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I recently while reading On War came across an essay bound in the same volume on the misinterpretations and misuse of Clausewitz's work. In particular, the armies of WW1 and their generals were noted as missing the whole point that War is an instrument of policy, even though they got the message about morale. This seemed to ring true to me, but my knowledge of the First World War is poor and I'd like to know some more about how armies and policy related in this period. Also, a good recommendation for a source about the war in general and its lead up would also be appreciated.

It could be argued that they had no choice. The popular notion that they were a bunch of idiots is not entirely accurate, they had limited power (informations, political capital, freedom from urgent concerns) to actually implement change. They also tended to be called upon after war had became inevitable (and the alliance system in place was obviously instable).

There's always a disconnect because while war is an extension of politics by other means, the Generals never know exactly at what point regular politics will break down, and their version of "politics" is activated. So Generals have to practice for "war in general" as opposed to "this war in particular". It is also why we end up training to "fight the last war; because we don't know what to expect, except in rare occassions.

The end result is that every nail looks the same to your hammer; and the tactical thrusts --which usher in the strategic changes that make the political landscape malleable-- are not necessarily tailored to what you're trying to achieve politically.

To make it more difficult, it is well known that politicians who try to run the wars often do poorly, and it is wise to let the Generals do the fighting because they know how to do it. But what guarantee do you have the the General is politically astute enough to know what is needed? Sure, there'll be briefings from the President and an overall statement of intent with the orders, but at the same time a General is free to conduct war with a certain amount of freedom that a Leader doesn't have. He'll take his instructions and interpret them to how he knows his forces can fight best.

We see some of the mistakes of politics past in the current force structure of the US military today. We trained for years for a next generation war that would mirror World War Two in steroids; the whole force structure, warfighting plan, right down to designs for vehicles and packs was oriented towards a continent-level force-on-force clash of armies. When we actually did go to war, it was nothing even remotely like what we expected. Only the initial invasions of Iraq came close (1991, 2003) to what we expected; however, the institutional memory of the military was still firmly stuck in that original Big Clash mindset, and the generals in charge got to their positions by being experts in that style of warfare.

But the war ability no longer suited the political goals, our extension of politics by other means was now a round-peg/square-hole problem.

Clauseweitz was spot-on with his assessments, but they apply best when the Generals have the luxury of knowing what objectives they will be fighting towards. If you generalize his philosophies, it works well enough but can be more slippery to apply. Hence I find the philosophies of Sun Tzu to be more useful overall, since they are (IMO) more universally applicable --to politics and diplomacy as well as warfare, really.

I'm sorry, I forgot to include how all that was supposed to focus on Clauseweitzian theory application in World War One...

Anyhow...

WW1 commanders were trying to achieve their political objectives through the only strategy they knew how-- that breakthrough cavalry thrust that would go to the heart of the enemy's warfighting center and disrupt it, and route them. It is all too easy to forget that the stalemate of the trenches on the Western Front happened for a reason-- they were trying to defend themselves from enemy cavalry breakthroughs, while trying to achieve a brakthrough of their own.

Let's not be too hard on those WW1 commanders-- they had almost a thousand years of known military history backing them up, assuring them they were doing the right thing. Getting a heavy mounted charge to slam through the defending line and smash their rear area was the way war was done, and as far back as Egyptian chariots that was the truth. That method of fighting was, in fact, reinforced in the early stages of the war, during Falkenhayn's maneuver phase against the Russians.

But when both side bogged down in the trenches, they had time to think and come up with technologies to break through and defend. I think it is safe to say that the Generals had no idea what sorts of things they'd unleashed with their new technologies. The airplane wasn't seen as a warfighter at first, but an artillery observation platform: basically, the biggest, highest damn hill-top around. They didn't see the potential it represented until later.

Same with machineguns. Gas. Flamethrowers. And rapid-firing cannon. Only the tank was marginally realized as a replacement for horse cavalry, but even that realization was clouded with old thinking-- the tank was going to burst through the barb wire and machineguns, and then step aside so the fast horse cavalry could resume the charge.

But the new technology was only really seen as something to change the tactical situation. They didn't comprehend that it completely altered the strategic situation, and by doing so, thus altered what could be reasonably expected politically. The WW1 Generals were trying as hard as they could to fight what they knew. But the situation was up-ended; it was one of those rare times when the tools forced the man to evolve, rather than the man forcing the tools to evolve. The last time something like that was seen was Crecy, with the Longbow, and reliable gunpowder weapons that commoners could master. But even those revolutions in warfare allowed for variations on traditional physical forms of fighting (ie, massed close-quarters formation).

As long as the tactics remained the same, the strategies that those tactics could pull remained the dominant means of reshaping the political landscape. WW1 forced a change in tactics, which forced a change in strategies, which, in turn, meant that new political realities had to be faced. The institutional failure was complete-- the very people who ordered the new weapons built and put into practice, the civilian leaders and even weapon designers themselves, had no idea how they were fundamentally altering the politics of warfare. Laying it all on the Generals is just seeking simplicuty for simplicity's sake.

I'm going to need to post an extensive essay on what the hell the Germans were actually doing in WW1--because it's a very complex subject primarily because they didn't have an idea themselves---but for the moment, it was Hindenburg who was in command of 8th Army at the battle of Tannenberg, not Falkenhayn.

Coyote wrote:We see some of the mistakes of politics past in the current force structure of the US military today. We trained for years for a next generation war that would mirror World War Two in steroids; the whole force structure, warfighting plan, right down to designs for vehicles and packs was oriented towards a continent-level force-on-force clash of armies. When we actually did go to war, it was nothing even remotely like what we expected. Only the initial invasions of Iraq came close (1991, 2003) to what we expected; however, the institutional memory of the military was still firmly stuck in that original Big Clash mindset, and the generals in charge got to their positions by being experts in that style of warfare.

Actually, you're completely wrong on this.

Let me put it in simple terms:

A force that can fight and defeat the Second Guards Tank Army on the Central Front in Europe in a high intensity battle that sees tank battalions destroyed in minutes; can deal with a bunch of insurgents who have nothing heavier than RPG-7s.

At the end of the Cold War; we had plans for a 55 ton MBT with an autoloading 140mm gun, and a whole clutch of vehicles based off the 55 ton chassis including:

Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle (FIFV): The salient feature of the FIFV is that it will have the same armor protection as the Block III tank, thus ensuring that its pioneer infantrymen can go anywhere the tank goes. This is the kind of mechanized infantry vehicle the Army proposed in the early 1970s, before the Bradley's predecessor, the XM723 was developed, but could not sell to the Defense Department or Congress—it was deemed as heavy, complex and expensive as a tank and thus incapable of the required proliferation on the battlefield (roughly two infantry vehicles for every three tanks). All parties to this long-running debate, however, appear to have learned the lesson of the the Bradley and have accepted the necessity for an infantry vehicle that can advance in the face of the heaviest fire, without the need for compensating tactics. "With this vehicle, the infantry will be able to remain on board until they overrun target," Mr. Wynbelt said, "and then dis-embark, so that they will not have to fight toward an objective."

Compared to the Bradley, the FIFV will have more than 11 times the effective effective frontal protection and 200 percent greater protection from flank attacks, plus all of the VIDS passive and active countermeasures of the Block III tank.

The FIFV will have missile armament with a degree of antiarmor capability as yet undetermined. The Army is looking for a 150 percent increase in effectiveness—including twice the armor penetration—from an automatic main gun in the 35-mm to 60-mm caliber range. There would also be a centrally controlled area suppression weapon system to deal with enemy infantry in the vincinity of the vehicle; this is expected to be 60 percent more effective than the individual port-firing weapons now operated by infantrymen mounted in the M2 Bradley.

With power and fuel capacity comparable to the main battle tank, the FIFV is expected to have 70 percent greater cruising range than the Bradley and cross-country speeds more than one-third higher. Vetronics and advanced fire control will allow the vehicle crew to be reduced from three men to two, but the size of the dismounted element is not yet certain.

"When we went from the M113 to the Bradley," Mr. Wynbelt said, "there was great controversy as to how big the squad should be. [It was fixed at nine, three of these being vehicle crew members. ] That controversy is happening all over again."

The first FIFV unit would begin equipping in the year 2005, and the initial procurement objective for force package one is 1,321 vehicles.

Gee; a 55 ton vehicle with 11 times the frontal protection and twice the flank protection of the existing M-2 Bradley; and a 70% greater cruising range; with 33% higher cross country speeds due to an advanced common engine with much greater efficiency than present engines, and an active protection system to shoot down incoming ATGMs and RPGs?

You know, that would have been SO great to have in Iraq from 2005 onwards; but hey; it was cancelled because it was too "heavy" and "legacy force"! Even the program to replace the Abrams AGT-1500 gas turbine with the Block III engine (LV-100 Gas Turbine) with 50% greater efficiency was killed to pay for Future Crap Spreader.....

Lets not get into the whole "information dominance" thing with Stryker and FCS - it's kind of easy to sneak up on five insurgents in a house with a wheeled vehicle, because they have no reconnaisance scouts; etc; but in a battle against a Soviet Guards Tank Army; well, they will know where all of your battalions are down to a rough area of a few klicks because of ELINT and all sorts of reconnaisance.

Pfft. Nevermind that the German 55-ton PzH-2000 SP Howitzer, designed to fight in Central Front Europe in WW3 has seen it's first combat use in.......Afghanistan, where it's earned the nickname "The Beasts of Tarin Kowt" from the Taliban, because it's so lethal.

Back onto topic:

The big problem with World War I; was that the lethality and ranges of the weapons involved had increased much faster than the ability of the commanders to control units in response to them.

For example, IIRC a British attack managed to seize a German trenchline; but they paused in their exploitation to lay telephone wire back to the British trenches to restore communications with higher command; and this delay allowed the Germans, using their interior lines of communications to generate a counter-attack that drove back the British and recaptured the trenchline.

The obvious solution to this lack of communications with your frontline units was to have a "pre-planned" assault plan ready; and to have people STICK TO THE PLAN.

But problems occured, because war never likes plans; units get ahead of themselves, or fall behind; and end up being shelled by their own artillery who are firing on firing plans which can't be updated.

This is also why the employment of Tanks was not decisive in WWI; because they had to be tied to a fixed plan, and couldn't alter it on the fly when things went better or worse than planned.

MKSheppard wrote:Back onto topic:

The big problem with World War I; was that the lethality and ranges of the weapons involved had increased much faster than the ability of the commanders to control units in response to them.

For example, IIRC a British attack managed to seize a German trenchline; but they paused in their exploitation to lay telephone wire back to the British trenches to restore communications with higher command; and this delay allowed the Germans, using their interior lines of communications to generate a counter-attack that drove back the British and recaptured the trenchline.

The obvious solution to this lack of communications with your frontline units was to have a "pre-planned" assault plan ready; and to have people STICK TO THE PLAN.

Units could stick to a plan. The problem with communication was that the Germans would use artillery to dominate no-man's-land and prevent it. Runners would die and efforts to dig linking saps also often failed. Battalions would attempt to hold out in the opposition lines but with out ammunition (specifically bombs) and actual physical reinforcement, they would be overwhelmed sooner or later.

Really, the decisive weapon in WW1 was artillery. Combined with proper mixed-arms infantry tactics it could take ground and hold it from mid-1916 onwards, but too often units and commanders either did not accept this or were given too little time and support (or unrealistic goals) and therefor failed.

MKSheppard wrote:

Coyote wrote:We see some of the mistakes of politics past in the current force structure of the US military today. We trained for years for a next generation war that would mirror World War Two in steroids; the whole force structure, warfighting plan, right down to designs for vehicles and packs was oriented towards a continent-level force-on-force clash of armies. When we actually did go to war, it was nothing even remotely like what we expected. Only the initial invasions of Iraq came close (1991, 2003) to what we expected; however, the institutional memory of the military was still firmly stuck in that original Big Clash mindset, and the generals in charge got to their positions by being experts in that style of warfare.

Actually, you're completely wrong on this.

Let me put it in simple terms:

A force that can fight and defeat the Second Guards Tank Army on the Central Front in Europe in a high intensity battle that sees tank battalions destroyed in minutes; can deal with a bunch of insurgents who have nothing heavier than RPG-7s....

Dude, seriously, trust me that there is always a sub-culture within military circles that tries to yank the institution away from Big War philosophy; to get us to "learn and internalize the lessons of Vietnam". I've lived through over two decades of hearing about this or that upstart movement in the echelons that tries to orient us towards urban warfare, or peacekeeping ops, or "low-intensity conflict" and "operations other than war" and so on and so forth.

But here's how it works-- these non-traditional thinkers usually get a little bit of a faction going, and they make a lot of noise.. it is amazingly like a Parliament, in away. They get a few manuals written and passed through the reviews and maybe even a stamp of approval from the Joint Chiefs and then limited distribution. These manuals and their doctrines invariably end up gathering dust on shelves as curio items in unit libraries, picked over by seekers of military trivia such as myself when we're doing extra drills to make up for a day we missed or something.

These non-traditional thinkers get to serve as the distraction of the year; they are sometimes lucky enough to gain a little traction if their idea coincide with some current event (like during Yugoslavia). But in the end, their little insurgency of thought fades, and everything is pounded back into the conformity of Big Army Stopping the Horde at the Fulda Gap. There are few top thinkers that can get outside that box, the promotions system thought up during the Cold War was based on many things, including "who command a Joint Service detatchment?" and "How many rotations (and how did you do) at NTC?"

Basically, for longer than the careers of anyone serving, the Big Army Clash mode of thought has brutally paved over everything-- or, at best, treated other operations as sideshows that represent dangerous distractions from the dominant mindset.

Even now, when we try to break away from the mindset, we end up taking it with us and applying the same mode of thought to the new ideas-- hence we end up with 'one-size-fits-all' monolithic endeavours like the FCS. The USA is unparalleled in taking apart enemy armies and nations on grand scale, and so we try to make every problem fit our solution. It doesn't work that well, and it explains why we have soft-skin trucks and HumVees with zero combat worth going into combat, trying to be escorted by similar vehicles that have been modified to serve as gun trucks. The Army is still resistant to the idea of armored cars and dedicated, purpose-built light warfare vehicles. Troops in the field and commanders in the ground see the value, sure, but the appropriations still have to strain everything through that "what if we have to stop them at Fulda Gap...errr, I mean, the Pusan Perimeter again?"

They are still trying to make everything a Big Battle. It will be our Cavalry Charge that never comes. Well, unless the powers-that-be get what they want and we are able to either re-vivify the Soviet corpse, or keep poking at the Chinese so they actually awaken and become the tiger we need them to be so we can go back to getting ready for another Big One. Our Cold War-weaned warriors can't fathom any other kind of war, and they're still squeamish about the Vietnam thing to do much more than get their feet wet, and that only when forced.

Melchior wrote:It could be argued that they had no choice. The popular notion that they were a bunch of idiots is not entirely accurate, they had limited power (informations, political capital, freedom from urgent concerns) to actually implement change. They also tended to be called upon after war had became inevitable (and the alliance system in place was obviously instable).

Without getting into it much deeper myself I would say this is pretty far from the mark on a few notes.The problem, and Keegan pointed it out best, is that this was an era where military planners had literally constitutional force (Joffre within the Zone of Armies was a dictator by law) but no equal force required them to plan their actions within a larger sphere which encompassed non-military matters. They had plenty of resources and enourmous influence at court what they didn't have was any STRUCTRUAL check on their power. When you let military planners try and solve purely military problems without any input from the civilian segment of the government then you have the situation whereby the timetables for mobilization became more important than the objectives for which war was to be fought.

I've lived through over two decades of hearing about this or that upstart movement in the echelons that tries to orient us towards urban warfare, or peacekeeping ops, or "low-intensity conflict" and "operations other than war" and so on and so forth.

It's more like every 10-15 years or so, the Army gets a bug in it's ass which essentially amounts to:

Oh my god, we'll be obsolete unless we can rapidly deploy a force within x amount of hours!

in response to some perceived failing or threat to the Army's status in the overall Service Pecking Order (TM).

It first occured in the 1950s; you can see the evidence of it in the M56 Scorpion; then it laid down and died a bit until the good old M551 Sheridan came around. There was a whole package deal of proposed Sheridan derivatives, like APC, flame tank, SP AA gun, etc for the mobile, lightweight force!

After the dismisal overall performance of the Sheridan, the concept died again......until 1979.

In the wake of teh Iranian Crisis, the Army decided that yes, a rapid deployment force would be needed; and actually did type-classify the LAV-25 as the Mxxx something. I'm in North Carolina now, sO I can't get to my sources; but the US Army LAV-25 was basically the USMC LAV-25, but with less seats for infantry, and more 25mm ammunition.

In the end, the army decided not to buy the LAV-25; and the entire RDF concept was allowed to die, along with the fetish for lightweight mania.

But then came Clinton and Kosovo; and the Army got all upset and drew the wrong conclusions from how long it took to move a few Apaches to Kosovo, where one of them promptly crashed, versus the time it took for the USMC to hypothetically deploy to the area, and thus was born the STRYKER and FCS!

Both being hypothetically capable of being rapidly theater deployed via the mighty C-130!

These non-traditional thinkers get to serve as the distraction of the year

Or they decide to leave the "normal" side of things and go into the high speed low drag special forces side of things, where they can get killed in anomynity! Good for everyone; nobody loses!

or, at best, treated other operations as sideshows that represent dangerous distractions from the dominant mindset.

It's the truth actually, because you can use a huge combined arms army to do a lot of things; including "Stability" and "Peacekeeping" operations; albeit as a slightly blunt instrument; you can't use specialized units like Delta Force, or the Green Berets as a straight up force; the SEALs found that out the hard way in Panama, when they tried to take on a Panamanian force guarding an airfield....and the Panamanians had AK-47s and the SEALs MP-5s...you can guess what happened...

Even now, when we try to break away from the mindset, we end up taking it with us and applying the same mode of thought to the new ideas-- hence we end up with 'one-size-fits-all' monolithic endeavours like the FCS.

FCS is a dangerously flawed system built on using "infinite" RHAe applique armor from "information dominance" to win fights against conventional forces, while being light enough to be deployed fast enough and to fight guerilla wars cheaper than the legacy "heavy" force.

It doesn't work that well, and it explains why we have soft-skin trucks and HumVees with zero combat worth going into combat, trying to be escorted by similar vehicles that have been modified to serve as gun trucks.

Mainly because the insurgency in Iraq has been quite unpreceedented in it's scale of firepower. In Vietnam, you could still use Jeeps and other light vehicles for a lot of "in country" tasks, because all the explosive material, etc had to be humped down from North Vietnam via the Ho chi Minh trail, and so the VC and NVA had to use their scarce explosives for things other than blowing up SPC Stuckledick in his Jeep.

Same thing in Bosnia and Kosovo; there was little opposition to us there; excepting perhaps a couple of shots fired and a few windshields starred by bullets.

So we went in expecting that we could use unarmored vehicles in large numbers, only to find out that the Insurgents in Iraq had access to vast quantities of explosives from Saddam-era ammunition dumps; some of them were as large as small cities and were just sitting in the desert by themselves with no guards; making it easy to loot them for 155mm shells, semtex, etc in the early phase of 2003-2004 when we were still trying to get a handle on the country.

This means that the minimum vehical for random duties in Iraq is more akin to a heavy armored car than the traditional soft skin vehicle used.

The Army is still resistant to the idea of armored cars and dedicated, purpose-built light warfare vehicles

Because after Iraq, they'll be useless, and will have separate logistics chains set up for them, as well as having really high silhoulettes, and being dangerously top heavy and roll-over prone, along with having a lack of interior space (the "v" shaped anti-blast hull cuts into interior space a lot).

Most likely the next generation humvee replacement will have much better IED resistance in the specs from the start; but it will not be a straight up M1117 ASV.

While this is an interesting discussion it doesn't really pay much attention to the two major elements of Von Clausewitz that I asked for evidence of the generals ignoring. Firstly I was looking at the whole 'war as an extension of policy' angle, but just as important was Clausewitz stating that Defensive war was stronger than offensive. These both seemed to be major points of his doctrine, but rather than fight a limited Defensive war to keep France away from their border and free up troops for the Russian front, Germany invades France via a neutral nation. Why?

I will comment on the nature of offense versus defense at least in the minds of the general who were about to undertake WWI. They were presented with a whole host of dilemna's stretching from the near universal adoption of the German military conscription and staff academy system. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and, to a lesser extent, the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, were the biggest reference points for generals trying to devise a new strategy for winning.

All of the planning begins with a fundamental insight that is both true and dangerous...you cannot win a war solely on the defensive, or at the very least you cannot achieve positive results with the defensive. What you can do is prevent loses (in terms of territory, strategic assets etc) however the defensive is by its very nature a reactionary form of warfare. It is by its nature stronger, everything from interior lines to knowledge of the terrain favours defenders in terms of winning battles. The problem lies with not just winning battles but winning a victory. For virtually every nation entering into WWI victory was a condition which did not include a return to the status quo, given that fighting a defensive war would mean that the BEST possible result would be a return to the status quo with possibly superior long term strategic position but that is the best result. Against that best possible result we have the lessons taken from the aforementioned wars. In those cases effective combinations of rapidly deployed troops with well planned artillery overtook enemy defenses and fortifications. As a result military planners entering into the 20th century had to plan both to rapidly gather a large force and to use them quickly because if you didn't put your forces into the field immediately then your opponent (in the case of France-Germany, in the case of Germany-Russia, in the case of Russia- Austria (with German re-inforcements arriving continuously thereafter) would be able to gather superior force to seize objectives just as in both 1870 and 1905. Certainly the great right hook through Belgium did exactly that: the Germans massed a superiority of troops and outflanked then pushed back on an enemy with fewer available forces.

Anyway going back the point of any German policy was to secure better position in central Europe and weaken both France and Russia enough that they would never feel exposed on two flanks at once, they do not have the forces to do so by themselves (committment to the East undergaurds the West and vice versa) so they need to defeat one of their two opponents quickly in order to achieve enough parity for an effective defense against either.. In order to achieve this they have to attack because neithe France nor Russia's striking power will be diminished by fighting an understrengthened defense against both, especially while subjecting their own terriotry to attack. In the case of France victory is the weakening of the German position and retaking Alsace-Lorraine and the mineral wealth contained thereinneeded to fuel their economy. Again this can't be done without the offensive (well it could if they could count on Russia to mobilize and defeat the Germans but the French didn't trust the Russians and after the difficulties they suffered in the wake of 1905 its not suprising). For the Russians victory was regaining their international standing in the wake of 1905 and weakening the German hold on the Baltic, again objectives that a defensive can't achieve. For the Austrians neither offensive nor defensive promised much hope for maintaining the Empire but defensive action stood a good chance of being overwhelmed by Russia's numbers especially if Germany undertook a defensive campaign as well. Moreover in the case which led to WWI defensive action against Serbia would be silly to promote aside from the bitter hatred there was the practical matter that unhindered the Austrians could have, and with the Bulgarians did, crush the Serbs.

Much of this goes back to a point which I can't speak to how Clausewitz address it, which is that while defensive is stronger there is a tipping point in which superiority in the offensive outweighs it and if you wish to achieve positive progress (as oppossed to avoiding negative progress) then you must concentrate your forces in such a manner as to create local pockets where the attacker has the advantage and use those to force your opponent into reactionary action.

Shep Wrote wrote:Hopeless IFV wank

Because having an IFV immune to RPGs is going to be so useful when those insurgents just blow up the 12 unprotected fuel trucks that it takes to power a 55 ton IFV.

MKSheppard wrote:
For example, IIRC a British attack managed to seize a German trenchline; but they paused in their exploitation to lay telephone wire back to the British trenches to restore communications with higher command; and this delay allowed the Germans, using their interior lines of communications to generate a counter-attack that drove back the British and recaptured the trenchline.

The Germans did more than that, they often captured half the British start off positions in their counter attacks as well.

The Germans were also quite willing to give ground if its value wasn't militarily significant such as the Somme where there were no major towns, roads, and no rail junctions. It was heavily forested with many small villages. To attack the Germans, the British had to attack out of a swampy area and the heavy bombardment they used rendered use of Tanks impracticable as few could move through the cratered muddy landscape before breaking down.

JointStrikeFighter wrote:Because having an IFV immune to RPGs is going to be so useful when those insurgents just blow up the 12 unprotected fuel trucks that it takes to power a 55 ton IFV.

Silly JSF...the 55 ton IFV would have been powered by an advanced common engine similar across the entire chassis range. You can see what such an engine would have looked like in the Abrams/Crusader Common Engine (LV-100) gas turbine; having 50% greater fuel efficiency; allowing for a 70% greater cruising range for the 55t IFV than the Bradley.

MKSheppard wrote:

JointStrikeFighter wrote:Because having an IFV immune to RPGs is going to be so useful when those insurgents just blow up the 12 unprotected fuel trucks that it takes to power a 55 ton IFV.

Silly JSF...the 55 ton IFV would have been powered by an advanced common engine similar across the entire chassis range. You can see what such an engine would have looked like in the Abrams/Crusader Common Engine (LV-100) gas turbine; having 50% greater fuel efficiency; allowing for a 70% greater cruising range for the 55t IFV than the Bradley.

Do you have links to websites describing the FIFV in detail? (I couldn't find any other than glossaries stating what "FIFV" stands for.) Does it look anything like the IDF's Namer (modified Merkava) or Achzarit (modified T-54/55 tanks)?

MKSheppard wrote:

JointStrikeFighter wrote:Because having an IFV immune to RPGs is going to be so useful when those insurgents just blow up the 12 unprotected fuel trucks that it takes to power a 55 ton IFV.

Silly JSF...the 55 ton IFV would have been powered by an advanced common engine similar across the entire chassis range. You can see what such an engine would have looked like in the Abrams/Crusader Common Engine (LV-100) gas turbine; having 50% greater fuel efficiency; allowing for a 70% greater cruising range for the 55t IFV than the Bradley.

Right, so now instead of having to blow up 5 fuel trucks they have to blow up 8 fuel trucks and with your bigger, more expensive, less common IFV your now in less places at once so your smaller number of trucks are just as vulnerable. I have no doubt that the FIFV would have been great for fighting the ruskis in the Fulda Gap but for an insurgency its just stupid.

JointStrikeFighter wrote:Right, so now instead of having to blow up 5 fuel trucks they have to blow up 8 fuel trucks and with your bigger, more expensive, less common IFV your now in less places at once so your smaller number of trucks are just as vulnerable.

Question, how many US Army vehicles have been immobilized in Iraq because of lack of fuel as a result of insurgent activities? I know it must be a considerable quantity, because if it's not that would mean you're talking out your ass, but I'd like to have a ballpark figure.

I have no doubt that the FIFV would have been great for fighting the ruskis in the Fulda Gap but for an insurgency its just stupid.

Right of course, because having a vehicle that actually protects the men during an ambush, allowing them to counter-attack, and itself remains mobile so as to support them, couldn't possibly be helpful against insurgents.

Adrian Laguna wrote:

I have no doubt that the FIFV would have been great for fighting the ruskis in the Fulda Gap but for an insurgency its just stupid.

Right of course, because having a vehicle that actually protects the men during an ambush, allowing them to counter-attack, and itself remains mobile so as to support them, couldn't possibly be helpful against insurgents.

Because a vehicle needs to be a 55ton $8 billion dollar IFV to do that.

JointStrikeFighter wrote:

Adrian Laguna wrote:

I have no doubt that the FIFV would have been great for fighting the ruskis in the Fulda Gap but for an insurgency its just stupid.

Right of course, because having a vehicle that actually protects the men during an ambush, allowing them to counter-attack, and itself remains mobile so as to support them, couldn't possibly be helpful against insurgents.

Because a vehicle needs to be a 55ton $8 billion dollar IFV to do that.

Which you have YET to show is unreasonable. Your original point was that:

JointSrtikeFighter wrote:Because having an IFV immune to RPGs is going to be so useful when those insurgents just blow up the 12 unprotected fuel trucks that it takes to power a 55 ton IFV.

You have not yet shown (and in fact been proven wrong)
1) That the size of the vehicle creates a logistical burden that is easily attacked
OR
2) That the vehicle is over-engineered for the job it is doing.

JointStrikeFighter wrote:

Adrian Laguna wrote:Right of course, because having a vehicle that actually protects the men during an ambush, allowing them to counter-attack, and itself remains mobile so as to support them, couldn't possibly be helpful against insurgents.

Because a vehicle needs to be a 55ton $8 billion dollar IFV to do that.

And? So? Therefore?

I'm still waiting for you to tell me how many US Army vehicles have been immobilized in Iraq, or Afghanistan, due to lack of fuel as a result of insurgent activities. Obviously if that was a viable strategy the insurgents would be employing it already.

[qoute]
2) That the vehicle is over-engineered for the job it is doing.[/quote]

You can fight an insurgency using entirely light infantry should you so desire; see the British in Malaya. [obviously an entirely different situation but the point that you dont need high tech forces to fight insurgents stands.][/quote]

JointStrikeFighter wrote:

2) That the vehicle is over-engineered for the job it is doing.

You can fight an insurgency using entirely light infantry should you so desire; see the British in Malaya. [obviously an entirely different situation but the point that you dont need high tech forces to fight insurgents stands.

Wow...that proves jack shit. I can take a backpack and go hike down to Washington DC right now (sure it'd take me a day or so) but I CAN do it.

Your response answers absolutely nothing in that it does not show that a large IFV is excessive for its job which is not just fighting an insurgency but also keeping the infantry safer while doing so. yes you can fight an insurgency with just light infantry but were we to do that in Iraq our casualties would be FAR worse than they already are.