Worst American General?

[montypython]

the factors in World War II were such that the Germans could decisively win every single battle plus brilliant industrial management and still lose the war, so the issue of generalship is less significant than the industrial resource pool at hand.

But knowing and understanding that is one of the factors that make up a "thoroughly modern major general". By the way, to the "British and Americans" mentioned above add the Russians.

I think the problem here is that there is a misunderstanding over what a General is and does. A General is not a super-Colonel who just does things on a bigger and better scale. A General is a different entity entirely, dealing with a different and much more complex environment that just handling troops in a battle.

In World War I the German Generals and the General Staff had more power over strategic operations and planning (e.g, Falkenhyn, Hindenburg, Ludendorff) wrt the government, while in WWII Hitler was the one making all the final decisions and acted as the defacto army chief (especially after the removal of Blomberg and Fritz). Beck's fate after attempting to affect Germany's strategic direction is an example of how much the German military leadership was hamstringed.

[The Yosemite Bear]

Generals who are considered among the best their nation ever fielded (though in the case of the English and most of the Americans that is damning with faint praise)

Might I gently point out that in wars between the UK and Germany and the USA and Germany, the score is 2:0 in both cases.

So? You know as well as I do that both these wars were decided by industrial advantages in an age where Generals do not really matter unless you get total incompetents to lead your nation. It really would not have mattered if you had somehow cloned Prince Heinrich, Gneisenau, Moltke, Seydlitz etc, because in the modern age numbers matter, not the skill of Generals.

fuck theres something seriously buggared with our Battlecruisers today, Don't worry we can make more, those Germans will be hard pressed to replace their losses...

[Thanas]

So? You know as well as I do that both these wars were decided by industrial advantages in an age where Generals do not really matter unless you get total incompetents to lead your nation.

What the coming of the industrial mass production age meant was that the role and function, the job description if you like, of generalship changed. Using the tools, the equipment that were being made in the quantities that they were being made in, was one of the functions of being a general. In that respect, British and Amereican generals did a better job of adapting to their new environment than their opposition did. Hence the 2:0 score.

Put another way, British and American generals changed their perception of their role to match the times. The opposition did not.

How did the role of Generalship change and how did the British and Americans adapt better to it, how does a win in two wars where you have nearly double the manpower, resources etc. indicate better Generalship and how does this suddenly retroactively turn the Americans and the English into the best Generals?

Besides, weren't most of the Germans fighting the Russians in WW2?

Yes, as well as in WWI where they took a huge chunk of troops. If anything, the win in WWII in Europe belongs to the Russian Generals.

[Stuart]

In World War I the German Generals and the General Staff had more power over strategic operations and planning (e.g, Falkenhyn, Hindenburg, Ludendorff) wrt the government, while in WWII Hitler was the one making all the final decisions and acted as the defacto army chief (especially after the removal of Blomberg and Fritz). Beck's fate after attempting to affect Germany's strategic direction is an example of how much the German military leadership was hamstringed.

And yet, in WW1 they made the incredible blunder of launching the submarine campaign that brought the USA into WW1 and in WW@ they screwed up the Russian front. German generals post-WW2 love dto blame that on Hitler but they'd screwed the pooch long before Hitler's interference became decisive. Just look at Stas BUsh's posts on the ineptness of German command in those eras.

there's something wrong with our ships today, Don't worry we can make more, those Germans will be hard pressed to replace their losses

If you're going to quote something, quote it right. What Beatty actually said was "There is something wrong wih our ships today - and there is something wrong with our system". The first referred to three magazine explosions, the second to systemic signalling problems. Neither are relevent to this discussion.

How did the role of Generalship change and how did the British and Americans adapt better to it, how does a win in two wars where you have nearly double the manpower, resources etc. indicate better Generalship

Generalship involves such things as appreciating that one has a massive superiority over the enemy in productive capability and using what one has to best advantage. Being a general (as distinct from being a colonel) involves dealing with a much greater span of factors than just troops in the field. Being a colonel is an operational command, being a general is a strategic command. The two are drastically different which is why comparatively few colonels make it to general.

and how does this suddenly retroactively turn the Americans and the English into the best Generals?

Nice piece of goalpost shifting. The point at issue is your original unacceptable and extremely stupid slur cast on British and American generalship. Frankly I had thought much better of you than that.

If anything, the win in WWII in Europe belongs to the Russian Generals.

Something I have never denied. Incidently, another group who collectively outperformed their German opposition

[K. A. Pital]

Hmm... I think this discussion warrants a mention. First of all, the resource superiority of the Allies did not automatically guarantee an insta-win.

The Germans could've won "all battles" and still lose the war? Only after the USA entered it. Before that, there's losing and losing - i.e. of course Germany would end up badly battered; the question was how badly, in the end. Continental defeat of Russia, though horrendous as an event to even comprehend (I mean the sheer extinction the Germans would unleash), could have happened had Germany mobilized earlier; so could the defeat of the British Empire finally occur. Of course, that leaves Germany with a massive bleeding genocide campaign in the East which they'll take years to complete; but it's not the same kind of "losing" as the one in reality.

The Nazi Reich's problem was not only a lack of resources relative to the allies (it's also relative - on the European continent, for example, the Reich was the unmatched monster by all resources sans oil), but their poor use. Lack of mobilization, wrong decisions about the use of aviation (including allowing the massive flight of industries in the USSR, despite actually having bombers to reach the factories), utterly bad policy of destroying Russia's industrial potential instead of using it... There's so many bad decisions which would make a book of their own. They were only balanced by the finesse of German generals in other areas, such as forces' interaction, fast reaction, impressive ability to conceal troop movements and mislead other nations' intelligence.

So yes, the Germans could've used their resources better. That includes their Generals. The OKH planning of Barbarossa was that of an adventure, and had many, many bad decisions hidden. However, if they fully understood the possibilities, a more powerful use of reserve, greater stockpiles and more intense rationing and mobilization at home could've well changed the outcomes of 1941-1942 to a result better than IRL.

It's a long story told short, but German generals weren't that bad par se... they just got some critical war experience in the early 1940s and continued to almost mindlessly rely on only those concepts they understood, rejecting all other concepts. When other nations learned those concepts IN ADDITION to the ones they developed themselves, the Germans couldn't really adapt.

[Simon_Jester]

But knowing and understanding that is one of the factors that make up a "thoroughly modern major general". By the way, to the "British and Americans" mentioned above add the Russians.

I think the problem here is that there is a misunderstanding over what a General is and does. A General is not a super-Colonel who just does things on a bigger and better scale. A General is a different entity entirely, dealing with a different and much more complex environment that just handling troops in a battle.

Thing is, given civilian control of the military, the generals don't get to decide whether to go to war.

So unless you argue that the German generals were bad generals because they didn't overthrow Hitler*, they were stuck fighting a war where they could never hope to have enough assets to beat all their enemies. Given that constraint, I don't think we can judge the quality of individual commanders, or even the commanders as a whole, from the fact that they lost the war. Or the quality of the opposing commanders from the fact that they won.

Napoleon was a good general; he still lost when enough enemies joined the alliance against him.

*I suppose you could if you wanted to, but it would be a very odd argument...

So yes, the Germans could've used their resources better. That includes their Generals. The OKH planning of Barbarossa was that of an adventure, and had many, many bad decisions hidden. However, if they fully understood the possibilities, a more powerful use of reserve, greater stockpiles and more intense rationing and mobilization at home could've well changed the outcomes of 1941-1942 to a result better than IRL.

It's a long story told short, but German generals weren't that bad par se... they just got some critical war experience in the early 1940s and continued to almost mindlessly rely on only those concepts they understood, rejecting all other concepts. When other nations learned those concepts IN ADDITION to the ones they developed themselves, the Germans couldn't really adapt.

Now, taking it to this level of depth, I definitely see what you mean about the faults of German generalship. I can certainly believe that the Germans were out-generaled; I just don't think we can deduce that they were from the fact that they lost the war.

[Stuart]

Thing is, given civilian control of the military, the generals don't get to decide whether to go to war. So unless you argue that the German generals were bad generals because they didn't overthrow Hitler*, they were stuck fighting a war where they could never hope to have enough assets to beat all their enemies. Given that constraint, I don't think we can judge the quality of individual commanders, or even the commanders as a whole, from the fact that they lost the war. Or the quality of the opposing commanders from the fact that they won. Napoleon was a good general; he still lost when enough enemies joined the alliance against him.

That's not quite the point although it gets into the relationship between generalship and politics a lot better. If we look at both WW1 and WW2 we can see that having a crazed half-wit running the country was hardly a German monopoly. In WW1 Haig had to work around the actions of Lloyd-George. In WW2, the British had to deal with Churchill's crazy ideas while the Russian generals had to deal with Stalin. In the US, Roosevelt nearly reduced the collective US Navy admiralty to tears with his screwball ideas. In each case as well as that of Germany, it was the job of the Generals to produce a winning strategy in the defined environment of which said crazed half-wit was part. This is where the British, Americans and Russian generals consistently outperformed their German opposite numbers. Dealing with a recalcitrant political leadership without resorting to a coup is one of the skills that form part of the skill-set needed to make a great General.

There are three great jumps in the evolution of an Army Officer as he or she heads for higher ranks.

At first we have the Junior Officer who handles just the arm service he was trained in. If an infantryman, he handles an infantry unit and very little else. If in armor he commands tanks, if an artilleryman, he serves his guns. This is primarily at the tactical level.

At the next level up, we have the Field Officer who has to integrate his original area of expertise into a a wider military context. He has to worry about integrating infantry with armor with artillery and add air support to the mix. He has to worry about keeping his unit supplied and fit. This role is primarily at the operational level.

At the highest level we have the General Officer who has to integrate the profession of arms into the wider aspects of a society at war. He has to be aware of industrial and production data, how long it will take to replace losses, what the political impact of those losses will be. What the demands and expectations of the political leadership are and how those expectations and demands can be moulded into a politically acceptable plan that can actually win.

Of these three steps, the jump from Field Officer to General Officer is by far the hardest and it is here that most officers either stall out and retire or make the jump and fail. One can even diagnose the failings of a particular officer by looking at their retirement rank. If it's Captain, then they failed to make the jump to being able to integrate multiple combat arms. If it's Colonel then they failed to make the jump to integrating the profession of arms with all the other considerations of a country at war. How to make the jump from Field to General is a problem that's bemused armies (under different names) ever since the Army stopped being commanded by the King. How does one turn a good Field officer into a competent General Officer? That's a philosophical question that's by no means easy to answer. The Germans did it by creating a staff officer training system that produced professinally-trained General Officers which sounds a reasonable and logical idea. Only, it demonstrably doesn't work. Score 2:0 remember? Their planning and conduct of the Russian campaign in 1941 was a marvel of ineptitude. This is what lies behind the sour grapes of Thanas's original comment to which I took great exception. The Germans can't accept that their trained professionals were trounced by a bunch of younger sons of landed gentry and a collection of bemused civilians who would rather be doing something else. (a lot of hyperbole there but also a lot of truth).

Let's take the Russians as an example. The standard line from German sources is "they were morons who swamped us with vast numbers of men and didn't care how many they lost". Forgetting for one moment that isn't true, there's a different aspect to it. One of the things about Generalship is that it demands a sense of realism. They have to work out how to win with what is available to them. The fact they don't have the ideal army for the job isn't an excuse for failure. The Russian Generals had what they had, an army built of soldiers with tremendous courage, tremendous endurance and not much of anything else. That was what they had, that was what they had to work with. They had to turn that Army into one that could win. By 1943 that was exactly what they had done and that makes them ***Great Generals***. The Germans also started the war with an Army that was largely infantry with hard core of armored and mechanized units. They spent WW2 complaining that it wasn't the Army they wanted and in doing so turned it into the army that lost.

[Thanas]

In World War I the German Generals and the General Staff had more power over strategic operations and planning (e.g, Falkenhyn, Hindenburg, Ludendorff) wrt the government, while in WWII Hitler was the one making all the final decisions and acted as the defacto army chief (especially after the removal of Blomberg and Fritz). Beck's fate after attempting to affect Germany's strategic direction is an example of how much the German military leadership was hamstringed.

And yet, in WW1 they made the incredible blunder of launching the submarine campaign that brought the USA into WW1 and in WW@ they screwed up the Russian front. German generals post-WW2 love dto blame that on Hitler but they'd screwed the pooch long before Hitler's interference became decisive. Just look at Stas BUsh's posts on the ineptness of German command in those eras.

Actually, the submarine campaign was only a blunder when the return to sinking ships without warning was reintroduced, which was mainly seen as a last measure seeing how the war was developing by then. It was a Hail-Mary pass, everybody knew it and it did not work.

How did the role of Generalship change and how did the British and Americans adapt better to it, how does a win in two wars where you have nearly double the manpower, resources etc. indicate better Generalship

Generalship involves such things as appreciating that one has a massive superiority over the enemy in productive capability and using what one has to best advantage. Being a general (as distinct from being a colonel) involves dealing with a much greater span of factors than just troops in the field. Being a colonel is an operational command, being a general is a strategic command. The two are drastically different which is why comparatively few colonels make it to general.

Yes. How is that relavant to the discussion at hand? Germany realized they were outnumbered in WWI, but that was not their choice to make to go to war. Political leadership trumps Generals all the time. That said, they managed to knock out Russia and despite limited resources deliver a better performance than the allies did on a man-to-man basis.

Nice piece of goalpost shifting. The point at issue is your original unacceptable and extremely stupid slur cast on British and American generalship. Frankly I had thought much better of you than that.

C'mon, the USA took until the end of WWI to become a first-rate military power, the British Generals are famous for getting their behinds handed to them by about any continental power (and a few colonial armies) since France completely crushed them in the hundred's years war. Nevermind how the army systerm was set up - purchasing commissions and all that. Considering anything but their latest history, they are hardly first rate except for some individual examples like Marlborough. And even in WWII the British performance is less impressive than the American one, for example take Montgomery and Eisenhower, with the possible exception of Alexander.

Something I have never denied. Incidently, another group who collectively outperformed their German opposition

Indeed, and nobody is denying that either.

Thing is, given civilian control of the military, the generals don't get to decide whether to go to war. So unless you argue that the German generals were bad generals because they didn't overthrow Hitler*, they were stuck fighting a war where they could never hope to have enough assets to beat all their enemies. Given that constraint, I don't think we can judge the quality of individual commanders, or even the commanders as a whole, from the fact that they lost the war. Or the quality of the opposing commanders from the fact that they won. Napoleon was a good general; he still lost when enough enemies joined the alliance against him.

That's not quite the point although it gets into the relationship between generalship and politics a lot better. If we look at both WW1 and WW2 we can see that having a crazed half-wit running the country was hardly a German monopoly. In WW1 Haig had to work around the actions of Lloyd-George. In WW2, the British had to deal with Churchill's crazy ideas while the Russian generals had to deal with Stalin. In the US, Roosevelt nearly reduced the collective US Navy admiralty to tears with his screwball ideas. In each case as well as that of Germany, it was the job of the Generals to produce a winning strategy in the defined environment of which said crazed half-wit was part. This is where the British, Americans and Russian generals consistently outperformed their German opposite numbers. Dealing with a recalcitrant political leadership without resorting to a coup is one of the skills that form part of the skill-set needed to make a great General.

To equivocate the control Hitler had over his Generals and Churchill is pretty meaningless, as is equivocating Hitler and Stalin's insane ideas because Stalin was much saner than Hitler was.

Let's take the Russians as an example. The standard line from German sources is "they were morons who swamped us with vast numbers of men and didn't care how many they lost". Forgetting for one moment that isn't true, there's a different aspect to it. One of the things about Generalship is that it demands a sense of realism. They have to work out how to win with what is available to them. The fact they don't have the ideal army for the job isn't an excuse for failure. The Russian Generals had what they had, an army built of soldiers with tremendous courage, tremendous endurance and not much of anything else. That was what they had, that was what they had to work with. They had to turn that Army into one that could win. By 1943 that was exactly what they had done and that makes them ***Great Generals***. The Germans also started the war with an Army that was largely infantry with hard core of armored and mechanized units. They spent WW2 complaining that it wasn't the Army they wanted and in doing so turned it into the army that lost.

Actually, what most of them complain about was Hitler and his interference. And given the war preparations made by Hitler - including the decision not to go to a full war economy for domestic purposes - the avenues of change for the Generals was very, very limited. Given the political situation and Hitler's interfering, there was no opportunity to change. Unless you can point out a possible program that would have turned the German Army of 1939 into one that could beat the Soviet Army and win WWII, I am not sure what your point is, especially considering the German High Command had no direct control of production facilities or the massive Nazi inefficient bureaucracy.

[Thanas]

To avoid a lenthy discussion - Stuart, what do you think are the feats that prompted you to rate the American and British Generals as good as those of France, Russia and Germany over the last centuries?

[Elfdart]

Does anyone really think the results in WW2 would have been much different if the opposing sides had magically swapped generals? If yes, explain. If no, this is a lot of silly dick-waving.

Being a general (as distinct from being a colonel) involves dealing with a much greater span of factors than just troops in the field. Being a colonel is an operational command, being a general is a strategic command. The two are drastically different which is why comparatively few colonels make it to general.

That kinda depends on the number of stars on their uniform, doesn't it?

[Thanas]

Does anyone really think the results in WW2 would have been much different if the opposing sides had magically swapped generals? If yes, explain. If no, this is a lot of silly dick-waving.

Well, without Manstein and Guderian you do not have blitzkrieg into france, so the tactical side of things would have turned otu a bit different, but as I said above in response to Stuart, individual skill does not matter that much in the age of mass armies and industrial warfare. The war might have ended faster in Germany's defeat (for example, the north african campaign would have gone a bit differently, as would have some actions on the Eastern Front, but the overall trend of the war would still have been the same).

[Marcus Aurelius]

Being a general (as distinct from being a colonel) involves dealing with a much greater span of factors than just troops in the field. Being a colonel is an operational command, being a general is a strategic command. The two are drastically different which is why comparatively few colonels make it to general.

That kinda depends on the number of stars on their uniform, doesn't it?

In practice yes, but what Stuart is saying is that as general officers generals should be able to think strategically at least in principle.

[Stuart]

Actually, the submarine campaign was only a blunder when the return to sinking ships without warning was reintroduced, which was mainly seen as a last measure seeing how the war was developing by then. It was a Hail-Mary pass, everybody knew it and it did not work.

So you concede that Germany was defeated in World War One prior to the arrival of the United States?

Yes. How is that relavant to the discussion at hand? Germany realized they were outnumbered in WWI, but that was not their choice to make to go to war. Political leadership trumps Generals all the time. That said, they managed to knock out Russia and despite limited resources deliver a better performance than the allies did on a man-to-man basis.

How is it relevent? basic defeinition of a General's job. It's the man-to-man comment that is out of place, that is a subaltern's or field officer's job.

C'mon, the USA took until the end of WWI to become a first-rate military power, the British Generals are famous for getting their behinds handed to them by about any continental power (and a few colonial armies) since France completely crushed them in the hundred's years war. Nevermind how the army systerm was set up - purchasing commissions and all that. Considering anything but their latest history, they are hardly first rate except for some individual examples like Marlborough. And even in WWII the British performance is less impressive than the American one, for example take Montgomery and Eisenhower, with the possible exception of Alexander.

Once again 2:0.

To avoid a lenthy discussion - Stuart, what do you think are the feats that prompted you to rate the American and British Generals as good as those of France, Russia and Germany over the last centuries?

It's your job to support your arguments, not mine to prove negatives. I've already gone deeply into the logic behind my refutation of your comments.

[Stuart]

That kinda depends on the number of stars on their uniform, doesn't it?

To a degree, yes. The divisions aren't as clear cut as I made them but there is a big jump between a colonel and a low-grade General (friend of mine made that jump and was quite surprised at the differences it brought about. One of them was losing the freedom to be outspoken on internet communities). Even a low-grade General has to start thinking about political and economic rationales of actions and the impact of things like casualty rates. This has some odd effects; for example television manners are now an important part of a General's responsibilities.

[Simon_Jester]

Yes. How is that relavant to the discussion at hand? Germany realized they were outnumbered in WWI, but that was not their choice to make to go to war. Political leadership trumps Generals all the time. That said, they managed to knock out Russia and despite limited resources deliver a better performance than the allies did on a man-to-man basis.

How is it relevent? basic defeinition of a General's job. It's the man-to-man comment that is out of place, that is a subaltern's or field officer's job.

Hmm.

I'd think that performing better with an army of fixed size would require good generalship, once we get up to a scale where general officers are needed to command the army. If two nations each have one million men under arms, and A's million men perform better than B's million men, it's possible that A did it with inferior generals, of course. But likely? I wouldn't think so.

[thejester]

That's a philosophical question that's by no means easy to answer. The Germans did it by creating a staff officer training system that produced professinally-trained General Officers which sounds a reasonable and logical idea. Only, it demonstrably doesn't work. Score 2:0 remember? Their planning and conduct of the Russian campaign in 1941 was a marvel of ineptitude. This is what lies behind the sour grapes of Thanas's original comment to which I took great exception. The Germans can't accept that their trained professionals were trounced by a bunch of younger sons of landed gentry and a collection of bemused civilians who would rather be doing something else. (a lot of hyperbole there but also a lot of truth).

Wait, what? At levels of 'strategic command' who were the Allied officers who weren't long term professionals?

[Stuart]

Wait, what? At levels of 'strategic command' who were the Allied officers who weren't long term professionals?

I did add the words "a lot of hyperbole" there. The truth is though that in both the US and British armies, the massive expansion of those forces meant that officers went up the ranks very quickly (the history of Saint Curtis being a good example). This did mean that a lot of officers who performed reasonably well at lower ranks were increased to the level of their incompetence. It also meant that a lot of younger officers who understood how much the times had changed went high as well.

The big difference was that Germany pre-WW1 made a big effort to identify promising young officers who looked like they might be good General material and groom them from an early point in their career. This went right to the Napoleonic era and reflected the fact that the Prussians were the first people to realize that armies were getting too big for one man to control and a General Staff was needed. Also, the Germans did it right in that they took into the program a lot of candidates and ruthlessly washed out those who didn't quite make the grade. This meant that there were quite a few junior German officers who had a little knowledge of staff procedures and that stood them very well. This is where Thanas went completely wrong; the great strength of the German Army wasn't its higher ranks, it was the lower ones. The lieutenants and captains pulled the General's and Field Marshal's nuts out of the fire with boring regularity.

That's also why the allies went to such great trouble to destroy the German General Staff system post WW1. They did a pretty good job of it too and the system was only partially reconstituted by 1939. The system that resulted from that rapid regrowth was very incestuous and that was one of its greatest weaknesses. Far too inward-looking for its own good.

The allies never really had anything like the German system. There was staff education and so on but it was patchy. Also, there wasn't the ruthless weeding out of the "almost but not quites" so they didn't have the drop-outs who retained just enough knowledge to fill gaps when needed. On the other hand, the General Corps that resulted was quite remarkable. Look up the biography (for example) of Sir Garnet Wolseley and it's enough to make one's jaw drop.

[Lonestar]

Wait, what? At levels of 'strategic command' who were the Allied officers who weren't long term professionals?

[Pelranius]

That's also why the allies went to such great trouble to destroy the German General Staff system post WW1. They did a pretty good job of it too and the system was only partially reconstituted by 1939. The system that resulted from that rapid regrowth was very incestuous and that was one of its greatest weaknesses. Far too inward-looking for its own good.

At the risk of sidetracking this thread, may I ask what steps the allies took to dismantle the German Staff System? I was under the impression that the German Army pretty much 'cheated' the Versailles restrictions by simply just having their NCOs and Officer Corps remain generally intact, but the Nazis apparently did a pretty good job of messing with it in their own ways.

[Stuart]

At the risk of sidetracking this thread, may I ask what steps the allies took to dismantle the German Staff System? I was under the impression that the German Army pretty much 'cheated' the Versailles restrictions by simply just having their NCOs and Officer Corps remain generally intact, but the Nazis apparently did a pretty good job of messing with it in their own ways.

They destroyed the facilities, dispersed the staff and burned the records. The last was the critical one and there was a lot of that in 1919. What they did was effectively throw the system back to its creation date so it had to be rebuilt from scratch using people's memories as source. Had the Germans had another decade or so, they'd probably have succeeded in rebuilding and run a first generation of officers through the system. That might have made a significant difference.

Another example is that the British went around German and burned every piece of paper relating to warship design they could find. There;'s a very sad story of the archivist who'd spent his whole life preserving and filing those records. He was weeping and begging the British to take them away so at least somebody would get some use from them. But no, they burned the lot. That's why German naval design in WW2 was so . . . . eccentric.

[Captain Seafort]

Another example is that the British went around German and burned every piece of paper relating to warship design they could find. There;'s a very sad story of the archivist who'd spent his whole life preserving and filing those records. He was weeping and begging the British to take them away so at least somebody would get some use from them. But no, they burned the lot. That's why German naval design in WW2 was so . . . . eccentric.

Eccentric in what way? My knowledge of the subject is somewhat limited, but my understanding was that the larger German designs tended to be very old-fashioned more than anything (the Scharnhorsts based on Mackensen and Bismarcks based on Baden).

[Stuart]

Eccentric in what way? My knowledge of the subject is somewhat limited, but my understanding was that the larger German designs tended to be very old-fashioned more than anything (the Scharnhorsts based on Mackensen and Bismarcks based on Baden).

The "descent from WW1" is a common theory I know but it isn't actually true - for the very reason I suggested above. The detail drawings were gone. Even the way the design staff was organized changed drastically between WW1 and WW2 to the great detriment of the latter. In WW2 and before, the whole design system was much altered

Rather than go into great detail here, might I suggest you read THIS article by Peter Lindenau. He summarizes the problems the German design effort faced in the 1930s very well. he has a nice writing style as well.

As for eccentricities in German ships lets see. 6 inch guns on 2,500 ton destroyers - in turrets no less? How about 16,000 ton heavy cruisers that were worse armed and armored than 10,000 ton American ships yet had twice the crews? Or battleships that had C37 AA guns but fire control systems for C33s? Goes on.

[Sea Skimmer]

As for eccentricities in German ships lets see. 6 inch guns on 2,500 ton destroyers - in turrets no less? How about 16,000 ton heavy cruisers that were worse armed and armored than 10,000 ton American ships yet had twice the crews? Or battleships that had C37 AA guns but fire control systems for C33s? Goes on.

Wasn't the issue that they in fact had both C37 and C33 guns not only on the same ship, but both on each beam rather then being grouped by type as would be the rational solution, allowing the fire control to lag or lead the target to compensate?

I always liked that one destroyer they never completed though, Z51 IIRC, with the triple screws and something like eight or ten diesel engines geared onto them. I bet the vibrations would have been sufficient to kill whales.

[Pelranius]

They destroyed the facilities, dispersed the staff and burned the records. The last was the critical one and there was a lot of that in 1919. What they did was effectively throw the system back to its creation date so it had to be rebuilt from scratch using people's memories as source. Had the Germans had another decade or so, they'd probably have succeeded in rebuilding and run a first generation of officers through the system. That might have made a significant difference.

How hard would it have been for the Germans to make copies of the records beforehand for at least some of the materials? I'm usually leaning on the skeptical side when it comes to the thoroughness of censorship efforts (this could arguably be called a censorship effort). I'm also not very convinced of the competence of the Imperial German Staff before and during WWI; they let the younger Von Moltke run the whole business, after all.

[Stuart]

How hard would it have been for the Germans to make copies of the records beforehand for at least some of the materials? I'm usually leaning on the skeptical side when it comes to the thoroughness of censorship efforts (this could arguably be called a censorship effort).

It would be a massive job and much of the problem is not just cretaing records but filing and indexing them properly so they can be used. Even without a deliberate attempt to destroy them, stuff gets lost and its considered a great "find" when it turns up again. Look how a skilled archives researcher like Mark finds things that are quite remarkably important. Also, the "other side" has to be convinced of the need to copy everything (which begs the question of how since photcopiers didn't exist back then. Making copies of existing documents was a laborious business).

I'm also not very convinced of the competence of the Imperial German Staff before and during WWI; they let the younger Von Moltke run the whole business, after all.

Nor am I; that's my whole point.