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The Malayan Campaign has multiple myths attached to the history. While some of these were prove false early in history, many of them received widespread publication and retention in the general public. However, in combating some of the myths, "counter myths" had been created in history.


1. The Guns of Singapore were useless.
The most easily disproven myth of the war. Stated in its most simple terms, the original myth was the guns were "facing the wrong way". It was later interpretated as the guns could not turn around to fire north, and were stuck needlessly facing south. Later expansion of the myth turned on airpower vs guns. As the argument goes, guns were relatively useless and they should had invested in more airpower.

The airpower variant of the myth is misleading however. When the expansion of Singapore naval guns were first discussed in the twenties, airpower was relatively new and lacked the range and firepower to engage ships decisively. More importantly, the British never did abandon airpower in favour of guns. What it did was to intergrate existing elements, upgrade defensive fortifications and guns and make them better. Aerial scouts served to enhance naval gunnery, providing targeting information and gunnery correction. Bombers would increase Singapore anti-ship capabilities, providing an additional threat to any incoming naval convoy.

However, while the guns did participate in battery missions, they WERE facing the wrong way. The issue would rest in the use of those guns, their history and its use in the Singapore Strategy. The original history of the guns were emplaced in the late 80s due to the threat of French and Dutch forces in the area. To provide "low" cost defences(Singapore was an enterpot settlement with no taxation), the British emplaced a few guns at Fort Siloso, Canning and other sites. Those guns protected the settlement from any direct naval invasion from foreign forces. The Japanese threat caused a review and expansion of those guns.
Their role would no longer be the sole defence of the settlement. Now, their role would be to protect the Sembawang naval base.... unfortunately, its placement caused various difficulties. Various factors would cause the base to be placed at Sembawang. The high cost of land would emplace the base outside of the existing fortifications.... Indeed, to merely transit to the base, the Johore straits would need to be defended. Any naval assault on the base would face only a limited portion of the guns. Their primary defence would thus lie with airpower and other lesser artillery as well as any capital ships in the region. Primary amongst this would be the Alor Star base, Tengah and Sembawang airfields.


Considering that the British strategy had switched from defending Singapore to defending the entire Malayan continent, the guns were of limited value. They closed off a point of vulnerability, preventing a direct naval assault on Singapore City itself. It could not effectively defend the naval base and if a capital fleet had been stationed there itself, it would had prevented a direct attack. The expansion of the gun batteries themselves would thus be an expensive white elephant. While it did help conserve resources by closing off a vulnerable attack, the existing guns would probably have served just as well if a fleet had been present. Worse of all, the British were still forced to place a large fortress contingent, fighters and bombers at Singapore and Johore so as to defend Singapore. The guns also played no direct role in the British plans to defend the Malayan campaign, which was now neccessary. Johore had to be defended if the naval base was to be used, and as airpower arrived on the scene, Perak and the northern Malay states would need to be secured so the British could protect as well as project airpower in the region.

While none of this was important in the grand scheme, indeed, the fact that it made Singapore invulnerable to a direct naval assault from the south(although a naval assault from the East was still plausible if the airplanes and fleets was missing. However, terrain and other military strategic problems would complicate an already difficult amphibious assault) could only enhance the British plan to defend the north.
The guns and the mentality it entailed would however serve to create a false dichotomy in the defence. Brigadier Ivan Simson would note an amazing disparity in terms of defences.
Fortress Commander Singapore ordered additional puji sticks to be installed to the south, on the beaches to protect against an non existant naval attack. At this point in time, the Japanese had already conquered Penang and Northern Malaya. Instead of investing in additional field defences in Johore or the northern shores of Singapore, more stakes were added to a comprehensive defence system of guns and mines to the south. The strategic orientation of said guns, to defend the Singapore Settlement would thus see the fortress commander placing more stakes in the south, leaving the north dangerously bare.

This would be even more unforgivable when we address the myth of no northern defences and "lower morale" of Perceival fame.

It wouldn't have mattered. If the Japs really wanted to, they could have sent their carrier aircraft and bomb the guns to pieces, then commence a Naval assault. The Japs merely chose another method that was simplest in execution. They wanted to take Malaya anyway for the oil and natural resources.

That aside, there is the serious problem that Thailand was actively supporting the invasion and they allowed some Japanese forces down from the Thai border. It will be hard, but not impossible to erect defences on the beaches, but if the Japanese could strike from Thailand, these defences would be moot. Further, there was a serious lack of adequate equipment, from fire support vehicles, down to the rifles. All in all, there wasn't enough invested in equipment, war materiel and weapons.

In any case, the Brits decided to divert attention to home defence after the disastrous abandonment of their equipment at Dundirk. The Brits took awhile to replace their equipment and there was no way Singapore or Malaya could be resupplied.

Fingolfin_Noldor wrote:It wouldn't have mattered. If the Japs really wanted to, they could have sent their carrier aircraft and bomb the guns to pieces, then commence a Naval assault. The Japs merely chose another method that was simplest in execution. They wanted to take Malaya anyway for the oil and natural resources.

Carrier aircraft were at a prenium. Japanese aircraft operating against Singapore were from fixed airbases. The batteries however were of sufficient tactical value that several batteries from Faber command were engaged and one destroyed by dive bombers. The Connaught battery for example fired 2000 rounds at Tengah Airfield, a japanese forward HQ(Did Singapore have to fall.)

More importantly, a sustained aerial bombardment and assault from the South would had to run through the gauntlet of British airpower, guns and ships. A much more risky proposition. Ditto for the large fortress contingent.

That aside, there is the serious problem that Thailand was actively supporting the invasion and they allowed some Japanese forces down from the Thai border. It will be hard, but not impossible to erect defences on the beaches, but if the Japanese could strike from Thailand, these defences would be moot. Further, there was a serious lack of adequate equipment, from fire support vehicles, down to the rifles. All in all, there wasn't enough invested in equipment, war materiel and weapons.

This myth really needs to be addressed. The real reason for Japan eventual victory rested in the fact that she could reinforce and resupply Japanese forces faster than the British could. The war diary from various senior British commanders in the War Office revealed that they never did expect to hold Singapore, and its purpose was a mere delaying action so that the Americans could get into the war/defend India as best as possible. If it wasn't for the Australians screaming at Churchill, the Australian 85h division that "walked into captivity" would had been deployed to Burma, a much better use.

British forces were deficient in tanks, however, they were adequately supported in artillery and AT guns. Japanese accounts all mention the superiority of British Artillery and its weight of firepower. The problems were more of climate and training, hardly surprising when one consider that the majority of units fighting in the campaign were green. The real problem was communications. Radio and wire frequently failed in the jungle. The disastrous SOE infiltration of Thailand is a good example. They were all promptly captured by the Thai/Japanese, and the set that did evade initial capture had its comns fail. Stay behind parties success in derailing Japanese supplies were also unable to communicate their success to Singapore.

In any case, the Brits decided to divert attention to home defence after the disastrous abandonment of their equipment at Dundirk. The Brits took awhile to replace their equipment and there was no way Singapore or Malaya could be resupplied.

There was equipment. The problem was there wasn't ships. I don't have the book available, but a professor dug through the relevant convoy shipping and showed that the British didn't have the ships neccesary to reinforce Singapore as per the Singapore Strategy. As it was, the reinforcements that did go through relied heavily on American ships, before her declearation of war.

PainRack wrote:Carrier aircraft were at a prenium. Japanese aircraft operating against Singapore were from fixed airbases. The batteries however were of sufficient tactical value that several batteries from Faber command were engaged and one destroyed by dive bombers. The Connaught battery for example fired 2000 rounds at Tengah Airfield, a japanese forward HQ(Did Singapore have to fall.)

Considering they were willing to deploy as many as about 100 aircraft against Prince of Wales and Repulse, that puts that in doubt. The amount of effort that could be put into the Midway invasion is similar to the effort needed to destroy the guns. Of course, as I said, the simplest method available was to invade from the north which they did.

This myth really needs to be addressed. The real reason for Japan eventual victory rested in the fact that she could reinforce and resupply Japanese forces faster than the British could. The war diary from various senior British commanders in the War Office revealed that they never did expect to hold Singapore, and its purpose was a mere delaying action so that the Americans could get into the war/defend India as best as possible. If it wasn't for the Australians screaming at Churchill, the Australian 85h division that "walked into captivity" would had been deployed to Burma, a much better use.

Well, that much is true, but the Japanese were rather low on supplies towards the end, if memory served. But yes, the defence of Singapore was pretty half hearted given the poor training and equipment they had.

British forces were deficient in tanks, however, they were adequately supported in artillery and AT guns. Japanese accounts all mention the superiority of British Artillery and its weight of firepower. The problems were more of climate and training, hardly surprising when one consider that the majority of units fighting in the campaign were green. The real problem was communications. Radio and wire frequently failed in the jungle. The disastrous SOE infiltration of Thailand is a good example. They were all promptly captured by the Thai/Japanese, and the set that did evade initial capture had its comns fail. Stay behind parties success in derailing Japanese supplies were also unable to communicate their success to Singapore.

The trouble with defences was that they had to be adequately deployed. If I recall correctly, these were outmaneuvered and the Japs moved a lot faster. Static defences, unless they covered choke points, can be rendered ineffective. Throw in superior air support, these positions could be bombed to dust. I haven't really read in detail the various battles, so I'll have to go do some digging. But yes, I agree that most of the troops were incredibly green and were even running from tanks.

From what I read, the anti-tank fire was apparently quite effective (no surprise, Japanese Light tanks were simply not of the same caliber as any of the best Soviet, American or German tanks and the Battle of Khalkin-Gol in Manchuria showed as much. 37mm guns which probably were at least supplied would hole those tanks.), so you are right on that. Though eventually, as in some cases, the Japanese numerical superiority won the day, like at Muar.

There was equipment. The problem was there wasn't ships. I don't have the book available, but a professor dug through the relevant convoy shipping and showed that the British didn't have the ships neccesary to reinforce Singapore as per the Singapore Strategy. As it was, the reinforcements that did go through relied heavily on American ships, before her declearation of war.

There wasn't much and the Brits took a while to commit to a new action, which was N. Africa. As I said, everything was being withdrawn to defend the British Isles, and the Royal Navy concentrated on the Mediterranean, the Baltics and the Channel until the last 2 years of the war when it sent Force... Z or what consisting of one carrier, a few battleships and cruisers and destroyers and based at Colombo. Though that force was largely ineffective anyhow. They picked the small targets and spent most of their time playing hide and seek with the superior IJN.

Now, from some additional digging, apparently one carrier was supposed to have joined Repulse and Prince of Wales. Though I don't see that increasing the effectiveness of the Royal Navy by much given the absolute superiority of the IJN over the Royal Navy then. It would have slowed the Japanese as they'd have to commit a fleet to do the job of killing the task force, but I'd doubt it would have been impossible to sink it.

ADDENDUM: I am not entirely sure, but it's quite possible Britain didn't anticipate the Pearl Harbor attack, which probably messed up a lot of planning and gave the enemy a huge amount of initiative at the start. The idea that the British attempt to rely on American help to resupply was probably moot given the speed of advance by the Japanese in the opening months of the war, and the Americans were going to have their own problems in Philippines very soon.

PainRack wrote: This myth really needs to be addressed. The real reason for Japan eventual victory rested in the fact that she could reinforce and resupply Japanese forces faster than the British could. The war diary from various senior British commanders in the War Office revealed that they never did expect to hold Singapore, and its purpose was a mere delaying action so that the Americans could get into the war/defend India as best as possible. If it wasn't for the Australians screaming at Churchill, the Australian 85h division that "walked into captivity" would had been deployed to Burma, a much better use.

8th Division was already in Malaya prior to war being declared. You're either thinking of the 7th Division, which would have arrived in Rangoon as the city was being occupied but instead ended up as the first AIF unit on the Kokoda Track, or one of the 8th's brigades - possibly the 23rd?

Fingolfin_Noldor wrote: Considering they were willing to deploy as many as about 100 aircraft against Prince of Wales and Repulse, that puts that in doubt. The amount of effort that could be put into the Midway invasion is similar to the effort needed to destroy the guns. Of course, as I said, the simplest method available was to invade from the north which they did.

Don't switch topics. The Japanese fleet did not have the striking or logistic capabilities to launch a sustained attack required for a direct aerial attack. Especially when combined with a naval fleet and aircraft.

Well, that much is true, but the Japanese were rather low on supplies towards the end, if memory served. But yes, the defence of Singapore was pretty half hearted given the poor training and equipment they had.

Defence of Singapore half hearted? Dude...... The Indian Corps fought and retreat from Northern Malaya down to Singapore and survived as an intact unit.

The trouble with defences was that they had to be adequately deployed. If I recall correctly, these were outmaneuvered and the Japs moved a lot faster. Static defences, unless they covered choke points, can be rendered ineffective. Throw in superior air support, these positions could be bombed to dust. I haven't really read in detail the various battles, so I'll have to go do some digging. But yes, I agree that most of the troops were incredibly green and were even running from tanks.

I'm referring to the ring of fortified positions supposed to be installed in Johore, as well as Northern Singapore. Perceival was unaware of the fact that 60 thousand dollars had already been allocated to the construction of those defences prior to General Dobbie halting them. Those funds could and should had been used to hire labour to work on them. As it was, Brigadier Ivan Simson was unable to hire resources to build those defences before the field army retreated to Singapore..... Accounts from surviving prisoners detail the utter shock in morale this resulted in.

With regard to defences,a major problem was the fact that Perceival didn't allow units to withdraw until it was too late.

There wasn't much and the Brits took a while to commit to a new action, which was N. Africa. As I said, everything was being withdrawn to defend the British Isles, and the Royal Navy concentrated on the Mediterranean, the Baltics and the Channel until the last 2 years of the war when it sent Force... Z or what consisting of one carrier, a few battleships and cruisers and destroyers and based at Colombo. Though that force was largely ineffective anyhow. They picked the small targets and spent most of their time playing hide and seek with the superior IJN.

Wrong Force. Task Force Z consisted of the Repulse and Prince of Wales, with an aircraft carrier attached. You're referring to the scratch fleet built around the Revenge class battleships. That fleet was specifically mentioned to be a fleet in being.... and was utterly useless for its purpose. Churchill attempts at naval strategy in the Pacific was utterly unrealistic... since the PoW and Repulse was supposed to be a Fleet in Being, yet, they could pose no offensive threat unless the Asiatic Squadron based in Manila joined them. And of course, under Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sembawang Naval Base could not host that many capital ships under the green plan.

Now, from some additional digging, apparently one carrier was supposed to have joined Repulse and Prince of Wales. Though I don't see that increasing the effectiveness of the Royal Navy by much given the absolute superiority of the IJN over the Royal Navy then.

On the contary. The addition of a carrier with fighters COULD had changed a lot of things. For one, the British would had been able to detect the cruisers and empty transports it was heading towards before it withdrew to Singapore. A massacre would then had resulted. Similarly, the addition of a carrier might had changed Phillips tactics...... in particular, the insane addiction to maintaining radio silence so as to prevent Japanese aircraft from detecting him.... Even though he had visual sightings of a Japanese patrol craft, Phillips did not send off for aerial reinforcements from Singapore or Malaya. Granted, Kota Bahru was already under heavy attack and the RAAF squadrons needed every plane to defend its field, but with his death, we simply don't know whether that tactical consideration applied to Phillips decision to not signal for help.

It would have slowed the Japanese as they'd have to commit a fleet to do the job of killing the task force, but I'd doubt it would have been impossible to sink it.

I have to dig up the interview, but the commander of the Japanese strike force was confident that even if two patrols of Buffaloes fighters had turned up, the Japanese bombers would had sunk the ships. A interesting issue would be whether the bombers would had run out of fuel though. As it was, the majority of losses from that battle was not from AA fire, but rather from the lack of fuel as bombers crashed when RTB.

ADDENDUM: I am not entirely sure, but it's quite possible Britain didn't anticipate the Pearl Harbor attack, which probably messed up a lot of planning and gave the enemy a huge amount of initiative at the start. The idea that the British attempt to rely on American help to resupply was probably moot given the speed of advance by the Japanese in the opening months of the war, and the Americans were going to have their own problems in Philippines very soon.

It wasn't moot..... since the units that did go to Singapore relied heavily on American merchant shipping. I'm talking about the reinforcements, which relied on American transports to move in theatre. Similarly, Britain was already heavily reliant on loaning American merchant ships to meet her convoy requirements. To reiterate, what Singapore required most wasn't equipment but formations. There simply wasn't any additional formations to move into theatre, and as for hurricanes, the Cape of Good Hope convoys sucked up her excess merchant capacity.

8th Division was already in Malaya prior to war being declared. You're either thinking of the 7th Division, which would have arrived in Rangoon as the city was being occupied but instead ended up as the first AIF unit on the Kokoda Track, or one of the 8th's brigades - possibly the 23rd?

My mistake. I'm referring to one of the brigade that was slated for Burma, but redirected to Singapore just in time to enter captivity weeks later.

PainRack wrote:Don't switch topics. The Japanese fleet did not have the striking or logistic capabilities to launch a sustained attack required for a direct aerial attack. Especially when combined with a naval fleet and aircraft.

What? The IJN had up to 10 carriers with approximately 100 airplanes each stocked with bombs that could be used for such an attack which would be less complicated than even the Pearl Harbor attack. I fail to see how it was incapable of launching a strike of that variety when 6 carriers launched an attack on Pearl Harbour and sank a great many ships through dive bombing and aerial bombing. This is hardly a switch in topics since you asserted from the start that the guns actually proved to be of some use whereas I pointed out that if the Japanese really wanted to, they could have destroyed the guns altogether.

Defence of Singapore half hearted? Dude...... The Indian Corps fought and retreat from Northern Malaya down to Singapore and survived as an intact unit.

Half hearted in the sense they were given poor equipment to fight with by the British who obviously reserved their best equipment in the European theater for the obvious reasons. The only thing that saved some units from complete annihilation was probably their stubborn doggedness. If the British were really serious in defence, it would done a lot more work to make sure Singapore was a lot more better defended, like modern airplanes instead of WWI era junk?

I'm referring to the ring of fortified positions supposed to be installed in Johore, as well as Northern Singapore. Perceival was unaware of the fact that 60 thousand dollars had already been allocated to the construction of those defences prior to General Dobbie halting them. Those funds could and should had been used to hire labour to work on them. As it was, Brigadier Ivan Simson was unable to hire resources to build those defences before the field army retreated to Singapore..... Accounts from surviving prisoners detail the utter shock in morale this resulted in.


With regard to defences,a major problem was the fact that Perceival didn't allow units to withdraw until it was too late.

Probably one of the endless litanies in defence planning mistakes made prior to and during the war.

Wrong Force. Task Force Z consisted of the Repulse and Prince of Wales, with an aircraft carrier attached. You're referring to the scratch fleet built around the Revenge class battleships. That fleet was specifically mentioned to be a fleet in being.... and was utterly useless for its purpose. Churchill attempts at naval strategy in the Pacific was utterly unrealistic... since the PoW and Repulse was supposed to be a Fleet in Being, yet, they could pose no offensive threat unless the Asiatic Squadron based in Manila joined them. And of course, under Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sembawang Naval Base could not host that many capital ships under the green plan.

I said last 2 damn years damnit. It was either Force H or Force Z or some damn letter of the alphabet.

On the contary. The addition of a carrier with fighters COULD had changed a lot of things. For one, the British would had been able to detect the cruisers and empty transports it was heading towards before it withdrew to Singapore. A massacre would then had resulted. Similarly, the addition of a carrier might had changed Phillips tactics...... in particular, the insane addiction to maintaining radio silence so as to prevent Japanese aircraft from detecting him.... Even though he had visual sightings of a Japanese patrol craft, Phillips did not send off for aerial reinforcements from Singapore or Malaya. Granted, Kota Bahru was already under heavy attack and the RAAF squadrons needed every plane to defend its field, but with his death, we simply don't know whether that tactical consideration applied to Phillips decision to not signal for help.

Nonsense. A British carrier can only carry up to 40 aircraft, and the only strike aircraft they had was Swordfish bi-planes which are useless in the Pacific theater and would have been destroyed by the Japanese Fighter screen before they could even mount an attack. The British are simply outclassed technologically in the Pacific Theater. Any British carrier sent to the Pacific would have been actively sought and targeted by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft and then subsequently found and destroyed.

It wasn't moot..... since the units that did go to Singapore relied heavily on American merchant shipping. I'm talking about the reinforcements, which relied on American transports to move in theatre. Similarly, Britain was already heavily reliant on loaning American merchant ships to meet her convoy requirements. To reiterate, what Singapore required most wasn't equipment but formations. There simply wasn't any additional formations to move into theatre, and as for hurricanes, the Cape of Good Hope convoys sucked up her excess merchant capacity.

Then be more specific. I thought you were referring to supplies and what not, which one of the things they really needed anyhow. Even a squadron of Sherman tanks could have made a huge difference in the ground campaign if used well and effectively. I will agree that manpower was also sorely needed as the Japanese had numeric superiority (and superiority in other things).

Fingolfin_Noldor wrote: What? The IJN had up to 10 carriers with approximately 100 airplanes each stocked with bombs that could be used for such an attack which would be less complicated than even the Pearl Harbor attack. I fail to see how it was incapable of launching a strike of that variety when 6 carriers launched an attack on Pearl Harbour and sank a great many ships through dive bombing and aerial bombing. This is hardly a switch in topics since you asserted from the start that the guns actually proved to be of some use whereas I pointed out that if the Japanese really wanted to, they could have destroyed the guns altogether.

First of all, the Prince of Wales attack was NOT with carrier aircraft. It was with land based naval aircraft. THAT was the changing of topic I referred to. How could you compare the Japanese attack on PoW with carrier assaults on Faber and other batteries?

Secondly, other than opportunity costs, a sustained bombing campaign required supplies and transportation that the Japanese Fleet didn't organise and plan for in 1940. Look at the US pacific raids in 1941. Carrier task forces organised for raids and long range strikes don't have the sustained firepower necessary to reduce fortifications. The guns were buried underground with concrete overhead cover, resistant to air attacks. As it was, dive bomber attacks against non-existent air cover only took out 1 battery. And this was AFTER the guns had removed their concrete protection so as to achieve greater turning rates. Are you suggesting that the IJN could operate in close support for days, if not the weeks neccessary against combined naval and aerial attacks?

Probably one of the endless litanies in defence planning mistakes made prior to and during the war.

I'm going to address that myth actually...... It was a mistake, but one attributed to poor staff work and poor working relations between the various staff commands and political adminstration along with a bad sense of strategy/tactics. Not Perceival "It would lower morale".

I said last 2 damn years damnit. It was either Force H or Force Z or some damn letter of the alphabet.

Errr...... I didn't point out anything with regards to last two years or anything. I merely elaborated on the force at Colombo. Force H was the task force built around Vice Admiral Sommerville Warspite. Albeit, Sommerville participated in the Indian Ocean Raid as the Admiral of the Eastern Fleet. However, it was actually much more powerful too, since he had two fast carriers attached.

Nonsense. A British carrier can only carry up to 40 aircraft, and the only strike aircraft they had was Swordfish bi-planes which are useless in the Pacific theater and would have been destroyed by the Japanese Fighter screen before they could even mount an attack. The British are simply outclassed technologically in the Pacific Theater. Any British carrier sent to the Pacific would have been actively sought and targeted by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft and then subsequently found and destroyed.

The attack on PoW had little fighter escort, and more importantly, their only neccessity was to "hold" off Japanese attacks. By the time Japanese aircraft detected them, they were already low on fuel.
As I also said, the additional recon forces might had detected the cruiser and transport force and destroyed them, as opposed to turning back.

Then be more specific. I thought you were referring to supplies and what not, which one of the things they really needed anyhow. Even a squadron of Sherman tanks could have made a huge difference in the ground campaign if used well and effectively. I will agree that manpower was also sorely needed as the Japanese had numeric superiority (and superiority in other things).

How was I not specific enough?

There was equipment. The problem was there wasn't ships. I don't have the book available, but a professor dug through the relevant convoy shipping and showed that the British didn't have the ships neccesary to reinforce Singapore as per the Singapore Strategy. As it was, the reinforcements that did go through relied heavily on American ships, before her declearation of war.

I mentioned that the British had ships, but they didn't have the ships to move them to Singapore. To show this point, I pointed out they used American shis to move existing units.

As for numerical superiority..... that depends on how you count it. In terms of a field army, the British had more troops. The issue was they were scattered due to the need to defend everywhere.(The Johore line vs the Northern states line)

Fingolfin_Noldor wrote:What? The IJN had up to 10 carriers with approximately 100 airplanes each stocked with bombs that could be used for such an attack which would be less complicated than even the Pearl Harbor attack. I fail to see how it was incapable of launching a strike of that variety when 6 carriers launched an attack on Pearl Harbour and sank a great many ships through dive bombing and aerial bombing. This is hardly a switch in topics since you asserted from the start that the guns actually proved to be of some use whereas I pointed out that if the Japanese really wanted to, they could have destroyed the guns altogether.

I don't see how the situation is analogous, at all. First of all, the IJN has seven carriers of varying types, none of which carry 100 aircraft. Furthermore, the Pearl Harbor raid sunk the Pacific Fleet's battle-line when they were totally unprepared sitting ducks, when the air-defenses were virtually unmanned and when there was no fighter opposition. Singapore will almost certainly be different. In addition, it is incredibly unlikely that the IJN will commit all their carriers: they have other things to do. And as Painrack noted, they're virtually impotent against decent fortifications.

Nonsense. A British carrier can only carry up to 40 aircraft, and the only strike aircraft they had was Swordfish bi-planes which are useless in the Pacific theater and would have been destroyed by the Japanese Fighter screen before they could even mount an attack. The British are simply outclassed technologically in the Pacific Theater. Any British carrier sent to the Pacific would have been actively sought and targeted by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft and then subsequently found and destroyed.

You make it sound like identifying a carrier force is easy in WW2. It's not, especially a relatively small one. And the RN taskforce just has to break up an attack, it doesn't have to shoot every incoming airplane down to improve the chances of survival.

phongn wrote:I don't see how the situation is analogous, at all. First of all, the IJN has seven carriers of varying types, none of which carry 100 aircraft. Furthermore, the Pearl Harbor raid sunk the Pacific Fleet's battle-line when they were totally unprepared sitting ducks, when the air-defenses were virtually unmanned and when there was no fighter opposition. Singapore will almost certainly be different. In addition, it is incredibly unlikely that the IJN will commit all their carriers: they have other things to do. And as Painrack noted, they're virtually impotent against decent fortifications.

My mistake. I thought it was close to a hundred, though it seems normally much lower. Most of the guns were exposed and could be destroyed with bombs, and some were destroyed. The 15" guns that were there weren't exactly buried in the ground but housed in concrete. Quite likely a bombing would have damaged the guns or at least knock them off alignment and cripple them.

A number of the guns were given at most a concrete cover which can be destroyed. One gun had its concrete cover destroyed. So no, not impossible to immobilise/cripple any of the guns.

You make it sound like identifying a carrier force is easy in WW2. It's not, especially a relatively small one. And the RN taskforce just has to break up an attack, it doesn't have to shoot every incoming airplane down to improve the chances of survival.

Even if difficult, if the fleet has to scatter every damn time it sights an airplane, how is it going to carry out its mission and collect back its aircraft without breaking radio silence? As it was, when Sommerville headed a carrier fleet late in the war, it had to pick its targets and quickly get away. At one point of time, they were nearly attacked by Nagumo, but Nagumo turned away for some other mission. I would also point out that the search area for the British ships should they linger in the Straits of Malacca or the South China Sea is smaller than the area around Midway.

PainRack wrote:First of all, the Prince of Wales attack was NOT with carrier aircraft. It was with land based naval aircraft. THAT was the changing of topic I referred to. How could you compare the Japanese attack on PoW with carrier assaults on Faber and other batteries?

Since when did Mount Faber have any gun batteries? I do know that land based naval aircraft were used to destroy Force Z.

Secondly, other than opportunity costs, a sustained bombing campaign required supplies and transportation that the Japanese Fleet didn't organise and plan for in 1940. Look at the US pacific raids in 1941. Carrier task forces organised for raids and long range strikes don't have the sustained firepower necessary to reduce fortifications. The guns were buried underground with concrete overhead cover, resistant to air attacks. As it was, dive bomber attacks against non-existent air cover only took out 1 battery. And this was AFTER the guns had removed their concrete protection so as to achieve greater turning rates. Are you suggesting that the IJN could operate in close support for days, if not the weeks neccessary against combined naval and aerial attacks?

I'm going to concede on this point, though if this website: http://www.fortsiloso.com/history/1919.htm is correct, most of the guns were given concrete cover only and one gun at Serapong had its concrete cover destroyed by a bomb. So if the Japs really wanted to, it could have destroyed some of those guns with or without their concrete cover.

I'm going to address that myth actually...... It was a mistake, but one attributed to poor staff work and poor working relations between the various staff commands and political adminstration along with a bad sense of strategy/tactics. Not Perceival "It would lower morale".

The attack on PoW had little fighter escort, and more importantly, their only neccessity was to "hold" off Japanese attacks. By the time Japanese aircraft detected them, they were already low on fuel.
As I also said, the additional recon forces might had detected the cruiser and transport force and destroyed them, as opposed to turning back.

Alright.

How was I not specific enough?

I had thought by "reinforcements", you meant equipment and supplies, which the British sorely needed if they were going to hold off the Japanese.

I mentioned that the British had ships, but they didn't have the ships to move them to Singapore. To show this point, I pointed out they used American shis to move existing units.

Ok, possible, but incredibly difficult. The German U-boats were operating the Mediterranean, and it's possible the Germans could have found and destroyed the convoy.

As for numerical superiority..... that depends on how you count it. In terms of a field army, the British had more troops. The issue was they were scattered due to the need to defend everywhere.(The Johore line vs the Northern states line)

The whole point of tactics is to apply numeric superiority at the right locations after all.

Fingolfin_Noldor wrote:[
My mistake. I thought it was close to a hundred, though it seems normally much lower. Most of the guns were exposed and could be destroyed with bombs, and some were destroyed. The 15" guns that were there weren't exactly buried in the ground but housed in concrete. Quite likely a bombing would have damaged the guns or at least knock them off alignment and cripple them.

Actually, only 1 battery of guns were destroyed by air attack. A good number of the guns survived the ongoing campaign, and their last fire mission was to destroy various British installations before surrender.

And again, this was AFTER they removed their concrete protection so as to achieve greater turning rates.

Since when did Mount Faber have any gun batteries? I do know that land based naval aircraft were used to destroy Force Z.

Faber command.

Two new Fire Commands would control the sea approaches to Singapore, Changi and Faber. Changi Command would cover the eastern approaches to Singapore and the proposed naval base, and Faber Command would protect the southern and western approaches to Singapore.

Your very own website link.

I'm going to concede on this point, though if this website: http://www.fortsiloso.com/history/1919.htm is correct, most of the guns were given concrete cover only and one gun at Serapong had its concrete cover destroyed by a bomb. So if the Japs really wanted to, it could have destroyed some of those guns with or without their concrete cover.

A sustained bombing campaign against NO air cover did that.
As for underground, are you nuts? The Siloso Fort itself had its guns underground. There's even a full section there called Why Underground?

Similarly, the Battle Box, Connaught Battery were also underground. There was various batteries such as the fort defending the Singapore River, as well as IIRC Changi battery which was aboveground. Which incidently points to the problems I stated for the guns. The guns were built on top of old British plans to defend the Singapore Settlement. That meant that a goodly number of guns were out of position to defend the naval base.

I had thought by "reinforcements", you meant equipment and supplies, which the British sorely needed if they were going to hold off the Japanese.

Why? Its not as if existing units weren't already equipped with AT guns and artillery. The problem was they needed newer formations. For aircraft, they needed more aircrew and newer aircraft.

Also, let me repeat myself. How on earth was my statement ambigous? I in no way stated that the British was counting on American help which didn't arrive. I stated explictly that they were short of ships, and one of the examples of this was them resorting to hiring Americain ships to move in reinforcements.

Ok, possible, but incredibly difficult. The German U-boats were operating the Mediterranean, and it's possible the Germans could have found and destroyed the convoy.

Ahem. The Cape of Good Hope. That was one of the key issues with the Singapore Strategy. The addenmum made was that reinforcements from overseas would help hold onto the base. However, the loss of the Mediterran destroyed the existing reinforcement chain from Britain.

Even if difficult, if the fleet has to scatter every damn time it sights an airplane, how is it going to carry out its mission and collect back its aircraft without breaking radio silence? As it was, when Sommerville headed a carrier fleet late in the war, it had to pick its targets and quickly get away. At one point of time, they were nearly attacked by Nagumo, but Nagumo turned away for some other mission. I would also point out that the search area for the British ships should they linger in the Straits of Malacca or the South China Sea is smaller than the area around Midway.

Errr..... the search area was huge. Task Force Z was operating from Kauntan to the South China Seas and this was the area they searched under. In particular, the strike force was off-course primarily because one of their planes had reported the ships position wrongly due to the large distances involved.

And they simply didn't need to scatter. For example, if the fighter had managed to intercept the recon plane, something eminently possible, no aerial attack would had been launched. The fleet would had have no effect on the Malayan campaign however, since it simply wasn't reliant on ships..... At best, it would had disrupted Japanese right amphibious hooks and also allowed Rose Force to be more effective(The 5 Fast patrol craft were destroyed by Japanese air attacks after the first commando raid)

Fingolfin_Noldor wrote:Even if difficult, if the fleet has to scatter every damn time it sights an airplane, how is it going to carry out its mission and collect back its aircraft without breaking radio silence?

Why, precisely, would the hypothetical carrier taskgroup scatter? That'd take away the advantages of mutually supporting AA fire, and leave them to be defeated in detail.

As it was, when Sommerville headed a carrier fleet late in the war, it had to pick its targets and quickly get away. At one point of time, they were nearly attacked by Nagumo, but Nagumo turned away for some other mission.

Eh? Somerville never commanded the Far Eastern/British Pacific Fleet's aircraft carrier squadron - that job fell to Adm. Vian, of 4th Destroyer Flotilla fame. If you're referring to the force Somerville commanded in March-April of 1942, then I would think it obvious why Somerville declined to match Nagumo's six fleet carriers with two of his own, especially given the extremely hastily assembled nature of Somerville's force.

Black Admiral wrote:Why, precisely, would the hypothetical carrier taskgroup scatter? That'd take away the advantages of mutually supporting AA fire, and leave them to be defeated in detail.

I meant to run off as a group like what Sommerville did.

Eh? Somerville never commanded the Far Eastern/British Pacific Fleet's aircraft carrier squadron - that job fell to Adm. Vian, of 4th Destroyer Flotilla fame. If you're referring to the force Somerville commanded in March-April of 1942, then I would think it obvious why Somerville declined to match Nagumo's six fleet carriers with two of his own, especially given the extremely hastily assembled nature of Somerville's force.

That is the fore I was referring to. Yes. Should have realised that it was before the Battle of Midway. And yes, the idea of Somerville challenging Nagumo would be quite simply suicidal.

PainRack wrote:

Fingolfin_Noldor wrote: My mistake. I thought it was close to a hundred, though it seems normally much lower. Most of the guns were exposed and could be destroyed with bombs, and some were destroyed. The 15" guns that were there weren't exactly buried in the ground but housed in concrete. Quite likely a bombing would have damaged the guns or at least knock them off alignment and cripple them.

Actually, only 1 battery of guns were destroyed by air attack. A good number of the guns survived the ongoing campaign, and their last fire mission was to destroy various British installations before surrender.

And again, this was AFTER they removed their concrete protection so as to achieve greater turning rates.

Conceeded.

Since when did Mount Faber have any gun batteries? I do know that land based naval aircraft were used to destroy Force Z.

Faber command.

Two new Fire Commands would control the sea approaches to Singapore, Changi and Faber. Changi Command would cover the eastern approaches to Singapore and the proposed naval base, and Faber Command would protect the southern and western approaches to Singapore.

Your very own website link.

Fire control or guns? The weblink had some 18-19 sites but none of them had marked Faber as a site of guns.

A sustained bombing campaign against NO air cover did that.
As for underground, are you nuts? The Siloso Fort itself had its guns underground. There's even a full section there called Why Underground?

Similarly, the Battle Box, Connaught Battery were also underground. There was various batteries such as the fort defending the Singapore River, as well as IIRC Changi battery which was aboveground. Which incidently points to the problems I stated for the guns. The guns were built on top of old British plans to defend the Singapore Settlement. That meant that a goodly number of guns were out of position to defend the naval base.

Conceeded, though there wasn't much of an air cover towards the end because all air assets were destroyed.

Why? Its not as if existing units weren't already equipped with AT guns and artillery. The problem was they needed newer formations. For aircraft, they needed more aircrew and newer aircraft.

By equipment, I also meant aircraft and the necessary manpower to run them. I concede they have the weapons to defend, though they somehow allowed the Japs to penetrate a weak point some how.

Also, let me repeat myself. How on earth was my statement ambigous? I in no way stated that the British was counting on American help which didn't arrive. I stated explictly that they were short of ships, and one of the examples of this was them resorting to hiring Americain ships to move in reinforcements.

I thought you meant American ships moving supplies from America itself and not going heck of a long route through the Atlantic dodging U-boats and going down a very long route that I think is about 1-2weeks long just to get to Singapore.

Ahem. The Cape of Good Hope. That was one of the key issues with the Singapore Strategy. The addenmum made was that reinforcements from overseas would help hold onto the base. However, the loss of the Mediterran destroyed the existing reinforcement chain from Britain.

Well, I did say the Mediterranean would prove an immerse difficulty, and there are U-boats also in the Atlantic which may spot the convoy and well, the rest is history.

Errr..... the search area was huge. Task Force Z was operating from Kauntan to the South China Seas and this was the area they searched under. In particular, the strike force was off-course primarily because one of their planes had reported the ships position wrongly due to the large distances involved.

The issue is, that Japanese if I recall, had airfields in Thailand and that itself puts a limitation. They cannot go too far north, but stay close the shores of Malaysia to look out for any signs of Japanese invasion landing craft. If they go too far north, there is a danger of getting spotted. I guess they could move towards Borneo but they might miss any invasion force coming from Thailand.

And they simply didn't need to scatter. For example, if the fighter had managed to intercept the recon plane, something eminently possible, no aerial attack would had been launched. The fleet would had have no effect on the Malayan campaign however, since it simply wasn't reliant on ships..... At best, it would had disrupted Japanese right amphibious hooks and also allowed Rose Force to be more effective(The 5 Fast patrol craft were destroyed by Japanese air attacks after the first commando raid)

If the recon plane gets off a message on the location of the fleet before it gets destroyed, the fleet has to head down south. This element of doubt will bedevil planning. There isn't a lot of room to maneuver here.

Fingolfin_Noldor wrote: Fire control or guns? The weblink had some 18-19 sites but none of them had marked Faber as a site of guns.

Faber command was not at Mount faber, same as how Connaught Battery was not at Connaught Road. I have to dig up a modern day map but its in the general area. And for some odd reason, my gif files of the gun batteries are now missing.............

The issue is, that Japanese if I recall, had airfields in Thailand and that itself puts a limitation.

Indo-china.

They cannot go too far north, but stay close the shores of Malaysia to look out for any signs of Japanese invasion landing craft. If they go too far north, there is a danger of getting spotted. I guess they could move towards Borneo but they might miss any invasion force coming from Thailand.

Errr........ I don't understand.

If the recon plane gets off a message on the location of the fleet before it gets destroyed, the fleet has to head down south. This element of doubt will bedevil planning. There isn't a lot of room to maneuver here.

Historically, the fleet DID head south after the sighting.The fatal mistake made was when Phillips turned towards Kuantan after he received reports that enemy forces had landed there. Again, any of this might had been averted if an carrier had been available. Similarly, the British fleet might had been able to do some real good if an intergral airforce had sighted the Japanese cruiser convoy.

The vaunted RAF/RAAF units in Malaya.
Squadron/Type/Number/CO
62 / Blenheim I (B) / 11 / Wing Commander J Duncan

21 / Buffalo / 12 / Squadron Leader W F Alghorn (RAAF)

26 / Blenheim (F) / 12 / Squadron Leader F R C Fowle

1 / Hudson / 12 / Wing Commander R H Davis (RAAF)

60 / Blenheim I (B) / 8 / Wing Commander H I. Vivian

8 / Hudson / 12 / Wing Commander F N Wright (RAAF)

36 / Wildebeests / 12 / Wing Commander R N McKern

34 / Blenheim IV / 16 / Wing Commander Longfield G P Longfield

243 and 488 / Buffalo / 32 / Wing Commander G B M Bell (OC 243 of Wing with Squadron Leader W G Coulston as OC 488)


453 / Buffalo / 16 / Squadron Leader W J Harper


100 / Wildebeests / 12 / Wing Commander A W D Miller


205 / Catalina / 3 / Wing Commander I. W Burgess



vs

Japanese 3rd Guard Division= 146 fighters, 172 bombers and 36 reconnaissance aircraft, total 354.

22nd Naval Air Force= 36 fighters, 138 bombers, 6 reconnaissance planes and 30 flying boats.


A significant portion of the naval air force did not fight in Singapore or Malaya. A good number of bombers for example was lost/required repairs after the strike on PoW and Repulse. Therefore, the main aerial combatent was actually the Japanese Army Airforce..


Therefore, the myth that Zeros played a significant reason in the defeat of Singapore is disproven. The main fighter plane of the Malayan skies were the Ki-43 Hayabusa, otherwise known as Oscar. That explains how 30 hurricane planes, with at best 12 operational at any time was able to punch above their weight in the final days of Singapore, although operational conditions as well as early withdrawal prevented them from playing any tactical role in Java/Sumatra.

Hurricanes would play a more significant role in Burma, especially after they were rebuilt to fight in tropical conditions.
(Source, Rehearsal for War by Ban Kan Choon, Yap Hong Kuan, 2002, Horizon Books Pte Ltd, Singapore)

According to Simsons memoirs, written after Percival death, one of the reason why Perceival fobbed off his demand that defences be rapidly constructed in Johore and the northern coasts of Singapore after the Japanese were threatening Kuala Lumpur was the fact that "this would be bad for morale"

While similar statements about morale had been made by other British officials such as Shenton Thomas, they were made particulary with regards to the evacuation of Penang and abandoning of British positions without a fight or alternately, the disturbance of civil services by military preparations.

It is highly unlikely however that Percival did say such a statement. For one, we have no other record of Percival having made this statement. Consider that this is the man who insisted that the British launch an immediate counter-attack during the last days of the Singapore Seige, ignoring the massive morale and order problems caused by the lack of water, food and routed units.

Secondly, on Dec 28th, Percival send a command directive ordering and hastening the construction of fortifications and the benefit this would had on their position. While it did not specifically mention the northern coasts of Singapore, it would suggest that Perceival did not simply dismiss the value of fortifications based on a "over the shoulder" belief.

Lastly, Simsoms himself states that Percival ultimately allows him to approach the Fortress Commander Simmons for the authorisation to construct fortifications in Singapore. While this smacks of Pontius Pilate and the handing off of a nuisance to another commander, again, no official mention of low morale is in existence in the surviving records.


So what are we to make of this dismissal of Simsoms plan to build foritifactions on the northern coast of Singapore? We would never really know, but it is true that fortifications works in Singapore occurred only in the southern coast, even during the desperate months of December and January. Percival comments on defences addressed mostly the issues of lack of fortifications after Dobbie plan was dismissed and his efforts to redress this lack prior to the campaign.

The best guess would be that Percival was vulnerable to his weak position as a commander and his "mission" to defend Singapore as far north as possible. The plan to defend Malaya rested on two pillars
- The Singapore Strategy, which was never formally abandoned.
- The forward plan, in which air units would smash incoming Japanese forces while Army forces protect their neccessary bases and infrastructure.
Matador was devised as an afterthought, to buy "more" time for further reinforcements, so that the variant of the Singapore Strategy, in which reinforcements would flow into Singapore from across the Empire to fend off the Japs.

Percival planned the battle of Jitra and his orders to Heath were clear. That even though they still held other port, Singapore contained most of the foodstocks, infrastructure and materials neccessary for the Malayan campaign, and given the high degree of AA protection, his preference that military stocks be unloaded at Sembawang Naval Base. Since the British had essentially no other plans for defending the Malayan campaign other than Matador and air forward campaign, other than a half crafted, semi-abandoned plan to defend norther Johore along the Mersing and other lines from a Japanese amphibious attack(in which Percival committed Australian forces to despite the disaster in the north), its entirely possible that defensive plans to defend the northern coast was viewed as Percival as unimportant given the scale of the campaign up north. The need to deny aerodomes as far away from Singapore in particular made Kualar Lumpur and the area relatively important, this even after the airbridge with India had been broken after the loss of Penang.

I always figured the British never bothered to fortify the north shore because they simply had a thoroughly inefficient command structure that saw no point to seemingly wasted effort on what could only be a short delaying position before the ultimate surrender.

Really, the north shore is just not very viable and I’m sure the British brass knew it, since they all would have studied Port Author in at least some point in there careers. The naval base would be totally useless, positioned as it was to be safe from naval attacks, and even mere 105mm Japanese guns could bombard every point on the island. Reinforcement or evacuation during a protracted siege would be extremely difficult, even if the RN somehow could have retained naval superiority, something it clearly did not have at the time.

The huge civilian population would suffer immensely, and a serious risk would exist that Japanese shelling would put the water system out of operation. As it was the island had its population doubled to a million by refuges during the battle which already heavily strained its services. None of this would matter to a German, Russian or Japanese commander, but for the western allies it would be unthinkable to ignore it.

The reality is anyway the defence of the entire south East Asian region was hopeless given the available resources, and every reinforcement committed was a waste. The ultimate Japanese timetable for the conquest was not delayed a single day by allied resistance.

Sea Skimmer wrote:I always figured the British never bothered to fortify the north shore because they simply had a thoroughly inefficient command structure that saw no point to seemingly wasted effort on what could only be a short delaying position before the ultimate surrender.

Well.... That depends on the perspective. It has been said that the expection by senior British military commanders of the Malayan/Singapore campaign was to simply buy time, bogging down Japanese forces until America comes in and save the day. Brooke Popham in particular argued that no further forces be sent to Singapore, with reinforcements flowing to bases in Java and Sumatra. Similarly, the "diverted" reinforcement to Burma which was reversed.

However, the field army under Heath and Bennet definitely had different hopes. In their opinion, the battles in Northern Malaya up to Johore were mere skirmishes, meant to screen Singapore, and contemporary account by lesser officers mention how they felt that they were to "escape" into Singapore like a fort. This is reflected in the orders that Percival sent, which continously attempted to hold untenable positions for far too long, causing outlier units to be cut off and destroyed.

The huge civilian population would suffer immensely, and a serious risk would exist that Japanese shelling would put the water system out of operation. As it was the island had its population doubled to a million by refuges during the battle which already heavily strained its services. None of this would matter to a German, Russian or Japanese commander, but for the western allies it would be unthinkable to ignore it.

I presumed you mean the population had several hundred thousands added to it, instead of doubled? Since the existing SS populace was a million.

The reality is anyway the defence of the entire south East Asian region was hopeless given the available resources, and every reinforcement committed was a waste. The ultimate Japanese timetable for the conquest was not delayed a single day by allied resistance.

Well. 3 days:D

Although this might be arguably the effect of 3rd Air Group diversion to invade Sumatra than British resistance. However, even this amphibious assault served the campaign in Singapore, as Percival commited his forces to defend the southern and eastern coasts due to the fear of an amphibious attack. Which ultimately means that the guns and fortifications were of no value whatsoever, since significant numbers of British soldiers were still committed to defend the South.

PainRack wrote: Well.... That depends on the perspective. It has been said that the expection by senior British military commanders of the Malayan/Singapore campaign was to simply buy time, bogging down Japanese forces until America comes in and save the day. Brooke Popham in particular argued that no further forces be sent to Singapore, with reinforcements flowing to bases in Java and Sumatra. Similarly, the "diverted" reinforcement to Burma which was reversed.

I’ve been thinking about Burma a lot recently, I wonder if ALL British reinforcements had gone to Burma, if they couldn’t well have held Rangoon. Failure to secure Burma would have place the right flank of the entire Japanese war empire in jeopardy. It might realistically have led to the recapture of Malay within 1-2 years and would have negated the Japanese the ability to expand strongly into New Guinea and the Solomon’s.

However, the field army under Heath and Bennet definitely had different hopes. In their opinion, the battles in Northern Malaya up to Johore were mere skirmishes, meant to screen Singapore, and contemporary account by lesser officers mention how they felt that they were to "escape" into Singapore like a fort. This is reflected in the orders that Percival sent, which continously attempted to hold untenable positions for far too long, causing outlier units to be cut off and destroyed.

Well that just points to the systematic failings of the British military system in Malay and its near utter lack of training for large scale operations. Once it was hit with a solid crack of a Japanese Army (a big Corps really) it was going to crumble before it could respond properly.

A defence might have been better rallied at Singapore, but repulsing one Japanese attack would have bought little respite. I suspect that even with extensive fortifications in place the initial Japanese amphibious assault would have succeeded anyway.

I presumed you mean the population had several hundred thousands added to it, instead of doubled? Since the existing SS populace was a million.

I thought it was in the range of 500-600,000 actually, with refuges totaling an estimated 500,000. I decided to say a million because odds are the refugee numbers are not accurate at all.

The following link says 769 million
http://www.populstat.info/Asia/singapoc.htm

Well. 3 days:D

Although this might be arguably the effect of 3rd Air Group diversion to invade Sumatra than British resistance. However, even this amphibious assault served the campaign in Singapore, as Percival commited his forces to defend the southern and eastern coasts due to the fear of an amphibious attack. Which ultimately means that the guns and fortifications were of no value whatsoever, since significant numbers of British soldiers were still committed to defend the South.

What days do you mean specifically? I was and am under the belief that despite some specific delays within operations, such as the Java Sea Battle forcing back the landing on Java 24 hours, that the Japanese ultimately did accomplish all of its First Stage Objectives on time, excluding maybe Operation C, the Indian Ocean carrier riad, which was the formal end to First Stage Operations but which was also considered a separate operation at the same time.

As for Singapore, another serious burden on the defence was the need to cover against airborne landings. Crete had just happened a few months before and Singapore would be a logical place to try the trick again, its too bad the British didn’t and couldn’t reasonably know just how small Japanese airborne force were

I want to clear up a few things on the issue of my favorite sort of artillery weapon; coast artillery. It was absurd how long it took me (this was some time ago) to find decent information on the batteries at first.

PainRack wrote: However, while the guns did participate in battery missions, they WERE facing the wrong way. The issue would rest in the use of those guns, their history and its use in the Singapore Strategy. The original history of the guns were emplaced in the late 80s due to the threat of French and Dutch forces in the area. To provide "low" cost defences(Singapore was an enterpot settlement with no taxation), the British emplaced a few guns at Fort Siloso, Canning and other sites. Those guns protected the settlement from any direct naval invasion from foreign forces. The Japanese threat caused a review and expansion of those guns.

The existing batteries in the 1920s had 6in and a few 9.2in guns for counter bombardment, which dated to the predreadnought era and an entirely lower class of naval threat. Some kind of upgrade was necessary if Singapore wasn’t always going to have the British fleet close at hand for its defence as seemed likely.

Post Jutland cruisers and battleships, besides the potential threat of monitors (which Britain had used extensively to bombard even very heavily defended German positions in the Flanders) could simply stand off and pound the city into rubble. Even the inland located naval base would be at risk, if the enemy could come within 10,000 yards of shore, which previously would have been about the limit for effective gunfire at all.

The main upgrade was thus five 15in guns, three of which had had revolving mountings that could make three revolutions either way from a center point before needing to go back the other way. The other batteries guns had 270 degree arcs of fire as I recall, they had a dumb reason why that was. The 15in gun is the exact same model as those on British battleships, so it was a relatively cheap weapon as far as giant pieces of artillery go.

About 15 other major guns got added, 9.2in and mostly 6in, plus some 4in, 12pdr and 6pdr guns for direct fire against enemy small craft. This isn’t exactly overwhelming firepower for an investment made over about 15 years, but combined with the existing batteries it was enough to make any direct Japanese naval attack an unacceptable challenge. The guns had more then just deterrence value.

Big problem was, almost all the ammunition supplied for weapons heavier then 6in was APC and thus almost useless against infantry, the smaller guns meanwhile simply couldn’t have that much effect across such a wide frontage. Ammunition stock were also not very large, the supply was based on the needs of coast defence, not fighting a siege.

Its also interesting to note that the British went so far as to build concrete pillboxes along the sea front to protect coast guns from being overrun by surprise landings, a step also taken by US coast artillery defenses on Oahu and at Manila Bay, which underwent similar bare bones long range upgrades in the 1930s but overall had much more artillery.

Overall if Singapore had not been fortified with coast artillery the money spent on other equipment would have made no difference, it would have been far too little spent too early and on items without lasting value. No airplane built before about 1935 for example had any real value in WW2, and a top quality plane in 1941 almost had to have been built during the war in light of constant improvements.

Sea Skimmer wrote: Overall if Singapore had not been fortified with coast artillery the money spent on other equipment would have made no difference, it would have been far too little spent too early and on items without lasting value. No airplane built before about 1935 for example had any real value in WW2, and a top quality plane in 1941 almost had to have been built during the war in light of constant improvements.

What about completing the defensive plans in Johore started under General Dobbie?

Well by the time Dobbie showed up most of the coast defenses had already been built, and the guns for the remaining batteries were already on order.

Building a worthwhile land defence in peacetime would not be very practical, it would use up too much land in an area that’s all plantations (you looking at a 45 mile perimeter minimal which needs at least 1000 yard fields of fire) and be quite expensive to upkeep. The money spent on coast guns is just not going to go very far under those circumstances you’d be luckily to get a single line of semi suicidal front firing pillboxes out of it.

Field fortifications could have easily been built to defend Johore in just a few months prior to the Japanese attack, and had it been a priority a lot of work could have been done even after the Japanese landed, but the British just didn’t even try. Under those circumstances having a weak land defence line might just make everything worse. If the available forces couldn’t stop an amphibious landing on Singapore, then they sure aren’t sure going to be able to hold a larger perimeter with no natural obstacles even if it did have a few man made ones. Even more men would have to cover the sea coast then historical since it would be almost totally wide open to Japanese attacks. The result would likely be the British simply make the last stand on Johore and get too chewed up to even try to make a last stand on Singapore. After all they'd be stuck retreating across a single causeway under fire.

Remember too that at Hong Kong Britain DID put its money into a strong land defence in the 1930s, called the Gin Drinkers Line, and it wasn’t even a speed bump to the Japanese despite the rough terrain and short perimeter. In fact the line was broken when a single Japanese platoon climbed Tai Mo Shan mountain and captured the British redoubt at the summit, the strongest work in the fortifications.

I missed this bit.

Sea Skimmer wrote: What days do you mean specifically? I was and am under the belief that despite some specific delays within operations, such as the Java Sea Battle forcing back the landing on Java 24 hours, that the Japanese ultimately did accomplish all of its First Stage Objectives on time, excluding maybe Operation C, the Indian Ocean carrier riad, which was the formal end to First Stage Operations but which was also considered a separate operation at the same time.

The target date for the fall of Singapore was February 11, a major holiday in Japan and a political coup for Yamashita if he had succeeded.

I'm not a trained military historian, but to me, it always feel as if the Malayan Campaign was fought the best the British could strategically, but they screwed up in every way tactically and on the minute level due to the level of strategic resources and attention the British Empire could send to the region.

As for population, I note that the data you provided says that the Singapore settlement had 700,000 people. Refugees added the existing population to over 1.2 million from what I read, although I don't have the source handy to check.
I do question the accuracy of the data though, since Singapore City shrank in population during the war years, as the population moved into the surrounding countryside to forage for food.