WWII Aerial Combat Kill Numbers (was: Fucking Hans Rudel)

[Simon_Jester]

Much more insane was the installation of that 7.5cm gun on five He 177 A-3/R5 aircraft…. clearly the perfect armament and combat role for a 65,000lb four engine bomber! Even after structural stiffening it physically broke the plane and never did see combat, though the Ju-88 proved strong enough to handle it. Both planes were also armed in larger numbers with 5cm guns for tank, train and bomber box formation busting.

...Gack. Were they fumbling their way towards the AC-130 gunship concept or something?

Forgive me if my phrasing implies ignorance; I can't think of a better way to put the question than that.

Considering though that the pressure and load on top German aces was higher than that of their Soviet counterparts, in sortie numbers, perhaps Rudel did fly all his 2500 sorties. 1 tank per 5 sorties seems a bit too high for such a large sortie number.

Let's see. Averaged out over five to six years of fighting, that's about one to 1.5 sorties a day, probably much more during high-intensity periods of combat.

Hell, at that point I'd expect factors like sleep deprivation and fatigue to start hurting his effectiveness; you can only run on caffeine and/or amphetamines for so long. Or am I missing something?

Why is that? I understand why that would be the case for infantry, but for pilots (and presumably other types of units - tanks for example), why are 95% of them so ineffective? Is it a lack of aggression, or are they unwilling to pull the trigger, or are they just not very good pilots?

Sea Skimmer's explanation matches with most of the other historian-grade material I've seen, so it sounds like "not very good pilots" in the literal sense: they are not very good pilots.

They end up flailing around in a dogfight with an enemy of equivalent (low to adequate) skill, or being meat on the table for an enemy of high skill. Since the high-skilled pilots are rare on both sides of the line, they rarely encounter each other, and both sides' high-skilled people wind up racking up huge kill scores against the other side's average Joes/Fritzes/Ivans, while having only occasional glancing encounters with enemy pilots skilled enough to have a good chance of shooting them down except by luck.

[Big Phil]

In other words, every pilot isn't just like Stuart at Stratigic Defense Instatute, able to kill 800 planes in a single afternoon?

[Marcus Aurelius]

...Gack. Were they fumbling their way towards the AC-130 gunship concept or something?

Nope. Those were just heavy attack aircraft. The American B-25G/H were somewhat similar in concept, although it was designed for the Pacific theater, where anti-shipping was a more important concern. Also, Japanese AA defenses in general could not match the German ones, which made medium bomber sized strafing aircraft more feasible. Ultimately the 75 mm gun proved to have too low rate of fire and too little ammo for effective ground attack and it was replaced with more .50 caliber machine guns in the B-25J, resulting in a stupendous battery of up to 18 forward-firing .50 caliber machine guns.

The fixed-wing gunship concept was created in Vietnam, where counter-insurgency was important. Even today the AC-130U is basically just an unusually heavy and sophisticated COIN aircraft with plenty of firepower. Technical advances now allow them to operate above the reach of common MANPADS missiles, just like the AC-47 could operate beyond the reach of 12.7 mm AA machine guns in Vietnam, but against a more serious air defense they would not even be deployed.

Hell, at that point I'd expect factors like sleep deprivation and fatigue to start hurting his effectiveness; you can only run on caffeine and/or amphetamines for so long. Or am I missing something?

He was wounded several times, so I guess he had time to sleep in the hospital... Seriously speaking, he probably did a lot more than 1.5 sorties a day during heavy fighting and less during lulls, which allowed him to recuperate at least somewhat. Stukas were usually operating from fields relatively close the the front, so several sorties a day was possible.

Sea Skimmer's explanation matches with most of the other historian-grade material I've seen, so it sounds like "not very good pilots" in the literal sense: they are not very good pilots.

Depends on what you mean by "pilot". Not all aces had truly exceptional flying skills, but most of them were very good marksmen. Some were expert tacticians, which usually gave them the upper hand, while others had superior situational awareness or understanding about the strengths and weaknesses of their machines (and the enemy's). The super aces had more than one of those attributes, but usually not all of them at the same time.

[Sea Skimmer]

Nope. Those were just heavy attack aircraft. The American B-25G/H were somewhat similar in concept, although it was designed for the Pacific theater, where anti-shipping was a more important concern.

The Italians mounted a 102mm gun in the nose of a four engine P.108 bomber for anti shipping too. Unfortunately for us enthusiasts the recoil cracked the airframe and it did not see combat. Main thing is the Italian and American guns were manually loading, while most of the German installations had an autoloader with 5-6 ready rounds, which in some cases could be replenished by a loader from a stowed supply.

Japan also had some experimental 75mm gun installations, I’m not sure any saw combat, I’d have to look it up.

The fixed-wing gunship concept was created in Vietnam, where counter-insurgency was important. Even today the AC-130U is basically just an unusually heavy and sophisticated COIN aircraft with plenty of firepower. Technical advances now allow them to operate above the reach of common MANPADS missiles, just like the AC-47 could operate beyond the reach of 12.7 mm AA machine guns in Vietnam, but against a more serious air defense they would not even be deployed.

Once the AC-130 got its 105mm it was able to operate above the reach of MANPADS with its Nam era avionics. After all even back then it had FLIR and some other high end stuff. During the latter stages of the 1972 Easter Offensive it was only able to fight with the 105mm after several losses to the SA-7. It was lucky as the 105mm only came into service in Mach of that year. It was a pretty good tank killer firing a HEAT shell. No doubt that the avionics capabilities are now much greater and indeed the latest AC-130s can even control UAVs to act as additional spotters. This is useful since most of the sensors on the aircraft only look out the one side.

[MKSheppard]

USAAF Aces

F. Gabreski (28 aircraft destroyed in the air, 3 on the ground in 166 combat sorties ; NOTE: he flew 20 sorties with the RAF but scored no kills)

R. Bong (40 Japanese aircraft destroyed in 200+ combat missions. In one period, he shot down 21 planes over 158 combat sorties.)

VVS Aces

I. Kozhedub (62 aircraft destroyed in 120 engagements over 330 combat missions)

A.I. Pokryshkin (59 aircraft destroyed in 156 engagements over 560 combat missions; shared 6 with other pilots).

[K. A. Pital]

Yeah, but those are fighter pilots. Bomber pilots did have around 1000 sorties or the like - I've actually found after a closer look about 20 or so HSU's with 700 to 1000 sortie number.

[Simon_Jester]

What do the sortie figures for the RAF's aces look like?

Depends on what you mean by "pilot". Not all aces had truly exceptional flying skills, but most of them were very good marksmen. Some were expert tacticians, which usually gave them the upper hand, while others had superior situational awareness or understanding about the strengths and weaknesses of their machines (and the enemy's). The super aces had more than one of those attributes, but usually not all of them at the same time.

Substitute "pilot" with "combat pilot." Being a really good shot, in this context, is another way to be a good pilot.

[LaCroix]

The D5 and 20mm were irrelevant to Rudel's success. Until he changed to the G variant in early 43, he had only 100 tank kills, and 1000 sorties. 1 in 10 sorties, a rather believable rate.

With the G, he made another 1500 flights, and netted ~400 tanks. 1 tank in ~4 sorties. Well, he was very experienced by then.

The important factor were the 37 mm guns and the huge number of sorties (he was a fanatic, after all).

[Marcus Aurelius]

The D5 and 20mm were irrelevant to Rudel's success. Until he changed to the G variant in early 43, he had only 100 tank kills, and 1000 sorties. 1 in 10 sorties, a rather believable rate.

Some of those 100 kills were probably made with earlier machine gun armed variants and bombs, but even if only 50 kills were made with the D-5, I would hardly call it "irrelevant". 10% is a fairly sizeable contribution. Probably it was more than that, since as Sea Skimmer pointed out, actually destroying tanks (or any armored vehicle) with bombs was quite difficult.

[MKSheppard]

There's also the fact to consider that Allied aces like Bong or Pokryshkin almost certainly had significantly higher kill scores -- due to the restrictive rules on what counted as a kill -- gun camera footage I believe, only counted if large enough parts of the aircraft to render it unflyable came off in camera -- e.g. like a wing; or the camera caught the pilot bailing out. And even then in many cases, you still needed a wingman to confirm your kill.

[Elfdart]

This is interesting and very funny. I always assumed the high kill scores for Luftwaffe pilots were the result of counting all the Polish and Russian planes destroyed on the ground.

[Sea Skimmer]

Relatively few Polish aircraft were killed on the ground. The Poles had an excellent policy of dispersal as they fully expected a massive surprise air assault… now the French are a whole different story filled with rampant stupidity. Most Polish planes were lost in the air, or burned by the crews after they ran out of fuel for operations owing to Luftwaffe destruction of ground facilities and disruption of the railway system. Some of the last sorties the Poles flew were actually recon planes sent up to look for tanker cars full of fuel along the railroads. The pilots then were largely ordered to Romania, where the British had promised to deliver some crated Gladiators and Hurricanes at the last minute. They didn’t arrive in time and it’s by this manner that so many Poles ended up in the RAF during the Battle of Britain.

The USAAF in Europe had separate air and ground kill Talley’s, but in the Pacific it seems both were counted together. Either way is reasonable, since braving light flak defending airfields was often statistically more deadly then a battle against fighters in the air.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

What did the French do? Put everything out in the open and had a bbq alongside?

[Sea Skimmer]

Pretty much. They had all the planes in neat rows along the runways so they could be easily reviewed by passing generals. This despite the fact that they fully well knew the invasion of Poland had opened with massive air attacks on airfields, as had the invasion of Norway despite the Norwegian air force being tiny in the first place.

The number of aircraft outright destroyed by German bombing the first day was not very heavy (the Germans had a vast number of targets to attack, some 50 French airfields alone, which meant none of the attacks could be really big) but huge numbers of planes took damage which took days to repair, and by then the Germans were steadily increasing the margin of superiority they had. In the end the Luftwaffe did lose about 850 planes in the Battle of France-Belgium-Holland, and had its serviceable front line strength reduced by 70%. This is why a long delay was required prior to attacking Britain; endless hoards of damaged planes had to be repaired and replacements brought up. But the French air force was largely annihilated in the end, and was able to have no strategic influence on the campaign.

Everything was made worse by the fact that the French had more artillery observation and reconnaissance squadrons then fighter and bomber units, and indeed less then 200 modern bombers in total out of about 1,100 modern planes. The French had some good designs, but after nationalizing the aircraft industry in the great depression they became almost unable to produce them at any worthwhile rate. Some of those numerous recon planes even spotted the German advance in the Ardennes well before the first tanks appeared at Sedan, and yet the reports wee officially dismissed.

[Marcus Aurelius]

Everything was made worse by the fact that the French had more artillery observation and reconnaissance squadrons then fighter and bomber units, and indeed less then 200 modern bombers in total out of about 1,100 modern planes. The French had some good designs, but after nationalizing the aircraft industry in the great depression they became almost unable to produce them at any worthwhile rate. Some of those numerous recon planes even spotted the German advance in the Ardennes well before the first tanks appeared at Sedan, and yet the reports wee officially dismissed.

The nationalization caused some temporary disruption to production, but the private aircraft industry was pretty inefficient as well. Many French historians argue that the nationalization in fact had a net positive effect on production by 1940. It certainly did save many promising designs from going undeveloped because of bankruptcies and stopped the destruction of R&D base due to engineers switching to other areas. By Sprint 1940 aircraft production was actually proceeding pretty well, but most of its fruits, namely the D.520, did not arrive early enough to have a substantial effect on the war. Significant number ended up in the Vichy air force and many were later used against Allied forces durign the fighting in North Africa.

[Stuart]

The American B-25G/H were somewhat similar in concept, although it was designed for the Pacific theater, where anti-shipping was a more important concern. Also, Japanese AA defenses in general could not match the German ones, which made medium bomber sized strafing aircraft more feasible. Ultimately the 75 mm gun proved to have too low rate of fire and too little ammo for effective ground attack and it was replaced with more .50 caliber machine guns in the B-25J, resulting in a stupendous battery of up to 18 forward-firing .50 caliber machine guns.

If I might enlarge on this a little. The reason behind the U.S. stuffing 75mm guns into the noses of aircraft was primarily to give ground attack aircraft a reasonable chance of picking off flak guns before the flak guns got them. The perception was that the prevalence of light automatic weapons (up to and including 40mm guns) in Army units would make ground attack a very dangerous operation (remember at this time, the ground attack mission was to be assigned to aircraft like the A-20 and the later A-26 that were essentially small medium bombers). So, doing ground attack meant getting the flak guns from outside the flak's effective range. That needed a relatively long-range, accurate weapon. Rockets didn't cut it, they were wildly inaccurate, bombs and napalm meant the attacking aircraft had to fly over the target so they weren't applicable. However, a heavy gun in the nose was a viable and apparently effective option (the British, by the way, went the same way with a semi-automatic 57mm gun in the nose of a Mosquito - it was called the Tsetse). In fact, the "ultimate" U.S. attack aircraft, the XA-38 Grizzly, was specifically designed around a semi-automatic 75mm gun for exactly that role. The aircraft would shoot out the flak guns as it started it's run and suppress their fire, then hose the target with rockets at close range, then drop the bombs or napalm as it went over. Finally, its .50 machine guns were in turrets and they'd be used to spray the troops as the aircraft went away.

What went wrong was that the early installations of the 75mm weren't as effective as hoped. Also, the ground attack role was largely taken over by single-seat fighter-bombers that were both less vulnerable to flak and less of an investment to lose when the flak got lucky. Also, it turned out that flak itself wasn't the all-killing weapon it was supposed to be. That was especially the case in the Pacific where Japanese flak was nowhere close to German standards. This meant that the long range flak-sniping role really didn't exist and for close range work, the 75mm really didn't compare with a salvo of unguided rockets. Anti-shipping was a sort of for-want-of-a-better application. Even then, rockets did better. For really close-range work, lots of machine guns were much better than the 75mm.

[Thanas]

Why wasn't it employed against German positions then? Was there no need for it or did the british already fulfil that role?

[Marcus Aurelius]

However, a heavy gun in the nose was a viable and apparently effective option (the British, by the way, went the same way with a semi-automatic 57mm gun in the nose of a Mosquito - it was called the Tsetse).

The Mosquito FB Mk XVIII was designed specifically with anti-shipping, or more precisely anti-U-boat duties in mind. The 57 mm Molins gun was capable of fully automatic fire as well, although in practice semi-automatic was preferred. In the end rockets were considered better than the gun, since U-boats were large enough targets that a salvo of rockets had a reasonable chance to hit, and only a small number was made (45 according to Wikipedia, or should I say Martin Bowman). As far as I know no Mosquito Mk XVIII was ever used for ground attack; that role was performed by the regular FB Mk VI, which was nevertheless used for anti-shipping duties as well.

Now that we're on the topic of crazy gun installations, the experimental Yak-9UT variant with a 57 mm N-57 gun must count as one. At least the Soviets did not put the thing to production (it was post-war anyways). Even the actually produced (albeit in limited numbers) Yak-9K with its 45 mm gun was pretty crazy, considering that the Yak-9 was a tiny single engine fighter.

Why wasn't it employed against German positions then? Was there no need for it or did the british already fulfil that role?

The single engine fighter-bombers probably proved to be more survivable and also sufficiently accurate and effective against soft targets with rockets and bombs. Furthermore, the Germans had a lot of 88 mm AA guns, which had a much longer effective range than the American 75 mm medium velocity guns. The Japanese ground troops on the other hand rarely hand anything better than single barrel 20 mm Type 98 AA guns. A twin barrel variant was developed later, but like many of the better Japanese WWII weapons, they were reserved mostly for the defense of the home islands. The Japanese army nothing between 20 mm and 75 mm AA guns and the latter were protecting fixed installations and other high value targets.

[Stuart]

Why wasn't it employed against German positions then? Was there no need for it or did the british already fulfil that role?

Basically, in Europe, single-engined fighter-bombers took over the job, notably the Typhoon and the P-47. They could carry the same rocket load, pretty much the same bombload and had more or less the same forward-firing armament in a package that only needed one engine and one pilot (oddly in measuring this sort of thing, its number of engines that counts, not type or size. From a war economy point of view, an engine is an engine is an engine). Also, the fighter-bombers were faster and smaller making them harder to hit. So, adding everything together, it was more effective to use the fighter bombers and chance the flak than it was to use the 75mm gunned aircraft to pick the flak guns off. Having made that determination, the 75mm birds pretty much all went out to the Pacific where uses were found for them.

Once napalm came in, fixed positions became pretty much death-traps. It took time to learn how to design bunkers so the occupants wouldn't get all toasty and/or asphyxiated. But, fighter-bombers were as good or better at opening barbeque time as any other aircraft so they got the job.

The Mosquito FB Mk XVIII was designed specifically with anti-shipping, or more precisely anti-U-boat duties in mind. The 57 mm Molins gun was capable of fully automatic fire as well, although in practice semi-automatic was preferred. In the end rockets were considered better than the gun, since U-boats were large enough targets that a salvo of rockets had a reasonable chance to hit, and only a small number was made (45 according to Wikipedia, or should I say Martin Bowman). As far as I know no Mosquito Mk XVIII was ever used for ground attack; that role was performed by the regular FB Mk VI, which was nevertheless used for anti-shipping duties as well.

The original intent of the Tsetse came from experience with the Hurricane Mark IID. This carried a 40mm gun (not a Bofors) under each wing and was used for tank-busting. However, experience over Tunisia showed that two 40mm guns were too much for it. The aircraft was slow, underpowered and very vulnerable. It was also pretty good at killing tanks. So, there was a requirement for a gun-armed tank killer to replace it. The obvious airframe was the Mosquito, hence the idea of fitting a six-pounder anti-tank gun into the nose. However, by the time people got serious with the program, the rocket had arrived and it was a better solution (a Hurricane could carry eight rockets and four 20mm cannon which made it a useful ground attack bird). So, the Tsetse program was re-orientated to anti-shipping. So, you're right that the Tsetse as finally conceived was for anti-shipping, but the operational requirement for a heavy gun-armed Mosquito pre-dated the decision to develop for that role.

Now that we're on the topic of crazy gun installations, the experimental Yak-9UT variant with a 57 mm N-57 gun must count as one. At least the Soviets did not put the thing to production (it was post-war anyways). Even the actually produced (albeit in limited numbers) Yak-9K with its 45 mm gun was pretty crazy, considering that the Yak-9 was a tiny single engine fighter.

It's not as crazy as it sounds. The 37mm, 45mm and 57mm versions of the YaK-9 were all intended as interceptors (Yefim Gordon wrote the history up in yakovlev's Piston Engined Fighters) and the intent of the big gun was to bring down German bombers with single shots. Russian fighter pilots were trained to get in close and fire at very short range so that makes quite a bit of sense. By the way, the Japanese had an interceptor version of the Ki-67 designated the Ki-109 and this was armed with a 75mm gun for shooting down B-29s. It didn't work. The big-gun Yaks apparently did although they were very limited, special-purpose aircraft. The Russians apparently believed that their fighters would only have a small margin of speed over advanced German bombers so one or two shots might be all they would get. In this sense the big guns on the Yaks were an early ancestor of air-to-air missiles. The 45mm went out quickly but the 37mm was a very effective gun and it stayed on Russian fighters into the 1960s.

[Marcus Aurelius]

The original intent of the Tsetse came from experience with the Hurricane Mark IID. This carried a 40mm gun (not a Bofors) under each wing and was used for tank-busting. However, experience over Tunisia showed that two 40mm guns were too much for it. The aircraft was slow, underpowered and very vulnerable. It was also pretty good at killing tanks. So, there was a requirement for a gun-armed tank killer to replace it. The obvious airframe was the Mosquito, hence the idea of fitting a six-pounder anti-tank gun into the nose. However, by the time people got serious with the program, the rocket had arrived and it was a better solution (a Hurricane could carry eight rockets and four 20mm cannon which made it a useful ground attack bird). So, the Tsetse program was re-orientated to anti-shipping. So, you're right that the Tsetse as finally conceived was for anti-shipping, but the operational requirement for a heavy gun-armed Mosquito pre-dated the decision to develop for that role.

I have to admit I didn't know that the Tsetse was originally intended for that role. I'd like to add though that the Hurricane IV retained a theoretical possibility to carry the two 40 mm Vickers S cannons (or even the earlier Rolls Royce cannons), although in practice it rarely did and rockets were used instead.

It's not as crazy as it sounds. The 37mm, 45mm and 57mm versions of the YaK-9 were all intended as interceptors (Yefim Gordon wrote the history up in yakovlev's Piston Engined Fighters) and the intent of the big gun was to bring down German bombers with single shots.

This I did know. It was not that the idea of large caliber cannons was that crazy per se, but the 45 mm cannon was clearly too much for the tiny Yak-9. The idea to use large caliber cannons actually came from the P-39, which the Soviets liked a lot.

The big-gun Yaks apparently did although they were very limited, special-purpose aircraft.

If my memory serves, only experienced pilots got to fly the Yak-9T and it was used in mixed units with regular Yak-9 fighters.

In this sense the big guns on the Yaks were an early ancestor of air-to-air missiles. The 45mm went out quickly but the 37mm was a very effective gun and it stayed on Russian fighters into the 1960s.

The last new fighter to carry it was, again from memory, the early 1950s design Yak-25. The MiG-19 had 23 mm and later 30 mm cannons in all major production versions. Only armed prototypes had the 37 mm. Of course the Yak-25 stayed in service for much of the 1960s, and the MiG-17 for some time as well, albeit mostly as a ground attacker and other secondary roles.

[Sea Skimmer]

This I did know. It was not that the idea of large caliber cannons was that crazy per se, but the 45 mm cannon was clearly too much for the tiny Yak-9. The idea to use large caliber cannons actually came from the P-39, which the Soviets liked a lot.

No it didn’t. The Soviets had the LaGG-3 first fly with a 37mm engine cannon in August 1941 long before any Lend Lease aircraft arrived and had been experimenting with such installations throughout the interwar period. The LaGG-3 and Yak-7 were both put into mass production with 37mm cannon in 1942. This is really not something any one aircraft invented, and if you did try to narrow it down credit would end up going to one of several French designs in WW1 which pioneered engines able to accommodate cannon internally.

[Frank Hipper]

Actually, aircraft mounting cannon for ground attack pre-dates WWI.

Gabriel Voisin successfully mounted mounted a 37mm Hotchkiss to a Voisin XIII fitted with a 200hp engine in 1913.
He fitted one to an aircraft in 1910, but it never flew with the cannon mounted, and in 1911 a Bleriot XI was ground tested with a 37mm Hotchkiss mounted forward of the propellor; test firing destroyed the aircraft.

Cannon armed Voisins flew throughout the war, carrying both rifled and smoothbore 37mm guns, and late in the war a few carried 47mm Hotchkiss guns.

The SPAD XII of 1917 fitted a short barrelled single-shot Hotchkiss, whose breech protruded so far into the cockpit that the plane was designed with a pre-war Deprdussin-style control system, and apparently lacked a firewall because of it as well.
It was intended for purely an air-to-air purposes, though, and was very modestly successful due to it being extraordinarily difficult to fly and fight, and was assigned to only the best pilots of the very few units it was issued to. Georges Guynemer, Rene Fonck, and Georges Madon all flew it.

The Germans fitted a few Friedrichsafen G.IIIa bombers with 20mm Becker cannon for strafing targets of opportunity during nightime tactical bombing attacks on Allied rear areas in 1918; the German tactical bombing campaign, as far as the Aliies were concerned, was far more effective than the strategic campaign against Great Britain.

As for tank busting in WWI, I can find only three specific kills being credited:

One goes to Ernst Udet, who (allegedly) took advantage of a British tank falling onto it's side while being blinded by smoke and strafing it's belly.

On August 23rd of 1918, Jasta 34B stopped a column of British tanks with machine gun fire; owing to the thin armor of WWI tanks, and owing to German armor-piercing ammunition this isn't quite as unlikely as it sounds.
28 victory ace Robert Greim and Johan Putz of this unit are credit with tank kills for that action.

[Sea Skimmer]

Actually, aircraft mounting cannon for ground attack pre-dates WWI.

I was talking about automatic cannon firing through the propeller hub, you know useful weapons. Manually loading cannon are neat but almost worse then useless given the low effective firepower and heavy weights. The only thing they made any real sense against was a Zeppelin, and only then prior to incendiary ammo. Attacks on U-boats failed because the planes were just too slow to catch them before they dived.

[Frank Hipper]

Actually, aircraft mounting cannon for ground attack pre-dates WWI.

I was talking about automatic cannon firing through the propeller hub, you know useful weapons. Manually loading cannon are neat but almost worse then useless given the low effective firepower and heavy weights. The only thing they made any real sense against was a Zeppelin, and only then prior to incendiary ammo. Attacks on U-boats failed because the planes were just too slow to catch them before they dived.

All of the French aircraft-mounted cannon in WWI were manually loaded, including the hub-firing SPAD XII.

Guynemer gained four air-to-air kills flying it, Fonck eleven.

[Marcus Aurelius]

No it didn’t. The Soviets had the LaGG-3 first fly with a 37mm engine cannon in August 1941 long before any Lend Lease aircraft arrived and had been experimenting with such installations throughout the interwar period. The LaGG-3 and Yak-7 were both put into mass production with 37mm cannon in 1942.

You are of course right about that. I suppose "do not write from memory" has to be learned many times before it really sinks in, since when you do that you are bound to remember some incorrect information you have read from an unknown or otherwise unreliable source.

This is really not something any one aircraft invented, and if you did try to narrow it down credit would end up going to one of several French designs in WW1 which pioneered engines able to accommodate cannon internally.

The first production fighter with a propeller hub automatic cannon I could find is the Dewoitine D. 501, which entered service in 1935. Is that correct or have I missed something? The first single engined fighter with a larger than 20 mm automatic cannon I can think of is still the P-39, which entered service in 1940.