Battleships and costs

[Marcus Aurelius]

But as has been said, the battleships were already almost entirely gone by the end of the 1940s anyway

How many US ships were left? The Royal Navy only had 5 in 1950 (Four KGV's and a Vanguard), and I'm pretty sure the French had Richeliue, Jean Bart, and Lorraine.

Tennessee (2), Colorado (3), North Carolina (2), South Dakota (4) and Iowa (4) classes were kept in reserve after WW2, that is 15 ships altogether. The older classes were scrapped, used as targets or research vessels after the war. The Tennessees and Colorados were kept in reserve until 1959 and the North Carolinas and SoDaks 1-3 years longer; only the Iowas remained after 1962. As you probably know, they were also the only ones ever recommissioned or modernized in any way.

[CaptHawkeye]

The 800kg modified 16in shells used at Pearl Harbor were rated for 150mm armor from 3000m. The list of battleships actually built with any single plate of deck armor over 150mm thick is rather small, I can only think of two off hand.

At least these bombs were actually useful. The second wave's attempt to sink Nevada with freaking GP bombs at low altitude was fucking comical. The performance of the Dive Bombers at Pearl was surprisingly inefficient all around though. The level bombers did way more damage and indeed, the Japanese seemed to favor level bombing against ships much more than dive bombing. (Though not more than Torpedo bombing.)

[Sea Skimmer]

How many US ships were left? The Royal Navy only had 5 in 1950 (Four KGV's and a Vanguard), and I'm pretty sure the French had Richeliue, Jean Bart, and Lorraine.

On the outbreak of the Korean War the US had zero active battleships except I think USS Mississippi which was reclassified as an auxiliary in 1946 and in use for weapons trials, ultimately becoming the test ship for Terrier SAMs with her aft turrets removed. All the US battleships save the Iowa class were decommissioned around 1947, the Iowa’s decommissioned 1949 but all battleships had also been on reserve fleet status since 1946 and either primarily served as training ships for the crews of other reserve fleet ships or simply never left port regularly. Battleships made good training ships since they could hold such vast crews and had many open spaces to hold lectures in. And do keep in mind if you copy anything I write without looking it up yourself, that is plagiarism.

At least these bombs were actually useful. The second wave's attempt to sink Nevada with freaking GP bombs at low altitude was fucking comical.

Your claim is far more stupid. Nevada was hit repeatedly, set heavily afire from a strike on her own AVGAS storage tank, and ultimately did sink even after her bow was beached. None of the US battleships at Pearl Harbor had good watertight integrity and were incredibly vulnerable to progressive flooding from even the most minor hits that caused leakage. 169 of the crew, more then 10%, became casualties, all of them from bombing hits and strafing. That’s not comical.

The performance of the Dive Bombers at Pearl was surprisingly inefficient all around though. The level bombers did way more damage and indeed, the Japanese seemed to favor level bombing against ships much more than dive bombing. (Though not more than Torpedo bombing.)

The whole point of the dive bombers was to suppress American defensive firepower and carried a mixture of SAP and GP bombs; they succeeded fairly well in this goal while also strafing. They would and did wreck American guns, kill gun crews and had been present, would have crippled the flight decks of American carriers, leaving the level and torpedo bombers to score the kills with less resistance. The Japanese only used level bombing at Pearl because the inner row of battleships simply could not be torpedoed, Otherwise they only used Kate level bombing elsewhere in the war to attack shore installations. This is the whole reason why they had to convert 40cm shells into AP bombs for the attack; they had no existing heavy AP bombs because they never previously expected to use level bombing in combat like that.

The attack on Prince of Wales and Repulse was setup in the same way and sank both ships. The brunt of the attack force carried torpedoes, but attacked in coordination with planes armed with 250kg bombs which split defensive fire and made evasive maneuvering more difficult.

[HMS Sophia]

And do keep in mind if you copy anything I write without looking it up yourself, that is plagiarism.

Ha. Yeah, I'm focusing on the RN, I was just curious about numbers in the USN. And seriously, I can find this in the books I actually own now, or hell, the internet, it's not like those figures are hard to find. So don't worry yourself...

[Sea Skimmer]

Its not inspiring when a person doing this kind of thing is asking people help out of hand.

[HMS Sophia]

Its not inspiring when a person doing this kind of thing is asking people help out of hand.

Hmm? Well my main problem was simply that I didn't know where to start with books. And I was getting frustrated, so I asked for some help.
I won't ask again if it bothers people.

[HMS Sophia]

Wanted to note that I received a copy of Pugh's "The cost of seapower".
It has some truly wonderful graphs, and it seems to be well written from the quick skim I have had. I cant wait to dive into it.

[HMS Sophia]

This book is very good. But Fuck me it has some information I didn't expect. I guess this is why it's call research

The specific cost per ton of a US battleship in the 1940's is three times the same cost of a Royal Navy battleship. You'd expect them to be similar, but apparently not.
Also, I didn't realise just how expensive an aircraft carrier was in WW2, at least once you add it's aircraft into the equation. That's impressive.

[Simon_Jester]

What contributed to the cost differential between US and British battleships of the same generation?

[HMS Sophia]

What contributed to the cost differential between US and British battleships of the same generation?

Well... according to Pugh, there was no rise pre Washington treaty. Costs were much the same. It does appear that just pre, during, and post treaty, British battleships went the route of the fast battleship. The US on the other hand went with much higher power to weight ratio's. They wanted higher speeds without losing anything.
Armament requirements on US battleships were much higher than compared to RN ships.
The US was trying to pack fighting power into a small space because of the panama canal limitations.
"Too few classes...were built in the 1940's for a satisfactory analyses to be made... However, the arguments above... high costs caused by pressing hard on the limits of technology and allowable size and exacerbating the complexity" That's paraphrased from the book.

It seems that the RN didn't worry about size limits post treaty, but the US were still worried because of the panama canal.

[Sea Skimmer]

USN vessels by WW2 simply had far more elaborate fittings and more advanced, and thus expensive machinery; meanwhile the RN didnt even consider hot running tap water essential and its ships often lacked standard USN gear like diesel generators of serious power. By the late 1930s the US also simply had higher wage scales and material prices. US ships ended up taking a lot more man hours to build; though the US could also produce its more elaborate ships more quickly because of that in some instances, and it all compounds together to make them cost a lot more money. The RN meanwhile had a priority for numbers to defend its wide ranging Empire, and saw little reason to force its highly economical shipyards to upgrade.

Panama had nothing to do with it, you really should you know, look at the facts of the matter. The canal restricted beam to 108ft but a British King George V has only 103ft beam. The only post treaty British designs to go anywhere, Lion and Vanguard, both had 108ft beam so that they could also pass through the canal. This was also a non trivial dry docking issue within the Empire, and one which had affected the beam of dreadnoughts even before WW1 broke out. The UK had very few wide docks. The USN meanwhile went right on ahead with the Montana class which was far too large for the existing Panama canal locks, while doing serious work on building a new set of locks to hold the things. Both projects died in the end because of the US wide steel shortage and a lack of critical need, but that was its own problem far divorced from any purely naval considerations.

Pugh doesn't sound too big if he gave you this idea that the RN wanted higher speeds without loosing anything and that this is a cost issue... I mean sure, everyone wanted everything, but as far as real ships go Nelson gave up speed, and KGV gave up two inches of gun caliber and two gun barrels (10x14in vs 12x14in or 9x16in) in ordered to work within treaty limits. Meanwhile with the unlimited 1920s projects sacrifices had to be made, for as huge as the ships were they still needed compromises on armament, armor, speed and other features. Thus the funky turret arrangements and narrow belts on G3 and N3. It not because the RN wanted it that way that they looked at building both the G3 with 16in guns and 30 knot speed and the N3 with 18in guns and 23 knot speed when they had a ship with both 18in gun and 30 knot speed on paper, K series designs, but such designs were judged too big and too lacking in belt armor to be acceptable. If you want everything you basically need a 75,000 ton battleship; even Yamato had to compromise on 27 knot speed because the 31 knot versions were too expensive and drew too much water to be satisfactory.

If the RN wanted anything in specific, it was numbers to defend a global Empire. That tended to discourage forcing the shipyards, which could build the existing simpler

[HMS Sophia]

Pugh doesn't sound too big if he gave you this idea that the RN wanted higher speeds without loosing anything

Re read. He said the US wanted higher capital speeds without losing any capabilities in terms of armaments or armour, not the RN.

Panama had nothing to do with it, you really should you know, look at the facts of the matter.

Once again I was talking about US battleships. They were restricted by the canal. That restriction as lifted with the Montana, specifically because they were building new locks for it.

[Sea Skimmer]

Re read. He said the US wanted higher capital speeds without losing any capabilities in terms of armaments or armour, not the RN.

Sorry, by fault, though still don't get what you mean by the RN going for fast battleships. Everyone went for faster battleships... and RN treaty ships were faster then the US treaty ships, all the more so when you compare the actual service speeds which proved lower then expected for USN vessels due to vibrational issues and generally just not as good performance as planned. Meanwhile the USN did give up a lot of armor compared to what the RN mounted, not considering the fact that RN face hardened armor had higher quality in the first place by about 15%.

Once again I was talking about US battleships. They were restricted by the canal. That restriction as lifted with the Montana, specifically because they were building new locks for it.

RN ships all fit the canal or are smaller, what does it matter? The beam limit was really only a serious problem for the Iowa class design, which was freakish anyway. As long as the treaty limit was in force more beam was a bad idea, since deck armor weights and horsepower requirements would spiral rapidly. Most of the US advantage in technology simply came out of the US becoming generally more advanced, not specific pushes for warship design; congress hardly was throwing out heaps of money to do anything like that in the interwar period.

[HMS Sophia]

Sorry, by fault, though still don't get what you mean by the RN going for fast battleships. Everyone went for faster battleships... and RN treaty ships were faster then the US treaty ships, all the more so when you compare the actual service speeds which proved lower then expected for USN vessels due to vibrational issues and generally just not as good performance as planned.

I think as far as I can read into it, his point was that if you go speed/armour/arms as the triangle, speed was on top. I would say he was arguing this with vessels like the KGV which dropped the B turrets quad design, but I don't know how far I would agree with him upon further reading.

RN ships all fit the canal or are smaller, what does it matter? The beam limit was really only a serious problem for the Iowa class design, which was freakish anyway. As long as the treaty limit was in force more beam was a bad idea, since deck armor weights and horsepower requirements would spiral rapidly.

It doesn't I suppose. It's just the point that the US were cramming more stuff into similar hulls I think...

[Sea Skimmer]

I just added a little bit more into my reply while you were typing that!

[Simon_Jester]

In what respects was the Iowa freakish?

[HMS Sophia]

I just added a little bit more into my reply while you were typing that!

So you did... I didn't know the face hardened armour was that much better. That's very interesting.

This all makes me wish I knew more about the US naval situation. And before you jump on me for that, I blame the dip shit who marked the first draft of my dissertation proposal. I was told that I couldn't write about the loss of the battleship across the major navies, but that I had to cut it down to one nation, and so unsurprisingly I picked the RN (I know more about it...)
I hate my uni...

I'm gonna let sea skimmer answer simon's question

[Sea Skimmer]

In what respects was the Iowa freakish?

We spent 10,000 tons to go totally against our established battleship design doctrine in ordered to make a South Dakota gain 6 knots of speed, less then one inch of deck armor and five calibers of main gun length. In a great many situations an Iowa simply does not have a clearly superiority to the treaty ship; and that’s pretty bad for a 1/3rd increase in displacement. Iowa did have better subdivision and some protection from diving shells which compromised her torpedo protection; though protection on A turret magazines was just BAD. The USN however got kind of obsessed at the time with having a ship which could aggressively hunt down a Kongo or Sharnhorst… just in time for aircraft to have that role covered. Building Alaska on top of this as a treaty cruiser kill just made the situation all the more absurd, as Alaska cost 75% as much an Iowa! An Essex was cheaper and far more useful even if we had to throw a few away to surface attacks.

Plenty of design options existed for a 45,000 ton battleship with about 30 knot speed and the same general armament but far more armor and torpedo protection by not having such a fine bow; it was in fact proposed after the super heavy shell appeared (invaliding the armor design of all existing US battleships, we designed against our own guns) to simply throw more armor on the stock Iowa’s constructed but that was vetoed as it would just be even more unsatisfactory weighing down an overlength hull back to about 31 knots.

As it was it was a tough sell just to get NC and SD classes built for 27 knots, a lot of people felt that since this was not going to match a 30 knot ship anyway, we might as well just make very well armored 23 knot ships. Even after the South Dakota class was laid down a lot of people wanted to go back to slower ships with more protection and more firepower.

The point being that the US expected its battleships to fight as a fleet, so who cares if the enemy can run away? They run away and the USN goes on to attack or capture whatever it wants (mainly, an enemy base in the western hemisphere) As gun range radically increased between wars the dangers of the enemy ‘crossing the T’ or exploiting other speed based tactics became far less relevant. It would take more and more speed advantage to gain a positional advantage, and that advantage would matter far less with air spotting in use.

In the end Iowa class speed was useful for escorting carriers; but this was hardly a good reason to build such a large warships. More cruisers and carriers would have been better. When you look at the numbers two Baltimore class cruisers could mount more 5in and automatic anti aircraft weapons then an Iowa while costing about 80% as much. Battleships cost less then smaller ships ton for ton, but it was an awful lot of money thrown into a single hull that still has to take a lot of time out for refitting and repair. In this respect the USN proved much better off then other navies as our machinery proved very reliable in service and we could afford the luxury of mobile floating dry docks that could take battleships that advanced as far forward as Gaum and Ulithi.

[Sea Skimmer]

So you did... I didn't know the face hardened armour was that much better. That's very interesting.

The two navies face hardened armor was about the same in WW1, the RN claimed at 25% improvement over WW1 material and the USN a 10% improvement. Some idiots on the internet will tell you British armor was 25% superior as they are simply ignorant of the USN having also made any improvements.

These numbers however have limits since nobody ever got to fire any large scale comparative trials using the same shells during the war against both types of armor that I can recall. The USN had the best APC shells and best homogeneous armor in the war; but only by marginal degrees. USN face hardened armor had a very thick face; meant to break those very good APC shells. The problem is this made it more likely that the excessively hardened plate would crack up when hit; breaking the shell but still allowing the debris to perforate the armor. At least in theory. However the extra thick face actually worked better in medium plate thicknesses; results do not scale linearly, making USN cruiser armor very good. RN face hardened armor had a better composition and more balanced thickness.

Everybody suffered from insufficient money for testing between wars and once the war began the lead time to produce the armor plate meant that nobody was gaining any real advantage from the masses of money then available to do work. So you fought with what you had and most work on armor concentrated on finding substitutions for rare metals like nickel. Also on inventing totally new armor; like the British plastic armor which was actually made from gravel set in a plastic resin for merchant ships. This was done after concrete was found to splinter so badly it was worse then no armor. Who said composite armor is new?

[Sea Skimmer]

As a note I really should have thrown in earlier; at least as far as USN costs go, all cost numbers are suspect because in some cases they do not include the cost of the ships armament, guns and turrets or sometimes just the guns, which was funded and constructed independently of the ship. So comparisons can only be considered generalized. In some cases costs may not include any government furnished equipment at all, which means no armor, rangefinders or similar items. But this should affect all ships equally in a random kind of way; and wartime inflation can throw a monkey wrench in everything anyway. DK Browns work has actual cost breakdowns in detail for a few ships.

[HMS Sophia]

DK Browns work has actual cost breakdowns in detail for a few ships.

Oooh, where? I have his eclipse of the big gun, but there is little in terms of cost breakdown in there. I've been told (yay for my supervisor getting in touch) that he's a really good source (and that he was a nice guy weirdly).

Also, I've been pointed at, and can find, a copy of Vanguard to trident for the future of the RN. My library might actually have some use at last.

[Sea Skimmer]

Book I suggested from the onset; Nelson to Vanguard. Somewhere near the back is a breakdown of costs for KGV, some earlier pages have simpler total costs for ships. Never seen Vanguard to Trident myself.

[HMS Sophia]

I would love to get hold of it. I might ask if my supervisor has a copy. However, my library doesn't have it and I cant afford it right now .

Vanguard to trident is simply Eric Grove's go at continuing Nelson to vanguard. (he thinks its good ). What I remember of it was good, and its good for what the RN wanted to do with itself post war...

I also now have a copy of a paper comparing the cost of HMS Nelson to a number of bombers. It's got how much it cost to build the Nelson in

[Sea Skimmer]

Well you know maybe you should think about a different or revised topic then, because you are not looking at many published sources existing on this, original research at the archives does not seem to be in your plans and you aren't blowing us away with what you already know. Its not like cost is that integral a factor to the whole matter compared to the battleship just not fucking working anyway.

[Simon_Jester]

The cost issue may be relatively incidental to his actual research and to the bulk of the thesis- as you say, the main issue is it just not working.