StarDestroyer.Net BBS

First up, a listing of the various color codes used in them to represent countries:

BLUE - U.S.A.
BLACK - Germany
ORANGE - Japan
RED - Great Britain
CRIMSON - Canada
SCARLET - Australia
GARNET - New Zealand
RUBY - Indian Empire
GOLD - France
SILVER - Italy
OLIVE - Spain
GREEN - Mexico
BROWN - Netherlands East Indies
PURPLE - U.S.S.R.
LEMON - Portugal
CITRON - Brazil
YELLOW - China
INDIGO - Iceland
EMERALD - Eire (Ireland)
GRAY -Azores
TAN - Cuba
VIOLET - China Intervention
WHITE - U.S.A. (Domestic Contingency)

SECRET

ENCLOSURE A

JOINT ARMY AND NAVY SPECIAL PLAN VIOLET

I. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. Historical precedents as to the use of the armed forces of the United States for purposes of intervention, indicate that plans should be made to meet like emergencies which may occur in the future.

2. Possible emergencies are likely to be of the following types:

(a) Intervention to protect the lives and property of American citizens, e.g., intervention in China during the Boxer Uprising and at Nicaragua in 1912;

(b) Intervention to maintain the rights, dignity, and authority of the United States, e.g., occupation of Vera Cruz in 1914;

(c) Intervention to remedy conditions so injurious to the United States, as a neighboring nation, that they can no longer be endured, e.g., intervention in Cuba in 1893:

(d) Intervention to forestall action by other countries including the League of Nations, as a matter of international equity and as an implied obligation of the United States in view of its assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, e.g., action in Haiti and San Domingo.

3. While it is impossible to forecast the exact situation to be met in case of possible future interventions, it is reasonably certain that in the future, as in the past, the following conditions will characterize the general situation:

(a) The decision to intervene will be made suddenly, and probably as the result of some overt act or special situation which will largely, if not entirely, determine the character of the intervention and the means to be employed;

(b) The situation will be such that promptness of action will be of paramount importance:

(c) There will be no considerable hostile naval strength;

(d) Possible theaters of operations are Mexico, Central America, South America, and the West Indies.

II. DECISION AS TO GENERAL PLAN.

Major Decision.

4. To provide for such intervention operations as may be ordered by the President of the United States.

Minor Decisions.

(a) To provide for the employment of Naval and Marine Corps forces for all initial and subsequent overseas intervention operations, within the limit of their capacity to execute.

(b) To provide also for the enployment of Army forces in all intervention operations for which Naval and Marine Corps forces are inadequate.

(c) That, when Joint Army and Navy action is ordered by the President, The Joint Board will formulate specific instructions, based upon said order and the situation existing at the time of the intervention; these instructions to include a statement of the Naval, Marine Corps, and Army forces required, the mission of such forces, and the theater of operations.

(d) In order to insure the immediate availability of Army forces suitable and adequate, for the operations contemplated by (b) and (c) above, to make provision for holding in a constant state of readiness such Army forces as will permit tho prompt dispatch, of any one of the expeditionary forces below indicated.



(e) To provide naval convoy and support during overseas movements and landing operations, for such Arny Expeditionary forces as are dispatched.

III. MISSION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT.

5. (a) To make effective such intervention as may be ordered by the President of the United States.

Contributory Missions.

(b) To maintain the United States Army Forces in such a constant state of readiness as to permit the prompt dispatch of any one of the expeditionary forces set forth in paragraph 4 (d) above, and upon the selection of the force to be used, to embark and transport this force to the Theater of Operations, and thereafter to maintain the said force in the Theater of Operations.

(c) To establish, operate, and maintain all ports of embarkation for the Army Transport Service.

(d) To procure, man, and operate all vessels necessary for the transportation and maintenance of the Army Expeditionary Force; the convoy of such vessels to be conducted by the Navy in accordance with Articles 1461-1467 (inclusive), U. S. Navy Regulations and General Orders No. 18, War Department, 1911.

IV. MISSION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

6. (a) To make effective such intervention as may be ordered by the President of the United States.

Contributory Missions.

(b) To maintain in a constant state of readiness for prompt dispatch such Naval and Marine Corps Forces as may be necessary, for all initial and subsequent overseas intervention operations, within the limit of their capacity to execute, and to provide such Naval and Marine Corps Forces as may be required under paragraph 4 (c) above.

(c) To provide suitable Naval escort and support of Army Expeditionary Forces during overseas movements and landing operations, under any of the variations indicated in paragraph 4 (d) above; convoys to be conducted in accordance with Articles 1461-1467 (inclusive), U. S. Navy Regulations and General Orders No. 18, War Department, 1911.

(d) To provide hospital ship service for Army Expeditionary Forces.

(e) To cooperate fully with the Army in the execution of such missions as may be assigned to the Army, under any particular variation as set forth in paragraph 4 above.

V. ARMY AND NAVY PLANS.

7. The foregoing Joint Army and Navy Special Plan Violet, when approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, shall constitute the basis upon which the Army Special Plan Violet and the Navy Basic Violet Plan will be formulated and developed.

8. When any question of jurisdiction and responsibility arises that requires interpretation of this Basic Plan, the matter will be referred to The Joint Board for decision.

SECRET



JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC INTERVENTION PLAN, TAN

SECTION I.

SITUATION.

1. PURPOSE OF THE PLAN.

The Joint Army and Navy Basic Intervention Plan, TAN, has for its purpose the most effective employment of the Army and Navy forces of the United States in an intervention in CUBA, undertaken under the provisions of the Treaty between the United States and CUBA, which was proclaimed July 2, 1904. Upon this Joint Plan will be based all Army Plans, TAN, all Navy Plans, TAN, and all Joint Plans, TAN.

2. ASSUMPTIONS.

a. Due to unsatisfactory conditions existing in CUBA, the President of the United States has decided to intervene, in accordance with existing Treaty rights, in one of the following ways:

(1) Variation A.
Intervention without military support.

(2) Variation B.
Establishment of a Provisional Government with military eupport.

b. The situation in CUBA is such that serious organized resistance to intervention is not anticipated.

c. Nothing in the international situation indicates that the intervention will be oppoeed by any foreign power.

d. The operations will be initiated without a declaration of war.

SECTION II.

DECISION.

1. NATIONAL MISSION.

While protecting United States and othar foreign interests in the Republic of CUBA, to intervene in that country for the purpoae of preserving CUBAN independence and maintaining a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, either without military support, or with military aupport, as may be directed by the President.

2. ARMY MISSION.

To establish a stable and efficient Government in the Republic of CUBA, either without military support (Variation A), or with military support (Variation B), as may be directed by the President; and to protect United States and othar foreign intereats in the Republic of CUBA.

3. NAVY MISSION.

To extend to United States and other foreign intereats in CUBAN seaports such protection aa may be required prior to the arrival of Army forces; to support and assist the landing of Army forces in CUBA; and, thereafter, to cooperate with the Army in the execution of the Army Mission and to render such assistance to the Army as may be requested by the Commanding General, American Intervention Force.

4. THEATERS OF OPERATIONS.

Under Variation B, Theaters of Operations are defined as follows:

a. For the Army:
All CUBAN Territory, exclusive of the area included within the limits of the U. S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay.

b. For the Navy:
All sea areas adjacent to the coasts of CUBAN territory, and the area included within the limits of the U. S. Naval Station, Guantamano Bay.

5. TIME ORIGINS.

M-DAY is the first day of open mobilization and is the time origin for the execution of this JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC INTERVENTION PLAN, TAN. M-DAY will be determined for each service by the War and Navy Departments respectively. Army M-DAY and Navy M-DAY may not necessarily coincide.

SECTION III.

PLAN.

1. UNDER VARIATION A.

In accordance with the National Mission, under Variation A, U. S. Army and Navy officers will serve as advisers to, or, if necessary, as replacements for, CUBAN officials; the officers required for these duties being furnished by the War Department, and by the Navy Department upon request of the War Department.

2. UNDER VARIATION B.

a. Provisional Governor.

In accordance with the National Mission, the Provision-al Governor, who will be appointed by the President of the United States under Variation B, and who may or may not be the Commanding General, American Intervention Force, has the following tasks:

(1) To establish a Provisional Government in CUBA for the maintenance of good order and the restoration of the financial standing of the CUBAN Government.

(2) To use American forces for the preservation of law and order only when the civil and military agencies of the CUBAN Government are unable to cope with the situation.

b. Army Tasks.

In accordance with the Army Mission, under Variation B, the Army tasks are as follows:

(1) By the War Department:

(a) To furnish Army officers, as indicated under Variation A (see Section III, paragraph 1, above), for duty with the Provisional Government.

(b) To send to CUBA for the support of the Provisional Government an American Intervention Force (A.I.F.) of such strength as may be required initially to support that Government; and to be prepared to augment this initial force upon requeat of the Provisional Governor.

(c) To provide the sea transportation for all Army forces to be employed in CUBA..

(2) By the Commanding General, A.I.F.:

(a) If not designated Provisional Governor, to report to the latter at the earliest opportunity and to oondnet the operations of his forces in support of the Provisional Government in accordance with the instructions of the Provisional Governor.

(b) To make every effort to establish friendly relations with the CUBAN population and to prevent clashes between American forces and the natives of CUBA.

c. Navy Tasks.

In accordance with the Navy Mission, under Variation B, the Navy tasks are as follows:-

(1) By the Navy Department:

(a) To furnish Navy officers upon request of the War Department, as indicated under Variation A (see Section III, paragraph 1, above), for duty with the Provisional Government.

(b) To send to CUBAN waters such Naval forces as may be required to carry out the Navy Mission.

(2) By Naval Forces:

(a) To extend to United States and other foreign interests in CUBAN seaports such protection as may be required prior to the arrival of Army forces in CUBAN territory.

(b) To render such support and assistance to Army forces while landing in CUBAN territory as may be required.

I missed a few pages for TAN, will put them up later

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The following is just a brief summary of RAINBOW FOUR's planning assumptions.

I didn't bother scanning in the entire war plan; it's just too long. I did however scan in this page because it's a very interesting insight into US War Planning Assumptions Circa April 10, 1940.

-----------

J.B. No 325
(Serial 642-4)

SECTION II

ASSUMPTIONS

1. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - RAINBOW NO. 4, is based on the following assumptions:

a. The coalition of Totalitarian Powers to which the United States is opposed in a RAINBOW. NO. 4 War, consist of Germany, Italy and Japan.

b. The termination of the war in Europe has resulted from the military defeat of Great Britain and France.

c. The combined fleets of Germany and Italy, including Naval units taken over from Great Britain and France, are equal or superior to the United States Fleet.

d. Germany and Italy have declared their intention of assuming sovereignty over all French; British, Dutch and Danish colonial possessions and mandates. Actual occupation at an early date may be expected to include Iceland; Senegal, Gambia, French Guinea and Sierra Leone, all on the West Coast of Africa; and all territories and mandates bordering the Red and Mediterranean Seas, including Egypt.

e. Japan, while compelled to retain strong forces in China, and Manchukuo has, vith the consent of Germany and Italy, declared the entire Far Eastern area to be within her sphere of influence.

f. Russia, while neutral is unfriendly to both Japan and the United States, hopes to extend her influence into India, and is furthering strong communistic activities in Mexico.

g. The British Dominions, Eire and India may have declared their complote independence from Great Britain.

h. Canada remains technically at war with Germany and Italy, has annexed Newfoundland, and declared her intention to resist German and Italian agression against Canadian soil.

i. German and Italian minorities or enemy sympathizers have been organized, and are threatening the stability of the established Governments in Brazil, Peru, and Mexico.

j. All American Republics have signified their intention of adhering to the Declaration of Lima, approved December 24, 1938, but otherwise than taking measures to control subversive elements remain in a non-belligerent stratus.

k. All American Republics; except Mexico, will permit the free passage of United States forces and will interpose no objections to the use of their territorial waters or land bases.

l. No organized resistance to occupation by the United States will be offered by British, Dutch, French or Danish colonies in the Western Hemispheres. However, unorganized resistance from enemy sympathizers may be expected.

g. War will be preceded by a period of strained relations which will develop into actual hostilities without a formal declaration of war.

-------------------------

Reading this, I'm struck by the similarities to TBO. Stuart, did you borrow Rainbow Four, and mix it with the Victory Plan's AWPD-1 to generate the framework?

(2) Variation B.
Establishment of a Provisional Government with military eupport.

b. The situation in CUBA is such that serious organized resistance to intervention is not anticipated.

c. Nothing in the international situation indicates that the intervention will be opposed by any foreign power.

d. The operations will be initiated without a declaration of war.

Did the people who drafted TAN have any plans for what to do if US intervention IS opposed by a foreign power, e.g., Fascist Spain or Nazi Germany? Or if "serious organized resistance to intervention" DOES occur? If not, it sounds like someone dropped the ball long before Castro took power.

Shep, you've gotten the best of my curiosity... I demand a posting of PLAN EMERALD and PLAN GARNET. What in holy hell has to happen for us to invade Ireland or New Zealand?

Sidewinder wrote:

(2) Variation B.
Establishment of a Provisional Government with military eupport.

b. The situation in CUBA is such that serious organized resistance to intervention is not anticipated.

c. Nothing in the international situation indicates that the intervention will be opposed by any foreign power.

d. The operations will be initiated without a declaration of war.

Did the people who drafted TAN have any plans for what to do if US intervention IS opposed by a foreign power, e.g., Fascist Spain or Nazi Germany? Or if "serious organized resistance to intervention" DOES occur? If not, it sounds like someone dropped the ball long before Castro took power.

Castro was tolerated - some might even say accepted - by the U.S. when he first took power. He drifted into the Soviet orbit later.