' were mainly heavy infantry armies, employing the same weapons of the Celts but integrating them with mail and scale armor, spears and helmets, with some tribes employing particular weapons or tactics (Franks were infamous for their throwing axe and are reported as using cavalry, while Lombards used war schytes). Dealing with them forced the Romans to completely change their equipment, employing longswords, spears and round shields, and tactics, with more cavalry and composite bow-equipped archers and a tendence to avoid pitched battles (as the Romans had a reduced ability to replace their elite troops). Note that many Germanic tribes adopted Roman weapons and tactics and were often part of their armies;
Huns: they are normally reported as the ultimate cavalry army, mainly employing mounted archers with subject tribes used as infantry. Eastern Roman reply was to just let Attila go mad against the walls of Constantinople (in a particular occasion, Attila attacked after getting wind of the walls being destroyed by an earthquake, only to find that the Romans had repaired and AUGMENTED them before he arrived), while Aetius defeated them by using Romanized barbarian troops and seizing the high grounds;
Sassanid Persia: the Sassanid retained the Parthian model of cavalry, but integrated it with the combined arms of the ancient Persian Empire: spear-equipped light infantry, heavy infantry, foot archers (so feared that the Romans usually considered themselves inferior until they exhausted their arrows) trained to both fight in line and from the ranks of the heavy cavalry, and war elephants. To them was added actual siege warfare ability, finally matching the Romans in that. The Romans never actually managed to adapt to them in the way they adapted to Germanic tribes or Parthians, as they had finally found their match.
Note that I simplified, as only a Roman army historian can actually explain that adequately.

[ray245]

I was thinking in terms of the army ability of the army to replace their losses after wars without a decline in the overall quality of the army.

That is pretty hard to say, given we have no knowledge of roman casualty figures for over 95% of the battles.

Were there any contemporary and reliable sources during the late Empire period that suggest that the losses was higher during this time as compared to the early Roman Empire?

[Setzer]

I know they spent a lot more time fighting other Romans when compared to Augustus' army.

[Thanas]

Were there any contemporary and reliable sources during the late Empire period that suggest that the losses was higher during this time as compared to the early Roman Empire?

Ammianus Marcellinus seems to suggest so at several time, so the loss rate was higher. However, that says nothing of the effectiveness to replace losses, because we do not know anything about the quality of recruits or how quickly the losses got replaced in detail. We can guess that the system worked well because roman armies were able to keep campaigning even after horrendous losses, but that is about it.

Note that I simplified, as only a Roman army historian can actually explain that adequately.

Indeed you horrendously simplified. But I am still hard pressed to find any argument in your post about why the Romans changed their army in view of a new enemy between the second and third century. The challenges were essentially the same. The real change in tactics we can see (Gallienus cavalry corps, Diocletian and Constantine's reform) is more an organizational development borne out of the need to mass a field army quickly. However, that change is not only due to the larger number of enemies (not their tactics per se), but also to deal with usurpers.

[ray245]

Were there any contemporary and reliable sources during the late Empire period that suggest that the losses was higher during this time as compared to the early Roman Empire?

Ammianus Marcellinus seems to suggest so at several time, so the loss rate was higher. However, that says nothing of the effectiveness to replace losses, because we do not know anything about the quality of recruits or how quickly the losses got replaced in detail. We can guess that the system worked well because roman armies were able to keep campaigning even after horrendous losses, but that is about it.

However, if the late army was more specialised than the early army, can't we assume that it is harder to replace the losses in the late Roman army than the early army?

[lord Martiya]

Indeed you horrendously simplified. But I am still hard pressed to find any argument in your post about why the Romans changed their army in view of a new enemy between the second and third century. The challenges were essentially the same. The real change in tactics we can see (Gallienus cavalry corps, Diocletian and Constantine's reform) is more an organizational development borne out of the need to mass a field army quickly. However, that change is not only due to the larger number of enemies (not their tactics per se), but also to deal with usurpers.

About the cavalry, you forget one thing: the Parthians. Caesar and Crassus cavalry was more a glorified scouting force, nothing that could resist more than five minutes against a cavalry meant to actually fight like the Parthian one, and the Romans needed something to keep occupied their thrice damned mounted archers while being capable to fight Parthians' cataphracts (they knew they wouldn't always have a Ventidius with an army of slingers and terrain that forced the mounted archers in melee combat like at Mount Gindarus). That was why the Romans started employing cataphracts on their own, first as small but growing numbers of mercenaries and then as actual military units, since as early as Hadrian's reign (the first officially recorded cataphract unit in Roman service is the ala I Gallorum et Pannoniorum catafractata under Hadrian, but Polybius stated the existance of Roman cataphracts as early as 2nd century BC).
And now, while I curse my inability to actually prove it's not a coincidence that Hadrian was the successor of the first Roman emperor to sack Ctesiphon and actually was in that victorious army, could you tell me the administrative part of replacing the older infantry equipment of rectangular shield, shortsword, a couple javelins and the optional dagger and darts with round shields, longswords and spear?

[Setzer]

I remember reading something about Pompey bribing a Seleucid Cataphract unit to join his side, but I don't know if that's true or not.

[Thanas]

Indeed you horrendously simplified. But I am still hard pressed to find any argument in your post about why the Romans changed their army in view of a new enemy between the second and third century. The challenges were essentially the same. The real change in tactics we can see (Gallienus cavalry corps, Diocletian and Constantine's reform) is more an organizational development borne out of the need to mass a field army quickly. However, that change is not only due to the larger number of enemies (not their tactics per se), but also to deal with usurpers.

About the cavalry, you forget one thing: the Parthians. Caesar and Crassus cavalry was more a glorified scouting force, nothing that could resist more than five minutes against a cavalry meant to actually fight like the Parthian one,

And neither of these examples are in any way indicative of Roman Army cavalry.

and the Romans needed something to keep occupied their thrice damned mounted archers while being capable to fight Parthians' cataphracts (they knew they wouldn't always have a Ventidius with an army of slingers and terrain that forced the mounted archers in melee combat like at Mount Gindarus).

They had that already, especially their artillery and infantry. What is even funnier is that even after the reform of Gallienus, it was Roman infantry which decided the battle against the eastern cavalry forces. Meanwhile, heavy cavalry units were to great success employed against the Germans. Thus, it does not immediately follow that Roman cavalry was a direct consequence of the

That was why the Romans started employing cataphracts on their own, first as small but growing numbers of mercenaries and then as actual military units, since as early as Hadrian's reign (the first officially recorded cataphract unit in Roman service is the ala I Gallorum et Pannoniorum catafractata under Hadrian, but Polybius stated the existance of Roman cataphracts as early as 2nd century BC).

You misunderstand a great deal about the Danube situation. First of all, the Romans encountered heavy horsemen in their wars with the Dacians, as early as Augustus. It is also often said (though not proven) that Vitellius used clibinarii against the forces of Vespasian. The first real experience with these armored horsemen was in the Dacian wars of Domitian, when the Jazyges allegedly destroyed a whole roman legion. The naming convention and the placement of the units also is more of an indication that they were meant to counter the sarmatian, not the parthian threat. The Roman heavy horseman seems more based on the Sarmatian one than the Parthian one, at least for the early formations.

Meanwhile, if we look at actual battle records, we see that the Roman infantry countered the Parthian cavalrymen, as seen by the campaigns against Zenobia and the Sassanids. The same is true of Julian's persian campaign. The roman developed specialized infantry legions to deal with the Parthian cavalry. They did not try to match cavalry with cavalry, they dealt with it with specialized infantry. Unlike in their dealings with the Germanic and sarmatian tribes, where they used a lot of cavalry.

And now, while I curse my inability to actually prove it's not a coincidence that Hadrian was the successor of the first Roman emperor to sack Ctesiphon and actually was in that victorious army, could you tell me the administrative part of replacing the older infantry equipment of rectangular shield, shortsword, a couple javelins and the optional dagger and darts with round shields, longswords and spear?

What administrative part, actually? The romans replaced as needed. As for the equipment, you seem to miss a lot of things that were actually carried by the late Roman infantrymen.

If you mean whether there was a conscious decision to replace older equipment, that one is pretty hard to find out. However, note that what we perceive as a standard legionnary, never actually existed. For example, the rectangular scuta were never adapted by all units.

That said, there is one example of whole legions being retrained for one specific purpose, and that is under Aurelian when he retrained the Palastinian legions against the Palmyrian cataphracts (note: instead of assigning this role to the cavalry).


However, I am still looking forward to your listing of changes in legionnary equipment and how you can prove it was due to the enemies changing. I have no doubt that some was (for example, the heavier neck guard seems an indication of the heavier cavalry role), but to say that Rome changed mainly because of their enemies is an exaggeration. It seems more that the Romans, as always, constantly adapted new developments (both foreign and indigenous, for example the plumbatae) when they could.

However, if the late army was more specialised than the early army, can't we assume that it is harder to replace the losses in the late Roman army than the early army?

One would think so, but note that even after loosing the entire Gallic army in the Battle of Mursa, the Caesdar Julian managed to rebuilt it within less than two years and that is while simultaneously campaigning. At the same time, the Emperor also campaigned with his field armies and made an offensive campaign against the Sarmatians etc. The Romans must have had a highly extensive system in place - I know of no other army that managed to replace its losses so quickly. My guess is that veterans, who had been discharged but were often kept on as armed guards for cities or settled in specialized colonies, or the sons of those veterans, provided an excellent reservoir for manpower. Thus, I would suggest that there was a pool of "militia", if you want, that could quickly receive additional training for their specialized role.

Also, note that the Romans often simply convinced prisoners to switch sides, these were then sent in a remote area of the empire, freeing up soldiers there who could then be transferred to the front.



EDIT: With regards to the above-made point about Roman cavalry, I can now say with near certainty that the goal of their introduction was not to go up against Parthians, but to provide the Roman Army with additional combined-arms potential.

[ray245]

If you mean whether there was a conscious decision to replace older equipment, that one is pretty hard to find out. However, note that what we perceive as a standard legionnary, never actually existed. For example, the rectangular scuta were never adapted by all units.

Didn't Claudius implemented a number of changes to the equipment of the Roman army?

[Thanas]

It was previously thought that he introduced the lorica segmentata in high numbers, however note that one armor piece like that was found on the battlefield of the defeat of Varus 9 AD alkready, so this theory is called into question nowadays.

[Twigler]

I read through "Claudius and the Roman Army Reforms", Historia 53 (2004) by C. Thomas - and there are a lot of "may haves" when it comes to equipment. Mainz sword changed to Claudius type - date uncertain; helmet change to the Weisenau type - somewhere in the first century. While at the same time the article is able to list strategical changes with far more certainty.

So that makes me wonder if the Roman army was equipped top-down (as in someone like a consul, or emperor would decide what the equipment was going to be), or bottom up (where legionaries, or individual army commanders would pick up equipment from the enemies they fought and then implement them in their own ranks if they're superior)?

I can only think of a few cases where I know that the equipment was clearly decided on by a top-down approach (the Marian reforms come to mind), so I'm wondering if it's not so much that the changes were planned, but that they trickled through the different armies?

[Thanas]

It was definitely a bottom-up approach (except maybe in the case of new units being established) for most of the Imperial history. The fabricae changed this somewhat - the romans still could use local sources (and most likely did) but could also call upon a network of armories to resupply them.

Which is probably another reason why their armies could recover that quickly.