Kratman and RN Capabilities

[PeZook]

Swimming across the Channel to invade England... can't you just mow the idiots down with destroyers anyway if the Wehrmacht demonstrates superhuman endurance?

You can just sail through them and kill them with bow waves and screws. Any soldier who'd make it to shore would be worth less than an 80-year-old auxilliary Territorial Defence infantryman he'd be inevitably taken prisoner by, anyway.

As was pointed out, all it takes to drown for a soldier is to still have his boots, webbing and rifle with him. At Normandy, plenty of soldiers drowned in pretty shallow water because they couldn't stay on the surface with their gear, and couldn't get out of their gear in time.

Even if the Germans are all supermen who can swim in boots and with weapons and ammo and grenades, it means that by the end of the day, the Germans would have a lot of disorganized light infantry at the beachhead. Such a "formation" would have...less than ideal combat worth under the best of circumstances, but now think about the following: what would have happened to maps and compasses and radios and code books during a swim to shore from a sinking barge?

Yeah. Have fun trying to organize an assault to take a port when your officers don't have any means to do that. Especially since the British historically removed many road signs or replaced them with fake ones pointing in wrong directions as a means to complicate enemy operations

[Simon_Jester]

We did instead, however, have very extensive fortifications everywhere, which were far better than the fortifications which halted the British at the Hellespont in 1915, and while the guns of the ships doing the bombardments here would be longer-ranged (well, not than the QE's) than the old pre-dreads at the Hellespont.... Who cares? The Endicott forts will hold up well enough since ships bombarding shore fortresses has always been problematic, and if the 1880s vintage guns of the Ottomans could stop a fleet, the 1890s - 1990s vintage Endicott forts will keep the Entente's squadrons at long enough ranges that the occasional 12in or 13.5in shell crashing down will be easily repaired;

The Endicott forts and their effectiveness were one of the big unknowns in my picture of how this would go. I know that they existed, and when they were made, but that's about it.

Leningrad hardly stopped manufacturing things in WW2 under far more heavy inaccurate long range bombardment. I think Stuart is being somewhat optimistic about how the Royal Navy could bombard the US coast, but, conversely, the United States Navy is about 4 years away from having the advantage in 1917, and Germany does not have 4 years of life left. Not under the British hunger blockade. They'd either have to actually start getting grain from the Ukraine in great quantities or win the war in a single decisive blow.

The problem being that winning the war in a single decisive blow was already tried in OTL and failed: The Spring Offensive.

How much did the Allies know about the strategic situation in Germany? If they didn't realize just how close Germany was to collapsing from starvation, then they'd be looking at:
-US entrance into the war in spring or summer of 1917, placing the Central Powers at approximate naval parity with the Allies.
-A divided Royal Navy, one that must either pare down the Grand Fleet to the point where a second Jutland becomes a dangerous possibility... or allow the Americans a free hand in much of the Atlantic.
-German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare (one which no longer needs to worry about American-flagged ships getting sunk in the Channel Approaches)
-Russia falling apart at the seams (a reaction to internal politics, which aren't changed in this timeline)
-Mutinies in the French Army (a reaction to Verdun and the Nivelle Offensive, which isn't changed in this timeline)

They might just agree to a negotiated peace rather than thinking "No, wait! If we just hang on and let the French take a few more pastings, the Germans will surely curl up and die in 1919! 1920 at the latest!" And that temptation will only get stronger after the Spring Offensive next year.

My impression is that one of the things the Americans really contributed to the Allied war effort in World War One was simple hope: the knowledge that there was now a fresh pool of industry and several million more potential draftees to throw at a war that had already bled Britain and France dry. Just knowing that reinforcements were going to be arriving seems to have had a pretty positive effect on... call it strategic morale.

Having the US join the Central Powers would have the opposite effect: knowing that the enemy just got a major boost in their long term warmaking potential right at the same time that one of the big three allies collapses and a second starts to wobble.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Even if the Germans made it across, there's always the option of capturing them and then parade them across Trafalgar square... Worked great for the Soviets after Operation Uranus.

[Stuart]

I wonder, Stuart, are there any other prominent sci-fi/alt-hist authors that you've managed to send off in a fit of screaming rage? Seeing as how you've done Stirling and Kratman already, I thought it might be worthwhile to ask.

Stirling was more a case of I let the matter drop after he was exposed as a comprehensive liar without any in-depth knowledge of the subject. His argument strategy was simply to make information up on the spur of the moment and assume that it was accepted as fact unless somebody went to the trouble of discrediting it. So, I would describe his demeanour as a sullen sulk rather than a screaming rage. Kratman was definately a case of screaming rage though, in the pmails afterwards he was almost incoherent with fury.

Apart from that, I don't think I've taken umbrage at anybody else; not to that point anyway. I have a lot of respect for most authors around; most at least try to get things right (even if I disagree with a lot they say, I can see how they got there). Kratman is an exception to that general rule; I honestly can't see how he says the things he does given his background. He just has to know better. In my opinion Stirling is a different case; his knowledge of things military is at the Popular Mechanics level badly reinforced by cherry-picked tertiary or quaternary sources. In a way, that's a pity because he actually writes quite well. Basically he needs a co-author to keep him on a leash. David Drake and Jerry Pournelle used to fill that role but I understand they had a falling out with him.

[Simon_Jester]

Was the issue with Stirling over the Draka setting, or something else?

Also, the question of US coastal defenses has come up. You seem to think of them as not being a significant obstacle to RN battlecruiser raids and the like; why so?

[Samuel]

Draka setting. Stuart gives some details here:

https://bbs.stardestroyer.net/viewtopic ... 4&t=103338

[Stuart]

Was the issue with Stirling over the Draka setting, or something else?

In a way, it was over the technical feasibility of some of the equipment described.

Also, the question of US coastal defenses has come up. You seem to think of them as not being a significant obstacle to RN battlecruiser raids and the like; why so?

The five ships I picked out as suitable for the raiding strategy (Repulse, Renown, Courageous, Glorious and Furious) were selected because they were heavily gunned (total of 20 15 inch and 1 18 inch) and because their absence from the Grand Fleet wouldn't mark much of a reduction in the Grand Fleet's strength. That heavy gun power meant they could stand off outside the range of the forts and pound on the city using aircraft from Furious for spotting. Remember, the objective isn't to actually do much damage but to create an air of public alarm that would force the American battle line to stay at home. So, given a choice between making the bombardments effective by risking the batteries and sacrificing effectiveness by staying out of their reach, then the choice would be for the latter.

We can alsoa ssume that the British wouldn't have stopped capital ship production the way they did. So, we could see all four Hood class battlecruisers completed and a follow-on class of battleships. The latter would be a good subject for speculation although a good guess might be a 24 knot Hood with heavier armor and 16.5 inch guns.

There's no doubt that this would be a much more "balanced" scanrio than OTL and it would take some deft footwork on the Entente powers part to keep things under control. However, Germany is already on the way down; the country can't survive much beyond 1919 and American power wouldn't be adequate to replace Germany by then (especially if the Brits were more careful and didn't allow the Great Scuttle, thus making the German fleet available to the RN).

So much depends on the date the US enters the war on the CP side. If its 1918, its too late. Germany is gone and teh US just ends up making an apologetic peace. 1916 or 1915 we have an entirely different situation

[Simon_Jester]

So... they're mostly doing terror bombing of cities. I can see it working if it's done from extreme range, though there are still going to be problems with minefields, and you might trip over a submarine that's lying in wait for just such an emergency.

And then there's a risk that the enemy will react to your raiding force by going after its bases. Are Halifax and Bermuda well defended?

I'm not saying that you wouldn't see the equivalent of the German raids on Hartlepool and Scarborough, but I'm not sure they'd be able to cause enough damage to achieve the RN's objective here without heavily risking the ships. Or that the British could handle a determined attack on the fleet bases being used to stage the raids from.

One very specific question: I thought Furious ran into trouble with her 18 inch gun mount in practice, with the hull not being able to take the weight and/or recoil; would she be able to perform under these conditions?
___________

Also, on ATG's topic, trying to prevent warship construction by shelling the shipyards sounds tricky if you have to do it from outside the range of shore batteries. Especially since the shore batteries are liable to be placed specifically to cover the shipyards.

I'm going to take Hampton Roads as an example. Looking at a map and trying my best not to ludicrously misestimate gun ranges, the naval shipyard is far enough inland that... looking at it, even with 15 and 18 inch guns, there's a fairly limited area where you can hit them from without actually sailing into the roadstead, and much of it is within range of the heavy batteries at Fort Monroe. The dead zone looks pretty, well, dead; I speculate that it could (would?) be mined in the event of war, simply to deny the enemy a place to park while bombarding the shipyard. And spotting aircraft may run into harassment from the nearby naval air station, though I don't know if they had anything capable of pursuit there, so I can't prove that.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

We can alsoa ssume that the British wouldn't have stopped capital ship production the way they did.

I can sort of see that if the US is becoming more and more hostile over the hunger blockade, but something's got to give, Stuart. There will certainly be no entente offensive in 1918, it's simply impossible without American industrial support and we both know it. We have to assume that there was no unrestricted warfare against commerce here, so the U-boot menace isn't an issue operating from US ports (that would certainly be terminal to the UK here, but there's no sane way to have the US and Germany on the same side with unrestricted submarine warfare in progress). The Germans can retreat to the Hindenburg line and send more troops east to actually get a solid hold on the Ukraine over the course of 1918 - 1919 instead of committing the Michael Offensive as a prospective alternative. Allied willpower for continued resistance will be deeply impacted, especially since this also leaves open the reinforcement of the Balkans and that means the collapse of Austro-Hungary won't happen either. For that matter the Germans can trade Minsk to the Reds for the Gangut-class at Brest-Litovsk if they absolutely know that the US is in the war and the naval equation is that much more important, which in combination with the German Black Sea Fleet would pretty much eliminate the Marine Nationale from the equation.

So, we could see all four Hood class battlecruisers completed and a follow-on class of battleships. The latter would be a good subject for speculation although a good guess might be a 24 knot Hood with heavier armor and 16.5 inch guns.

I thought the next gun up here would be 16.25in, since it's the traditional British progression of doubling shell weights?

Anyway, I don't see how more than four such ships could be laid down in the situation, and let's not forget that the British financial situation would be in complete shambles with the US cutting off, companies would swamp under and a direct command economy would virtually end up being necessary. Since the prospect of the British burning the east coast is a bit far-fetched, an invasion of Canada really does seem in the offing: Let's remember that in 1917 the US was still an aggressively expanding, colonizing power determined to put the bounty of an entire continent at the hands of its citizenry, and could quite possibly count on a revolt of the deeply truculent Quebecois.

There's no doubt that this would be a much more "balanced" scanrio than OTL and it would take some deft footwork on the Entente powers part to keep things under control.

The basic problem is that something like a quarter to a third of the entente's munitions production capacity was actually American; they now no longer have the necessary munitions to actually defeat the Germans on land, or indeed do anything more than maintain a cautious defensive strategy--while, perversely, the Spanish influenza killing a couple million people within Central Europe, as it will inevitably do with the war still on and the population that much more vulnerable, will make it easier for the Alliance to feed its citizenry.

However, Germany is already on the way down; the country can't survive much beyond 1919 and American power wouldn't be adequate to replace Germany by then (especially if the Brits were more careful and didn't allow the Great Scuttle, thus making the German fleet available to the RN).

The main question is in relation to the political consequences. I think internally the German government could regain control from Ludendorff in any scenario where the US is an ally. This, and the fact that the US would be invading Canada as a bargaining chip, and has no interests in the more extreme versions of any German peace, actually raises the prospect of a negotiated settlement taking place--just because the Entente might be able to claw a measure of survival shorn of its financial and materiale aide from the US.... Doesn't mean that the will, especially with the Spanish Influenza hitting a wartime population, would be there to actually do so.

So much depends on the date the US enters the war on the CP side. If its 1918, its too late. Germany is gone and teh US just ends up making an apologetic peace. 1916 or 1915 we have an entirely different situation

Any victory would be completely pyrrhic, though--the US would be the unquestioned master of the world because the British Empire would have been strained to the breaking point by the fighting in this kind of war.

Let's imagine the peace treaty in such an outcome, where the French and British bleed white on the Hindenburg line, the Germans are starving to death from the blockade, and everyone is dying by the millions of the influenza whilst the war rages, Canada is being overrun by the US army and a naval stalemate is maintained by the central position of the Royal Navy. It would probably end up a pretty interesting thing and be basically predicated on getting the entente to accept Brest-Litovsk and the Germans to cede territory in the west for them to do so. The probability goes up the longer the hunger blockade works and the further the US progresses in Canada and the more ominous the building programme of 16in battleships in the US starts to become.

[Simon_Jester]

We have to assume that there was no unrestricted warfare against commerce here, so the U-boot menace isn't an issue operating from US ports (that would certainly be terminal to the UK here, but there's no sane way to have the US and Germany on the same side with unrestricted submarine warfare in progress).

At least, not until after the US becomes a co-belligerent and pulls all its shipping out of British waters. Not so sure what would happen then.

[Stuart]

I can sort of see that if the US is becoming more and more hostile over the hunger blockade, but something's got to give, Stuart. There will certainly be no entente offensive in 1918, it's simply impossible without American industrial support and we both know it. We have to assume that there was no unrestricted warfare against commerce here, so the U-boot menace isn't an issue operating from US ports (that would certainly be terminal to the UK here, but there's no sane way to have the US and Germany on the same side with unrestricted submarine warfare in progress). The Germans can retreat to the Hindenburg line and send more troops east to actually get a solid hold on the Ukraine over the course of 1918 - 1919 instead of committing the Michael Offensive as a prospective alternative. Allied willpower for continued resistance will be deeply impacted, especially since this also leaves open the reinforcement of the Balkans and that means the collapse of Austro-Hungary won't happen either. For that matter the Germans can trade Minsk to the Reds for the Gangut-class at Brest-Litovsk if they absolutely know that the US is in the war and the naval equation is that much more important, which in combination with the German Black Sea Fleet would pretty much eliminate the Marine Nationale from the equation.

Some resources can be freed up by the cold hard fact that a German unlimited submarine campaign and the US presence on the CP side are mutually exclusive. So, most of the shipbuilding effort that went into building ASW and replacement merchant ships could be put into additional capital ship production. Also, the deteriorated world situation might well convince Lloyd George to give Haig the resources that were being hoarded in the UK. Further German advances in Russia are likely to be counter-productive due to front extension. As we've often discussed, Russia is the wrong shape for invasion from the west

I thought the next gun up here would be 16.25in, since it's the traditional British progression of doubling shell weights?

The 1919 Dreadnought plans quoted a 16.5 inch gun as being one of the options for the putative new battleships. The alternatives was the 18 inch gun. I think (personal opinion here) that the 16.5 inch was the heavy shell, low velocity version of the nominal 16.25 and the 16 inch that eventually ended up on Nelson was the light shell/high velocity variant.

Anyway, I don't see how more than four such ships could be laid down in the situation, and let's not forget that the British financial situation would be in complete shambles with the US cutting off, companies would swamp under and a direct command economy would virtually end up being necessary. Since the prospect of the British burning the east coast is a bit far-fetched

I don't think its far-fetched at all. It's the sort of raiding strategy the Brits loved when they couldn't find anything better to do. On the plus side for the British economy is that they immediately repudiate all their war-debts up to the time of the US declaration of war. That's a nice little benefit.

, an invasion of Canada really does seem in the offing: Let's remember that in 1917 the US was still an aggressively expanding, colonizing power determined to put the bounty of an entire continent at the hands of its citizenry, and could quite possibly count on a revolt of the deeply truculent Quebecois.

It was an aggressive expansionary power without a significant army. Remember, when the AEF went to France it wore British uniforms, carried British rifles, used French machine guns (with unerring efficiency picking the one that didn't work) and French artillery while its air force flew French fighters and British bombers. It was late 1919/early 1920 before the US Army got US equipment. Until then it was utterly dependent on the British and French for equipment. In fact, except in the fact that it provided a lot of warm bodies for the Germans to practice machine gun tactics on, the US Army was in logistics terms a lioability, not an asset. Without the diversion of British and French equipment to America, and allowing for hoarded troops in the Uk to be released, 1918 deficiencies could be restored. 1919 probably also. 1920, it doesn't matter. The Germans are gone.

Now, this leads us to Canada. It's a very obvious target. Only, we run into the small US Army in 1917 and the fact that the Canadians have been mobilized for three years. I'd suggest that its a very good probability the infant US army would get soundly spanked.

The basic problem is that something like a quarter to a third of the entente's munitions production capacity was actually American; they now no longer have the necessary munitions to actually defeat the Germans on land, or indeed do anything more than maintain a cautious defensive strategy--while, perversely, the Spanish influenza killing a couple million people within Central Europe, as it will inevitably do with the war still on and the population that much more vulnerable, will make it easier for the Alliance to feed its citizenry.

Given the overall balance explained above, I would disagree that the Entente was in a position only to mount a defensive. All things considered, plusses as well as minuses, they were OK for 1918 and probably 1919. However, the Great Influenza is an interesting point. It originated in Kansas and spread with US troops so its arguable the pandemic wouldn't have happened if the US troops had stayed home. Also, the effects of such pandemics are than they disrupt food production first so teh CP ability to feed its population would be hit. (By the way,the name "Spanish Influenza" tends to be looked on a bit dimly these days because it didn;t come from Spain. The Great Influenza tends to be the preferred nomenclature)

The main question is in relation to the political consequences. I think internally the German government could regain control from Ludendorff in any scenario where the US is an ally. This, and the fact that the US would be invading Canada as a bargaining chip, and has no interests in the more extreme versions of any German peace, actually raises the prospect of a negotiated settlement taking place--just because the Entente might be able to claw a measure of survival shorn of its financial and materiale aide from the US.... Doesn't mean that the will, especially with the Spanish Influenza hitting a wartime population, would be there to actually do so.

That's quite plausible and one end of the spectrum. The other is that the US bogs down in Canada, has to keep its fleet at home because of teh East Coast threat and starts to lose people from The Great Influenza. By the time its in fit condition to move, its 1920 and Germany has caved in. Result a quiet "sorry chaps let's pretend it didn't happen" type peace agreement. Oh, and the Rainbow plans get a lot more serious.

Any victory would be completely pyrrhic, though--the US would be the unquestioned master of the world because the British Empire would have been strained to the breaking point by the fighting in this kind of war.

No argument there.

Let's imagine the peace treaty in such an outcome, where the French and British bleed white on the Hindenburg line, the Germans are starving to death from the blockade, and everyone is dying by the millions of the influenza whilst the war rages, Canada is being overrun by the US army and a naval stalemate is maintained by the central position of the Royal Navy. It would probably end up a pretty interesting thing and be basically predicated on getting the entente to accept Brest-Litovsk and the Germans to cede territory in the west for them to do so. The probability goes up the longer the hunger blockade works and the further the US progresses in Canada and the more ominous the building programme of 16in battleships in the US starts to become.

Well, the Hindenburg line looked set to cave in anyway. I'd argue it differently. Germany, encouraged by teh US entry to the war tries to hang on in 1918. As the year runs on, it becomes apparant there isn't going to be a US influx of troops and morale caves in. By that time, the allied armies are on the Rhine and getting ready to cross. Germany gets a really, really nasty peace treaty. Essentially, the German Empire is disbanded, Germany hacked into four states (Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony and one other say hannover but rename to taste) that are virtually disarmed. Massive reparations etc etc etc. At that point, Entente eyes turn to America with a really nasty war looming Hence the "sorry about that" treaty.

Now that is an interesting situation.

[Simon_Jester]

Anyway, I don't see how more than four such ships could be laid down in the situation, and let's not forget that the British financial situation would be in complete shambles with the US cutting off, companies would swamp under and a direct command economy would virtually end up being necessary. Since the prospect of the British burning the east coast is a bit far-fetched

I don't think its far-fetched at all. It's the sort of raiding strategy the Brits loved when they couldn't find anything better to do.

The question isn't whether the British would raid the East Coast. The question is how much damage they'd do when they tried, and at how much risk to their own ships.

You seem to be saying "great damage, very little risk." The Duchess seems to be saying "relatively light damage, considerable risk." I don't know enough to be able to tell, which is why I'm asking:

Are the US coastal defenses poor enough to allow the RN's heavy raiding units to attack major targets on the Eastern Seaboard with impunity?

It was an aggressive expansionary power without a significant army. Remember, when the AEF went to France it wore British uniforms, carried British rifles, used French machine guns (with unerring efficiency picking the one that didn't work) and French artillery while its air force flew French fighters and British bombers. It was late 1919/early 1920 before the US Army got US equipment...

How much, if any, of this equipment was manufactured in the US? For example, much of the historical AEF was armed with the M1917 Enfield rifle, which was effectively a British design rechambered in .30-06. So that's a British rifle, one that would not be available to the US if it joined the Central Powers... leaving the US Army short by hundreds of thousands of rifles, right?

Wrong. The reason the US bothered to rechamber the design in the first place was that American factories were already manufacturing it for use by the British. If the US had suddenly declared war on the Entente in 1917, they would still have been able to take the factories making P-14s for Britain and switch them to making M1917s for the US.

Of course, the picture may be very different in other kinds of equipment. I imagine that being forced to rely on native-built designs would be a major problem for the nascent US air arm. I don't know how serious the problem would be in the artillery: was this a case of the US artillery using French-made guns, or of the US artillery using French-designed and US-made guns?

Now, this leads us to Canada. It's a very obvious target. Only, we run into the small US Army in 1917 and the fact that the Canadians have been mobilized for three years. I'd suggest that its a very good probability the infant US army would get soundly spanked.

I believe it. Here the equipment problem isn't the main factor so much as the manpower problem; the US would have to spend many months building up before it would have an army capable of invading Canada. It certainly couldn't do so as soon as war was declared.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

If that came to pass, Stuart, the latent hostility between the US and UK would nonetheless guarantee a severe arms race--which the British cannot afford. All of the pro-British sentiment that exploded in the WW1 era as "they are like us" would have never happened, German would be the second language of the United States and there would be a horrifyingly pro-German sentiment of the poor brave nation going to war for right against the terrorists of the era (the Serbs) and being crushed by the traditional enemy of the United States. The six South Dakotas would be followed by two improved models and then a completely different design probably with the 18in/48cal and the battlecruisers would be followed I suspect by a proper fast battleship--we would be swamping the navies of the world. Can the British really let that stand? Or would the war continue out of sheer desperation to try and cripple American industry from the base of Canada before that can take place?

Because unified German sentiment was enormously strong in this period, and by the 1920s I am quite certain that the conservative revolutionary movement would have reunified Germany under the protective umbrella of a United States Navy of almost impossible proportions, and the United Kingdom would be too broke to do anything about it--they would have to stand aside and let the restoration of Germany proceed or lose their colonial Empire to the United States, and the French would be completely powerless in the face of it. So would the Germans really "lose" here? Temporarily, but not in the long term. By being crushed so harshly the pro-German sentiment in the United States would be immense and within a few short years we would be flush with the power to do something about it. If the peace lasts ten years it would be remarkable.


But I'll amend that I think the date of a US entry would have to be earlier--because several key missteps would have to be avoided by the Germans (ham-handed involvement in Venezuela and Mexico and a few of the Kaiser's more outlandish comments) around 1900 and then in 1912 either Taft or Roosevelt would have become President or better yet Roosevelt selects Elihu Root as his successor and doesn't run against him in 1912, meaning that Root ends up serving two terms and is succeeded by Hughes in 1916; the United States will never support the Central Powers with Wilson having been president even briefly. All of this means that we're likely to go to war in late 1915 over the illegal hunger blockade of Germany (the US considered the distant blockade illegal, and it was unquestionably illegal to embargo traffic to neutral countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark) , not in 1917. And then it is indeed a very, very different picture.

[Stuart]

You seem to be saying "great damage, very little risk." The Duchess seems to be saying "relatively light damage, considerable risk."

Not really; I'm saying that there's relatively little risk although the direct gains are arguable. However, the political gain in keeping the US battleline in home waters is worth the risk.

Are the US coastal defenses poor enough to allow the RN's heavy raiding units to attack major targets on the Eastern Seaboard with impunity?

It's not a question of impunity so much as natural advantage. The ships can chose when and where to attack. That gives them a major edge.

How much, if any, of this equipment was manufactured in the US? For example, much of the historical AEF was armed with the M1917 Enfield rifle, which was effectively a British design rechambered in .30-06. So that's a British rifle, one that would not be available to the US if it joined the Central Powers... leaving the US Army short by hundreds of thousands of rifles, right? Wrong. The reason the US bothered to rechamber the design in the first place was that American factories were already manufacturing it for use by the British. If the US had suddenly declared war on the Entente in 1917, they would still have been able to take the factories making P-14s for Britain and switch them to making M1917s for the US. Of course, the picture may be very different in other kinds of equipment. I imagine that being forced to rely on native-built designs would be a major problem for the nascent US air arm. I don't know how serious the problem would be in the artillery: was this a case of the US artillery using French-made guns, or of the US artillery using French-designed and US-made guns?

Originally imported equipment was to be supplemented and then replaced by home made kit. However, the later stage never happened since the war ended first. The US production was just beginning to flow when the tap was turned off again in mid-1919. So, it'll be early-mid 1920 before the US production starts to equip their own forces.

I believe it. Here the equipment problem isn't the main factor so much as the manpower problem; the US would have to spend many months building up before it would have an army capable of invading Canada. It certainly couldn't do so as soon as war was declared.

Agreed. The putative invasion of Canada is probably a political card on the basis "we'll do it unless".

If that came to pass, Stuart, the latent hostility between the US and UK would nonetheless guarantee a severe arms race--which the British cannot afford

No argument there.

All of the pro-British sentiment that exploded in the WW1 era as "they are like us" would have never happened, German would be the second language of the United States and there would be a horrifyingly pro-German sentiment of the poor brave nation going to war for right against the terrorists of the era (the Serbs) and being crushed by the traditional enemy of the United States.

That's a bit more questionable. Remember we're working on a PoD of 1917 with the cause being Americans smuggling goods to Germany getting whacked. Now, prior to that, we've had the Lusitania sinking, some bombastic German actions that did not go down at all well and quite a few merchant ships getting torpedoed. So there'll be a lot of anti-german feeling as well (historically there was a lot; it was not healthy to have a German surname in 1915 -1917. It's much more likely the decision on whom to go to war with was a finely-cut issue and there would be a lot of dissent about it. Think Vietnam fifty years early.

As to what would happen postwar, its significant that there was still a lot of nationalist sentiment in the various parts of Germany that comprised the German Empire. Certainly in Bavaria and Saxony. I honestly don't think the US would be happy to get involved in that mess; isolationist sentment still ran strong. It would be more of "A plague on all their houses and if you stick your noses in over here we'll bust them."

But I'll amend that I think the date of a US entry would have to be earlier--because several key missteps would have to be avoided by the Germans (ham-handed involvement in Venezuela and Mexico and a few of the Kaiser's more outlandish comments) around 1900 and then in 1912 either Taft or Roosevelt would have become President or better yet Roosevelt selects Elihu Root as his successor and doesn't run against him in 1912, meaning that Root ends up serving two terms and is succeeded by Hughes in 1916; the United States will never support the Central Powers with Wilson having been president even briefly. All of this means that we're likely to go to war in late 1915 over the illegal hunger blockade of Germany (the US considered the distant blockade illegal, and it was unquestionably illegal to embargo traffic to neutral countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark) , not in 1917. And then it is indeed a very, very different picture

I agree; but I was working from a specific scenario, one that meant the date of WW1 entry had to be fairly late. Obviously pushing the date back does make it easier but it also increases the spread of possible outcomes. By the way, the US might not have liked it but the blockade of Germany was extremely legal as was embargoing traffic through neutral countries. There was actually a procedure laid down to establish whether goods could be embargoed based on increases over pre-war traffic. The US never liked embargoes but they never did anything about them because they were on very shaky legal ground. I'm afraid "illegal hunger blockade" is more emotive than accurate.

I think the basic problem the US had with blockades was that they weren't signatories to some appropriate agreements so during the ACW they used what was essentially the Napoleonic rules. They simply didn't apply in the 20th century

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

If that came to pass, Stuart, the latent hostility between the US and UK would nonetheless guarantee a severe arms race--which the British cannot afford.

Wasn't part of the problem with the arms race was that the UK didn't have a lot of money due to the substantial war debt that had to be paid to the US? In the scenario Stuart described, that war debt becomes annulled because the US took the side of the British's enemies.

[Stuart]

Wasn't part of the problem with the arms race was that the UK didn't have a lot of money due to the substantial war debt that had to be paid to the US? In the scenario Stuart described, that war debt becomes annulled because the US took the side of the British's enemies.

That was a great acceleration of the situation but the truth was that Britain was already on the downswing and the US was already on the upswing. In OTL, the immense war debts form WW1 greatly accelerated the UK downswing and their payment boosted the upswing of the US. If, as would happen in this scenario, the Uk repudiated those debts, the result would be that the UK downswing didn;t accelerate so fast and the US would be hit hard by the sudden non-payment. It's the old line, owe the bank a thousand dollars and the bank owns you. Owe the bank a thousand million and you own the bank. A lot of businesses relying on money from British contracts would go broke and that would cut into any American mobilization. The US would still overtake the UK but it would take longer. Much longer.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Wasn't part of the problem with the arms race was that the UK didn't have a lot of money due to the substantial war debt that had to be paid to the US? In the scenario Stuart described, that war debt becomes annulled because the US took the side of the British's enemies.

That was a great acceleration of the situation but the truth was that Britain was already on the downswing and the US was already on the upswing. In OTL, the immense war debts form WW1 greatly accelerated the UK downswing and their payment boosted the upswing of the US. If, as would happen in this scenario, the Uk repudiated those debts, the result would be that the UK downswing didn;t accelerate so fast and the US would be hit hard by the sudden non-payment. It's the old line, owe the bank a thousand dollars and the bank owns you. Owe the bank a thousand million and you own the bank. A lot of businesses relying on money from British contracts would go broke and that would cut into any American mobilization. The US would still overtake the UK but it would take longer. Much longer.

With the cost of sustaining another two years of war without the support of the United States, Stuart? I don't think so; the size of the lost generation will be much larger, and the industry of the country strained to the breaking point.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Well, the trouble would be, there are war reparations to be made, and the US would likely also have to pay war reparations.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Well, the trouble would be, there are war reparations to be made, and the US would likely also have to pay war reparations.

Try 'like hell no.'

[Simon_Jester]

You seem to be saying "great damage, very little risk." The Duchess seems to be saying "relatively light damage, considerable risk."

Not really; I'm saying that there's relatively little risk although the direct gains are arguable. However, the political gain in keeping the US battleline in home waters is worth the risk.

I'd call keeping the US battleline in home waters more than political gain for the UK. If it would work, if the ships could keep raiding for a sustained period of time without drawing a counterattack that punched out their fleet bases... then the strategy is worthwhile, sure.

But it depends on the US not being able to limit the damage caused by British raiders to acceptable levels, and not being able to counterattack the British fleet bases. I honestly don't know if that's plausible.

It's not a question of impunity so much as natural advantage. The ships can chose when and where to attack. That gives them a major edge.

This is definitely true to a point. But they can only be in so many places at once, and if their bases are in striking range of the US, the US Atlantic Fleet is in striking range of their bases. The question in my mind is whether the British could use raiding forces only to pose a sufficient threat to keep the USN fully bottled up.

Originally imported equipment was to be supplemented and then replaced by home made kit. However, the later stage never happened since the war ended first. The US production was just beginning to flow when the tap was turned off again in mid-1919. So, it'll be early-mid 1920 before the US production starts to equip their own forces.

Do you mean production of US-designed weapons, or production of any weapons at all? Because I could swear that a large fraction of Allied war production prior to US entry into the war was already coming from American factories. Am I wrong in this?

Well, the trouble would be, there are war reparations to be made, and the US would likely also have to pay war reparations.

Try 'like hell no.'

It would be very difficult for the Allies to impose war reparations on the US without doing something fairly drastic to convince them that they were beaten. Like wiping out their fleet and burning their coastal cities, more or less at a minimum. It might require outright invasion, and that could prove extremely difficult, because by the time Germany goes down the US will be more or less adequately mobilized to repel attacks on its home soil.

[Deathstalker]

Enjoying the thread.

To add the WWI discussion, England was living on borrowed time itself as far as starvation. Britain was losing merchant ships hand over fist to U boats, and if I recall, no one knew how bad it was and by the time they realized they were out of merchant ships, it would be to late. Another year of war, without US ships to help convoys, may have Britain reach a starvation point before the Germans. And the Germans could always buy or bully a continental power for food and have it delivered by rail.

[Fingolfin_Noldor]

Well, the trouble would be, there are war reparations to be made, and the US would likely also have to pay war reparations.

Try 'like hell no.'

You know very well that that will not work in International politics.

[Simon_Jester]

Well, the trouble would be, there are war reparations to be made, and the US would likely also have to pay war reparations.

Try 'like hell no.'

You know very well that that will not work in International politics.

It works if it's liable to cost more money to beat the reparations out of the recalcitrant power than you'd get back.

Which is plausible in this case. With the Western Allies brought so close to exhaustion by the end of the war, the prospect of a long drawn out struggle to convince the US that they're beaten isn't going to be in the cards. Remember, this is before "unconditional surrender."

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Well, the trouble would be, there are war reparations to be made, and the US would likely also have to pay war reparations.

Try 'like hell no.'

You know very well that that will not work in International politics.

Yes it will. It's called "Negotiations are closed, gentlemen, and if you want reparations, you may take them." Said in such a tone that it comes out as "like hell no".

The US is not prostrate in any of these scenarios, but only needs to prolong the war for two more years and it has a battle fleet capable of fully meeting the Royal Navy. And just because we would be unable to invade Canada in 1917 doesn't mean they would be able to invade us in early 1920, even with battle-hardened Imperial and French troops heading over. And some of the German U-boot fleet will have invariably sought shelter (and asylum for the crews who face starvation back home) in US ports, and would have been recommissioned into the USN, and we had our own submarines. With our nation threatened we would resort to unrestricted warfare against the Halifax convoys sending troops into Canada, and the state militias would provide a huge quantity of manpower, and after almost three years of preparation, the US Army would be plenty capable of not merely repulsing the British in Canada but taking Canada. And preemptively occupying Mexico and Cuba. The idea that the British would demand reparations when the US has recourse to war with the chance of annexing Canada as the reward of victory, is utterly absurd and if the British were insane enough to demand them, they would suffer the consequences. I literally cannot believe you said the US would be forced to pay reparations, it's like you haven't read any of this debate between me and Stuart whatsoever.

[The Duchess of Zeon]

Enjoying the thread.

To add the WWI discussion, England was living on borrowed time itself as far as starvation. Britain was losing merchant ships hand over fist to U boats, and if I recall, no one knew how bad it was and by the time they realized they were out of merchant ships, it would be to late. Another year of war, without US ships to help convoys, may have Britain reach a starvation point before the Germans. And the Germans could always buy or bully a continental power for food and have it delivered by rail.

The US would not have allied with Germany if Germany was engaged in unrestricted submarine warfare in any cronceivable way. Restricted campaigns and the Mediterranean are, a different story, but whether or not they could hurt the British so badly on their own would be a deeply contentious debate which cannot really be settled. Halpern's analysis would suggest yes, but others, very much no.