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In 1918, as per the Treaty of Versailles, Germany decleared that she was the aggressor in WW1 and had started the war. Nationalism immediately leaped into the picture and an entire generation of German patriots spent time and energy protesting this charge. Guderian for example stated that Bismarck was the last chancellor to visit an arms exhibition, and thus this shows that Germany wasn't militant in his memoirs.

So, the question is this. How much of this position was victor justice, and how much of it was justified?

I don't know that much about it, but Germany gave AH carte-blanche to deal with Serbia and precipitated the crisis. There are no innocent parties in 1914, but Germany does seem to stand tall as the nation that pushed hard into the war.

From what I understand, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was the first aggressor, with the invasion of Serbia. Germany became an aggressor AFTER they violated Belgian neutrality to get at France. The Second Reich was painted as the worst aggressor after the war because it still had a functional government at that point, able to gather up resources for reparations, while the Austro-Hungarian Empire DIDN'T.

Germany not only gave Austria-Hungary a "blank check" to do what they would with Serbia, Wilhelm personally urged the Austrian high command to "put a final end to the Serb question" even though Serbia acquiesced to almost all of Austria's demands.

Further, German had plans since 1912 to try to enter into a war with Russia as soon as feasible, because they considered war inevitable and sought to have it before Russia managed to modernize and bring itself up to parity with Germany. Germany's foreign policy, including the Moroccan Crises and their naval re-armament programs deliberately antagonized England and France in attempts to expand the German overseas empire and demonstrate their new status as a legitimate great power.

Although all powers were rabid nationalists, German schools before the war were very jingoistic, and even office and work environments practiced a kind of "militarization of the bourgeoisie."

Then, they invaded neutral Belgium, and throughout the war refused to accept anything less than a "German peace," that is, one where they kept the French and Belgian territories they had taken, secured a nominally independent Poland and other Eastern European countries which they then planned to control, annexed the Caucuses and territories in the Middle East for the Ottomans, who rapidly had become a German satellite themselves, established a German-dominated commerce union, and imposed indemnities on the Allies.

France and England had much more reasonable, although still harsh, peace terms, regarding German simply returning Belgian and French territory, imposing indemnities, and the return of Alsace-Lorraine. The French revanchists, however, were more apt to drive for more, including things like "ending Prussian militarism," as well.

So, while all parties were somewhat responsible via militant nationalism, etc., Germany was by far the most rabid with these practices. So, you could make a good case that Germany did bear the lion's share of the war guilt, but giving them sole responsibility was a lot of, as you say, "victor justice."

Edit: ^^^ Austria was certainly an aggressor too- they wanted to quash Serbia because it supported South Slav Nationalist movements that were growing in Hapsburg territory before they tore their empire apart. However, they needed German backing in order to be able to risk war with Russia, who not only had a pact with Serbia, but the Tsars considered themselves the protectors of all Orthodox Christians and Slavs.

The guilt clause of the treaty of Versailles was onerous one for the German people. They percieved it as a major insult, and it led in part to the consensus that they had been 'Dolchstoß' as is so often repeated. By no means did Germany bear the burden for World War One, that fell on the two alliances that had divided the Great Powers of Europe up into the Central powers and Triple Entente. Yes, Kaiser Wilhelm had built a fleet with the exact intention of it rivaling England's. He was a great admirer of naval power and of england in general, being a descendant of Queen Victoria and having seen the English fleet often in his youth. It was a stupid decision, but that alone hardly started the war. Germany did make aggressive moves in the opening months of the war, but only because they were the strongest army in Europe, and saw the need to knock France out of the war quickly before they were attacked in turn.

Russia was 100% solely responsible for WW1, by irrationally supporting the terrorist regicidal state of Serbia, where it was noted that the prior King and Queen were murdered by bayonets by the Black Hand, including those thrust up her vagina to defame her, with the rival royal family then installed in the fashion of a bandit kingdom, which in contravention to all the autocratic policies of the Tsarist Empire, they supported out of their lunatic notions of expansionism through Panslavism, the ideology which was the de facto cause of the First World War. Kaiser Wilhelm was by contrast simply a neurotic who, contrary to expecting or desiring war, was up with his all-male cruising party in the fjords of Norway when the war began, and had no real idea of how the Austrians would interpret the message--or how his cousin the Tsar would be led by more or less irrational madmen who dominated the Russian government into a war over what was more or less a minor bandit Kingdom.

The Duchess of Zeon wrote:Russia was 100% solely responsible for WW1

Care to back this up? Because it was Germany who escalated a minor war on the outskirts of Europe in the Balkans to a global one by it's retarded actions throughout the whole conflict.

Link to 1914 Document Depository

July 6, 1914 - Germany gives a "blank check" to Austria Hungary to do whatever she wanted to Serbia, with Germany's support; and so A-H goes and gives completly utterly unreasonable demands onto Serbia in their Ultimatum of 22 July:

The Royal Serbian Government will furthermore pledge itself:

1. to suppress every publication which shall incite to hatred and contempt of the Monarchy, and the general tendency of which shall be directed against the territorial integrity of the latter;

2. to proceed at once to the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana to confiscate all of its means of propaganda, and in the same manner to proceed against the other unions and associations in Serbia which occupy themselves with propaganda against Austria-Hungary; the Royal Government will take such measures as are necessary to make sure that the dissolved associations may not continue their activities under other names or in other forms;

3. to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, everything, whether connected with the teaching corps or with the methods of teaching, that serves or may serve to nourish the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. to remove from the military and administrative service in general all officers and officials who have been guilty of carrying on the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whose names the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to make known to the Royal Government when communicating the material evidence now in its possession;

5. to agree to the cooperation in Serbia of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the integrity of the Monarchy;

6. to institute a judicial inquiry against every participant in the conspiracy of the twenty-eighth of June who may be found in Serbian territory; the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government delegated for this purpose will take part in the proceedings held for this purpose;

7. to undertake with all haste the arrest of Major Voislav Tankosic and of one Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian official, who have been compromised by the results of the inquiry;

8. by efficient measures to prevent the participation of Serbian authorities in the smuggling of weapons and explosives across the frontier; to dismiss from the service and to punish severely those members of the Frontier Service at Schabats and Losnitza who assisted the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to cross the frontier;

9. to make explanations to the Imperial and Royal Government concerning the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian functionaries in Serbia and abroad, who, without regard for their official position, have not hesitated to express themselves in a manner hostile toward Austria-Hungary since the assassination of the twenty-eighth of June;

10. to inform the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised in the foregoing points.

Despite this; the Serbian government agreed to pretty much everything in a reply, even on the most insulting demands. For example:

The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for expressions of a private character, as for instance newspaper articles and the peaceable work of societies, expressions which are of very common appearance in other countries, and which ordinarily are not under the control of the state. This, all the less, as the Royal Government has shown great courtesy in the solution of a whole series of questions which have arisen between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, whereby it has succeeded to solve the greater number thereof, in favour of the progress of both countries.

...

The Royal Government binds itself further:

1. During the next regular meeting of the Skuptschina to embody in the press laws a clause, to wit, that the incitement to hatred of, and contempt for, the Monarchy is to be most severely punished, as well as every publication whose general tendency is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the constitution to embody an amendment into Art. 22 of the constitutional law which permits the confiscation of such publications as is at present impossible according to the clear definition of Art. 12 of the constitution.

But despite acceding to these incredibly insulting demands; that isn't enough for the Austro-Hungarians:

[Telegraphic]
Vienna, July 28, 1914

The Royal Serbian Government not having answered in a satisfactory manner the note of July 23, 1914, presented by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in state of war with Serbia.

COUNT BERCHTOLD

And then follows a series of exchanges between the Tsar and Kaiser following the mobilization of the Russian Army (the russians could not mobilize a few divisions to assist Serbia; they had to do it all at once); which Nicky makes clear to Willy.

The Willy-Nicky Telegrams

Despite this, the Germans decide to expand the war by escalating to a declaration of war on Russia on August 1st.

German DoW on Russia

While all this is going on, the Germans then decide to ask Belgium to let them march their troops through Belgium to attack France on August 2nd.

The German Request for Free Passage Through Belgium

The Belgians then say "Uh, no folks; we've always been Neutral, and that means no marching through us to attack another country" on August 3rd.

The Belgian Response

The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.

The Germans of course then declare war on France on August 3rd; and keeping with their escalation; invade Belgium on August 4th; which brings in Britain, who has pledged Belgian neutrality.

This is a whole series of strategically brilliant moves by the Second Reich.

It's followed up many years later with the triple brilliances of 1917 - The Zimmerman Telegram, Unrestricted Submarine Warfare, and the Sealed Train of Lenin.

So yes, we can say that the German Government was responsible for causing an escalation of what was a minor tribal spat in the Balkans to a continental war.

Instead of mobilizing a dozen or so divisions as a border guard force along the German/Russian Boarder in response to Russian mobilization, and communicating that intent via the "Willy/Nicky Telegram" line; the Germans decide that now is their time to make a grab for continental domination, and to do so, it is time to activicate the SCHELIFFEN PLAN.

Szass Tam wrote:Germany not only gave Austria-Hungary a "blank check" to do what they would with Serbia, Wilhelm personally urged the Austrian high command to "put a final end to the Serb question" even though Serbia acquiesced to almost all of Austria's demands.

Austria was certainly an aggressor too- they wanted to quash Serbia because it supported South Slav Nationalist movements that were growing in Hapsburg territory before they tore their empire apart.

I'm sure the United States was the aggressor when they invaded Afghanistan in 2001. The situation is similar, the Serbian government was supporting a terrorist organization, which attacked Austria-Hungary, same as the Afghani government was supporting a terrorist organization which attacked the United States. It is only natural that the Austrians hold Serbia responsible, the same way America held the Taliban responsible for the actions of Al-Quaeda. The claim that Austria-Hungary, or Germany, was somehow wrong in their response to Serbia is nothing more than bullshit. The ones who were in the wrong were the Russians, pan-slavism or no, there was no justification for going to war over that issue.

Further, German had plans since 1912 to try to enter into a war with Russia as soon as feasible, because they considered war inevitable and sought to have it before Russia managed to modernize and bring itself up to parity with Germany.

That must be why they didn't have any detailed plans to move against Russia. In 1914 when the Kaiser asked his Chief of the General Staff to mobilize Eastward, he was told that it was impossible, prompting Wilhelm to reply, "Your uncle would have given me a different answer!". Clearly they were prepared to pounce under any excuse.

Germany's foreign policy, including the Moroccan Crises and their naval re-armament programs deliberately antagonized England and France in attempts to expand the German overseas empire and demonstrate their new status as a legitimate great power.

Deliberate nothing, the Kaiser wanted to be friends with England, he liked the English, admired them even. The problem was that Wilhelm II knew jack and shit about being diplomatic, and less than nothing about modern diplomacy. On top of that, the man had a gift for acting in a manner that would be interpreted as the very opposite of his actual intentions. Germany's diplomatic problems weren't the result of malice or ambition, but rather tomfoolery on the part of the upper echelons of the German government.

Although all powers were rabid nationalists, German schools before the war were very jingoistic, and even office and work environments practiced a kind of "militarization of the bourgeoisie."

If Germany was exceptionally militarized, then how did France, with less than 60% of Germany's population, manage to raise an army the same size as the German one? In 1914 France had 47 divisions, Germany had 50, and the Germans had the Bear to deal with. Hell, if the war had started in 1916, the French army would have been larger than the German one. French soldiers served 50% longer than German ones, and there were no deferrals on service.

Then, they invaded neutral Belgium,

Okay there's that, though that's partly accidental. As mentioned above, Germans would have preferred to mobilize against Russia, but Motlke was too much of a moron to dynamically adjust plans for the situation at hand. So they stuck with the Schlieffen Plan. Which, btw, didn't work very well because Moltke the Spineless had crippled it.

and throughout the war refused to accept anything less than a "German peace,"

At what point exactly in the war did the allies made a peace offer that was rejected by the Germans because it wasn't one sided enough?

France and England had much more reasonable, although still harsh, peace terms, regarding German simply returning Belgian and French territory, imposing indemnities, and the return of Alsace-Lorraine. The French revanchists, however, were more apt to drive for more, including things like "ending Prussian militarism," as well.

Have you seen the Treaty of Versailles? Have you seen what the French wanted originally for of the Treaty? That's not what I would call "reasonable".

Adrian Laguna wrote:It is only natural that the Austrians hold Serbia responsible, the same way America held the Taliban responsible for the actions of Al-Quaeda.

Actually no. We asked the Taliban to give up Al Q; they said no. So we invaded and got rid of both. In contrast; the Serbians bent over backwards to accomodate the Austrian demands; including actually calling for a constitutional convention to allow the seizure and destruction of material printed in Serbia that agitated against Austria-Hungary.

Adrian Laguna wrote: I'm sure the United States was the aggressor when they invaded Afghanistan in 2001. The situation is similar, the Serbian government was supporting a terrorist organization, which attacked Austria-Hungary, same as the Afghani government was supporting a terrorist organization which attacked the United States.

What is the actual evidence for Serbian support of terrorism? This has been argued a few times at ACG and there never seemed to be much substance to the case that Serbia was backing the terrorists.

(Very late) EDIT: Or rather, that a unified Serbian government rather than individuals within that government.

thejester wrote:What is the actual evidence for Serbian support of terrorism?

IIRC, the Austrians claimed that the hand grenades used in the attack came from Serbian Armories; among other things; which is soooo damning.

thejester wrote:

Adrian Laguna wrote: I'm sure the United States was the aggressor when they invaded Afghanistan in 2001. The situation is similar, the Serbian government was supporting a terrorist organization, which attacked Austria-Hungary, same as the Afghani government was supporting a terrorist organization which attacked the United States.

What is the actual evidence for Serbian support of terrorism? This has been argued a few times at ACG and there never seemed to be much substance to the case that Serbia was backing the terrorists.

(Very late) EDIT: Or rather, that a unified Serbian government rather than individuals within that government.

One of the plotters who helped arrange to get the assasins across the border (which they did with Serbian travel documents and the complicity of serbian border guards) and helped both guide and finance them happened to be a uniformed officer of the Serbian intelligence service.

On the original question of culpability it rests with the Russians. When the dispute broke out between Austria-Hungary and Serbia there was a good period in which unilateral action would have quelled things but by time we get to the ultimatum being delivered it was down to fighting or Serbia asceding to a breach in its sovreignty. In this delicate period when Serbia was willing to asced to all 10 of the presented demands Russia decides to mobilize. From there its a straight downward spiral to war. As soon as Russia announced mobilization (or the period preparatory to mobilization which covered the partial mobilization they undertook) then the military worries overtook any chance of statesmanship prevailing.

Now there is certainly blame to go around. Serbia could certainly still let the Austrians come in and supervise the trial and probably no suffered much for it (long term instabilitys in Austria-Hungary along with Franz Joseph's ailing helath all but garuntee an eventuall dissolution). Austria itself was probably better served by an immediate retaliatory strike rather than the pervication of more than a month they undertook. Had they acted immediately and without German assistance (unlikely as such a scenario is) they could have quickly defeated Serbia and finished the affair before Russia could mobilize at which point the issue would have been moot and we would refer to the conflict as the Balkan War of 1914.

So wait, Russia is the only culpable party but Austro-Hungary is not, Germany is not, France and Britain are not?

That's something very new in my history book.

CmdrWilkens wrote:

thejester wrote:

Adrian Laguna wrote: I'm sure the United States was the aggressor when they invaded Afghanistan in 2001. The situation is similar, the Serbian government was supporting a terrorist organization, which attacked Austria-Hungary, same as the Afghani government was supporting a terrorist organization which attacked the United States.

What is the actual evidence for Serbian support of terrorism? This has been argued a few times at ACG and there never seemed to be much substance to the case that Serbia was backing the terrorists.

(Very late) EDIT: Or rather, that a unified Serbian government rather than individuals within that government.

One of the plotters who helped arrange to get the assasins across the border (which they did with Serbian travel documents and the complicity of serbian border guards) and helped both guide and finance them happened to be a uniformed officer of the Serbian intelligence service.

On the original question of culpability it rests with the Russians. When the dispute broke out between Austria-Hungary and Serbia there was a good period in which unilateral action would have quelled things but by time we get to the ultimatum being delivered it was down to fighting or Serbia asceding to a breach in its sovreignty. In this delicate period when Serbia was willing to asced to all 10 of the presented demands Russia decides to mobilize. From there its a straight downward spiral to war. As soon as Russia announced mobilization (or the period preparatory to mobilization which covered the partial mobilization they undertook) then the military worries overtook any chance of statesmanship prevailing.

Now there is certainly blame to go around. Serbia could certainly still let the Austrians come in and supervise the trial and probably no suffered much for it (long term instabilitys in Austria-Hungary along with Franz Joseph's ailing helath all but garuntee an eventuall dissolution). Austria itself was probably better served by an immediate retaliatory strike rather than the pervication of more than a month they undertook. Had they acted immediately and without German assistance (unlikely as such a scenario is) they could have quickly defeated Serbia and finished the affair before Russia could mobilize at which point the issue would have been moot and we would refer to the conflict as the Balkan War of 1914.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't that what Austria tried in the first place? (and failed to do so because of their rather inefficient army)

Ooh... This is the first time I heard a Russian was an aggressor approach, as opposed to Russia was a fool who didn't realise that all out war would occur.

What of the claim that Germany attempt to break Britain naval deadlock and gunboat diplomacy in traditional french waters were also acts of aggression?

PainRack wrote:Russia was a fool who didn't realise that all out war would occur

More correctly, the Tsar and his circle were fools, who pretty much realized the war could occur but thought it won't happen, and went through with war proceedings.

I doubt "agressor" is a term that could be easily applied in World War I.

"According to the statements of the Austrian General Staff, an active military movement against Serbia will not be possible before the 12th of August. As a result, the Imperial government is placed in the extraordinarily difficult position of being exposed in the meantime to the mediation and conference proposals of the other cabinets and if it continues to maintain its previous aloofness in the face of such proposals, it will incur the odium of having been responsible for a world war,"

Bethmann Hollweg, German chancellor to his ambassador in Vienna.

Apparently the German chancellor knew what was going on and what would happen.

Dastardly chaps the Serbians might have been but they weren't the ones trying to block a peaceful resolution.

But let us look what Germans themselves though at the time

Admiral Muller commented in 1916 on the allied peace offer which included German admission of war guilt, that it "contained certain bitter truths on our doings at the outbreak of war".

Albert Ballin an intimate political confidant of B-H and Jagow wrote to the secretary of state saying "I make every allowance for a man who is heavily incriminated, as your excellency is, and has to bear the fearful responsibility for having staged this war".

Let us look at what the Austrians had to say

Berchtold told the Germans (when asking for aid) "That we took our decision to go to war on the strength of the express statements both of the German Emperor and the German Imperial Chancellor that they regarded the moment as suitable and would be glad if we showed ourselves in earnest".

Czernin (A-H foreign minister) in 1917 told the Germans "It was not Austria alone that begun the war then". (he carried on, and mysteriously the rest of the sentence disappears from German civilian records although the military records didn't seem bothered enough to cover up the exchange)"Germany demanded that the ultimatum to Serbia should be drawn up in those sharp terms".

Czernin in 1918 asked Berchtold for permission to publish a letter from Tisza which showed "what strong efforts Germany was making at the time to hold us to a hard line, and how our alliance might have been in danger if we had given way".

Czernin also said "Repeated conversations and interviews I had with Ambassador von Tschirschky could create no other impression [...] that if we did not show ourselves in earnest, then on the next occasion Berlin would not only not support us, but would in fact "orient" itself in another direction".

The Germans actually threatened to abandon A-H to the wolves if they wouldn't essentially bring about a war.


Meanwhile a pro German Austrian politician put it thus in his diary in 1914 "The Germans were afraid we would refuse to go with them if the war broke out over some question remote to us [German reactions in 1911 confirm this]."
He goes on that "so when the Sarajevo murder took place, Germany seized her opportunity and made as Austrian grievance her signal for action. That is the history of the war"."

Germany thus gets the gold in this event.

Britain should probably have been a little more forceful in elucidating about what they would do because the Germans weren't really that bright when it came to diplomacy.

Austria Hungary had, for years prior to 1914, an almost paranoid view of Serbia. A-H annexed Bosnia in 1878, and worried about the rise of Orthodox nationalism among the Bosnian population (I refuse to call Orthodox Bosnians "Bosnian Serbs"), aided by Serbia, which was in turn aided by Russia and its pan Slavism. I think there was very real fear among the A-H powers that be that a unified Slav state would appear on its southern border, which would have threatened the stability of the Empire.

Anyhoo, A-H was just itching to go to war with Serbia-hardly a tear was shed for Ferdinand and Sophie, their deaths merely an excuse to finally deal with Serbia.

Adrian Laguna wrote: If Germany was exceptionally militarized, then how did France, with less than 60% of Germany's population, manage to raise an army the same size as the German one? In 1914 France had 47 divisions, Germany had 50, and the Germans had the Bear to deal with. Hell, if the war had started in 1916, the French army would have been larger than the German one. French soldiers served 50% longer than German ones, and there were no deferrals on service.

I was under the impression that the Allies, even with an expanded British Army, were scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel. Germany did have a larger population than France, and I think suffered from fewer casualties on the Western Front. It was only arrival of American troops, I've always been lead to believe, that helped alleviate the Allies manpower shortage.

Cecelia5578 wrote: I was under the impression that the Allies, even with an expanded British Army, were scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel. Germany did have a larger population than France, and I think suffered from fewer casualties on the Western Front. It was only arrival of American troops, I've always been lead to believe, that helped alleviate the Allies manpower shortage.

That doesn't answer the question of France with a peacetime army/intial mobilization brought up enough people to nearly match the German Army. The idea is that France in 1914 is much more militant(although it's logistics and organization is frickin' joke, but I digress) than Germany, to the point of placing special emphasis on esprit de corps. The germans, of course, took a rather more scientific approach.

I generally got the impression that Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia all could have stopped the outbreak of a general war at different points throughout the crisis, but were too stupid/arrogant/shortsighted to do so.

The Germans could have avoided giving AH a blank check, and could have avoided attacking Belgium (and for that matter, possibly France).

AH could have either accepted the Serbian reply without military action, or have attacked early, so there was no time for Russia to mobilize and the shock from the assassination was fresh.

Russia simply did not have to mobilize or attack period, their only excuse for getting involved was Pan-Slavism.

Stas Bush wrote:More correctly, the Tsar and his circle were fools, who pretty much realized the war could occur but thought it won't happen, and went through with war proceedings.

There's a big difference between mobilization and actually marching across someone's boarder in a hail of shellfire and crushing of boarder guards, etc. Otherwise, Operation RYAN in 1983 would have ended with a Soviet nuclear first strike on NATO.

MKSheppard wrote:

Stas Bush wrote:More correctly, the Tsar and his circle were fools, who pretty much realized the war could occur but thought it won't happen, and went through with war proceedings.

There's a big difference between mobilization and actually marching across someone's boarder in a hail of shellfire and crushing of boarder guards, etc. Otherwise, Operation RYAN in 1983 would have ended with a Soviet nuclear first strike on NATO.

Not in the Tsarist Army of 1914. Their mobilization was staged such that if an advance did not begin, they'd start to have massive clogging in the supply pipeline to the troops, such that an advance would be impossible for logistical reasons.

The Duchess of Zeon wrote:

MKSheppard wrote:There's a big difference between mobilization and actually marching across someone's boarder in a hail of shellfire and crushing of boarder guards, etc. Otherwise, Operation RYAN in 1983 would have ended with a Soviet nuclear first strike on NATO.

Not in the Tsarist Army of 1914. Their mobilization was staged such that if an advance did not begin, they'd start to have massive clogging in the supply pipeline to the troops, such that an advance would be impossible for logistical reasons.

Can you explain why the Russian Army's mobilization plans and logistics systems would end up fucking itself like that? Lack of storage facilities for supplies, maybe?

Sidewinder wrote:

The Duchess of Zeon wrote:

MKSheppard wrote:There's a big difference between mobilization and actually marching across someone's boarder in a hail of shellfire and crushing of boarder guards, etc. Otherwise, Operation RYAN in 1983 would have ended with a Soviet nuclear first strike on NATO.

Not in the Tsarist Army of 1914. Their mobilization was staged such that if an advance did not begin, they'd start to have massive clogging in the supply pipeline to the troops, such that an advance would be impossible for logistical reasons.

Can you explain why the Russian Army's mobilization plans and logistics systems would end up fucking itself like that? Lack of storage facilities for supplies, maybe?

Its the same way that EVERYONE's mobilization schedule essentially dictated war. Because of the German success in 1870 at marshalling and dispatching troops (both foot and byrail) most naitons began to build mobilizaiton and rail schedules that were massive in their complexity and timing. However ALL of them were built aroudn the idea that the troops, once arriving at a given locaiton, would move on to the offensive from that locaiton. Essentially had the German's mustered for the attack through Belgium and not continued forward then re-inforcement divisions and supplies would have all come crashing in to the same corner of Germany that they were in (because in the mobilization plan those trops would not be there anymore).

For every major combatant there were only so many staging areas and supply depots that were built into the mobilization schedules so once troops started moving there then those same troops would have to be out by the pre-set time or else the follow on shipments would be dumped right on top of them. Now a competent QM corps could unravel SOME problems if you delay maybe a day or two but if you start talking about a 1 or 2 week delay then the supplies and troops will be stuck in a jumble that will take days to sort out.



On a completely different note:

wautd wrote:

cmdrWilkens wrote:Now there is certainly blame to go around. Serbia could certainly still let the Austrians come in and supervise the trial and probably no suffered much for it (long term instabilitys in Austria-Hungary along with Franz Joseph's ailing helath all but garuntee an eventuall dissolution). Austria itself was probably better served by an immediate retaliatory strike rather than the pervication of more than a month they undertook. Had they acted immediately and without German assistance (unlikely as such a scenario is) they could have quickly defeated Serbia and finished the affair before Russia could mobilize at which point the issue would have been moot and we would refer to the conflict as the Balkan War of 1914.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't that what Austria tried in the first place? (and failed to do so because of their rather inefficient army)

Here is the timeline, briefly, and I'll address the point at the end:

28 June: The murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand
2 July: Confession by the assasins, revelation as to Serbian involvement (help with the border crossing and access to military arsenals etc)
4 July: Berchtold (The A-H Foreign Minister) sends a not to Germany requesting agreement with Austrian military action
5 July: Germany gives the green light to Austria-Hungary
7 July: Austrian Council of Ministers meets to consider military action
14 July: The Council finally approves a note followed by an ultimatum
19 July: The note is completed but the decision is made not to send it for another week
23 July: The note is finally delivered with an expiration on 25 July
24 July Serbian ministers meet to discuss the note and any actions to take. Most agree that concessio to most of the 10 numbered requests would be neccessarry
25 July: Russia announces "Period Preparatory to War" at 11 o'clock, news reaches Belgrade around noon and response to the note shifts to rejecting 2 points and attaching conditions to 6 more points.
26 July: Serbia mobilizes and Russia recalls reservists in the Western military districts
28 July: Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia

That is literally a month from act to re-action and was interspersed with requests from allies that were not neccessarry and fretted away by petty infitting as the dualism left Tisza with lots of power but more fearful of his position because of it. Had the Austrians, when they conveed the council of ministers, immediately moved to sending a note or issuing an ultimatum, as they would 3 weeks later, the issue would have moved faster than the courts in Russia or Germany could have reacted. Certainly a military strike, which would have easily been possible as early as 22 or 23 July (in practice from mobilization to the attack on Serbia 12 days passed, if a note was delivered on the 8th to expire on the 10th an attack would come as early as the 22nd). Moreover a declaration of war or an ultimatum less than two weeks after the murder would have had far greater weight than the same delivered a month afterwards. There is also the matter that faster action is intended mostly to forestall Russian intervention as B-staffel and the Minimalgruppe Balkan would both be able to attack (possibly even A-Staffel) meaning 22 (or 52) divisions instead of the ten that did attack. With that degree of numerical superiority it is hard to imagine a failure to suceed (as they would with Bulgarian help in 1915)