Defending Malaya

[Ma Deuce]

Let me tell you how it feels to be on the OTHER side of the coin. When people of a different race make fun of yours, you don't hate yourself, you hate THEM for making fun of yours. When people of a different race say yours should be hated and mistrusted, you don't hate and mistrust yourself, you hate and mistrust THEM for abusing you as an expression of THEIR hatred and mistrust of you.

Which may be why you seem to believe that all racism is based on visable physical features. By your logic, the Nazi propaganda against Jews and Slavs would have made Germans feel it was directed against them because they're all caucasians, right? Or how about racism against the Irish by English or Americans?

Since racism in Asia tends to follow similar patterns, I highly doubt any of the Malay or Chinese would have regarded the Japanese as being the same "race" as them, especially considering the Japanese themselves certainly didn't (and frankly still don't) feel that way about other Asians, which varied from the Koreans, whom they seemed to treat the same way as Americans did blacks, to the Chinese, whom they treated as the Nazis did the slavs.

Now if this was say, analogous to the Korean War where your enemies were the exact same ethnic group as many of your own troops, then you might have a point. But in this case, most people from mainland Asian ethnic groups would likely hold racist opinions of the Japanese already, thus I find it hard to see them construing propaganda directed specifically against the "Nip Menace" (or whatever catchphrase they choose to describe the Japanese by, along with a healthy dose of "Remember Nanking!") as being also directed against them, especially if the propaganda is crafted with these groups in mind.

[Simon_Jester]

On the other hand, the water issue is absolutely critical. It's not just the reservoirs on the island, if supplies from the mainland are cut, Singapore falls. It's only a matter of time.The defenses need to be inland from Singapore; once the enemy reaches the shoreline defenses, the battle is lost anyway.

Singapore was relying on water shipped from the mainland at this time?

The British were handing out Hurricanes in 1941 to allies. Getting a substantial number to Thailand would probably be the best single investment possible. The key will be pitching the message. "We'll invade if the Japanese appear" is a no-no; "If the Japanese invade, we will stand by you" is much better. in this issue, presentation is everything.

Any comments on the contrast/comparison with the situation in the Low Countries in 1939-40?

You're a member of the majority race, in a nation with significant racial homogeny, right?

Let me tell you how it feels to be on the OTHER side of the coin. When people of a different race make fun of yours, you don't hate yourself, you hate THEM for making fun of yours. When people of a different race say yours should be hated and mistrusted, you don't hate and mistrust yourself, you hate and mistrust THEM for abusing you as an expression of THEIR hatred and mistrust of you.

There's a catch, Sidewinder. Most people who live in an area that is "racially" uniform (for the "there are only five to ten "races" in the world" definition of race) will pick up internal hatreds totally independent of the broad "racial" stuff. This is why the Japanese think of Koreans about the way whites in the American South thought of blacks in the 1970s or '80s; the fact that both groups have mildly pigmented skin and an epicanthic fold doesn't mean they love each other.

You can have "the Japanese are bastards" propaganda in Malaya without saying thing one about "Asiatics" in some generic sense. Therefore, there is no question of "making fun of" the race that the Malayans specifically are a part of. If you're doing your job right, they're not thinking "wait, the Japanese are Asians, the British want to fight them, I'm Asian, they must hate me!" They're thinking "Wow, I sure don't want to be conquered by Japan!"

[ray245]

The overwhelming majority of ‘British’ troops defending Malay came from India, followed by troops from gasp, the Federated States of Malay! I’m sure propaganda will make them hate themselves in no time!

You're a member of the majority race, in a nation with significant racial homogeny, right?

Let me tell you how it feels to be on the OTHER side of the coin. When people of a different race make fun of yours, you don't hate yourself, you hate THEM for making fun of yours. When people of a different race say yours should be hated and mistrusted, you don't hate and mistrust yourself, you hate and mistrust THEM for abusing you as an expression of THEIR hatred and mistrust
of you.

Hell, you have no idea that there are significant Chinese opposition to the Japanese expansion in Malaya and Singapore right? For some reason you seems to think that Asian during that time even shared the concept of pan-Asianism, and view themselves as a collective group.

[Sea Skimmer]

You're a member of the majority race, in a nation with significant racial homogeny, right?

Let me tell you how it feels to be on the OTHER side of the coin. When people of a different race make fun of yours, you don't hate yourself, you hate THEM for making fun of yours. When people of a different race say yours should be hated and mistrusted, you don't hate and mistrust yourself, you hate and mistrust THEM for abusing you as an expression of THEIR hatred and mistrust of you.

Thank you so much for that brilliant lesson, clearly this insight is nothing I could have ever figured out for myself. Too bad for that that racial issues run deeper then mere skin color (see Rwanda), and Japan is so busily butching Chinese by the millions that I couldn’t possibly run out of real graphic material, particularly if I sent intelligence officers to China to collect more of it as well as to observe the Japanese in action. Japans distained for all other races was hardly a secret, and reflected in its own clumsy propaganda and inability to voluntarily mobilize any worthwhile number of men from the literal hundred million Asians it conquered in 1941-42. Malay and Singapore Island in particular had a huge Chinese minatory too, which was subject to the same kind of mass slaughter seen at Nanking after the fall of the island. So yeah, I don’t even need to bring race into it, just show the Japanese for what they are.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Apparently, Sidewinder never heard of Sook Ching massacre in Singapore, where at least 50000 Chinese men died, either by the bullet along some beach, or something else.

Hell, I'm part Chinese and this ignorant turd comes along blurting out rubbish.

[Sea Skimmer]

There's a lot that can be done to shield vital installations using local labor and relatively little resources. building earth berms around things for example is surprisingly effective; they turn damaging near-misses into inconsequential near misses. Investing in such things as fire brigades is also useful; they prevent small fires turning into big ones. In air raid damage, the Japanese were running very close to the lower margin of effectiveness; it doesn't take much to push them below that margin. On the other hand, the water issue is absolutely critical. It's not just the reservoirs on the island, if supplies from the mainland are cut, Singapore falls. It's only a matter of time.The defenses need to be inland from Singapore; once the enemy reaches the shoreline defenses, the battle is lost anyway.

The biggest problem was the population of the island was more then doubled by an unchecked flow of refugees prior to the siege compounded by a failure to assign engineers to fix leaking water pipes all over the city. Both could be dealt with by better planning, mainly by keeping the civilians off the island. Even in modern Singapore with six times the population a large fraction of the water supply comes from rainfall. So a loss mainland water may not force an end to resistance any sooner then exhaustion of food supplies would. It might also be possible in three years time to build and fill some of the additional reservoirs Singapore has added in real life. Certainly local resources could do the job if the money appeared as they are almost all earth fill dams.

Holding the mainland supplies of water requires holding such a large frontline that the Japanese could most likely be stopped at a point much further north. So I’m not seeing a last ditch defense of the water supplies as being terrible viable. To compound the matter, the area is filled with rubber plantations which were vital to the war effort, and it’s unlikely anyone could ever get permission to rip them apart building prepared defense lines. I do believe doing exactly that was proposed but rejected on several levels.

In any case a retreat to Singapore may mean certain defeat, but since this is with hindsight we know that Japan was doing everything on a shoe string. They only had the ammunition for one attempt at taking the island, and they needed those troops to conquer Burma afterwards. A generally more successful and protracted defense could allow Burma to be saved, placing the allies in a much stronger position for the rest of the war. Malay might be retaken in 1943 instead of wasting time in the hopeless Italian campaign for example. After that bombers flatten every oil port in South East Asia.

Given enough fighters to ward of threatened Japanese air attacks, the Japanese position in Indochina becomes tenuous. They'll actually have to think about defending their positions there rather than expanding. Malaya can only really be defended on the Mekong.

I don’t know about that, if I could get two extra infantry divisions I would be very confident of winning a battle in Malay. Japanese resources, particularly ammunition just didn’t suffice for a drawn out battle. They had men fight the entire campaign with 100 rounds. They have no real advantages even against properally trained defenders with nothing newer then 1918.

The British were handing out Hurricanes in 1941 to allies. Getting a substantial number to Thailand would probably be the best single investment possible. The key will be pitching the message. "We'll invade if the Japanese appear" is a no-no; "If the Japanese invade, we will stand by you" is much better. in this issue, presentation is everything.

Only Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union though which are somewhat special cases. But in all reality if someone had felt like it, by the end of 1941 the UK was defended by over 100 squadrons of Spitfires while prewar plans only called for 52 modern fighter squadrons and the Battle of Britian was won with effectively fewer aircraft.

That's a cogent argument as far as it goes, but the real problem isn't maritime, its the land defenses and trying to prevent the advance down the Malayan peninsula. Torpedo biplanes won't help with that.

If a large portion of the Japanese force never unloads or has its heavy equipment sunk, I’d say that would help immensely. Only the Imperial Guards division advanced completely overland. I would use the biplanes as night intruders after the initial fury of anti shipping missions.

If the British could ship enough goodies to thailand to convince them that remaininga British ally is viable, then we can do that by shifting the battle for Malaya to the Mekong. With the very limited forces they have available, I don't think the Japanese have the moxie to do an assault crossing of the Mekong and then head across Thailand to Malaya and Burma. Not against the RTA. If their bases in Indochina are being battered as well (now there's a thought - Hampdens. They are both medium bombers and torpedo biombers. Getting some of them would be a useful double-edged sword) the Japanese might not be capable of moving and would give the Malaya move up as a bad job. Again, we run into Japanese capability here. Virtually every operation they carried out was at the lowest edge of viability (Wake Island being a good example of how close they shaved things). It won't take much to push them the other side of that level.

I am aware of that close shaving, which is why I believe even a futile defense of Singapore island should be ensured and as much shipping as possible knocked out since Japan was downright reckless in sending forward transports. Hampdens and Hurriances would be nice, but this means convincing the Air Ministry that Japan has worthwhile aircraft too. Since no serious air threat would be seen prior to the Japanese occupation of Saigon, and even then only from unescorted bombers, I don’t see much hope of this occurring. The window to press for delivery is small, and meanwhile even Malta was often being starved of aircraft despite being under heavy pressure from the Luftwaffe until the end of May 1941. Also IIRC the Hampden did not become a torpedo bomber until late in the war, after being withdrawn from operations over Germany. Ideally, I would get the French order for SBD Dauntless dive bombers and Martin Maryland bombers diverted to Malay. Both types were largely wasted on training duties in Brittan anyway.

The planes certainly existed to spare, from the Home Defenses and Bomber Commands futile early night bombing campaign, but I just don’t see them being sent. The more obsolete types I could ask for and get in 1939.

[PainRack]

The overwhelming majority of ‘British’ troops defending Malay came from India, followed by troops from gasp, the Federated States of Malay! I’m sure propaganda will make them hate themselves in no time!

You're a member of the majority race, in a nation with significant racial homogeny, right?

Let me tell you how it feels to be on the OTHER side of the coin. When people of a different race make fun of yours, you don't hate yourself, you hate THEM for making fun of yours. When people of a different race say yours should be hated and mistrusted, you don't hate and mistrust yourself, you hate and mistrust THEM for abusing you as an expression of THEIR hatred and mistrust of you.

India aside, the rest of the forces in Malaya had no problems with disliking the Japanese. Anti japanese propaganda was already prevalent in the local overseas Chinese community and sustained by branches of the KMT in the Straits Settlement.Special Branch was actually monitoring these so as to maintain law and order.

The Australians viewed the Japanese as the major threat to them(Far East, Near North). The British and other Europeans are leery of the Japanese after their intrusion into the International Settlement.

The only problems is India and the latent National Congress political movements. And given the Indian Army performance in Malaya, this simply wasn't an issue.

The biggest problem was the population of the island was more then doubled by an unchecked flow of refugees prior to the siege compounded by a failure to assign engineers to fix leaking water pipes all over the city. Both could be dealt with by better planning, mainly by keeping the civilians off the island. Even in modern Singapore with six times the population a large fraction of the water supply comes from rainfall. So a loss mainland water may not force an end to resistance any sooner then exhaustion of food supplies would. It might also be possible in three years time to build and fill some of the additional reservoirs Singapore has added in real life. Certainly local resources could do the job if the money appeared as they are almost all earth fill dams.

1 million vs 5 million isn't six times. And prior to desalination and other water treatment/reclaimation efforts, we relied on up to 80% of our water from Malaysia, although this is inflated by industrial requirements.
Not to mention that the water reservoirs and other resources were labour intensive projects that were in the rural areas of town, invest in them and there's the issue of labour for your defences lines.

And of course, the likelihood that the Straits Settlement would refuse to invest in such projects. Despite the immense profits of Malaya, the actual monies were coming in from Perak and the rubber plantations up north. Improve sanitation and water supplies in Singapore? Nah....

[Sea Skimmer]

1 million vs 5 million isn't six times.

Yes a horrible mistake of mine.

And prior to desalination and other water treatment/reclaimation efforts, we relied on up to 80% of our water from Malaysia, although this is inflated by industrial requirements.

Yes industry guzzles water. The modern world water use breakdown is something like 70% agriculture, 15% industry and 15% for actual drinking and bathing. So I doubt per capita water use was nearly as high as it would be today.

Not to mention that the water reservoirs and other resources were labour intensive projects that were in the rural areas of town, invest in them and there's the issue of labour for your defences lines.

I don’t think that would be a big a deal, working over three years we are talking about employing men by the thousands, not even the tens of thousands. If labor was any real problem I’m sure workers could be imported from India or the Netherlands East Indies, or maybe Thailand to further win over Thai support. The defenses I have in mind are really not much, just enough to provide a start of a main line of resistance on ground which was already chose and surveyed. Probably no more then four positions per kilometer, consisting of flank firing machine gun bunkers, squad shelters and a few scattered command posts plus partly cleared fields of fire. Nothing but the command posts would be proof against more then a 105mm shell hit requiring concrete a little less then a meter thick. Barbed wire, cut timber and other material would be stockpiled for wartime improvements. Indeed large stocks of such material existed in real life which was never used!

This wouldn’t even be that expensive, but in real life the total sum spent on land defense (almost all of which went into pillboxes defending coastal guns from amphibious attack) was a mere 60,000 pounds, about a quarter of the price of a single destroyer. In contrast the naval base cost around 60 million pounds which was the price of about eight and a half King George V class battleships. Ironically it was Winston Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 1920s who played a leading role in seeing the defense budget for the place cut back to almost nothing. But this was not helped by the fact that the original plan for Singapore called for an absurdly huge base that would have cost as much as the Royal Navy.

And of course, the likelihood that the Straits Settlement would refuse to invest in such projects. Despite the immense profits of Malaya, the actual monies were coming in from Perak and the rubber plantations up north. Improve sanitation and water supplies in Singapore? Nah....

Who says they have to pay? This would be funded out of Britain to make Singapore something like a proper fortress. Britain could have spent more money on rearmament if she wanted, but in some respects spending was held back by limitations of the armaments industries which had been heavily run down between the wars. Pillboxes and a dam don’t draw on the same resources. I can’t imagine it would be that ridiculously expensive anyway, but I’m not too confident that it could be built and filled in time unless plans already existed. So this is a wish list item more then a serious piece of the plan.

On a note going back to aircraft, I’ve just read that apparently a large portion of the French Hawk order, some 90 aircraft. was sent to South Africa to start up a major pilot training program. Getting that program moved to Malay could be very useful as such a large program is bound to have many trained instructor pilots. Not ideal, but anything would at least give the Japanese more to shoot at.

[Sea Skimmer]

So PainRack, would you happen to know the specific sources of water Singapore utilizes on the Malay mainland? I can’t find anything on them (reasonable that this information is not blatantly published all over!), and I would like to do a more detailed investigation in the feasibility of holding a pocket against the Japanese. I’ve found a few reservoirs on Google Earth but none of them seem very large, though its hard to judge how deep they might be as I also cannot find a really decent topographic map of the area online yet.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

So PainRack, would you happen to know the specific sources of water Singapore utilizes on the Malay mainland? I can’t find anything on them (reasonable that this information is not blatantly published all over!), and I would like to do a more detailed investigation in the feasibility of holding a pocket against the Japanese. I’ve found a few reservoirs on Google Earth but none of them seem very large, though its hard to judge how deep they might be as I also cannot find a really decent topographic map of the area online yet.

There are a number of rivers I believe, not very sure about the exact rivers. These days, most of the water goes through a Johor water processing plant before coming through the pipes running along the causeway.

[Stuart]

Even in modern Singapore with six times the population a large fraction of the water supply comes from rainfall. So a loss mainland water may not force an end to resistance any sooner then exhaustion of food supplies would. It might also be possible in three years time to build and fill some of the additional reservoirs Singapore has added in real life. Certainly local resources could do the job if the money appeared as they are almost all earth fill dams.

Not so; water supplies are the determining factor in maintaining Singaporean viability as a fortune. This is the problem; Singapore has negative strategic depth - most countries measure strategic depth as the extent to which enemy forces can penetrate over the border before the vital functions of the state are compromised. In Singapore, if hostile forces are at the border, the vital functions of the state have already been compromised. That's why the armed forces of the Republic of Singapore are configured they way they are. The same basic lesson applies in 1941/42. Singapore cannot be defended at the strait or anywhere else on the island. It has to be defended inland on the mainland. So, defenses actually on Singapore are really a last-ditch effort to stave off the inevitable; the real defense is to make sure that the enemy never actually reach the strait. I think we're well on the way to evolving a defensive plan that achieves this.

In any case a retreat to Singapore may mean certain defeat, but since this is with hindsight we know that Japan was doing everything on a shoe string. They only had the ammunition for one attempt at taking the island, and they needed those troops to conquer Burma afterwards. A generally more successful and protracted defense could allow Burma to be saved, placing the allies in a much stronger position for the rest of the war. Malay might be retaken in 1943 instead of wasting time in the hopeless Italian campaign for example. After that bombers flatten every oil port in South East Asia.

I agree with all of that - with the possible exception that the Japanese shortage of supplies is hindsight. Information from China was already clearly indicating that the Japanese had no real idea of logistics. All their units were instructed to live off the countryside and supply lines were rudimentary at best. The same basic experience was suggesting that the Japanese idea of campaigning was to send a division or two to a location, point them in a specific direction and leave them to their own devices. Resupply? What's that? In fact, perceptions of Japanese infantry skills ran through the following phases.

• They are idiots
  They are supermen
  Hey, guess what, they were idiots after all

Now, this feeds back to the intelligence problem and our original specified task. One of the key jobs, I believe, is to set up a proper intelligence analysis center that can take in all the required information and produce a proper threat analysis. All the information needed was out there but nobody put it together properly. Given a proper threat analysis (and the power to bang service heads together) the inability of the Japanese to sustain high-intensity operations and their non-existant logistics tail immediately points to the way to defend Singapore - make sure getting to the place is going to mean a long, hard fight. Defending Singapore iteslef shound be restricted to making sure the place doesn't fall to a coup de main.

I don’t know about that, if I could get two extra infantry divisions I would be very confident of winning a battle in Malay. Japanese resources, particularly ammunition just didn’t suffice for a drawn out battle. They had men fight the entire campaign with 100 rounds. They have no real advantages even against properally trained defenders with nothing newer then 1918.

I agree on the marginal resources of the Japanese and agree this is the grave weakness we can play on. The problem with defending Malaya is that small amphibious operations can easily outflank any defensive position (same consideration applies today) along the peninsula. Defending Malaya also means defending the coast and that's a real problem. Remember the Japanese philosophy; take a unit, dump it somehwere and tell it to live off the land. That's a terrible way to fight a war but it does mean that amphibious outflanking moves are cheap and easy assuming one doesn't care about the lives of teh troops involved (and the Japanese Spirit Warriors didn't - they referred to their troops by a nickname that played on the cost of the stamp to conscript a replacement).

Now, we can stop those amphibious operations one of two ways. We can ensure naval supremacy over the waters around Malaya (not practical given the force levels in question) or we can fight the battle far enough north that the kind of short-swing amphibious operations the Japanese mounted are impractical. (note that the ability of land units to form hedgehogs and beat off an amphibious end-run is a seperate issue). That brings us back to keeping the Thais happy. The five front line divisions they have are just part of the equation. The ground they occupy is also a major factor.

Only Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union though which are somewhat special cases. But in all reality if someone had felt like it, by the end of 1941 the UK was defended by over 100 squadrons of Spitfires while prewar plans only called for 52 modern fighter squadrons and the Battle of Britian was won with effectively fewer aircraft.

There were a few more than that but the point is, there were a lot of Hurricanes and they weren't needed in Europe. So getting some of them shouldn't be impossible. There are other modern fighters around as well including ex-French Hawks and so on. The key is giving the RTAF enough modern aircraft to mount a credible defense. French bombing of Thai border towns in middle-late 1940 was a nasty shock to the Thais (and one of the reasons why they invaded French IndoChina in early 1941). hence their sensitivity to the air attack threats from Japan. Hurricanes, ex-French Hawks etc would do that. Of course, the best solution to keeping the Thais happy would be some Spitfires. That would need real pull in Whitehall but it is plausible - the French authorities in IndoChina were Vichy after all, not Free French and it could be pitched as bringing them back into the fold.

If a large portion of the Japanese force never unloads or has its heavy equipment sunk, I’d say that would help immensely. Only the Imperial Guards division advanced completely overland. I would use the biplanes as night intruders after the initial fury of anti shipping missions.

That's a precarious use of highly-trained torpedo-bomber pilots. But, the problem is that teh kind of short-reach amphibious operation the Japanese specialized in didn;t use real transports. They used small craft and fishing boats that aren't plausible targets for torpedoes. I agree such craft are not the basis for a practical amphibious operation but the Japanese genius in Malaya was to understand that an operation doesn't have to be practical to be effective. I'd suggest that conventional light bombers would be much more effective than torpedo planes.

I am aware of that close shaving, which is why I believe even a futile defense of Singapore island should be ensured and as much shipping as possible knocked out since Japan was downright reckless in sending forward transports. Hampdens and Hurriances would be nice, but this means convincing the Air Ministry that Japan has worthwhile aircraft too. Since no serious air threat would be seen prior to the Japanese occupation of Saigon, and even then only from unescorted bombers, I don’t see much hope of this occurring. The window to press for delivery is small, and meanwhile even Malta was often being starved of aircraft despite being under heavy pressure from the Luftwaffe until the end of May 1941. Also IIRC the Hampden did not become a torpedo bomber until late in the war, after being withdrawn from operations over Germany. Ideally, I would get the French order for SBD Dauntless dive bombers and Martin Maryland bombers diverted to Malay. Both types were largely wasted on training duties in Brittan anyway.

Hampdens were used as torpedo planes (in theory anyway) from 1941 onwards with the type being exclusively Coastal Command from 1942 on. However, it may not be necessary. The Maryland is a brilliant idea. The aircraft is almost ideally suited to kind of operation we're planning - its actually faster than nearly all the Japanese fighters in the area and the RAF had no idea what to do with it. It's literally there for the taking. With a 2,000 pound bombload it could make life very unpleasant for the Japanese groups (and give those extemporized invasion groups a sudden case of attitude adjustment). A mix of Marylands and surplus Battles would make an air striking force perfectly adequate for the task at hand. At a guess, it wouldn't take much field-modification to give the Maryland torpedo-carrying capability. It doesn't have to be good at the job, having the capability would be enough. My understanding is that the British only got nine SBDs and they were all tied down in various test programs. The bulk of the 174 plane French order was picked up by the USN.

So, I would summarize the revised defense policy as follows:

• Establish a proper intelligence and analysis center to fully understand the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese Army
  Build enough land defenses in Singapore to prevent a coup de main
  Train the rest of the Army to fight north and keep the IJA away from Singapore
  Support the Thais, get them as much modern equipment as possible and ensure Pibulsongkhram keeps saying how much he likes the west and doesnt like Vichy France
  Build up a Battle/Maryland air striking force based in Singapore (northern airfields aren't needed at all)
  Get some modern fighters out there. Hurricanes will do. Tomahawks as well.
  When Thailand hits French IndoChina in 1941, support them as a pro-Free France, anti-Vichy operation. That puts the front line on the Mekong where it belongs

If this is done, Malaya is unlikely to fall at all and that means Burma won't fall and India won't be threatened. Singapore remains a powerful fleet base with a capable air striking force and there isn't much the Japanese can do about it. In fact, Japanese IndoChina (Laos, Vietnam and the eastern half of Cambodia) are at quite severe risk and defending them will be a Japanese preoccupation. The Singapore base will be perfectly positioned to strike at the flank of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and DEI. It's a dramatically different strategic situation and all from some some not-very expensive changes and deployment of some otherwise unwanted aircraft.

[Pelranius]

Would it be a bad idea to try to mobilize Malay public opinion by painting the Japanese as sun worshipping infidels, or is that really opening a large can of worms? Though the Royal Malay Regiment fought very well in OTL, so expecting fifth column activity from anyone in Malaysia and Singapore is simply worrying too much.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Would it be a bad idea to try to mobilize Malay public opinion by painting the Japanese as sun worshipping infidels, or is that really opening a large can of worms? Though the Royal Malay Regiment fought very well in OTL, so expecting fifth column activity from anyone in Malaysia and Singapore is simply worrying too much.

The Malays back then weren't as religious as they are now. In those days, it was actually possible to have non-Muslim Malays. Which is why, there existed non-Muslim Peranakans; Chinese inter-marrying Malays. The religiousity is a relatively recent phenomenon that arose as part of the Malay Nationalist movement.

[PainRack]

Yes industry guzzles water. The modern world water use breakdown is something like 70% agriculture, 15% industry and 15% for actual drinking and bathing. So I doubt per capita water use was nearly as high as it would be today.

Modern day Singapore agriculture are chickens/eggs farms, two vegetable farms, a goat farm, a smattering of flowers/orchids and some aquaculture.
In comparison, up to 80% of Newater 2 years ago was used by industry such as wafer fabrication and more than 40% of local water consumption is by businesses. 55% of water consumption in Singapore is used by households.
http://worldwaterconservation.com/Singapore.html
http://www.pub.gov.sg/conserve/Business ... fault.aspx

Meh.. looking at the modern day figures, it could be achievable.

I don’t think that would be a big a deal, working over three years we are talking about employing men by the thousands, not even the tens of thousands.

It probably will be a big deal considering that as of the late 1930s, labour was short in the Malayan states. As it was, the 1920s and 1930s saw a huge influx of immigrant workers from India and China, working in the Tin mines and rubber plantations and labour was still short. Furthermore, reservoirs are worthless without pipelines and pumps. Percival complained that he didn't have enough engineers as it was to build defences in Johore, another substantial project to build inline defences, defences in Perak and reservoirs?(The written memorandum preserved in Battle Command conflicts with Ivan Simson accounts of defences are bad for morale)
I probably have to go do a through check, but Singapore began importing water from Johor by 1927. The initial pipelines were laid through the causeway, the original water reservoirs were actually very limited. MacRitchie/Thomson Reservoir, Kallang, Fort Canning, Seletar.... that should be about it. There were also some freshwater rivers such as Changi Creek but these were used to sustain the outlying plantations/villages.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MacRitchie_Reservoir

So PainRack, would you happen to know the specific sources of water Singapore utilizes on the Malay mainland? I can’t find anything on them (reasonable that this information is not blatantly published all over!), and I would like to do a more detailed investigation in the feasibility of holding a pocket against the Japanese. I’ve found a few reservoirs on Google Earth but none of them seem very large, though its hard to judge how deep they might be as I also cannot find a really decent topographic map of the area online yet.

Modern day or WW2? I have no idea what the WW2 sources were, but modern day water comes from Johore and its collected from the bulk of the state rivers. There isn't a specific water collection point in Johore but rather, the maintenance of various pumps, storage and etc in Malaysia.

We could point to the Mersing line, a military defence position that Singapore wanted held to secure her water supplies in the event of an invasion of Malaysia. But for defence, what about Kuala Lumpur ? This was the area where Percival began to plan his second defence afterall. The roads at that point in time were limited and ran through KL.

Now, this feeds back to the intelligence problem and our original specified task. One of the key jobs, I believe, is to set up a proper intelligence analysis center that can take in all the required information and produce a proper threat analysis. All the information needed was out there but nobody put it together properly. Given a proper threat analysis (and the power to bang service heads together) the inability of the Japanese to sustain high-intensity operations and their non-existant logistics tail immediately points to the way to defend Singapore - make sure getting to the place is going to mean a long, hard fight. Defending Singapore iteslef shound be restricted to making sure the place doesn't fall to a coup de main.

I would like to point out that the information analysis from Far East Service Branch, diplomats and etc WAS available in Singapore. Indeed, the British has already established various SOE services centred in Singapore and they were backed up by analysis of the Shanghai campaigns. Details about Japanese flanking tactics, methods to counter them, even Japanese infiltration and their activities were noted by Special Branch, although they were initially ordered not to suppress them in the late 1930s due to the political climate.

No one did put them together and a manual on jungle warfare, flanking and the Japanese tactics was left undistributed at staff headquarters. Its tempting to blame Percival for this but let's be fair.

He was GOC Malaya for 8 months before the invasion. Far East Command staff were stripped of good officers, sent either to India or the Middle East and was functioning on a shoestring manpower basis. During WW1, a sepoy mutiny required rushing in Japanese troops to suppress it as other colonial forces were too far away. Even the coordination of Malaya defences were scattered. The Battle Box at Fort Canning was an hour drive away from Sembawang, the RN base and headquarters to their staff.

I agree on the marginal resources of the Japanese and agree this is the grave weakness we can play on. The problem with defending Malaya is that small amphibious operations can easily outflank any defensive position (same consideration applies today) along the peninsula. Defending Malaya also means defending the coast and that's a real problem. Remember the Japanese philosophy; take a unit, dump it somehwere and tell it to live off the land. That's a terrible way to fight a war but it does mean that amphibious outflanking moves are cheap and easy assuming one doesn't care about the lives of teh troops involved (and the Japanese Spirit Warriors didn't - they referred to their troops by a nickname that played on the cost of the stamp to conscript a replacement).

The Japanese didn't have the boats. If Penang had been properly evacuated, it would had taken weeks before the Japanese could had moved through Thailand boats to hit Western malaysia.

That's a precarious use of highly-trained torpedo-bomber pilots. But, the problem is that teh kind of short-reach amphibious operation the Japanese specialized in didn;t use real transports. They used small craft and fishing boats that aren't plausible targets for torpedoes. I agree such craft are not the basis for a practical amphibious operation but the Japanese genius in Malaya was to understand that an operation doesn't have to be practical to be effective. I'd suggest that conventional light bombers would be much more effective than torpedo planes.

Perhaps he was referring to the initial landings at Kota Bahru and Siam?

Would it be a bad idea to try to mobilize Malay public opinion by painting the Japanese as sun worshipping infidels, or is that really opening a large can of worms? Though the Royal Malay Regiment fought very well in OTL, so expecting fifth column activity from anyone in Malaysia and Singapore is simply worrying too much.

There was a fifth column movement in Malaya .. its effectiveness however has been exaggerated by both British soldiers and local nationalists.
The original Kuantan rumours, the one that got Admiral Philip to divert there comprised of Japanese monks parachuting into the area!
Suffice to say that from what little British intelligence and SOE later found out, the Japanese did infiltrate the areas, including subverting a British officer to supply plans for Kota Bahru. Its unlikely that the Japanese did have anyone signalling on British take-off timing and etc, similarly, the myths about the Japanese stockpiling wood and bicycle spare parts in Malaya to supply their forces seems far fetched.
The use of local Malay Guides is a cultural thing. One needs to understand that the British did not have political ownership of Malaya. They have political ownership of the Straits Settlement, they have political oversight over the Federated Malay States, they influenced the Unfederated Malay States. Thus, bemoaning that Malay residents guiding Japanese troops of treason appears to be a bit... off, especially when one considers the then Malay rural culture of aiding strangers.

[ray245]

Would it be a bad idea to try to mobilize Malay public opinion by painting the Japanese as sun worshipping infidels, or is that really opening a large can of worms? Though the Royal Malay Regiment fought very well in OTL, so expecting fifth column activity from anyone in Malaysia and Singapore is simply worrying too much.

The Malays back then weren't as religious as they are now. In those days, it was actually possible to have non-Muslim Malays. Which is why, there existed non-Muslim Peranakans; Chinese inter-marrying Malays. The religiousity is a relatively recent phenomenon that arose as part of the Malay Nationalist movement.

My memory on that part of history is a little sketchy. The Malay Nationalist movement occurred in the 50s right?

[Simon_Jester]

Not so; water supplies are the determining factor in maintaining Singaporean viability as a fortune. This is the problem; Singapore has negative strategic depth - most countries measure strategic depth as the extent to which enemy forces can penetrate over the border before the vital functions of the state are compromised. In Singapore, if hostile forces are at the border, the vital functions of the state have already been compromised. That's why the armed forces of the Republic of Singapore are configured they way they are. The same basic lesson applies in 1941/42.

Certainly water supplies exist on Singapore (rainwater). I gather that your point is that the water supply was inadequate to support the population even in the 1940s?

From PainRack, we have that 55% of water consumption in Singapore is used in households, with the rest going to business and industry and effectively zero reserved for agriculture.

Correct me if I am mistaken, but:
-The population of the island has increased by a factor of 6 since the 1940s (currently 4.8 million, then around 750 thousand).
- Per capita water consumption in households has probably also increased; I suspect without extensive proof that there are relatively more people flushing toilets and taking regular showers than you did then.
- In 1941, the industrial demand for water on Singapore was effectively zero.

If I am correct in all these assumptions, then the domestic water consumption of Singapore is almost certainly from 5 to 10 times greater than it was in the early 1940s, possibly even more. How much water the could get from the catchment basin capacity that actually existed in 1940 is beyond me. Whether the gap could still be made up by a comprehensive effort, or by evacuating part of the civilian population*, likewise.

*Which might be ludicrously impractical, of course, for a number of reasons, such as Japanese naval superiority...
________

Another question is whether water could be rationed- how much of the water consumed by the island at that time was going to purposes that were not vitally necessary for the survival of the inhabitants, and how much for drinking and the essential minimum of sanitation?

In 1940 the island had something around 750 thousand people; how much water does a population that size need under siege conditions?
______

In fact, perceptions of Japanese infantry skills ran through the following phases.

• They are idiots
  They are supermen
  Hey, guess what, they were idiots after all

Hmm... supermen in the line and idiots on the staff?
[kidding, kidding, but on the square]

=======

I probably have to go do a through check, but Singapore began importing water from Johor by 1927. The initial pipelines were laid through the causeway, the original water reservoirs were actually very limited. MacRitchie/Thomson Reservoir, Kallang, Fort Canning, Seletar.... that should be about it. There were also some freshwater rivers such as Changi Creek but these were used to sustain the outlying plantations/villages.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MacRitchie_Reservoir

The Wikipedia article says that the first actual water delivery was made in 1932, only about eight to ten years before the period we're considering. This suggests that while the water flowing through the pipeline was valuable and important, it may not have been so essential to the survival of the island as it would have been ten or twenty years later, let alone fifty or sixty.

I'd be happier with that conclusion if I were sure of where Wikipedia's getting it from.

[Stuart]

I would like to point out that the information analysis from Far East Service Branch, diplomats and etc WAS available in Singapore. Indeed, the British has already established various SOE services centred in Singapore and they were backed up by analysis of the Shanghai campaigns. Details about Japanese flanking tactics, methods to counter them, even Japanese infiltration and their activities were noted by Special Branch, although they were initially ordered not to suppress them in the late 1930s due to the political climate.

Oh, I know all the information was available, that's what I meant when I said we don't need hindsight to put our finger on the primary Japanese weakness. All the information needed was literally sitting on people's desks. What was lacking was a system to collate all that information, analyse it and distribute ther esults . Then to bang service heads together until they actioned the necessary responses. Implicit in the OP was us taking over the defense of Singapore/Malaya included the necessary authority to bang heads.

No one did put them together and a manual on jungle warfare, flanking and the Japanese tactics was left undistributed at staff headquarters.

Correcting that sort of thing is probably the most valuable contribution that can be made. In this particular case, it needs selecting a suitable staff officer, holding him responsible and then cashiering him for dereliction of duty. If his name is Byng, so much the better.

Its tempting to blame Percival for this but let's be fair. He was GOC Malaya for 8 months before the invasion. Far East Command staff were stripped of good officers, sent either to India or the Middle East and was functioning on a shoestring manpower basis. During WW1, a sepoy mutiny required rushing in Japanese troops to suppress it as other colonial forces were too far away. Even the coordination of Malaya defences were scattered. The Battle Box at Fort Canning was an hour drive away from Sembawang, the RN base and headquarters to their staff.

Exactly, putting that sort of thing right is top priority. Get all that sort of idiocy sorted out would probably be enough to allow Singapore/malaya to hold on their own albeit by a tight margin. Everything else Seaskimmer and I have put together just adds to the odds on our side.

The Japanese didn't have the boats. If Penang had been properly evacuated, it would had taken weeks before the Japanese could had moved through Thailand boats to hit Western malaysia.

I'd argue that; the Japanese were pretty good at extemporizing things and they were planning small amphibious flanking movements right from the start. Penang did give them more options but changing things there wouldn't have removed all of the amphibious option. The key point is that, given troops proper training in forming hedgehogs, those short-reach amphibious operations wouldn't have been important, they would have quickly degenerated into groups of starving light infantry wandering around without ammunition.

Perhaps he was referring to the initial landings at Kota Bahru and Siam?

Perhaps, but taking those head-on with old biplanes would be precarious. But, with Thailand in the war on our side, those invasions aren't happening. The IJA is up on the Mekong, trying to do an assault crossing and being cut to pieces in the process

[Simon_Jester]

Correcting that sort of thing is probably the most valuable contribution that can be made. In this particular case, it needs selecting a suitable staff officer, holding him responsible and then cashiering him for dereliction of duty. If his name is Byng, so much the better.

Why Byng?

[Raesene]

Correcting that sort of thing is probably the most valuable contribution that can be made. In this particular case, it needs selecting a suitable staff officer, holding him responsible and then cashiering him for dereliction of duty. If his name is Byng, so much the better.

Why Byng?

Because of Admiral Byng who was shot in 1757 after not preventing the French fleet from subsequently capturing Minorca.

[Sea Skimmer]

[
Not so; water supplies are the determining factor in maintaining Singaporean viability as a fortune. This is the problem; Singapore has negative strategic depth - most countries measure strategic depth as the extent to which enemy forces can penetrate over the border before the vital functions of the state are compromised. In Singapore, if hostile forces are at the border, the vital functions of the state have already been compromised. That's why the armed forces of the Republic of Singapore are configured they way they are. The same basic lesson applies in 1941/42. Singapore cannot be defended at the strait or anywhere else on the island. It has to be defended inland on the mainland. So, defenses actually on Singapore are really a last-ditch effort to stave off the inevitable; the real defense is to make sure that the enemy never actually reach the strait. I think we're well on the way to evolving a defensive plan that achieves this.

Well I’m still building defenses on the island. Concern over amphibious attacks and paratrooper landings ran high down to the bitter end and tied down a great deal of troops throughout the campaign. But thinking further, the inner line would be reoriented to covering airfields against parachute landings. After all, despite a lack of combat use prior to the invasion of Norway parachute landings were all the rage of the 1930s and it’s not unreasonable to plan against them.

I agree with all of that - with the possible exception that the Japanese shortage of supplies is hindsight. Information from China was already clearly indicating that the Japanese had no real idea of logistics. All their units were instructed to live off the countryside and supply lines were rudimentary at best. The same basic experience was suggesting that the Japanese idea of campaigning was to send a division or two to a location, point them in a specific direction and leave them to their own devices. Resupply? What's that? In fact, perceptions of Japanese infantry skills ran through the following phases.

I agree one could easily know that Japan was crummy at logistics, but the Japanese in Malay didn’t just suck at moving supplies forward, they had few to move forward at all. That might I don’t think anyone could know.

Now, this feeds back to the intelligence problem and our original specified task. One of the key jobs, I believe, is to set up a proper intelligence analysis center that can take in all the required information and produce a proper threat analysis. All the information needed was out there but nobody put it together properly. Given a proper threat analysis (and the power to bang service heads together) the inability of the Japanese to sustain high-intensity operations and their non-existant logistics tail immediately points to the way to defend Singapore - make sure getting to the place is going to mean a long, hard fight.

I agree fully. The more we learn about the history of 1940-41 the more and more it becomes apparent that the allies already did know quite a bit about what Japan could do. But no one read the reports.

Defending Singapore iteslef shound be restricted to making sure the place doesn't fall to a coup de main.

Well that’s part of the reason why I want an island defense line. We know Japan will land in North Malay in hindsight and this would be the most obvious area anyway, but even if we discount Japanese air powers ability to sink British battleships, we can’t discount that Japan might send a strongly escorted convoy the land at a spot only 20-50 miles north of Singapore island. After all Japan had the assets to do this, six battleships on the Inland Sea that historically did nothing prior to a sortie to oppose the Doolittle Raiders, enough to counter even the deployment of all the R class battleships to Malay. Plus we don’t know about Kido Butia and aren’t likely to gain intelligence of that scope. That means planning must anticipate that half the Japanese fleet carriers attack the Philippines while half attack Malay. That would provide the air cover to make a landing fairly close to the island. Especially if we read the reports filed on the Zero fighter.

Now, we can stop those amphibious operations one of two ways. We can ensure naval supremacy over the waters around Malaya (not practical given the force levels in question) or we can fight the battle far enough north that the kind of short-swing amphibious operations the Japanese mounted are impractical. (note that the ability of land units to form hedgehogs and beat off an amphibious end-run is a seperate issue). That brings us back to keeping the Thais happy. The five front line divisions they have are just part of the equation. The ground they occupy is also a major factor.

We can’t ensure naval superiority, or even counter landings with destroyers for lack of destroyers, but we could get ahold of motor torpedo boats. They worked pretty well defending Bataan from the exact same kind of landings. Hong Kong already had a squadron of old ones; I don’t think it’s out of reason to get more. Additionally local sampans and fishing boats could be armed to create a coastal patrol force that can at least give warning. Its peacetime duties can be justified as policing and anti piracy patrol to make up for a lack of big RN warships.

Of course, the best solution to keeping the Thais happy would be some Spitfires. That would need real pull in Whitehall but it is plausible - the French authorities in IndoChina were Vichy after all, not Free French and it could be pitched as bringing them back into the fold.

That raises a very interesting question. Could the forces and ships be found to invade Saigon ahead of the Japanese? And if they could, what would Japans response be? This isn’t the most realistic of options given British defeats throughout 1941, but it would pretty well neutralize the threat to Malay and create a tripwire position that must fall first.

That's a precarious use of highly-trained torpedo-bomber pilots.

Ill have some medals minted. It’s a war on.

But, the problem is that teh kind of short-reach amphibious operation the Japanese specialized in didn;t use real transports. They used small craft and fishing boats that aren't plausible targets for torpedoes. I agree such craft are not the basis for a practical amphibious operation but the Japanese genius in Malaya was to understand that an operation doesn't have to be practical to be effective. I'd suggest that conventional light bombers would be much more effective than torpedo planes.

I was thinking only in terms of sinking the initial invasion force which was in merchant ships. Japan was very slow to unload anything more then men from transports; this is why they so absurdly underestimated US strength at Guadalcanal even though they knew a large transport force had been present and unloading for several days. Historical British air attacks sank or damaged several vessels, so we know it can be done. If we get lucky we might even sink one of the all important Japanese landing craft transporter ships.

The small outflanking operations can probably not be countered by air attacks; the vessels are too small and mostly operated under cover of nightfall. Torpedo planes have some chance of hitting large ships at anchor or slowly moving with flare support, but dropping a bomb onto a small junk is a whole different story. I have no idea on the viability of night strafing with flares. The US certainly tried bombing in the Solomon Islands, and didn’t have much luck. Motor torpedo boats, and since this is the RN they also had separate motor gun boats that operated in conjunction (prior to the Fairmile D type with 57mm guns) would be the best option. They can provide both warning and kill functions and will work especially well on the west coast where the Japanese cannot deploy escort ships. Unfortunately the first Fairmile D didn’t appear until 1942, those things would be incredible for this role.

If not MTB/MGBs can be obtained, we revert to ordering Elco boats from the US. In the meantime all that expensive machinery in the naval base can be used to make gun mountings to put obsolete 13pdrs and 18pdrs from Australia on fishing boats. We may also be able to obtain some Fairmile B motor launches which were equipped with manually loading 3pdrs. They could only make 20 knots but that's good enough.

At a guess, it wouldn't take much field-modification to give the Maryland torpedo-carrying capability.

Likely not, I’ve heard of planes having shackles threaded through spare sets of bomb bay doors before in ordered to convert them to torpedo planes. Converting back to a bomber meant swapping the doors.

It doesn't have to be good at the job, having the capability would be enough. My understanding is that the British only got nine SBDs and they were all tied down in various test programs. The bulk of the 174 plane French order was picked up by the USN.

That’s a shame, I thought it was more. I have to wonder if this was because the British just didn’t want another non standard type, or if the USN intervened. Robbing US carrier air groups is certainly worth it to hold Malay.

So, I would summarize the revised defense policy as follows:

• Establish a proper intelligence and analysis center to fully understand the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese Army
  Build enough land defenses in Singapore to prevent a coup de main
  Train the rest of the Army to fight north and keep the IJA away from Singapore
  Support the Thais, get them as much modern equipment as possible and ensure Pibulsongkhram keeps saying how much he likes the west and doesnt like Vichy France
  Build up a Battle/Maryland air striking force based in Singapore (northern airfields aren't needed at all)
  Get some modern fighters out there. Hurricanes will do. Tomahawks as well.
  When Thailand hits French IndoChina in 1941, support them as a pro-Free France, anti-Vichy operation. That puts the front line on the Mekong where it belongs

I’m on board with it.

If this is done, Malaya is unlikely to fall at all and that means Burma won't fall and India won't be threatened. Singapore remains a powerful fleet base with a capable air striking force and there isn't much the Japanese can do about it. In fact, Japanese IndoChina (Laos, Vietnam and the eastern half of Cambodia) are at quite severe risk and defending them will be a Japanese preoccupation. The Singapore base will be perfectly positioned to strike at the flank of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and DEI. It's a dramatically different strategic situation and all from some some not-very expensive changes and deployment of some otherwise unwanted aircraft.

It’s amazing what taking an enemy seriously can for your fortunes. Just ask the Japanese how well discounting the west worked out.

[PainRack]

Well that’s part of the reason why I want an island defense line. We know Japan will land in North Malay in hindsight and this would be the most obvious area anyway, but even if we discount Japanese air powers ability to sink British battleships, we can’t discount that Japan might send a strongly escorted convoy the land at a spot only 20-50 miles north of Singapore island. After all Japan had the assets to do this, six battleships on the Inland Sea that historically did nothing prior to a sortie to oppose the Doolittle Raiders, enough to counter even the deployment of all the R class battleships to Malay. Plus we don’t know about Kido Butia and aren’t likely to gain intelligence of that scope. That means planning must anticipate that half the Japanese fleet carriers attack the Philippines while half attack Malay. That would provide the air cover to make a landing fairly close to the island. Especially if we read the reports filed on the Zero fighter.

That's highly unlikely. A landing on the northern coast of Singapore would have to run through the gamut of the Straits of Johor, a tight waterway while under the constant fire of Singapore guns and aircraft. They have the carrier firepower to disable the RAAF squadrons, what they don't have is the sustained fleet train to carry out a constant air support the likes of the Americans. And given the speed and capabilities of Japanese amphibious landings, the transports would had been massacred by the guns.

[Sea Skimmer]

That's highly unlikely. A landing on the northern coast of Singapore would have to run through the gamut of the Straits of Johor, a tight waterway while under the constant fire of Singapore guns and aircraft. They have the carrier firepower to disable the RAAF squadrons, what they don't have is the sustained fleet train to carry out a constant air support the likes of the Americans. And given the speed and capabilities of Japanese amphibious landings, the transports would had been massacred by the guns.

Even more so since that’s not what I said at all. How does a my statement of a ‘landing 20-50 miles north of Singapore island turn into landing on the north coast of Singapore island? Last I check Singapore island is only about 15 miles north-south in the first place. The Japanese would never mount a major ship to shore landing operation within about 20 miles of the islands coastline, because that would be within range of the 15in gun batteries which could range to 32,000 yards. More if they were issued supercharges though what evidence exists suggests this is unlikely to have been the case.

If however the Japanese chose this attack method I suggest the distance might be further north then 20 miles in turn because the lower reaches of the Johor River provide a formidable barrier against exploiting a beachhead on the east coast of Malay. So they’d have to land far enough north to cross the river in a narrower area before completing the encirclement of the island. None of this is likely to happen either, but it has to be accounted for. We can’t reasonably assume Kota Baharu is the most southerly place Japan would ever think to land on, especially once we’ve started making modifications to the historical British dispositions.

[PainRack]

Even more so since that’s not what I said at all. How does a my statement of a ‘landing 20-50 miles north of Singapore island turn into landing on the north coast of Singapore island? Last I check Singapore island is only about 15 miles north-south in the first place. The Japanese would never mount a major ship to shore landing operation within about 20 miles of the islands coastline, because that would be within range of the 15in gun batteries which could range to 32,000 yards. More if they were issued supercharges though what evidence exists suggests this is unlikely to have been the case.

If however the Japanese chose this attack method I suggest the distance might be further north then 20 miles in turn because the lower reaches of the Johor River provide a formidable barrier against exploiting a beachhead on the east coast of Malay. So they’d have to land far enough north to cross the river in a narrower area before completing the encirclement of the island. None of this is likely to happen either, but it has to be accounted for. We can’t reasonably assume Kota Baharu is the most southerly place Japan would ever think to land on, especially once we’ve started making modifications to the historical British dispositions.

Ackkkk......... Mine bad.

I try and see whether I could dig up the correspondance between Bennett and Perceival regarding the defences in Johore.

[frogcurry]

Than supply them with information about what the Japanese do in China. They aren't fighting the yellow peril- they are fighting a bunch of brutal zealots who butcher civilians and don't respect those who surrender.

How would the chinese immigrant/ Malay native population ethnic split and the proto-communist movements that existed back then play into this?

i.e. Would it be possible to "use" the guerilla problems of the Emergency by establishing security militia movements, to act as a foundation for anti-Japanese resistance in those areas that were taken?
And is it likely that this sort of propaganda would have counterproductive effects by giving more fuel to the communist movements in the chinese population, by showing how evil the Japanese are (but we won't actually stop them unless they attack the British ruled lands)?

[ray245]

Than supply them with information about what the Japanese do in China. They aren't fighting the yellow peril- they are fighting a bunch of brutal zealots who butcher civilians and don't respect those who surrender.

How would the chinese immigrant/ Malay native population ethnic split and the proto-communist movements that existed back then play into this?

i.e. Would it be possible to "use" the guerilla problems of the Emergency by establishing security militia movements, to act as a foundation for anti-Japanese resistance in those areas that were taken?
And is it likely that this sort of propaganda would have counterproductive effects by giving more fuel to the communist movements in the chinese population, by showing how evil the Japanese are (but we won't actually stop them unless they attack the British ruled lands)?

The Chinese community is more or less evenly spit between supporting the CCP and the KMT in China. The British could make full use of people who are sympathic to the KMT.