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Initially central direction meant direction from land headquarters. However, the big 'Okean' exercise of 1970 apparently demonstrated that no such central direction could be altogether satisfactory. The Soviets therefore decided to decentralize: in most cases seagoing flagships would control groups of ships and, in some cases, aircraft The flagships themselves would enjoy data-link communication with headquarters ashore.

From the late 1960s on, the Soviets developed a series of computer combat direction systems broadly comparable to Western ones such as the US NTDS and the British ADAWS, but reflecting their own concerns. These 'Second Captains' form a link between the commanding officer and the ship's weapons systems. The computer forms a compiled tactical picture and applies Soviet-style doctrinal rules to it to determine an optimum course of action. In the earliest version (in the carrier Moskva and the submarine tender/flagship Volga) output was in textual form, and the command saw only a Second World War-style grease pencil compiled plot. Modern 'Second Captains' provide synthetic video on a bridge or command centre (BIP, battle information post) work station. The 'Second Captain' differed dramatically from its Western counterparts in that it embodied a series of tactical rules (a very Soviet idea) and in that it preferred advice (and recorded deviations therefrom).

Only very recently have some Western combat direction systems incorporated tactical advice, and even then it is clearly advice rather than instruction. More generally, Western users would have considered the capacity of Soviet command system computers insufficient to carry both a complex tactical picture and data from which advice could be developed. Presumably the Soviets did not expect any individual ship to have to cope with so much information. Very unlike a Western combat direction system, the 'Second Captain' seems to devote little effort to sorting out data from alternative sources. Target identification is probably mainly by ESM, the data from which pass through the 'Second Captain'.

The main effect of emphasising tactical doctrine (which was the case throughout the Soviet military) was presumably a rigidity foreign to Western navies. When 'Second Captains' first appeared, a senior Soviet officer was said to bemoan the likely loss of nearly all initiative; he was probably right. In a very pessimistic society, doctrine is always welcome, because the individual following it faithfully cannot be blamed for tactical failure.

Roughly contemporary with the first 'Second Captains' were the first group ASW systems, in which a group of ships were linked to fire their long-range mortars (RBU-6000s) together into an area in which a computer (fed by their sonars) determined a submarine was to be found. The 'Fig Jar' data link initially commanded sub-chasers from shore; in the mid-1960s the computer moved out to sea.

These two ideas came together. In the 1970 'Okean' exercise the Soviets tested their new naval technologies, including the early 'Second Captains' and long-range anti-ship missiles. They found that direct command from ashore was impractical: turn-around time for information was far too long. They needed some intermediate command level, a sort of flagship. Like the distributed RBU-6000 system, this one would use a data link: it would collect information from the ships of the group, then send them commands. The commands would go to their 'Second Captains', which would pass them on to the ships' weapon systems. The new system might be called a 'Second Admiral'.

Much the same idea, of remotely controlling a ship's weapons, was applied to coastal units carrying anti-ship missiles. A 'Tarantul' does not bave a computer, but its missile fire control system can accept commands via a one-way data link. The link allows a shore command post to concentrate the fire of several boats against a single target.

In 1970 the Soviet Navy was concerned with two distinct surface-ship missions, attacking ships (which might be called the rocket cruiser, or RKR, role) and strategic ASW (mainly pro-SSBN, or PSW). It quickly developed 'Second Admirals' for each role. They were tested on board two Sverdlov class cruisers: Zhdanov for RKR, Admiral Senyavin for PSW. These ships were tested in the 'Okean' 1975 exercise. Specially-built flagships followed: the Kirov class for RKR, the Kiev class for PSW (the latter were modified from an existing design, hangar space being surrendered for 'Second Admiral' facilities).

Eventually the 'Second Captain' and higher-level concepts were considerably extended. For example, the 'Second Captain' on board a 'Bear F Mod 4 maritime patrol aircraft can control surface units. As designed, the Kuznetzov command system was expected to accept radar data from the ship's fighters - and to order them to fire their air-to-air missiles. Submarines now incorporate 'Second Captains' (and, reportedly, combat direction systems copied from some Western ones) and some of them act as brigade flagships.

The 'Second Captain' had very visible consequences for Soviet surface warship design. Typically a ship has one long-range radar feeding it directly. Air targets chosen on the basis of its tactical picture are passed to the ship's weapon system, which has its own shorter-range search radar. It is apparently not the case, as many have imagined, that the pairing of long- and short-range radars reflects fear that the primary unit may fail; they have different purposes. The recent Sovremennyy class is unique in having only a single air search set, whose picture is presumably shared by the ship's 'Second Captain' and her weapons systems.

MKSheppard wrote:Excerpted from Conway's 1947-1997; I felt that this was important enough to discuss outside of HAB - since this has quite interesting implications across a lot of disciplines, and helps us understand the Soviet Navy's late Cold War doctrine.

Initially central direction meant direction from land headquarters. However, the big 'Okean' exercise of 1970 apparently demonstrated that no such central direction could be altogether satisfactory. The Soviets therefore decided to decentralize: in most cases seagoing flagships would control groups of ships and, in some cases, aircraft The flagships themselves would enjoy data-link communication with headquarters ashore.

From the late 1960s on, the Soviets developed a series of computer combat direction systems broadly comparable to Western ones such as the US NTDS and the British ADAWS, but reflecting their own concerns. These 'Second Captains' form a link between the commanding officer and the ship's weapons systems. The computer forms a compiled tactical picture and applies Soviet-style doctrinal rules to it to determine an optimum course of action. In the earliest version (in the carrier Moskva and the submarine tender/flagship Volga) output was in textual form, and the command saw only a Second World War-style grease pencil compiled plot. Modern 'Second Captains' provide synthetic video on a bridge or command centre (BIP, battle information post) work station. The 'Second Captain' differed dramatically from its Western counterparts in that it embodied a series of tactical rules (a very Soviet idea) and in that it preferred advice (and recorded deviations therefrom).

Only very recently have some Western combat direction systems incorporated tactical advice, and even then it is clearly advice rather than instruction. More generally, Western users would have considered the capacity of Soviet command system computers insufficient to carry both a complex tactical picture and data from which advice could be developed. Presumably the Soviets did not expect any individual ship to have to cope with so much information. Very unlike a Western combat direction system, the 'Second Captain' seems to devote little effort to sorting out data from alternative sources. Target identification is probably mainly by ESM, the data from which pass through the 'Second Captain'.

The main effect of emphasising tactical doctrine (which was the case throughout the Soviet military) was presumably a rigidity foreign to Western navies. When 'Second Captains' first appeared, a senior Soviet officer was said to bemoan the likely loss of nearly all initiative; he was probably right. In a very pessimistic society, doctrine is always welcome, because the individual following it faithfully cannot be blamed for tactical failure.

Roughly contemporary with the first 'Second Captains' were the first group ASW systems, in which a group of ships were linked to fire their long-range mortars (RBU-6000s) together into an area in which a computer (fed by their sonars) determined a submarine was to be found. The 'Fig Jar' data link initially commanded sub-chasers from shore; in the mid-1960s the computer moved out to sea.

These two ideas came together. In the 1970 'Okean' exercise the Soviets tested their new naval technologies, including the early 'Second Captains' and long-range anti-ship missiles. They found that direct command from ashore was impractical: turn-around time for information was far too long. They needed some intermediate command level, a sort of flagship. Like the distributed RBU-6000 system, this one would use a data link: it would collect information from the ships of the group, then send them commands. The commands would go to their 'Second Captains', which would pass them on to the ships' weapon systems. The new system might be called a 'Second Admiral'.

Much the same idea, of remotely controlling a ship's weapons, was applied to coastal units carrying anti-ship missiles. A 'Tarantul' does not bave a computer, but its missile fire control system can accept commands via a one-way data link. The link allows a shore command post to concentrate the fire of several boats against a single target.

In 1970 the Soviet Navy was concerned with two distinct surface-ship missions, attacking ships (which might be called the rocket cruiser, or RKR, role) and strategic ASW (mainly pro-SSBN, or PSW). It quickly developed 'Second Admirals' for each role. They were tested on board two Sverdlov class cruisers: Zhdanov for RKR, Admiral Senyavin for PSW. These ships were tested in the 'Okean' 1975 exercise. Specially-built flagships followed: the Kirov class for RKR, the Kiev class for PSW (the latter were modified from an existing design, hangar space being surrendered for 'Second Admiral' facilities).

Eventually the 'Second Captain' and higher-level concepts were considerably extended. For example, the 'Second Captain' on board a 'Bear F Mod 4 maritime patrol aircraft can control surface units. As designed, the Kuznetzov command system was expected to accept radar data from the ship's fighters - and to order them to fire their air-to-air missiles. Submarines now incorporate 'Second Captains' (and, reportedly, combat direction systems copied from some Western ones) and some of them act as brigade flagships.

The 'Second Captain' had very visible consequences for Soviet surface warship design. Typically a ship has one long-range radar feeding it directly. Air targets chosen on the basis of its tactical picture are passed to the ship's weapon system, which has its own shorter-range search radar. It is apparently not the case, as many have imagined, that the pairing of long- and short-range radars reflects fear that the primary unit may fail; they have different purposes. The recent Sovremennyy class is unique in having only a single air search set, whose picture is presumably shared by the ship's 'Second Captain' and her weapons systems.

Stuart wrote:From about 2001, much better data came out and now we have got an idea of just what was correct and what wasn't. If you ger Norman's World Naval Weapons Systems, 5th Edition, it has a much better and more accuarte account.