Worst American General?

[CaptHawkeye]

He's obviously not a General, but i'm surprised some snarky assholes didn't try to shoe horn Halsey onto that list. He has a terrible reputation post war...why? Because he basically didn't have a crystal ball at his disposal during the Philippines.

[CmdrWilkens]

Should Custer be on the list?

Following up even further of Elfdart's one liner. Custer was bold, aggressive, had swagger and very little humility. During the civil war he rose rapidly and was certainly at the forefront of cavalry commanders in the east both in terms of skill and brashness. His demise was the result of many things not the least of which was a combination of under trained troops, a lack of intelligence (one of the other columns of the force to which Custer belonged had already encountered part of the force he engaged but failed to let the other columns know this in time), and critically a belief that the shock value of a charge against the campsite would secure his objective causing the tribe to flee.

Simply put he didn't realize, and would have had a hard time realizing, not just that he was outnumbered but he was outnumbered by an enemy prepared to fight. From a tactical standpoint his disposition of forces and conduct during the battle itself, from what little evidence remains, was well executed save that is suffered from being very very very aggressive. Unfortunately he had virtually no hard intelligence and much of what he did have led to the wrong conclusions...so he was caught unprepared and wiped out as a result. It was poor command leadership but hardly "worst of" worthy.

[CaptHawkeye]

I've noticed that a lot of guys in history can end up on a "worst generals" list for what is more or less a simple mistake aggravated by conditions which were basically beyond the General's control. People seem to forget that hindsight is 20/20, and while it's easy for us to say "he was shit" it's not like many of us would have acted differently at the time.

To me a good General will typically use all of the resources available to him as efficiently as possible in order to achieve victory (or whatever outcome is reasonably attainable) in the quickest and most cost-effective manner possible.

[Edi]

Thread moved here from Off Topic by order of Thanas, Tyrant of the History Forum

[Elfdart]

I've noticed that a lot of guys in history can end up on a "worst generals" list for what is more or less a simple mistake aggravated by conditions which were basically beyond the General's control. People seem to forget that hindsight is 20/20, and while it's easy for us to say "he was shit" it's not like many of us would have acted differently at the time.

True, but the ones on the list aren't really the generals who were dealt shitty hands. No one has knocked Wainwright for the loss of the Philippines, since he was left with an army that was poorly equipped, out of supplies and completely cut off. Fredendall, on the other hand was done in by his stupidity, incompetence and (according to officers who served under him) outright cowardice. Rommel was flabbergasted by how much gear the US II Corps was given and how well-supplied they were and said something to effect that if only he could have received so much the war in North Africa might have turned out differently.

[Zinegata]

He's obviously not a General, but i'm surprised some snarky assholes didn't try to shoe horn Halsey onto that list. He has a terrible reputation post war...why? Because he basically didn't have a crystal ball at his disposal during the Philippines.

Halsey's actions during the Battle of Leyte Gulf were honestly inexcusable though. He could have easily divided his force to deal with both Ozawa and Kurita's forces, as he had overwhelming material superiority. Instead, he attacked Ozawa's force with what could only be described as "overkill" and left a bunch of destroyers and escort carriers to face the main Japanese force (forgetting the 7th Fleet battleships were also dealing with Nishimura's force to the South).

It is a telling blunder that in spite of overwhelming material superiority, Halsey came exceedingly close to almost losing the Pacific War (or at least making its victory longer and even more protracted).

And to prevent that blunder from becoming fatal, well, Samuel Morison said it best:

In no engagement of its entire history has the United States Navy shown more gallantry, guts and gumption than in those two morning hours between 0730 and 0930 off Samar

[Thanas]

Rommel was flabbergasted by how much gear the US II Corps was given and how well-supplied they were and said something to effect that if only he could have received so much the war in North Africa might have turned out differently.

That was pretty much common during the war. Every German General wished he had the American material supperiority.

[CaptHawkeye]

Halsey's actions during the Battle of Leyte Gulf were honestly inexcusable though. He could have easily divided his force to deal with both Ozawa and Kurita's forces, as he had overwhelming material superiority. Instead, he attacked Ozawa's force with what could only be described as "overkill" and left a bunch of destroyers and escort carriers to face the main Japanese force (forgetting the 7th Fleet battleships were also dealing with Nishimura's force to the South).

It was wrong, true, but ultimately a mistake. Conflicting recon had indicated to him that Kurita's force had been more or less smashed and was retiring back to Formosa. Nishimura's force was largely token, but couldn't be ignored. The big problem is that Ozawa's carriers were at the north, and Halsey had NO WAY of knowing that they were intended only as bait. Even if they were, even a small number of Kamikazes could cause serious problems for the Navy. A Kamikaze had sunk the St. Lo the day before after all. He had every reason to assume Ozawa's force was a much greater threat than what we know of it today.

It is a telling blunder that in spite of overwhelming material superiority, Halsey came exceedingly close to almost losing the Pacific War (or at least making its victory longer and even more protracted).

Not even close. The landings at Leyte were 100% complete by the time the Combined Fleet had entered the area. Even if Kurita had chosen to attack the landing zone, he would have gotten there only to find a handful of empty transports to shoot up. Meanwhile, he would have left himself with literally no time or way to escape Halsey. Kurita wasn't stupid, he knew the war was lost and had no intention of dieing pointlessly at the Philippines while his superiors sat safe in their bunkers in Japan. US Navy forces defending the landing zones basically consisted of lots of light ships like Destroyers and Escort Carriers. Whose loss wouldn't slow down the war at all.

And to prevent that blunder from becoming fatal, well, Samuel Morison said it best:

In no engagement of its entire history has the United States Navy shown more gallantry, guts and gumption than in those two morning hours between 0730 and 0930 off Samar

[/quote]

The defense at Samar was a heroic effort no doubt. Ultimately a very successful one too, despite all the cynicism the veterans of the battle have for it. US Navy losses at Samar were very minor considering the damage inflicted to Kurita's force in turn.

[Night_stalker]

Should Custer be on the list?

Following up even further of Elfdart's one liner. Custer was bold, aggressive, had swagger and very little humility. During the civil war he rose rapidly and was certainly at the forefront of cavalry commanders in the east both in terms of skill and brashness. His demise was the result of many things not the least of which was a combination of under trained troops, a lack of intelligence (one of the other columns of the force to which Custer belonged had already encountered part of the force he engaged but failed to let the other columns know this in time), and critically a belief that the shock value of a charge against the campsite would secure his objective causing the tribe to flee.

Simply put he didn't realize, and would have had a hard time realizing, not just that he was outnumbered but he was outnumbered by an enemy prepared to fight. From a tactical standpoint his disposition of forces and conduct during the battle itself, from what little evidence remains, was well executed save that is suffered from being very very very aggressive. Unfortunately he had virtually no hard intelligence and much of what he did have led to the wrong conclusions...so he was caught unprepared and wiped out as a result. It was poor command leadership but hardly "worst of" worthy.

True, but 2 things strike me as just plain dumb of him to have done. He left the Gatling guns, guns which might've been useful in holding back the oncoming swarm of Natives back at their ferry, and he split his forces in 2 to attack a possibly numerically superior enemy. I am no solider, but that last one strieks me as particularly dumb for a trained commander to do.

[Rogue 9]

Rommel was flabbergasted by how much gear the US II Corps was given and how well-supplied they were and said something to effect that if only he could have received so much the war in North Africa might have turned out differently.

That was pretty much common during the war. Every German General wished he had the American material supperiority.

That's been the case in pretty much every war the United States has fought, from the Civil War (inclusive) on. The United States post-Industrial Revolution has been fanatic about equipping its armies, during the Civil War often to its detriment. Multiple generals (most notably McClellan, but also Rosecrans and a few others) on the Union side simply would not move without their full supply train, even when moving with what they had immediately would have crushed poorly equipped insurgent forces that in fact escaped before the heavy artillery, reinforcements, or whatever else the holdup was got to the front.

True, but 2 things strike me as just plain dumb of him to have done. He left the Gatling guns, guns which might've been useful in holding back the oncoming swarm of Natives back at their ferry, and he split his forces in 2 to attack a possibly numerically superior enemy. I am no solider, but that last one strieks me as particularly dumb for a trained commander to do.

It was done without disaster by the Army of Northern Virginia a few times, but that goes back to McClellan being on the list more than that being a good idea in general. (More to the point, Lee knew his foe and knew that McClellan would not take the initiative to attack, something that one cannot assume about every commander in every engagement.)

[Bilbo]

Should Custer be on the list?

His record as a general was pretty good; it was his record as a colonel that sucked.

If I remember correctly most of Custer's command decisions were to make glorious charges into battle that got lots of soldiers around him killed while surviving.

The man was a glory hound and a buffoon.

[Night_stalker]

Yeah, it's ironic that he only acheived the level of fame that he was lookling for in life after his death.

[Thanas]

True, but 2 things strike me as just plain dumb of him to have done. He left the Gatling guns, guns which might've been useful in holding back the oncoming swarm of Natives back at their ferry, and he split his forces in 2 to attack a possibly numerically superior enemy. I am no solider, but that last one strieks me as particularly dumb for a trained commander to do.

The first one can be justified because a mobile cavalry force which Custer used for charging is not going to be helped much with guns being dragged behind. The latter actually is a viable cavalry tactic if you have good forces and the enemy is unable to respond/redeploy. He thought he was attacking savages with no coordination, when in fact many were pretty decent fighters who had resolved their squabbles.

[Night_stalker]

True, but at least if he brought them along, he would have the option of simplying sending them back. I know that it was a good tactic, but I think sending out scouts, who pointed out how freakin' big the camp was would'v been better. At that point, any commander who didn't graduate 34 out of his class of 34 at West Point, would've called for backup, and waited. Custer, the idiot did not, and the rest is history.

[Thanas]

True, but at least if he brought them along, he would have the option of simplying sending them back. I know that it was a good tactic, but I think sending out scouts, who pointed out how freakin' big the camp was would'v been better. At that point, any commander who didn't graduate 34 out of his class of 34 at West Point, would've called for backup, and waited. Custer, the idiot did not, and the rest is history.

Sure, any good general would have had proper reconnaissance. That said, even Generals who are considered among the best their nation ever fielded (though in the case of the English and most of the Americans that is damning with faint praise) got absolutely hammered by ambushes. So it is not that Custer is so unique in that regard, especially considering the "quality" of his peers.

[Night_stalker]

Like I said, he failed to figure "lots of tents= possible lots of warriors". That was just plain idiotic of him.

[Stuart]

Generals who are considered among the best their nation ever fielded (though in the case of the English and most of the Americans that is damning with faint praise)

Might I gently point out that in wars between the UK and Germany and the USA and Germany, the score is 2:0 in both cases.

[Thanas]

Generals who are considered among the best their nation ever fielded (though in the case of the English and most of the Americans that is damning with faint praise)

Might I gently point out that in wars between the UK and Germany and the USA and Germany, the score is 2:0 in both cases.

So? You know as well as I do that both these wars were decided by industrial advantages in an age where Generals do not really matter unless you get total incompetents to lead your nation. It really would not have mattered if you had somehow cloned Prince Heinrich, Gneisenau, Moltke, Seydlitz etc, because in the modern age numbers matter, not the skill of Generals.

[CmdrWilkens]

Like I said, he failed to figure "lots of tents= possible lots of warriors". That was just plain idiotic of him.

No it would be idiotic of you, when the whole tribe moves in large groups of tents with warriors able to actually mount and oppose carbine cavalry numbering less than one in ten adult males...and the number with the desire to fight in such circumstances usually much smaller, large number of tents means that Custer had found what was likely the enemey's center of gravity. The whole point of the expedition was to drive the Sioux in to seeking a settlement with the US and destroying the homes of a good protion of the civilians in the tribe was a common tactic which worked.

Custer thought, because of the faulty intelligence at hand, that he was about to surprise one of the main population centers the whole expedition was targetting. The idea that he would face a vastly numerically superior force that was both ready and intending to fight was an almost unique occurence over the course of the Indian Wars.

True, but at least if he brought them along, he would have the option of simplying sending them back. I know that it was a good tactic, but I think sending out scouts, who pointed out how freakin' big the camp was would'v been better. At that point, any commander who didn't graduate 34 out of his class of 34 at West Point, would've called for backup, and waited. Custer, the idiot did not, and the rest is history.

The guns were with his support column and he DID call for them to come up once he ran in to resistance and realized he would need to pull back and re-group (too late as it turned out as he had already had his best avenue of retreat cut off). The basic tactic of dividing his force to entrap as much of the enemy as possible by cutting off the majority of the available escape routes was both sound doctrine and something the gattling guns couldn't keep up with. Given that, ordering them forward would have split up his supporting column rendering them MORE susceptible to attack by a fleeing or rogue enemy unit. I've dealt with the whole lots of tents = bad thing above but I'll put it back down here for emphasis, given the history of warfare on the plains and the data at hand hearing about a large number of tents was the equivalent of saying "here is the objective of this entire mission ready to be taken."

[Simon_Jester]

I'm pretty sure Wilkens is right. Custer had long experience of leading cavalry attacks into tent cities full of native noncombatants and shooting the place up. He had good reason to think he'd just be doing it again.

I'm not sure Custer was a good general, but I can certainly accept that he wasn't one of the worst of the worst. Not everyone who loses is lousy; not everyone who wins is a genius. Especially not in an environment where one side usually wins except when the opposition gets unusually clever- because the kind of ambush it takes to bring off a victory at all will tend to catch adequate and good generals as well as poor ones.

[Elfdart]

Generals who are considered among the best their nation ever fielded (though in the case of the English and most of the Americans that is damning with faint praise)

Might I gently point out that in wars between the UK and Germany and the USA and Germany, the score is 2:0 in both cases.

So? You know as well as I do that both these wars were decided by industrial advantages in an age where Generals do not really matter unless you get total incompetents to lead your nation. It really would not have mattered if you had somehow cloned Prince Heinrich, Gneisenau, Moltke, Seydlitz etc, because in the modern age numbers matter, not the skill of Generals.

Besides, weren't most of the Germans fighting the Russians in WW2?

[Stuart]

So? You know as well as I do that both these wars were decided by industrial advantages in an age where Generals do not really matter unless you get total incompetents to lead your nation.

What the coming of the industrial mass production age meant was that the role and function, the job description if you like, of generalship changed. Using the tools, the equipment that were being made in the quantities that they were being made in, was one of the functions of being a general. In that respect, British and Amereican generals did a better job of adapting to their new environment than their opposition did. Hence the 2:0 score.

Put another way, British and American generals changed their perception of their role to match the times. The opposition did not.

[Elfdart]

I'm pretty sure Wilkens is right. Custer had long experience of leading cavalry attacks into tent cities full of native noncombatants and shooting the place up. He had good reason to think he'd just be doing it again.

I'm not sure Custer was a good general, but I can certainly accept that he wasn't one of the worst of the worst. Not everyone who loses is lousy; not everyone who wins is a genius. Especially not in an environment where one side usually wins except when the opposition gets unusually clever- because the kind of ambush it takes to bring off a victory at all will tend to catch adequate and good generals as well as poor ones.

Even if you accept the premise that Gen. Custer was a glory hound who just got lucky, he did have the advantage of facing off against Rebel horsemen, whose leaders were also vainglorious nutcases. Also to his credit, he was the one who finally nailed the coffin lid shut on Lee's army by seizing the rail hub where Lee was marching his starving men to be fed. I read somewhere long ago that Custer's main goal was to get revenge against the Rebels for raiding his personal baggage and he was looking to do the same to them, which wouldn't surprise me.

[montypython]

So? You know as well as I do that both these wars were decided by industrial advantages in an age where Generals do not really matter unless you get total incompetents to lead your nation.

What the coming of the industrial mass production age meant was that the role and function, the job description if you like, of generalship changed. Using the tools, the equipment that were being made in the quantities that they were being made in, was one of the functions of being a general. In that respect, British and Amereican generals did a better job of adapting to their new environment than their opposition did. Hence the 2:0 score.

Put another way, British and American generals changed their perception of their role to match the times. The opposition did not.

For World War I that may have been the case, but the factors in World War II were such that the Germans could decisively win every single battle plus brilliant industrial management and still lose the war, so the issue of generalship is less significant than the industrial resource pool at hand.

[Stuart]

the factors in World War II were such that the Germans could decisively win every single battle plus brilliant industrial management and still lose the war, so the issue of generalship is less significant than the industrial resource pool at hand.

But knowing and understanding that is one of the factors that make up a "thoroughly modern major general". By the way, to the "British and Americans" mentioned above add the Russians.

I think the problem here is that there is a misunderstanding over what a General is and does. A General is not a super-Colonel who just does things on a bigger and better scale. A General is a different entity entirely, dealing with a different and much more complex environment that just handling troops in a battle.